Humorous Political Stunts: Nonviolent Public Challenges to Power by Sorensen, Majken Jul
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
University of Wollongong Thesis Collection 
1954-2016 University of Wollongong Thesis Collections 
2014 
Humorous Political Stunts: Nonviolent Public Challenges to Power 
Majken Jul Sorensen 
University of Wollongong 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses 
University of Wollongong 
Copyright Warning 
You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose of your own research or study. The University 
does not authorise you to copy, communicate or otherwise make available electronically to any other person any 
copyright material contained on this site. 
You are reminded of the following: This work is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 
1968, no part of this work may be reproduced by any process, nor may any other exclusive right be exercised, 
without the permission of the author. Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe 
their copyright. A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a copyright infringement. A court 
may impose penalties and award damages in relation to offences and infringements relating to copyright material. 
Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, for offences and infringements involving the 
conversion of material into digital or electronic form. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent the views of the University of Wollongong. 
Recommended Citation 
Sorensen, Majken Jul, Humorous Political Stunts: Nonviolent Public Challenges to Power, Doctor of 
Philosophy thesis, School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, University of Wollongong, 2014. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/4291 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
1 
 
Humorous 
Political 
Stunts 
 
Nonviolent Public 
Challenges to Power 
 
 
 
 
  
S c h o o l  o f  H u m a n i t i e s  a n d  
S o c i a l  I n q u i r y  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  W o l l o n g o n g  
A u s t r a l i a  
2 0 1 4  
 
Majken Jul Sørensen 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the 
requirements for the award of the degree   
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Humorous Political Stunts 
Nonviolent Public Challenges to Power 
 
 
 
  
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the 
requirements for the award of the degree 
 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
 
from 
 
UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG, AUSTRALIA 
 
by 
 
Majken Jul Sørensen, MA 
 
School of Humanities and Social Inquiry 
 
August 2014 
  
3 
 
Thesis Certification  
I, Majken Jul Sørensen, declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the 
requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy, in the School of Humanities 
and Social Inquiry, University of Wollongong, Australia, is wholly my own work 
unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. The document has not been 
submitted for qualifications at any other academic institution.  
 
 
Majken Jul Sørensen 
28 August 2014 
Publications in support of this thesis 
Sørensen, Majken Jul. "Humor as a Serious Strategy of Nonviolent Resistance to 
Oppression." Peace & Change 33, no. 2 (2008): 167-90. 
Sørensen, Majken Jul. "Humorous Political Stunts: Speaking ’Truth’ to Power?". 
European Journal of Humour Research 1, no. 2 (2013). 
Sørensen, Majken Jul, and Brian Martin. "The Dilemma Action: Analysis of an 
Activist Technique." Peace & Change 39 no. 1 (2014): 73-100.  
Sørensen, Majken Jul "Radical Clowning - Challenging Militarism through Play and 
Otherness" HUMOR: International Journal of Humor Research (in press). 
A small part of the text in chapters 3,4,6 and 7 is a slightly modified version of 
some of the text that appeared in these articles.  
  
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Howard Clark 
  
5 
 
Abbreviated table of contents 
List of abbreviations and organisations…………………………………………15 
Note on translations ……………………………………………………………………..16 
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………17 
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………..19 
Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………….22 
Chapter 1: Nonviolence, humour and relations of power…………….…29 
Chapter 2: A methodology for emancipation and social change …..108 
Chapter 3: Humorous political stunts ………………………………………….153 
Chapter 4: Radical clowning as humorous political activism ………245 
Chapter 5: Ofog - playful anti-militarist mischief ………………………..293 
Chapter 6: Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt – combining legal and 
spectacular actions……………………………………………………………………...374 
Chapter 7: Humorous political stunts and relations of power……..457 
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………….491 
References…………………………………………………………………………………..508 
  
6 
 
Contents 
 
List of abbreviations and organisations ...................... 15 
Note on translations ........................................................... 16 
Abstract .................................................................................. 17 
Acknowledgements ............................................................ 19 
Introduction .......................................................................... 22 
Thesis outline and guiding questions ................................................................. 23 
Dreaming about a better world ........................................................................... 27 
Chapter 1: Nonviolence, humour and relations of 
power ...................................................................................... 29 
Introduction ........................................................................................................ 29 
Literature on nonviolence ................................................................................... 30 
Defining violence and nonviolence ..................................................................... 31 
Gandhi: Nonviolence as a way of life ................................................................. 34 
Sharp: A pioneer for a pragmatic approach to nonviolent action ........................ 37 
Vinthagen: Four dimensions of nonviolence ....................................................... 44 
Dialogue facilitation ......................................................................................... 45 
Power breaking ............................................................................................... 45 
7 
 
Utopian enactment .......................................................................................... 47 
Normative regulation ....................................................................................... 49 
Attitudes to humour in research on nonviolence................................................. 50 
Humour research ................................................................................................ 51 
Defining humour ................................................................................................. 54 
Sociological theory on humour ........................................................................... 56 
Humour, politics, protest and social conflict........................................................ 61 
Political jokes .................................................................................................. 62 
Traditional folly ................................................................................................ 66 
Humour in occupations and dictatorships ....................................................... 69 
Humour, power and gender ............................................................................ 74 
Organisational theory and humour .................................................................. 77 
Humour as nonviolent resistance .................................................................... 80 
Culture jamming, pranks and tactical carnival ................................................. 90 
Power, resistance, activism and discourse ......................................................... 99 
Humour and ethics ........................................................................................... 102 
Conclusion........................................................................................................ 105 
Chapter 2: A methodology for emancipation and 
social change ...................................................................... 108 
Introduction....................................................................................................... 108 
8 
 
Data collection – a case study strategy ............................................................ 108 
Selection of cases ............................................................................................ 110 
Data collection process for the case study with Ofog ....................................... 112 
Participatory action research ........................................................................ 113 
Participant observation ................................................................................. 121 
Semi-structured interviews ........................................................................... 125 
The development of the research process .................................................... 128 
Other methods .............................................................................................. 133 
Data collection process for the case study on KMV ......................................... 134 
Newspaper reports of KMV’s activities ......................................................... 134 
KMV documents ........................................................................................... 136 
Interviews ..................................................................................................... 137 
Official documents ........................................................................................ 140 
Epistemological assumptions ........................................................................... 140 
Research and power ........................................................................................ 148 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 151 
Chapter 3: Humorous political stunts ........................ 153 
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 153 
Defining humorous political stunts .................................................................... 154 
9 
 
Analysing humorous political stunts as “play of politics” ................................... 157 
Supportive Humorous Stunts............................................................................ 168 
John Howard Ladies’ Auxiliary Fan Club ...................................................... 169 
Mark Thomas’ PR training for dictatorships .................................................. 171 
Searching for landmines at the Belgian bank AXA ....................................... 175 
Confronting power through support .............................................................. 176 
Corrective Humorous Stunts ............................................................................ 179 
The Yes Men: Hijacking WTO and Dow........................................................ 180 
ACE bank for ethical investments ................................................................. 185 
Confronting power by correcting it ................................................................ 186 
Naïve Humorous Stunts ................................................................................... 189 
Innocent advertising during the Nazi occupation of Denmark ....................... 190 
Donating blood to avoid bloodshed in Serbia ................................................ 191 
Poland – taking the TV for a walk ................................................................. 191 
Santas hand out gifts from the shop shelves ................................................ 192 
Confronting power with naiveté ..................................................................... 195 
Absurd Humorous Stunts ................................................................................. 199 
Poland’s Orange Alternative ......................................................................... 199 
CIRCA – Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army ..................................... 202 
10 
 
Confronting power with absurdity ................................................................. 203 
Provocative Humorous Stunts .......................................................................... 206 
Otpor: Dinar za Smenu ................................................................................. 207 
Voina: Insulting bridge painting ..................................................................... 208 
Teddy bears over Belarus ............................................................................. 209 
Confronting power with provocation.............................................................. 213 
Stunts overlapping different categories ............................................................ 217 
The diversity of humorous political stunts ......................................................... 221 
Humorous political stunts and the play of politics ............................................. 223 
The borders of the humorous political stunt ..................................................... 231 
Do humorous political stunts really make a difference? ................................... 238 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 241 
Chapter 4: Radical clowning as humorous political 
activism ............................................................................... 245 
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 245 
Radical clowning with Ofog .............................................................................. 245 
Peacock’s clown theory .................................................................................... 249 
Play ............................................................................................................... 251 
Otherness ..................................................................................................... 256 
Incompetence ............................................................................................... 259 
11 
 
Ridicule ......................................................................................................... 261 
Analysis: Clowning the way to hearts and minds? ............................................ 263 
Facilitating outreach and mobilisation ........................................................... 264 
Facilitating a culture of resistance ................................................................. 269 
Challenging power relations on the ground................................................... 271 
Clowning – an absurd humorous political stunt ............................................. 282 
Play, otherness, ridicule and theory of nonviolent action .............................. 286 
Conclusion........................................................................................................ 289 
Chapter 5: Ofog - playful anti-militarist mischief ... 293 
Introduction....................................................................................................... 293 
The anti-militarist network Ofog ........................................................................ 294 
Civil disobedience ............................................................................................ 296 
Ofog activists and activities .............................................................................. 298 
Ofog’s public humour ....................................................................................... 300 
Reality AB ..................................................................................................... 301 
Refining recruitment ads from the armed forces ........................................... 303 
Ironic posters and flyers ................................................................................ 307 
War Starts Here ............................................................................................ 311 
Britta’s ladies gym against NEAT 2012 ......................................................... 314 
12 
 
Svensk Vapenfadder – Swedish weapon sponsors ...................................... 317 
Speech bubbles at the Pride Parade ............................................................ 330 
Summing up on Ofog’s public humour ............................................................. 337 
Analysis: Humour in political activism............................................................... 339 
Facilitating outreach ...................................................................................... 340 
Facilitating mobilisation ................................................................................. 345 
Facilitating a culture of resistance ................................................................ 348 
Challenging power relations through discursive guerrilla war ....................... 354 
Artificial distinction between humorous and other creative actions ............... 358 
Risky humour ................................................................................................ 359 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 368 
Chapter 6: Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt – combining 
legal and spectacular actions ....................................... 374 
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 374 
The launch of KMV ........................................................................................... 375 
Who were the total resisters? ........................................................................... 378 
KMV’s strategy ................................................................................................. 384 
Creating a spectacle ..................................................................................... 385 
Using the courts ............................................................................................ 407 
Solidarity ....................................................................................................... 415 
13 
 
Lobbying and participating in the public debate ............................................ 422 
The legal procedures that changed the law ...................................................... 423 
Changing §1 ................................................................................................. 426 
Changing §§19 and 20 ................................................................................. 428 
Analysis: The role of humour within a campaign .............................................. 432 
From silence to spectacle ............................................................................. 432 
The role of the humorous political stunts ...................................................... 438 
KMV and the courts ...................................................................................... 442 
The role of other factors ................................................................................ 447 
Dissolving KMV ................................................................................................ 450 
The impact of KMV ........................................................................................... 451 
Conclusion........................................................................................................ 453 
Chapter 7: Humorous political stunts and relations of 
power .................................................................................... 457 
Introduction....................................................................................................... 457 
How to evaluate the impact of humorous political stunts? ................................ 458 
Impact on outreach and mobilisation ............................................................ 461 
Impact on cultures of resistance ................................................................... 463 
Impact on challenging relations of power ...................................................... 465 
The model of humorous political stunts revisited .............................................. 471 
14 
 
Humour and Vinthagen’s four dimensions of nonviolent action ........................ 476 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 488 
Conclusion .......................................................................... 491 
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 491 
Humour, power and nonviolent resistance ....................................................... 491 
Humorous political stunts and the power of nonviolence.................................. 493 
The case studies about Ofog and KMV ............................................................ 497 
The risks and limitations with humorous political stunts ................................... 502 
Further research in the field ............................................................................. 505 
References .......................................................................... 508 
 
  
15 
 
List of abbreviations and organisations 
CIRCA: See Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army. 
Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army: Clown group originating in Britain 
that has inspired many activist groups. 
The Chaser team: Australian comedy team, responsible for the APEC stunt in 
Sydney in 2007 among many other things. 
FMK: Folkereisning Mot Krig, Norwegian pacifist peace organisation originating in 
1937. 
FMV: Försvarets materielverk (Swedish Defence Materiel Administration), operates 
NEAT/Vidsel Test Range. 
John Howard Ladies’ Auxiliary Fan Club: Australian group originating in 2004 to 
challenge Australia’s conservative prime minister from 1996 to 2007, John Howard. 
Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt: (The Campaign Against Conscription) Scandinavian 
network originating in 1981, primarily concerned with the conditions of total 
resisters.  
KMV: See Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt.  
Netwerk Vlaanderen: Belgian network concerned with responsible banking. 
Organised the ACE bank stunt and the demining action against AXA bank.  
NEAT: See Vidsel Test Range.  
Ofog: Swedish anti-militarist network originating in 2002. The name roughly 
translates into “mischief”.  
Orange Alternative: Polish organisation active in the 1980’s, among many 
happenings responsible for bringing elves to life on Children’s day in 1987. 
Otpor: Serbian network originating in 1998, responsible for the Dinar za Smenu 
action among many other stunts. 
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S.I.N: Samvittighetsfanger I Norge (Prisoners of Conscience in Norway). Loose 
network that cooperated with Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt. 
Solvognen: Danish experimental theatre group which organised the Santa action 
in Copenhagen 1974. 
Studio Total: Swedish PR company which organised the dropping of teddy bears 
over Belarus in 2012. 
Vidsel Test Range: Europe’s largest overland military test site, located in the north 
of Sweden. Administered by the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV). 
Formerly known as NEAT, North European Aerospace Test range.  
Voina: Russian art collective, responsible for painting a giant penis on Liteiny 
Bridge in St. Petersburg in 2010. 
Yes Men: US activist group specialising in “identity correction” and responsible for 
impersonating representatives of Dow Chemicals and the World Trade 
Organisation among many other stunts.  
Note on translations 
All translations of quotes, article titles, concepts etc. originally appearing in Danish, 
Swedish and Norwegian are done by me. 
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Abstract 
Humour and seriousness are frequently posed as opposites both in academia and 
everyday language. However, some nonviolent actions are both humorous and 
serious and living proof that the dichotomy misses an important type of humour. 
These humorous political stunts publicly challenge dominant discourses and 
powerful institutions and people in five distinct ways. 1. Supportive stunts are 
framed as ostensible attempts to help, celebrate and protect from harm. 2. 
Corrective stunts present an alternative version of dominant discourses by 
hijacking the identity or message of people, companies and institutions. 3. Naïve 
stunts disguise their critique behind a pretended innocence, and 4. absurd stunts 
defy all claims to truth and rationality. In 5. provocative stunts the pranksters 
transcend power by appearing not to care about the consequences of infuriating 
the powerful. The particular dynamics of these five strategies are explored through 
15 short examples covering everything from struggles against neo-liberalism and 
controversial bank investments to dictatorships. A theatre metaphor further 
illustrates how humorous political stunts can be analysed. 
The nuances about relations of power and humour uncovered by this typology 
illustrate why it is inadequate to discuss whether humour should be considered 
subversive or a vent for frustration as has been debated within humour studies for 
decades. Instead the interesting question is what role humour can play in 
facilitating resistance, since political humour is so diverse and takes place in such 
different contexts that it is misleading to evaluate its impact as if it is all the same. 
Two in-depth case studies are the basis for the further exploration of humour and 
nonviolent action. Inspired by participatory action research methodology, the study 
has utilised archival material, media reports, interviews, workshops, and participant 
observation to document and analyse the use of humour by the groups Ofog and 
KMV.  
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Ofog is a Swedish anti-militarist network working on issues related to the arms 
industry, military recruitment and military test sites. Ofog activists have found the 
use of humour to be a positive way to reach out to media, passers-by and potential 
new activists. Even more important is humorous political stunts’ contribution to the 
discursive guerrilla war waged by activists. Power does not just manifest itself in 
brutal repression and exploitation, but also in dominant discourses about what is 
true, right and just. In this struggle, humorous incongruity can deconstruct patterns 
of domination through the use of exposure, exaggeration, parody and irony among 
many other techniques.  
Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt, KMV, was a Scandinavian campaign against 
conscription active in the 1980s. Here the focus is the work for improving the 
conditions for Norwegian total resisters who refused both military and alternative 
service. KMV pursued different strategies in its work, one of which was to create a 
spectacle around court hearings and imprisonments, including several humorous 
political stunts. Together with the legal work of filing charges against the state for 
violation of their human rights, KMV’s spectacular actions were crucial in changing 
the law on conscientious objection.   
The phenomenon of humorous political stunts is discussed in relation to 
Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolent action and its four dimensions. Just like other 
nonviolent actions, some stunts are strong in one dimension while others mainly 
work in another. Almost all the stunts temporarily contribute to breaking power and 
many also include a dialogue facilitation element. The absurd and naïve stunts 
have demonstrated a particular ability to be part of utopian enactment and 
normative regulation, since Santas, clowns and similar figures speak to people’s 
imagination and hopes for a more just and peaceful world. 
Analysing humorous political stunts can give both academics and activists insights 
into what type of stunt is most likely to emphasise a certain aspect of a humorous 
nonviolent action in relation to various audiences. It will also bring a deeper 
understanding of the nature and dynamics of power, resistance and humour.   
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Introduction 
What happens when nonviolent political activists use humour to challenge those 
they consider more powerful than themselves? What does it mean to the activists, 
and what types of responses do the use of humour generate from opponents, 
media, police, bystanders and other activists?  
These questions first started to interest me in 2003 when a Serbian activist told me 
about his experience with using humour to oppose the rule of the Serbian dictator 
Slobodan Milošević. According to the young man who had been active in a group 
called Otpor, humour had been an effective way to make Otpor different from other 
opposition groups and attract new young activists. Humour also lowered levels of 
fear and created situations it was difficult for the regime to find an adequate 
response to. 
My primary focus is how subordinate and marginalised political groups use humour 
to expose, ridicule and influence those they consider more powerful than 
themselves, both in dictatorships and in democracies. It is explorative research that 
raises more questions than it answers.  
There is an inherent contradiction in trying to use the rational mode of 
communication to analyse expressions made in the humorous mode. In the 
discourse of science and research ambiguity is usually treated as an undesired 
anomaly, but in the humorous political stunts which are my main unit of analysis, 
the ambiguities are a necessity. In addition, humour is fragile and loses much of its 
edge and special flavour as soon as one starts to analyse it and tear it apart. 
Anyone who has ever tried to explain a joke will know what I mean.  
When I have mentioned the theme of this thesis, I have been met with two types of 
reactions. So called “ordinary people” and political activists have generally reacted 
with enthusiasm and believed political humour to be a useful tool. I have enjoyed 
the privilege that my research area turned out to be a good topic for dinner 
conversations, including with people I met for the first time. Most of these “ordinary 
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people” share the view that is prevalent in many societies – that humour is 
something positive and valuable in human interaction. They have no doubt that 
humour can have an effect on politics and rarely question the more troublesome 
sides of humour. However, in the literature on humour, it has for decades been a 
persistent claim that humour cannot “really” have an impact on relations of power, 
and that it is “just” a way of letting off steam. This discrepancy between an 
everyday understanding and part of the scholarly work on humour indicates that 
here is an interesting research question that deserves more attention. In addition, 
such different views are not just interesting from a theoretical point of view, but can 
have implications for the decisions activists struggling for a better world make 
about which methods to use.  
The data I have relied on indicate that the positions of unbridled optimism and 
strong scepticism are both inadequate, and that the reality of real world activism is 
complex. It is not straightforward to use humour in order to achieve political change 
and it can be extremely difficult to convey the message that activists want to send 
to the intended audiences. The sceptic’s idea that humour cannot really change 
anything might look simple, but begs a whole set of questions about what “real 
change” is, and how one is to know when it has happened. It assumes the 
existence of a neutral position from which to judge an outcome. This idea about 
“real change” usually also implies a comparison with other types of political dissent, 
which the sceptic considers more genuine. What this ideal type of resistance ought 
to look like is not clear to me, so I do not know if by “real resistance” they mean 
conventional, rational protest or a violent struggle. The only thing that is obvious is 
that dichotomous views on power and resistance cannot accommodate the 
complexities needed to understand what happens when marginalised political 
activists use humour within campaigns of nonviolent resistance. 
Thesis outline and guiding questions 
I have approached the theme of humour, political activism and relations of power 
from various angles and with a range of different methods. I consider it quite naïve 
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to expect humour alone to be able to dismantle powerful institutions and 
discourses, so the question is not whether humour can change relations of power. 
Instead, the question that has guided my research has been:  
What role can humour play in facilitating resistance to dominant discourses 
and powerful institutions and people?  
In order to approach this question, it was logical to start with investigating: 
1. What does existing research on nonviolence, power, humour and political 
protest say about the role of humour in resistance to dominant discourses 
and powerful institutions and people?  
This is the subject of chapter 1, which begins by outlining theories of nonviolence, 
identifying the two different but overlapping traditions of principled and pragmatic 
approaches to nonviolence. It continues with an introduction to societal theories on 
humour, and in particular the humour that is used to express protest and dissent. 
Central concepts such as power, resistance, nonviolence and humour are defined 
here. 
Chapter 2 explains how the examples and cases in Chapter 3-6 were selected and 
how the research strategy was designed. The methods of semi-structured 
interviewing, participant observation and document analysis that I have used are 
also explained. The chapter places the thesis within an emancipatory approach to 
research, taking its point of departure in standpoint theory and participatory action 
research oriented strategies.   
Chapter 3 introduces the phenomenon of humorous political stunts, a concept I 
have developed to distinguish public humorous performances that challenge 
relations of power from other types of political humour. Taking all the findings from 
existing research on nonviolence, power, humour and political protest into 
consideration requires one to abandon thinking that implies that humour is “one 
thing” and instead take its complexities into account and ask:   
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2. What different types of humorous political stunts exist?  
In chapter 3, 15 examples of humorous political stunts serve to show the diversity 
of the phenomenon and develop an original typology of five different types of stunts 
called supportive, corrective, naïve, absurd and provocative. The defining 
characteristic of this contribution is the way the stunt relates to the truths and 
rationalities upheld by people in positions of power. 
In order to explore the phenomenon of humorous political stunts in more detail, I 
have been guided by another two questions: 
3. What role can humorous political stunts play in facilitating outreach, 
mobilisation, and a culture of resistance?  
 
4. What does the use of humour mean to those who perform humorous 
political stunts? 
These questions are primarily addressed in the two case studies in chapter 4-6. 
Chapter 4 is about clowning, one particular version of the absurd stunt that a 
number of activists have used. The chapter is based on interviews with people 
from the anti-militarist network Ofog in Sweden and the findings suggest that 
clowning opens up space and communicates nonviolent values.  
Chapter 5 is an in-depth case study of how Ofog uses and perceives outward 
directed humour. It is based on 2½ years of research inspired by participatory 
action research methodology that I did together with the network. Experiences from 
a number of humorous political stunts confronting military recruitment, military test 
sites and arms production are discussed in relation to the model presented in 
Chapter 3. The chapter also discusses ethical aspects of using humour.  
Chapter 6 is an historical case study of the Scandinavian Kampanjen Mot 
Verneplikt (KMV), which means “Campaign Against Conscription”. Throughout the 
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1980s the group challenged militarism by refusing both military and substitute 
service, when a growing number of young men chose to become so-called total 
resisters. In Norway the consequence of total resistance was 16 months in prison. 
One of the campaign’s strategies was to use spectacular and sometimes 
humorous actions in order to challenge this law. The chapter traces how humorous 
and non-humorous elements in the campaign complemented each other and finally 
resulted in a law change in 1990. Since humour was only one factor among several 
others, humour is not the only focus in this chapter. I also investigate in detail the 
legal work KMV did and the particular circumstances surrounding the law change.  
For the two case studies on Ofog and KMV I have chosen to make a thorough 
documentation of the humour used by the two groups. Not all the details are 
necessary in order to present my arguments about humorous political stunts but I 
consider it important to contribute to documenting their experiences, since these 
two groups have not had any part of their history written elsewhere. 
Chapter 7 both addresses the overall question of what role humour can play in 
facilitating resistance to dominant discourses and powerful institutions and people, 
and one specific question related to this: 
5. How do the different forms of humorous political stunts affect the logic of a 
nonviolent action?  
This question is approached by identifying how the five types of humorous political 
stunts relate to the four dimensions of nonviolence called dialogue facilitation, 
power breaking, utopian enactment and normative regulations. The existing data 
show that the humorous political stunt has its strength in its possibility to break 
monopolies of power, for instance when it contributes to what I call the discursive 
guerrilla war about who is to define what is true, right and just. In certain cases 
humorous political stunts can also contribute to dialogue and serve as an utopian 
enactment and regulate norms.  
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Dreaming about a better world 
Some humorous political stunts appeal to reason and logic after having taken a 
detour, but many appeal more to emotions and the multiple meanings and truths 
that exist simultaneously in the world. Stephen Duncombe in his book Dream calls 
for progressives to make more use of imagination and speak to people’s fantasies 
when they do politics.1 Humorous political stunts are one answer to this. 
Duncombe argues that Enlightenment was once a progressive dream, but in 
democracies progressives now need bigger dreams that can speak to people’s 
longing for drama and spectacle if they want to seriously challenge the dominant 
world order. Appealing to reason, logic, restraint and moderation the way many 
social movements working on issues like climate change and global justice do 
today is doomed to fail. Duncombe writes that “truth and power belong to those 
who tell the better story”.2 His book illustrates vividly how desires and dreams are 
manufactured and constructed, not a self-evident constant that can be taken for 
granted.  
Duncombe does not consider himself a postmodern provocateur claiming there is 
no truth. On the contrary he is very firmly grounded in the reality of an unjust world 
order that causes early death and suffering for many. However, it does not matter 
that this is the truth, and that that this truth is available for people to know, if they 
don’t care or don’t want to believe it. The consequence is that if progressives want 
to reach the hearts and minds of people, truth and reason are not enough: they 
need to speak to the imagination as well. Duncombe suggests looking to places 
like Las Vegas and popular video games and analysing what is so attractive about 
them. What type of desires do they promise to fulfil, and what spectacles can 
progressives offer instead that appeal to the same desires? Duncombe is very 
critical of the dreams sold in Las Vegas and violent video games, but suggests that 
                                            
1
 Stephen Duncombe, Dream: Re-Imagining Progressive Politics in an Age of Fantasy (New York: 
New Press, 2007). 
2
 Duncombe, Dream: Re-Imagining Progressive Politics in an Age of Fantasy: p. 8. 
28 
 
progressives have to let go of their fear of the spectacle and find ways to make 
their own participatory spectacles that can make people dream. Duncombe almost 
echoes peace researcher Elise Boulding in her book Cultures of Peace3 when he 
suggests that “without dreams we will never be able to imagine the new world we 
want to build.”4 With stories of the Reclaim the Street movement and Billionaires 
for Bush, stunts and carnival within the same tradition as the humorous political 
stunts presented here, he also points towards a possibility, a potential for these 
types of stunts to become bigger. What they offer, like Las Vegas and video 
games, is a possibility to participate, to be active, to be involved. And as 
Duncombe finishes his introduction: “To embrace dreams as part of a winning 
strategy for progressive politics may be just a dream itself, but really, at this point, 
what do we have to lose?”5  
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Chapter 1: Nonviolence, humour and relations of 
power 
Introduction 
Two different academic traditions are brought together to provide the background 
for this thesis. Within peace studies, nonviolence is a field which investigates 
alternatives to violence in the struggle for social change. To illustrate the dynamics 
of nonviolent struggle I present two very different approaches. Mohandas K. 
Gandhi, leader of the Indian struggle against the British colonial power, personifies 
the idea of nonviolence as a way of life, an idea nonviolent scholar Gene Sharp 
argues against. His academic writing concentrates on explaining nonviolence as a 
technique which is available as an effective tool for everyone and where moral 
principles are irrelevant. The introduction to literature on nonviolence is concluded 
with the theory of Stellan Vinthagen which combines ideas from Gandhi and Sharp 
with modern sociology to provide new insights on nonviolent resistance.  
The other academic tradition relevant to discussing humour as a method of 
challenging power relations is humour studies. This is also a multidisciplinary field 
that has caught the interest of psychologists, sociologists and a number of other 
disciplines. I primarily focus on the social aspects of humour. After a brief 
introduction to the various ways of understanding humour’s role in society and the 
sociology of humour developed in the incongruity tradition, I suggest that part of 
the traditional definition of humour is problematic when it comes to political 
humour, since it treats the humorous and the serious as opposites.  
The major part of the literature review in this chapter focuses on the research done 
on humour, protest and social conflicts. It covers a wide range of approaches 
including traditional folly and humour used against occupations and employers. 
Along the way I evaluate and comment on a number of the works presented. 
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Literature on nonviolence 
Nonviolent resistance to injustice has been carried out for centuries without any 
academic analysis. Literature on the subject is a combination of practitioners’ own 
descriptions of what they have done and others’ descriptions and analysis. 
Recently it has become part of the academic discipline of peace studies. Much 
literature on the subject consists of case descriptions of particular struggles 
combined with some theory or strategic discussion, like Nonviolent Social 
Movements: a Geographical Perspective edited by Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, 
and Sarah Beth Asher,6 Unarmed against Hitler: Civilian Resistance in Europe, 
1939-1943 by Jacques Semelin,7A Force More Powerful by Peter Ackerman and 
Jack Duvall,8 Strategic Nonviolent Conflict by Peter Ackerman and Christopher 
Kruegler,9 Waging Nonviolent Struggle by  Gene Sharp with Joshua Paulson,10 and 
Sharon E. Nepstad’s  Nonviolent revolutions.11 Sometimes other terms are used for 
the same or very similar phenomena, such as “people power”, or “civil resistance” 
in People Power edited by Howard Clark12 and Civil Resistance and Power Politics 
edited by Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash.13 In his book Unarmed 
Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies Kurt Schock  
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combines nonviolent theory with social movement theory.14 In a recent study, Erica 
Chenoweth and Maria Stephan have convincingly shown how nonviolent 
campaigning is more effective than armed struggle in achieving its goals.15 They 
have compared 323 violent and nonviolent campaigns between 1900 and 2006, 
and found that nonviolent campaigns were “nearly twice as likely to achieve full or 
partial success as their violent counterparts”.16 They have deliberately looked 
specifically at three types of resistance where “common sense” says that violence 
will be more effective than nonviolence – anti-regime, anti-occupation and 
secession. Nevertheless, even in these hard cases, nonviolent campaigns are 
more likely to achieve their goals. Chenoweth and Stephan’s main explanations for 
the relative success of nonviolent resistance are that it generally is more 
participatory than violent insurrections, and therefore better can build broad 
movements where everyone can participate. Nonviolence also increases the 
chance that security forces will defect. 
The Indian independence movement and the US civil rights movement are two of 
the most documented and analysed nonviolent struggles, but numerous other 
examples of campaigns and actions all around the world exist. For a while, various 
terms such as “civil defence”, “social defence” and “civilian based defence” were 
used to describe defence against invasion and occupation where nonviolence 
played a major role. 
Defining violence and nonviolence  
Many definitions of violence exist, I find the definition developed by peace 
researcher Johan Galtung useful. He distinguishes between direct, structural and 
cultural violence. Direct violence is the intentional harm or threat of harm of other 
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human beings. This can be killings or other physical attacks. When I use the term 
violence alone, this is the type of violence I refer to. Structural violence is when an 
unjust system harms people, for instance if they die early because of lack of food, 
clean water, and sanitation. Frequently I will refer to structural violence as 
injustice.17 Cultural violence is the belief systems which make it possible to uphold 
the unjust structures or legitimise direct and structural violence.18  
When it comes to nonviolence I find Stellan Vinthagen’s definition useful. He 
defines a nonviolent action as an attempt to overcome violence and repression 
without using any violence yourself.19 This definition has two aspects, which he 
calls against-violence and without-violence. To take action without using violence 
(without-violence) does not by itself make it nonviolence. People can sit outside 
their parliament and enjoy the sun. That is an everyday event that has nothing to 
do with nonviolence even if it happens without violence. But if they sit there and 
make it visible that this is a protest against the government’s use of violence, for 
example the wars it is waging, then it is a nonviolent action. They do it without 
using violence, in order to confront someone else’s violence (against-violence). 
Nonviolent actions can take many different forms; some well-known examples are 
strikes, boycotts and acts of civil disobedience. Nonviolent actions have been used 
in struggles as diverse as anti-militarism, civil rights and environmental protection 
as well as against dictatorships and foreign occupations. Although some authors 
consider the two terms nonviolence and nonviolent action to imply a different 
ideological or philosophical approach20, I use all the forms of the word nonviolence 
interchangeably.  
                                            
17
 This distinction between direct and structural violence was first made by Johan Galtung, 
"Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969). 
18
 Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization 
(London Sage Publications, 1996). 
19
 Stellan Vinthagen, Ickevåldsaktion: En Social Praktik Av Motstånd Och Konstruktion (Göteborg: 
Institutionen för freds- och utvecklingsforskning (PADRIGU) Göteborgs universitet, 2005), PhD 
thesis. p. 26. 
20
 Gene Sharp, Sharp's Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in Conflicts 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
33 
 
Many misunderstandings of what nonviolent action is exist.21 For one thing, it is a 
common mistake to associate nonviolence with passivity and avoidance of conflict. 
But with Vinthagen’s definition, nonviolent action is about confronting various forms 
of violence. Frequently nonviolent methods are used to escalate conflicts in order 
to make violence and repression visible to others and force them to take a stand. 
Martin Luther King Jr., the leader of the civil rights movement in the United States, 
wrote in his famous ”Letter from a Birmingham jail” as a response to his critiques:  
… You may well ask, “Why direct action? Why sit-ins, marches and 
so forth? Isn’t negotiation a better path? You are quite right in 
calling for negotiation. Indeed, this is the very purpose of direct 
action. Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and 
foster such a tension that a community which has constantly 
refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to 
dramatize the issue that it can no longer be ignored. My citing the 
creation of tension as part of the work on the nonviolent-resister 
may sound rather shocking. But I confess that I am not afraid of 
the word “tension”. I have earnestly opposed violent tension, but 
there is a type of constructive, nonviolent tension which is 
necessary for growth.22 
For some people it sounds like a contradiction to work for a nonviolent world by 
escalating conflict. But the confusion only happens when one confuses conflict with 
violence.  
Another common misunderstanding about nonviolent action is to think that no one 
gets hurt or dies in a nonviolent struggle. However, nonviolence only means that at 
least one side refrains from using violence, and it is not a requirement that other 
sides do the same. Many people have been killed and hurt during nonviolent 
struggles for social change.  
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Gandhi: Nonviolence as a way of life 
Nonviolence can be divided into two main categories – those who treat it as a 
technique in a struggle for change, sometimes referred to as pragmatic 
nonviolence, and those who consider it a lifestyle involving one’s whole life, called 
principled nonviolence.23 However, this should be understood as a spectrum with 
two opposite poles rather than distinct categories. The divide is artificial and many 
writers and practitioners do not fit neatly into one end of the spectrum. 
Nevertheless it is a useful analytical distinction for presenting the whole spectrum 
of thinking on nonviolence based on the Weberian ideal types. In the next section, 
the theories of scholar Gene Sharp will introduce the idea of nonviolence as a 
technique. Regarding nonviolence as a way of life, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi 
will show the way. More than anyone else, he made the concept of nonviolent 
struggle for change available to the world when he led the struggle for an 
independent India against the British colonial power, and he personifies the idea of 
nonviolence as a way of life.  
Gandhi, often referred to as Mahatma Gandhi, (an honorary title he himself did not 
approve of) wrote extensively about nonviolence in the form of letters and 
articles.24 He did not himself write a coherent theoretical framework of nonviolent 
action, but wrote throughout his life about what he called his “experiments with 
truth.”25 By studying how he practiced his method and the texts he wrote, many 
scholars have systematised his ideas. The most systematic attempt of developing 
a coherent norm system was done in Norwegian by Johan Galtung and Arne 
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Næss.26 The amount of literature on Gandhi is enormous, and still growing.27 In 
this short introduction I will rely on the way Vinthagen has described Gandhi’s 
practical philosophy.28 This is a thorough work based on his study of Gandhi’s own 
writings and more than enough to cover the core ideas necessary here. 
 
Illustration 1. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. Drawing by Siri Mette 
Henriksen 
Gandhi was a very religious person, and in order to understand his whole 
philosophy, one also has to consider his spiritual sides and the meaning he 
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attached to them. However, it is possible to understand his practical use of 
nonviolence and the logic in the method without dwelling on his religious writing. 
Since I am concerned with the role of humour within the practical application of 
nonviolent action, I will only describe the minimum which is required to understand 
nonviolence as a way of life.  
The central concept in Gandhi’s writing is satyagraha which is often taken to mean 
nonviolent struggle. However, his ideas about nonviolent struggle reach much 
further than what many other writers mean when they use this term, which is the 
reason I will use satyagraha when referring specifically to Gandhi’s philosophy. 
Satyagraha comes from Sanskrit and loosely translates as soul force or truth force. 
For Gandhi, satyagraha consist of three parts: 1. Truth (satya), 2.nonviolence 
(ahimsa) and 3. self-suffering (tapasaya). All three are closely related and 
combined they are the basis of satyagraha. Truth is closely connected to God, and 
only God knows the whole and full Truth (with capital T). All people should strive to 
know Truth, but will only ever find what they believe to be truth (with lower case t). 
However, it is their obligation to fight for this truth, but remaining humble towards 
the possibility that they are wrong. Acknowledging the possibility that people can 
be mistaken leads Gandhi to nonviolence, ahimsa. If one person in her fight for her 
truth kills someone else, she has denied that person the possibility to be right and 
the possibility that she herself is wrong. If it later turns out that she is wrong and 
the dead person was right, it is not possible to apologise and revive the person. 
This possibility remains open if she struggles for her truth with nonviolent means. 
Should that happen, she and the people she struggles against have together 
gotten one step closer to Truth.29 It is not necessary to be religious in order to 
acknowledge that no one knows the whole and full truth. 
The means to reach towards Truth is to strive for ahimsa, which means 
nonviolence or love. According to Vinthagen, ahimsa is a collective non-egoistic 
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self-realisation (not to be confused with western ideas about individual self-
realisation). The collective aspect is that one person’s suffering is connected to 
other people, and the collective self-realisation is concerned with diminishing the 
amount of suffering and violence in the world. For Gandhi, it is not possible to 
reach the truth as long as other people suffer. Therefore, ahimsa is about much 
more than avoiding the use of violence oneself: it also includes opposing the 
violence of others. This part of Gandhian thought is central in Vinthagen’s definition 
of nonviolence. The total absence of violence is an unachievable goal, but what is 
realistic is an eternal striving towards reducing violence. In the struggle against 
violence, suffering is inevitable, which leads to the third aspect of satyagraha, self-
suffering, tapasya. The idea of self-suffering is foreign to many, but has nothing to 
do with masochism. I will return to this when I show how Vinthagen uses the 
concept.  
Gandhi did not distinguish between the means and the ends of a goal; each 
depends on the other. He is supposed to have said that “If you take care of the 
means, the ends will take care of themselves”, but there is no source for this quote. 
Nevertheless, it summarises his ideas about nonviolence nicely. If people use 
nonviolence (ahimsa) to reach their goals, the result will be marked by that 
approach.  
Another aspect of Gandhi’s thought which I will return to later is the idea of 
“constructive work”. Parallel with the struggle against violence and injustice, those 
struggling for nonviolent social change should also work to build the world they 
want to see. Gandhi’s campaigns during the Indian independence struggle were 
almost always for something, and not just against it. This is an aspect of 
nonviolence which is lacking in the technical approach to nonviolent action which 
Sharp represents.  
Sharp: A pioneer for a pragmatic approach to nonviolent action 
In the 1950’s US scholar Gene Sharp set out to prove that nonviolence was not 
just an option for committed pacifists who based their choice on strong moral 
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principles, like Gandhi had done, but an effective strategy which everyone could 
use in their struggles for freedom and justice. Although he of course based his 
work on what others had done previously, he was the first to develop systematic, 
academic thinking about nonviolence. His book The Politics of Nonviolent Action30 
is a groundbreaking analysis of nonviolence. Although forceful critiques of his ideas 
have been published, it is unquestionable that his contribution to the study of 
nonviolence has been unique and far reaching.  
Sharp’s analysis starts with the concept of power. He insists that power does not 
come in a certain amount where more power to one person automatically means 
less power to someone else. To agree with his approach to nonviolence, one has 
to accept that governments, police and courts are only powerful as long as people 
obey and let them get their way. This is called a consent theory of power. Since 
power is a relationship, people always have the possibility to withdraw their 
consent to being governed by someone else. The basic idea is that when people 
stop obeying laws and orders, those usually considered “powerful” become 
“powerless”.  
Many factors influence elites and authorities’ ability to remain in control – e.g. 
material and human resources, personal authority and charisma as well as the 
sanctions they can impose. But in order to stay in power, they always depend on 
obedience. Even if they can invoke prison or death penalty on those who are 
disobedient, every person in a position of authority is always depending on a 
certain number of obedient citizens to carry out the sanctions, such as police 
officers, soldiers, prison guards and executioners, to mention just a few. The day 
these functionaries decide to withdraw their obedience, the elites fall to the ground. 
However, since the daily news provides abundant evidence of brutal repression, 
violence and injustice, a central question is: Why do people obey? Of course fear 
of sanctions plays a role, Sharp says, but that is not the whole answer. Habit, self-
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interest or the idea that obedience is a moral obligation also kick in. In addition, 
potentially disobedient persons might lack the self-confidence and belief in their 
own ability to achieve change. However, obedience is not eternal and inevitable, 
even in dictatorships where it has persisted for decades. The giving and receiving 
of orders always occur in an interaction between two or more persons.31 In Sharp’s 
opinion, each individual always has a choice to disobey,32 a point of his theory 
which has received some criticism. In Vinthagen’s theory, this aspect of 
disobedience has been modified to some degree. 
In his introduction to nonviolence as a technique, Sharp writes: “In political terms 
nonviolent action is based on a very simple postulate: people do not always do 
what they are told to do, and sometimes they do things which have been forbidden 
to them.”33 Thus, nonviolent action can both occur when people avoid doing what 
they usually do or have been requested to do, or they can do something they 
normally do not do, or which is specifically forbidden.34 If people’s ordinary 
behaviour is important in order authorities to uphold their position, “acts of 
omission” can have a huge effect – for example if the police refuse to arrest 
protesters, or soldiers desert or mutiny. Less dramatic “acts of omission” are tax 
refusal or strikes. Actions which people are not expected to do or are directly 
forbidden can be organising a boycott or a demonstration, or it can be illegal 
actions involving civil disobedience, a theme I will return to in chapter 5 about 
Ofog.  
Sharp described 198 different methods of nonviolent action giving numerous 
historical examples of their use. However, this number is rather artificial since only 
creativity limits the possibilities. His three broader categories are a more 
operational concept for analysis:  
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1. Methods of protest and persuasion 
2. Methods of noncooperation 
3. Methods of nonviolent intervention 
Well known methods of protest and persuasion include demonstrations, petitions 
and letter writing campaigns. Two traditional methods of noncooperation are the 
strike and the boycott. Examples of methods of nonviolent intervention are the sit-
ins which the civil rights movement did in segregated restaurants in the southern 
states in the US in the 1960’s or the establishment of a parallel education system 
which the Kosovo Albanians did in the 1990’s. 
According to Sharp, people striving for nonviolent social change can achieve their 
goals in four different ways: 
1. Conversion: The opponent ends up viewing the issue completely differently, 
and is convinced that the nonviolent activists are right.  
2. Accommodation: The opponent accommodates the demands of the 
nonviolent activists, for example because she sees that she cannot win, but 
without changing her point of view fundamentally.  
3. Nonviolent coercion: Things change without the consent of the opponent. 
He loses control of the situation when he no longer has access to the 
resources he once had, for example when police and army refuse to shoot 
nonviolent activists. 
4. Disintegration: In rare cases the opponent simply disintegrates and falls 
apart after prolonged nonviolent coercion, and there is no longer anyone to 
negotiate with.35  
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For some nonviolent activists it is a goal to convert the opponent and make her 
agree that the nonviolent activists are right. This is a quite high demand and it is 
seldom that a complete conversion happens. Sharp thinks that it is mainly religious 
nonviolent activists who work with this goal in mind. Many of Gandhi’s actions had 
the goal to change the hearts of the British, and he thought that the self-suffering 
played an important part in this. However, social distance between the nonviolent 
activists and those they want to convert can make it difficult to touch someone’s 
heart and convert her. No matter how much they are willing to suffer it does not 
matter if those who witness the suffering do not consider them human. In the case 
of India, Thomas Weber has shown how the self-suffering of the Indian 
independence activists did not work directly on the police ordered out to beat them 
up, but indirectly on so-called third parties. His case study of the salt raids at 
Dharasana in 1930 shows that the refusal to fight back did not touch the police or 
the British authorities at all. Those who were converted by the suffering were the 
general public in the US who read the journalist Webb Miller’s moving report of the 
events. When it came to the police responsible for the beating, Miller observed how 
the refusal to offer any resistance when attacked made the aggressors even more 
furious.36  
I consider it important to think of the opponent not as a single individual, but an 
organisation or other unit whose members share a common goal. Apart from this 
particular goal their interests usually differ a lot. A state, a company or an 
organisation is seldom an integrated whole, and although leaders may try to speak 
with one voice when communicating with others, individuals within the unit can vary 
a lot in their approaches to a nonviolent movement (and vice versa of course). 
Even when leaders are not converted, other supporters of the opponent, such as 
police or military personnel, may be. Anyone aiming to convert someone must 
avoid humiliating their opponent, and the activists will have to signal that a 
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conversion will not harm the converted. In order to touch the heart of the opponent 
in this way, it does not matter how many activists participate. It is their dedication 
which counts. 
When an opponent accommodates to the demands of the nonviolent activists, but 
without actually changing his mind, Sharp thinks the opponent considers the 
nonviolent activists an irritation rather than a threat. He might also consider the 
costs of continued struggle more damaging than giving in to some of the activists’ 
demands. If there is a chance of withdrawing with honour intact he will do that.  
The third way the activists can achieve their goals are through nonviolent coercion. 
The opponent has not changed her mind in any way, and she is prepared to keep 
on fighting as previously. She will not negotiate or withdraw. But still she cannot 
win, because the nonviolent activists have cut off her access to central resources 
for the struggle. Maybe some of her former allies have been converted, or they see 
which way the wind blows and prefer to change side while there is still time. 
Nonviolent coercion is well-known from strikes or threats to strike. When it comes 
to nonviolent coercion, numbers count. If a large number of people are disobedient, 
it is harder for the opponent to continue as before. However, even more important 
than the number is the position of the disobedient. Key disobedient people make a 
bigger difference than the general public. Those who are armed on behalf of the 
state, such as police and military, are important, but the system also depends on 
courts, key industry and infrastructure.  
A central concept in Sharp’s theory is political jiu-jitsu, which he uses to describe 
what happens when an opponent’s supporters abandon him because he is 
perceived to overreact to the nonviolent confrontation. The term is derived from the 
Asian sport jiu-jitsu, where the fighters try to use the opponents’ own weight and 
force in order to win. When a nonviolent movement is met with violent repression, 
the same effect can happen. When the opponent is seen to misuse his force, 
previous supporters might leave him and he loses his position in the end. It can be 
difficult to convince supporters and bystanders that violent repression is necessary 
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against someone who remains nonviolent. Sharp describes the phenomenon this 
way: 
Cruelties and brutalities committed against the clearly nonviolent 
are likely to disturb many people and to fill some with outrage. 
Even milder violent repression appears less justified against 
nonviolent people than when employed against violent resisters. 
This reaction to repression is especially likely when the opponent’s 
policies themselves are hard to justify. Thus, wider public opinion 
may turn against the opponent, members of his own group may 
dissent, and more or less passive members of the general 
grievance group may shift to firm opposition.37  
The dynamic of political jiu-jitsu shows why it is important for those who choose 
nonviolence to remain nonviolent, including when faced with repression. Even a 
tiny bit of violence is likely to change the dynamic. The opponent can be expected 
to focus on the violence, no matter how little and how justified it may appear in 
some eyes, and this violence is likely to be the excuse for using all the force at his 
disposal. If those who want change use violence, they will shift the game to an 
arena where the opponents have the upper hand thanks to his access to the use of 
force.  
Brian Martin has further developed the concept of political jiu-jitsu in his work on 
the dynamics of backfire.38 Martin reveals how violent repression sometimes 
backfires, not only in cases of nonviolent resistance. Many factors influence this 
dynamic, it is not enough for an injustice to happen. People also need to know 
about it, and the perpetrators of injustices that have a potential to backfire do 
everything possible to avoid such reactions. Martin describes five techniques 
perpetrators use to minimize outrage, such as cover up their actions and discredit 
the victims. 
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Sharp’s theory has received much critique, especially the way he insists that power 
is based on consent. Kate McGuinness presented a theoretical feminist critique of 
this consent theory, claiming that Sharp did not have much to offer feminists 
resisting patriarchy.39 Martin shows how the core of Sharp’s theory is very actor 
oriented, thus making the forces that prevent people from taking nonviolent action 
secondary. Another aspect which is not covered by Sharp’s theory is the 
complexity of many cases of domination, for instance when someone is both 
subordinate but nevertheless occasionally benefit from the system. Martin sums up 
his critique: 
The point is that Sharp’s picture focuses first and foremost on the 
ruler-subject dichotomy and on consent and its withdrawal, 
whereas a detailed analysis of the structures of power can only 
enter as an afterthought or as a general context for the consent 
picture.40  
Vinthagen: Four dimensions of nonviolence 
Stellan Vinthagen’s conceptual exploration of nonviolent action, developed in his 
thesis Ickevåldsaktion: En social praktik av motstånd och konstruktion (Nonviolent 
action – A Social Practice of Resistance and Construction) combines Gandhi’s and 
Sharp’s insights on nonviolence with modern sociological theories developed by 
Jürgen Habermas, Erving Goffman, Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault.41 With 
this combination, he takes nonviolent theory a major step further in understanding 
it to be a “multi-dimensional rationality”. Nonviolence is a combination of resistance 
and construction, expressed through four aspects which he calls dialogue 
facilitation, power breaking, utopian enactment, and normative regulation. Together 
they explain the unique rationality of nonviolent action as a tool for change, using 
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insights from contemporary sociology to explain the rationality of nonviolence in a 
way which takes critique of Gandhi and Sharp seriously.  
Dialogue facilitation 
The choice of nonviolent action, as opposed to a violent alternative, means that 
nonviolent activists can be seen to engage in a kind of dialogue. In Gandhian 
terms, dialogue means that they are prepared to work towards a common Truth 
with their opponent. Vinthagen uses Habermas’ thoughts on the ideal speech 
situation to develop this further. He shows how Habermas’ concept of the ideal 
speech situation has many things in common with Gandhi’s concept of satyagraha. 
In the ideal speech situation, the participants in the communication mean what they 
say and they treat each other’s statements with mutual trust. The communication is 
undisturbed by power relations, and there is time enough to hear all people’s 
opinions and explore what they mean. All people with a stake in the issue under 
consideration participate on equal terms and all have access to relevant 
information. Finally, everyone is ready to change their point of view based on 
convincing arguments by someone else. In practice, such an ideal speech situation 
will never occur, but is the utopia one should strive towards. In this situation, 
rational arguments are allowed to rule and the best argument wins, not the person 
who is most resourceful or best at manipulating. The ability to change one’s 
opinion when confronted with good arguments is also a central aspect of Gandhi’s 
philosophy, something he did himself on several occasions. In Gandhi’s opinion it 
is a “blessing” to have an opponent, because the conversation with her helps 
everyone involved to reach a little closer towards Truth. In nonviolent actions, one 
acknowledges the possibility that one’s opponent might be right, at the same time 
as one holds on to one’s own truth until better arguments have been put forward.  
Power breaking  
The second aspect of Vinthagen’s theory is the way nonviolence is used to break 
existing relations of power. Although dialogue should be free from power according 
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to the utopia of the ideal speech situation, this is not the reality on the ground. 
Everyone working to change status quo is met with power in many different forms 
and thwarted by vested interests. The way Vinthagen describes power breaking is 
also a critique of Sharp’s idea of power. Although they both agree that power 
happens in the interaction between people and is not something that exists in itself 
outside of the relationship, Vinthagen thinks that Sharp’s view of power is too 
simplistic. Although individuals have a possibility to change their behaviour, this is 
not something they just do. Deciding to resist is not just an individual choice open 
to anyone who are oppressed. Using the theories of Michel Foucault and Pierre 
Bourdieu, Vinthagen shows that power and resistance are complex processes and 
not just a question of making the right choice. The research of both Foucault and 
Bourdieu shows that no one is outside of power and free to decide to resist. 
Through their upbringing, people become subordinated to power, and the power is 
so much part of them that they do not think about it – people just continue to act as 
they have always done. Obedience and submission are so infiltrated in everyone’s 
life that they become part of their bodies, what Bourdieu calls habitus. For 
Vinthagen, power is something which people give away, often unconsciously and 
out of habit and conventional thinking. They are obedient because they have 
always been that, and “one has to follow the rules.” Power should not be confused 
with money, property, high status or other things people associate with power. 
These manifestations can be tools for exercising power, but they are not power in 
themselves.42   
In some of their writings, Foucault and Bourdieu almost make it sound as if 
resistance is not possible because power is everywhere. Vinthagen does not follow 
them in this. He thinks that people are at least to some degree free individuals who 
can make decisions about what is best for them.43 But people, including nonviolent 
organisers, have to acknowledge and understand the systems of submission in 
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order to be able to empower and liberate themselves. They need to fight actively 
and systematically against their internalised submission.  
Even if nonviolent actions are a way of facilitating a dialogue with the opponent, the 
dialogue is influenced by the existing power relations. Although nonviolent actions 
should encourage dialogue and be open towards the opponent’s good arguments, 
(in the cases where this is a person or an organisation) at the same time they 
should actively resist existing relations of power. This is of course a challenge, 
since those who benefit from the status quo seldom have reason to engage in 
dialogue until they are forced to do so. They frequently resist this dialogue on equal 
terms with all possible means, including devaluing the activists as persons and 
their motives, reframing what the action is about and using all official and unofficial 
sanctions at their disposal.  
Utopian enactment  
The third aspect of Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolent action deals with how 
nonviolent actions can be a way of acting as if the societies the activists work 
towards already exist. This he calls utopian enactment. The activist should both 
believe and behave as if even the most brutal opponent at some point will be 
willing to change. The nonviolent action should make visible that the utopian 
situation is possible in principle, at least for a short moment while the action is 
being carried out. 
Good nonviolent actions help people deal with hatred and enemy perceptions and 
undermine the idea that violence is normal. At the same time as the activists fight 
injustice, they should – to the degree it is possible – build the society they long for, 
just as in Gandhi’s constructive work.  
The problem with Habermas’ ideal speech situation is not just existing power 
relations, but also emotions which will affect communication. Negative emotions of 
hatred, grief and sadness can lead to perceptions that some people are worth less 
than others, deserve to die or be harmed and longing for revenge for real or 
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perceived past injustice. Facts like these influence communication from both the 
nonviolent activist and her opponent. Gandhi speaks about how activists should 
“touch the opponent’s heart” to reach him or her, and that rational argumentation is 
not enough. He saw the self-suffering, tapasya, as one way of doing this. The 
ability to suffer can show the opponent the humanity of the nonviolent activist. The 
idea of suffering is closely connected to Indian philosophy of religion, but in 
Vinthagen’s interpretation of the concept, self-suffering is different. He sees it as a 
risk of death or harm which the nonviolent activists accept as part of the struggle. 
Willingness to run risks is common among soldiers fighting in wars, and is nothing 
unique for nonviolent activists. It is not a wish to suffer or die, but means that one is 
prepared for it, or even counts on it, in the struggle for one’s cause. 
 
Illustration 2. Lunch counter sit-in in Richmond February 22, 1960 at the 
Thalhimer’s Department Store. African American students sit orderly and 
ask to be served at a white only counter. Photo reprinted under GNU 
Free documentation license. 
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Vinthagen uses a drama model developed by Erving Goffman to show how 
nonviolent actions undermine the perception that violence is normal and for a short 
while dramatise what the society that the activists strive for could look like. An 
example from the civil rights movement in the US which Vinthagen himself uses 
can illustrate what he means: In May 1959, when segregation was still enforced in 
the southern states, a group of 10 African Americans went to Biloxi Beach in 
Mississipi to swim and have fun with family and friends. But this was a “white only” 
beach, and while the African Americans sang and walked with their picnics and 
swimming towels they were arrested. This way, they dramatised the injustice being 
done to them, and what justice would look like. The civil rights movement was good 
at enacting injustices like this, where African Americans peacefully and with great 
dignity asked to be served in lunch restaurants for white people, or as Rosa Parks, 
refused to move from the seat where whites had priority on the bus. These activists 
were of course aware that they ran a risk of being beaten up by white people in 
favour of segregation or arrested by the police. But at the same time they made a 
live drama which showed what a more just society would look like, where going to 
the beach, buying lunch or taking the bus is nothing else than ordinary everyday 
life and not a confrontation.  
Normative regulation 
The fourth and last aspect of Vinthagen’s theory is that in nonviolent actions, the 
activists work towards making nonviolence the norm, something he calls normative 
regulation. In most societies people learn that violence is normal, at least in some 
situations. This “knowledge” about violence is internalised the same way as power, 
resulting in the perception that violence is normal even if they disapprove of it. 
Nonviolent activists try in different ways to ”unlearn” this perception and make 
nonviolence the new norm. For Gandhi, the constructive programme was an 
important part of this education to make nonviolence central in all aspects of life. In 
western nonviolent movements, it is mainly through nonviolence training before big 
nonviolent actions that different organisations have tried to teach participants new 
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ways of reacting. Only a small minority have taken up the idea of living in 
communities that emphasise nonviolence as a way of life.  
Many nonviolent training methods were developed or refined during the civil rights 
struggle in the US. They aim to prepare the participants for what will happen during 
the action and make new and more desirable reactions a natural first choice. When 
the African Americans went into a restaurant for whites, it was important that all 
participants stayed calm and dignified if they were physically or verbally attacked. It 
should not be possible in any way to frame them as aggressive. Many people learn 
while growing up that it is acceptable to shout or hit back at an attacker, but the 
civil rights activists (as well as many other activists) had to unlearn this behaviour. 
Role plays are one method in this preparation, where the aim is to make dignified 
responses to attack and abuse a part of the body’s natural reaction. The question 
is of course to what degree previous lessons can be unlearned and new behaviour 
internalised. Can this be done during a weekend course before a major nonviolent 
action? The nonviolent discipline in many actions with thousands of participants 
shows that this can be done when it comes to the action itself, but is the change so 
thorough that the new behaviour becomes part of a new way of life? Gandhi would 
probably have been sceptical of the idea that a weekend course can change well 
established ways of reacting much. He saw life in the communities, ashrams, as a 
daily training where nonviolent activists should live their life as a service to society 
and the constructive programme. For an individual to experience profound change 
it is often necessary to create new social relations and to be in an environment 
where the majority really does experience nonviolence as the norm. 
Attitudes to humour in research on nonviolence 
Both of the two traditions of nonviolence introduced above have shown very little 
interest in humour. In her PhD thesis Janjira Sombutpoonsiri gives an execellent 
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overview of the different attitudes towards humour.44 Those who are closest to 
perceiving nonviolence as a principled way of life usually dismiss humour as a 
legitimate method in a conflict because it can humiliate and ridicule and in the long 
run be counterproductive to peaceful conflict resolution.45 However, Gandhi said 
that “if I had no sense of humour, I should long ago have commited suicide”46, so 
this broad generalisation should be taken with a grain of salt.  
Among the pragmatic approaches where nonviolence is seen as an effective 
method in a political struggle rather than a moral obligation, the attitude to humour 
is a little more positive. In his 198 methods of nonviolent resistance, Sharp also 
includes one which is called “Humorous skits and pranks,” (number 35) where he 
uses examples from Eastern Europe, but he does not elaborate any further on the 
issue.47 Sombutpoonsiri traces a similar lack of interest for humour and even 
scepticism towards its effectiveness among other scholars from the proponents of 
pragmatic nonviolence. Humour does not seem to be found worthy of serious 
attention.48   
With this introduction to the core ideas about nonviolence and their attitude to 
humour, it is time to turn to theories of humour and in particular the relevant 
research on protest and social change. 
Humour research  
Humour research is a multi-disciplinary field, and many different authors have 
written about the subject over the centuries. Psychology is the area which has 
produced the largest amount of academic research, but humour has also been 
studied from the perspective of rhetoricians, linguists, sociologists, theorists of 
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literature, philosophers, communication theorists, and anthropologists. In his book 
Blind Men and Elephants49, Arthur Asa Berger illustrates how each of these 
disciplines has contributed to explaining humour, but like in the poem to which his 
book title refers, each of them only sees part of the subject in question, and 
therefore they are not able to explain the whole of it.   
There is no theory of humour with which everyone agrees. A common way of 
categorising theories is into three schools50 each with its own underlying 
assumptions of what humour is and how it should be explained.  
1. Relief theory focuses on how humour can reduce tensions, and how it is 
used to express forbidden ideas and deal with taboo topics. Sigmund Freud 
is the person most closely associated with this approach to humour. 
2. Superiority theory claims that humour is a way of showing who is superior, 
and even when we laugh at ourselves, we laugh at a part of us which is 
inferior. 16th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes put forward this theory. In 
modern times, Charles R. Gruner is the only humour theorist who claims 
that all humour is based on aggression, and a dichotomy of winning-losing.  
3. Incongruity theory is concerned with the cognitive perception of what is 
funny, and is the most widespread way of explaining humour today. This 
theory says that in order for us to perceive something as funny, there has to 
be an incongruity or ambiguity which forces us to think in more than one 
dimension at the same time.  
Although some theorists see their own theory as a way of explaining all humour, 
each of these three perspectives contributes something meaningful to the 
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understanding of humour, but no single one provides the full explanation. Humour 
is not one thing, but a label which has relations to both cognitive processes, 
emotions within the individual, interpersonal relations in small groups as well as 
broader social relations in our societies. As sociologist Jerry Palmer has 
suggested, it seems unrealistic to demand that one theory should explain all this.51  
Incongruity theory explains the cognitive process that needs to be present in order 
to generate humour. Relief theory is one way of explaining why an individual 
chooses to use humour in a certain situation, or laugh at a particular joke. 
Superiority theory can explain some forms of aggressive humour.  
Since this thesis is about the use of humour as a method of social activism, the 
humour I present here is constructed to be part of a social conflict. It is kicking 
upwards to criticise particular people in power or systems of power – for example 
dictators, elected politicians considered to take themselves too seriously, dominant 
“isms” of any kind, or a company profiting from environmental exploitation or 
human suffering. Therefore it should be no surprise that it includes many examples 
of humour which some people would call aggressive – that is, humour which 
criticises, humiliates, ridicules or in some way aims at “speaking truth to power”. 
Nevertheless I want to emphasise that I do not consider this a contribution to 
Gruner’s theory about humour’s universal aggressiveness.52 
It is not the purpose here to discuss all the literature on humour, and I will only look 
in depth at the theories and literature which are relevant for the theme of humorous 
political activism which aims to challenge power relationships. This means that I 
will focus on sociological theories of humour and what has been written about 
political humour or humour related to social conflict.  
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Defining humour 
Humour is special way of communicating. In itself, it is neither good nor bad. It can 
be used to hurt other people, and it can be used to make them happy, just like 
other methods or mediums for communication. In his article “Humor as a Double-
Edged Sword: Four Functions of Humor in Communication”, John C. Meyer calls 
this ability to both unite and divide “the paradox of humour”.53 Michael Billig has 
identified three other paradoxes of humour. It is both universal and particular, 
meaning that all cultures have a sense of something that is funny, but not everyone 
finds the same things funny. 54 In addition, the impulse to laugh appears to be 
biological.55 Another paradox that Billig has identified is similar to Meyer’s paradox: 
Humour is both inclusive and exclusive. Finally, there is the third paradox regarding 
humour’s ability to be mysterious and resist rational analysis at the same time as it 
is possible to understand and analyse it.56  
My focus is on political humour which aims to criticise power. Most of the examples 
I provide are from grassroots organisations who “kick upwards” and criticise abuse, 
self-righteousness and dominant truths and world views. That humour can be used 
in this way does not exclude the fact that it is frequently used to ridicule minorities 
and humiliate those at the bottom of society as well.57  
Psychologist Rod Martin, in his introductory book on humour and psychology, uses 
this definition with four components:  
1. Humour has a social aspect, which is associated with play. When using 
humour, people operate in a different mode than when they talk seriously. 
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2. Secondly, there is a cognitive-perceptual component of humour. This is the 
mental process which needs to happen in order for people to perceive 
something as funny.  
3. Humour also has an emotional aspect. People do not just react to 
something funny intellectually, it also creates a good feeling. English does 
not really have a word to describe this feeling, but Martin calls it mirth.  
4. Finally, the emotion of mirth is frequently expressed through laughter. 
Laughter is a signal that this is play and not serious.58   
This is a useful operational definition, but the way the humorous is contrasted with 
seriousness makes this an inadequate way of defining some political humour which 
has a serious intent. Although political humour operates within a play frame and 
generates laughter and amusement this should not be confused with not being 
serious.  
One interview with an Ofog activist in particular caused me to question Martin’s 
(and most other humour researcher’s) choice of words. Lisa and I had just talked 
about a humorous nonviolent action that activists in Ofog had carried out, and Lisa 
had expressed concern about the problems with combining the ironic with the 
serious when it became obvious how problematic the term serious is in this 
context:   
Majken: But [how do you mean], when you talk about serious and 
non-serious, because I think that something like Reality AB [the 
action] is very serious…? 
Lisa: yes, yes, serious was maybe the wrong choice [of word], 
ehh, serious as in non-ironic, that is what I mean 
Majken: yes, yes, grave and… (hesitant) 
Lisa: yeeees (hesitant) 
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Majken: The other is also grave, no, it is very difficult with the 
words (both laugh) 
Lisa: Yes, grave and serious 
Majken: Yes, I think I understand what you mean  
When I first listened to this interview I felt very embarrassed that I did not manage 
to express myself more clearly, but then realised that humour research had not 
provided me with a language to have this kind of conversation. The core of the 
problem was that both everyday language and humour research use a terminology 
that is not adequate for talking about humour that has a very serious intent.  
I am not the first to notice this contradiction, since it is implicitly addressed in a 
book title like Taking humour seriously, 59 and briefly mentioned as a side comment 
by scholars writing about political humour.60 Linda Hutcheon in her book about 
irony writes that “even humorous ironies can be deadly serious.61 However, the 
implication for humour studies as such has not been discussed. I suggest that if the 
term “seriously” is replaced by “rational argument”, Martin’s definition is still valid.  
Sociological theory on humour  
The sociologists of humour have hardly paid any attention to political humour and 
its relations with power. The focus has been on developing broader sociologies of 
humour and humour’s place in everyday life and interaction. Marvin Koller 
described the different social functions of humour, including social correction and 
provoking thought.62 Michael Mulkay made an important contribution to the study of 
humour when he suggested that the humorous mode or discourse operates in a 
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way which is very different from the serious mode or discourse we engage in most 
of the time.63  
In the serious mode, we do our best to avoid misunderstandings, incongruity and 
double meanings. We assume that there exists a “real” world, and that other 
people potentially can see the world more or less the same way as us. When we 
discover that someone perceives that reality in a way which is different to our own 
understanding, we look for explanations for the discrepancies.  
In contrast, says Mulkay, we have the humorous mode, which requires us to think 
in a different way. It is based on incongruity and duality, and we can only grasp 
humour when we switch to the humorous mode of understanding the world, where 
inconsistency and ambiguity are part of the rules. As I mentioned when discussing 
definitions of humour, I agree with this differentiation between a humorous and a 
non-humorous mode of communication. However, I think it is inappropriate to call 
the other mode serious, since this indicates that humour cannot be serious. Instead 
I will refer to the non-humorous mode as rational. I do not disagree with the basic 
idea that Mulkay presents, since it is the incongruities in the humorous mode which 
appear to be essential to him, I just point out that the word “serious” is misleading.  
Within the same tradition of incongruity, Peter Berger has written about how 
humour requires us to think in more than one dimension at the same time64, and 
Jerry Palmer has brought our attention to the fact that humour has to be 
negotiated, to be permitted, in order to be able to happen. Every theory of humour 
also needs to take into consideration that humorous intent is not enough for 
humour to succeed. Humour is fragile and can easily fail. This does not mean that 
the butt of the joke or prank has to agree that something is funny, but either the 
situation demands or the audience agrees that this was humorous.65 He points to 
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the fact that there is a huge difference between laboratory experiments with 
psychology students and a stand-up comedy show in real life. Every comedian 
knows that a show has to be “built up”, and the joke which is a success towards the 
end can’t be told until the audience is warmed up.66  
In his writing about humorous incongruity, Palmer works with a concept he calls the 
logic of the absurd, which consists of two parts. In order for an incongruity to be 
funny, it has to appear suddenly in order to surprise us. At the same time the 
cognitive process of perceiving something as both implausible and slightly 
plausible at the same time has to happen.67 Palmer thinks that a combination of an 
incongruity as well as an adequate level of arousal is required to produce humour. 
If the arousal is too high, we will experience a feeling of threat and anxiety rather 
than mirth.68 Elliott Oring has used the term appropriate incongruity to express 
similar thoughts.69 The development of incongruity theory within psychology is long 
and complicated, but the details are not relevant here.70  
When we go to a comedy show, the situation immediately makes us understand 
that something is intended to be funny, but in everyday interaction, it is a constant 
negotiation about what constitutes humour and what does not.71 There is no 
automatic relationship between intention and what others perceive. Shared humour 
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depends on shared context and knowledge of the cues that make a situation 
humorous as well as emotional resonance.72 However, something can be 
negotiated as humour, even if the butt of it disagrees and sees this as non-
humorous, an important point which I will return to later. When something which is 
intended as humour is perceived differently, Palmer thinks there can be many 
different explanations. He points to reasons such as the skills of the performer or 
the use of mediums we now consider old-fashioned, like silent movies. In addition, 
intended humour can be considered offensive either because of the structure of the 
humour, the relationships between the parties involved or the nature of the 
occasion.73  
Murray S. Davis also places himself firmly in the incongruity tradition,74 and argues 
that nothing is incongruous in itself, only in relation to something else, when there 
is something which does not fit in.75 Along the same lines as Oring and Palmer, 
Davis argues that the incongruity has to be moderate in order to be considered 
funny.76 Davis’ contribution to the sociology of humour is a thorough description of 
all the different ways humour can be generated when one unit of a social system is 
replaced with something incongruent. This way, humour draws our attention to the 
essential parts of social systems and what it means to be human.77  
Summing up the sociologies of humour, it is obvious that the incongruity tradition 
has been a common point of reference for sociologists. Political humour has not 
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played a major role in any of these works which aim to categorise and explain how 
humour works in society. An exception to this, which is the focus of the next 
section, is the category of political jokes. 
A sociological article that deserves mentioning in this section as well is “Romance, 
Irony, and Solidarity” by Ronald Jacobs and Philip Smith. They have looked at the 
relationship between irony and civil society, and are mainly concerned about 
improving theory of civil society. They are critical of existing theory of civil society 
because culture, emotions and identity have been neglected in this metanarrative 
and a consequence is  
a latently mechanistic conception of human action; a failure to 
consider identity as multiple, contradictory, hybrid, or public; and 
an inability to explain how democratic institutions and procedures 
sometimes promote social outcomes that are neither just nor 
moral.78 
In order to have discourses within civil society that promote “healthy’ political 
cultures”79, Jacobs and Smith argue that the genres of romance and irony should 
be brought into public life and not delegated to the sphere of the private. Combined 
these two genres provide a discourse that makes room for the four attributes they 
consider essential for a descriptive/normative theory of civil society – inter-
subjectivity, solidarity, reflexivity, and tolerance. Romance and irony each have 
virtues and vices which supplement each other. Among the positive sides of irony, 
Jacobs and Smith point towards irony’s potential to disrupt power and encourage 
reflexive processes in civil society.80 However, they also warn against irony’s risk of 
being trapped in fatalism and becoming disengaged from civil society if it just 
creates ironic distance without providing alternatives.81  
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A similar argumentation is used by Robert Hariman in his article “Political Parody 
and Public Culture”82 where he argues that parody is essential for a democratic 
public culture. According to him “genres such as parody play a particularly crucial 
role in keeping democratic speech a multiplicity of discourses.”83 The reason is that 
as soon as something has been “doubled” through parody, it can no longer pretend 
to be an uncontested truth.84  
Several contributions to humour studies have focused on the different functions of 
humour in relation to social interaction.85 However, their categorisations are not 
adequate to (or meant to) understand political humour which challenges power 
relations.  
Humour, politics, protest and social conflict 
The amount of academic literature about political humour is enormous. Frequently 
it is approached as a certain type of genre (like satire, parodies or cartoons) 
presented in a certain medium (such as TV or the Internet).86 Others have 
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analysed political humour from a historical perspective,87 politicians’ use of 
humour,88 or tried to create artificial experiments about the use of humour in equal 
and unequal power relations.89    
Humour as an expression of social protest has a long history, but it is debated as 
to whether it works as a safety valve, allowing a dissatisfied population to let off 
steam now and then, or if it actually contribute to resistance. In this section, I begin 
with presenting research on political jokes and traditional folly as an expression of 
protest, and continue with various case studies on humour as a form of protest 
against occupations and dictatorships. Both gender studies and organisational 
theory have also provided insights into humour’s influence on power relations. The 
small body of literature which focuses specifically on humour as nonviolent 
resistance is presented before I round off with humour’s relationship with other 
types of creative activism such as culture jamming, pranks and tactical carnival.  
Political jokes 
Jokes have been a relatively popular source for studying humour, both in 
psychology and when it comes to social aspects of humour. Because they come as 
a ready “package”, jokes are short and do not require much explanation compared 
to everyday conversational humour. Jokes also differ from the comedy we watch 
on TV. Although professional comedians often use jokes, it is an even more 
packaged product. The public humorous stunts and performances which I will 
present are also very different from jokes. 
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One of those who has written most extensively on jokes from a sociological point of 
view and their relation to society is Christie Davis. Among other things he has 
studied jokes about stupidity and political jokes in the former Soviet Union. 
In his book Jokes and their Relation to Society Davies explores how jokes about 
stupidity and the canny have developed from being about other localities (the next 
village, a certain region) to being about other ethnicities.90 He illustrates how the 
butts of the jokes are not the very foreign, but those that are slightly different, like a 
distorted image of yourself in a strange mirror. Jokes about a certain group do not 
indicate that this group is a victim of hate, and they are not a sign of social conflict. 
As an example, he mentions that jokes about Poles and Irish people’s stupidity in 
the US do not mean that they are the ones who are most marginalised. He quotes 
two English boys who are interviewed about jokes about the Irish, who says “We 
have nothing against the Irish; my father and his father are Irish. They are just 
supposed to be stupid.”91 Davies argues that the reason people enjoy stupidity 
jokes is their own fear of the modern world, which is so complicated that people 
usually cannot explain how the machines they use every day work. This 
uneasiness leads people to joke about those whom they imagine cannot 
understand even the simplest things.92  
In the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe under Soviet dominance before the 
fall of the Berlin wall and the nonviolent revolutions in many of these countries, 
jokes about stupidity were not directed towards minorities, but towards the most 
powerful people in society, the party members, planners, bureaucrats and police. 
This way, jokes about stupidity became political jokes, in societies where the rulers 
did not just want to rule, but expected people to celebrate them and attempted to 
control all aspects of social and private life. However, Davies thinks that it is still 
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the same mechanisms that guide these jokes. Behind the iron curtain they just took 
a slightly different turn.93  
Davies is very hesitant in calling these jokes a protest. He understands them to be 
a sign of dissatisfaction and they showed that the communist systems were 
unstable, but they were not a sign of active resistance. He disagrees with those 
who have proposed that the more repressive a regime is, the more political humour 
directed against it one will find. There were more jokes about the communist 
regimes after 1956 when control and repression were relaxed a bit compared to 
the previous decades. But neither does Davies support those who have put 
forward the opposite idea, that political jokes prevent resistance because they 
become a vent for frustration. He simply says that political jokes are a sign of the 
system’s instability, but that they do not help or prevent active resistance.94  
Gregor Benton, is his chapter “The Origins of the Political Joke”95 about political 
jokes in the Soviet Union under dictatorship, insists that the political joke is not a 
form of resistance, and that a smart repressive regime permits jokes about it as “a 
clever insurance against more serious challenges to the system.”96 Without 
providing any documentation for his claim, he finishes his chapter with a very 
strong statement that claims that political jokes cannot change anything:  
But the political joke will change nothing. It is the relentless 
enemy of greed, injustice, cruelty and oppression – but it could 
never do without them. It is not a form of active resistance. It 
reflects no political programme. It will mobilise no one. Like the 
Jewish joke in its time, it is important for keeping society sane and 
stable. It cushions the blows of cruel governments and creates 
sweet illusions of revenge. It has the virtue of momentarily freeing 
the lives of millions from the tensions and frustrations to which 
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even the best organised political opposition can promise only long-
term solutions, but its impact is a fleeting as the laughter it 
produces.97  
Alexander Rose is another academic writer who looks at political jokes. In “When 
Politics is a Laughing Matter”98 he explores the differences between jokes in 
democracies and jokes under authoritarian rule. He finds that in a democracy the 
focus is on individual politicians and their personal shortcomings, but not their 
politics. In authoritarian regimes, there is more focus on exposing the difference 
between the visions and realities of the politics.  
Egon Larsen’s book Wit as a Weapon: The Political Joke in History99 is a collection 
of political humour which includes many examples of jokes as well as descriptions 
of some satirical journals and cabarets from around the world. The title suggests 
that the author thinks humour has an ability to influence people, but the book does 
not include any analysis of this or explain what sort of harm can be done with this 
“weapon”.  
“Wit and Politics: An essay on Laughter and Power”100 by Hans Speier as well as 
Don L. F. Nilsen’s “The Social Functions of Political Humor “101 should also be 
mentioned in this section about jokes, since their data consist almost exclusively of 
jokes, supplemented by some witty remarks. Nilsen is categorising the political 
jokes according to the social function they serve when told by politicians or political 
commentators. The categories include disarming critics, making a point, or 
exposing chauvinism, ineptitude, oppression, pretentiousness and relieving 
tension. Speier also divides his material into categories such as “The diversionary 
and soothing jokes”, “The healing joke”, “The cynical political joke” and so on. 
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Speier reflects on the role of humour in relation to politics and power, and sees it 
as just another way of struggling for power, along with flattery, bribery and 
violence. He points out how certain jokes and techniques appear to be timeless 
and can travel huge distances. Speier thinks that there are more jokes from 
“above” at the expense of the downtrodden than from below that kick upwards, but 
does not document this claim.102 This idea of humour’s potential for reinforcing 
social hierarchies appears now and then103 with a reference to two studies in two 
psychiatric wards where the high ranked staff initiated joking more often than lower 
ranked staff during staff meetings.104 However, the data for these studies are from 
formal meetings, not recordings of what happens when the high ranked staff are 
not present. Coser even specifically mentions that the findings might have been 
different in more informal settings. In a similar way, Speier has no access to 
humour which is kicking upwards in the data he uses, since humour from “below” is 
not documented in the same way as speeches and biographies of statesmen. The 
discussion about numbers is quite irrelevant since it is unlikely to reach any 
conclusion, but I will provide many examples of political humour from below, 
although none will be in the form of jokes.  
Traditional folly 
One of the most cited works on carnival and traditional folly is Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
Rabelais and His World,105 which he wrote in the late 1930s during Stalin’s rule. 
The book is a thesis about the French Renaissance writer Rabelais, whom Bakthin 
believes it is only possible to understand when the context of medieval carnival is 
taken into consideration. To Bakhtin, carnival is a liberation from the prevailing 
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truths and order,106 and the grotesque in art and literature (such as in Rabelais) is 
only possible to understand in the spirit of carnival. The book has been interpreted 
as a critique of the repression in the Soviet Union and was not published until 
1965. Although still widely cited and acclaimed, Bakhtin’s claims about carnival 
have also been strongly contested.107 
Another author who writes about traditional folly but from a very different 
perspective is Anton Zijderveld who focuses on medieval and early modern Europe 
in his book Reality in a Looking-Glass.108 Zijderveld thinks that traditional folly was 
diverse. Some of it was conservative in preserving traditions and enforcing social 
norms, but other aspects were critical of all norms and rules. More than anything 
else, traditional folly was ambiguous.109  
The fools were outcasts and pariahs of society, but popular because of the 
entertainment they provided. Folly was often the expression of a pagan past, 
covered by a thin layer of Christianity. It could be a disguise for critique but most 
entertainers were ready to ridicule everything and everyone and did not have a 
political agenda. Church leadership and double standards were good material for 
entertainment, and much unrest was released through folly. Nevertheless, 
Zijderveld thinks that most of the fools were “opportunistic critiques” without 
ideology.110 One of the most well-known examples of medieval folly was the 
“festival of fools,” organised by the lower clergy in different versions all over 
Europe. Central elements were cross dressing, eating forbidden food, riding on a 
donkey with head towards tail, electing a choir boy for bishop, playing dice in front 
of the altar and in various ways reversing and turning conventions upside down. 
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The tradition was condemned by the higher clergy, who interpreted it as a cover for 
pagan fertility traditions, but nevertheless continued for several hundred years. In 
the end it disappeared because of modernisation, not condemnation. According to 
Zidjerveld, folly was never intended as an ideological critique of power, but in its 
practice ended up as an important critique of the status quo. He thinks that the idea 
of folly as a safety valve needed for release once a year in order to keep unrest at 
bay at other times had nothing to do with reality. It was an argument invented by 
the lower clergy in order to be able to continue the traditions that they enjoyed.111  
Another medieval tradition which Zijderveld takes a closer look at is the court jester 
of the 16th and 17th centuries. At this time the court jester was firmly established as 
an institution and started to depart from its roots among the medieval fools. 
Zidjerveld calls the court jesters “parasites of power”, and sees them as an 
integrated part of the absolutist monarch institution. The idea of the court jester 
“speaking truth to power” might be more of a myth than reality, since the court 
jester was considered a kind of pet along with the royal dogs. The court jester 
would do everything to please his master and knew his tastes, which meant that he 
attacked other people in powerful positions, such as intellectuals or religious 
people, with spiteful words, or played tricks on those out of favour with the king. 
However, his own master would never be the butt of the joke. 
The writings of Bakhtin and Zidjerveld illustrate that, just as with the political jokes 
of today, the historical role of humour in protest and social conflict is by no means 
straightforward. The same can be said of the humour during occupations and 
dictatorships which is the subject in the next section, where there exists 
considerable disagreement about its achievements.  
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Humour in occupations and dictatorships 
Academic literature on humour as a method for protest in modern times is relatively 
limited, and even the literature which has been published in academic journals 
sometimes is more anecdotal than contributing to development of theoretical 
understanding. Humour from different occupations and dictatorships has been 
studied in various academic fields. 
Already in 1942, Antonin J. Obrdlik wrote “’Gallows humor’ – A Sociological 
Phenomenon” which was published in the American Journal of Sociology.112 The 
article is interesting because it is an early contribution to the topic that this thesis is 
concerned with. Obrdlik gives a first-hand account of the Czech humour during the 
Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia. He uses the term gallows humour to describe all 
the humour used by people in a difficult situation, no matter what they joke about. 
The claims in the article are not very well documented, and it does not include a 
single reference. However, there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of the 
anecdotes and jokes Obrdlik recounts. Obrdlik makes two major claims about the 
social functions of humour:  
1. That it helps increase morale among a repressed people. He also thinks that the 
amount and strength of humour is a sign of how morale is doing. If there is no 
humour directed against the occupier, he thinks it means that people have given 
up.  
2. The second claim is that humour disintegrates the forces that it is directed 
against. There is no documentation of this claim, although Obrdlik attempts to 
justify it. His most convincing argument is that the Nazi’s anger towards the 
humour is a proof that it hurts. Obrdlik argues that an enemy that felt in control 
would not take humour seriously. That humour directed against the occupation 
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forces was severely punished, and that graffiti removed immediately, meant that 
the Nazis felt insecure.  
Much later, humour from two other countries occupied by Nazi Germany from 
1940-45, Denmark and Norway, has been described in academic literature. 
Nathaniel Hong in his article “Mow’em all down grandma: The ‘weapon’ of humor in 
two Danish World War II scrapbooks”113 uses humour from two Danish scrapbooks 
from the occupation to discuss to what degree humour is a political weapon. He 
claims that most people who write about political humour overestimate its potential 
as a form of resistance without actually having any data behind their claims. Hong 
thinks that by using the scrapbooks as sources the way he does, he comes much 
closer to the everyday life of ordinary people and their use of humour than many 
other researchers. First and foremost, the scrapbooks show the complexity of the 
issue.  
One of the collectors of humour who Hong looks at is called Jensen. He primarily 
seemed to use his book to get through these difficult years more easily and Hong 
thinks that the humour in his books became a substitute for real resistance. The 
other collector is called Holmboe, and he collected many examples of jokes in 
circulation and wrote down humorous anecdotes. Holmboe himself said that what 
he tried to do was document the mood of the Danish population during these 
years. His primary concern was the free flow of information, free speech and the 
way censorship prevented that. His family participated in many different forms of 
resistance activities, and according to Hong, the humour which Holmboe collected 
shows how humour can be part of a critical reflection. However, humour was only a 
minor part of Holmboe’s huge material, which mainly consisted of newspaper 
articles.  
Hong thinks the power of humour is overestimated, but his main focus is jokes, 
which do not engage with the enemy/opponent as long as they are whispered in 
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private. Only a few of Hong’s examples are public and therefore part of an 
interaction with the German occupier. Because of this focus on jokes, the article’s 
conclusions have little relevance for this thesis. But although Hong uses written 
primary sources, we still know little about to what degree the private jokes 
contributed to creating a culture of resistance and a hidden transcript, a subject I 
will return to shortly. Although the humour turned out to be a safety valve for 
scrapbook writer Jensen, Hong presents no data to show that everyone else 
reacted the same way.  
In her writings about the use of humour as resistance to the Nazi occupation in 
Norway 1940-45, Kathleen Stokker114 notes that quisling humour (directed towards 
Vidkun Quisling, the leader of the Norwegian Nazi party) protected people’s self-
respect and gave the population some sort of control in an uncontrollable 
situation.115 The jokes also served to break down isolation and create a solidarity 
and group identity within the population. Because so many people shared the 
jokes, their very existence contradicted the Nazi propaganda that people who did 
not join them would stand alone.116 Stokker writes:  “The jokes also provided an 
image of nation-wide solidarity that vitally assisted the resistance effort.”117 Stokker 
compares the Norwegian occupation humour with jokes from Eastern Europe 
during dictatorship, and finds that in Norwegian humour “everyone” fights back, 
and support for the resistance movement is found in the most unusual places, 
whereas in Eastern Europe, the jokes show that you should trust no one.118  
In the post-war period, the jokes have helped create the myth that “everybody” 
participated in the resistance, and that nobody supported the occupation, which is 
contradicted by the fact that 60.000 Norwegians joined the Nazi party. Similarly, 
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Patrick Merziger, writing about humour in Nazi Germany itself, has identified a 
post-war perception of whispered jokes that has served to overstate the distance 
between the German people and the Nazi party.119  
Humour from a different occupation has also been collected and presented in an 
academic article. In “Humor of the Palestinian Intifada”, Sharif Kanaana presents 
resistance humour from the occupied Palestinian territories from the first 
Intifada.120 She and her assistants have collected around 200 different jokes and 
anecdotes about the Intifada from all parts of Palestine. The majority are about 
Palestinians triumphing over Israelis. The Israelis in the jokes are almost 
exclusively the Israeli Army, not Jews, and not even settlers. In a minority of the 
jokes collected, the butt are Palestinians who are not doing enough for the Intifada, 
and in a few cases, collected late in the Intifada, the target is the leadership of the 
Intifada.  
In the stories about Palestinians triumphing over the Israeli soldiers, it is very often 
women and children from non-urban settings who are smarter than the soldiers 
and intuitively understand what the Intifada is about. The jokes are not violent 
towards the Israeli soldiers, even when the soldiers are captured. The strength of 
the Palestinians lies in their humiliation of the soldiers. The author also contrasts 
the intifada jokes to her perception of pre-intifada humour, where Palestinians 
made fun of themselves and seemed to lack self-respect.  
Apart from dividing the humour into categories depending on their theme, the 
article does not contribute to any theoretical developments. However, it is an 
interesting finding that the humour during the Intifada was mainly nonviolent, and 
seeking out alternative ways of humiliating the enemy, rather than promoting 
violence.  
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A recent article about humour utilised against a dictatorship is Helmy and Frerichs’ 
“Stripping the Boss: The Powerful Role of Humor in the Egyptian Revolution 
2011”.121 They argue from a social psychological perspective that humour can be a 
“resource in power battles”122, and conclude that humour was a stress buffer during 
the Egyptian revolution in February 2011. They even go as far as saying that 
without the extensive use of open ridicule of President Mubarak and other forms of 
public humour, it would not have been possible for the activists to sustain their 
occupation of Tahrir Square for the 18 days that was necessary for the revolution 
to bring down Mubarak.123 Although I find it a very far reaching conclusion to 
consider humour such a decisive factor, their study is certainly convincing that 
humour was important. An anecdotal account of the same case is Iman Mersal’s 
article about the spirit of solidarity created by humour on Tahrir Square.124  
In his article “Political Humor in a Dictatorial State: The Case of Spain”125, Oriol Pi-
Sunyer does not tell how the data for the article were collected, and there is no 
systematic analysis of different categories regarding content. The article reads as 
Pi-Sunyer’s own personal observations about the functions of humour. He sees it 
as a form of oral guerrilla warfare that everyone could, and almost everybody did, 
participate in. He also mentions how jokes, like other forms of oral communication, 
travel far and fast in times of uncertainty. Pi-Sunyer thinks that humour functioned 
as a way of alleviating anxiety.  
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Humour, power and gender 
There is not much academic work which focuses particularly on power and 
humour. However, some aspects have been raised from a gender perspective. 
Joanne R. Gilbert’s book Performing Marginality: Humor, Gender and Cultural 
Critique126 is an interesting starting point. In this book Gilbert focuses on how 
American women stand-up comedians perform their marginality as women. She 
points to the fact that they actually manage to get paid for subverting power 
relations by performing the age old role of the fool. Their entertainment is a 
disguised resistance that holds up a mirror so that society can see itself 
reflected.127 She sees marginality as the perfect position for expressing critique, 
because it is a place between the inside and outside. As an example of this 
marginal position being used as disguised resistance, Gilbert shows how women 
who use self-deprecatory humour (e.g their body size or sexuality) and put 
themselves down in their show appear so non-threatening that they disarm their 
audience. But because they perform this in a comic context, they also subvert the 
status quo by raising subtle questions and critique.128 This is an interesting thought 
to explore in relation to other marginalised groups, such as those who are “just” 
politically marginalised. Gilbert is also critical of critiques which claim that women 
who use self-deprecatory humour are not feminist, and that what they do is harmful 
to feminism. Gilbert thinks that they have missed a crucial point – that this is 
humour, not to be taken too seriously. 
Gilbert draws on superiority and relief theories of humour to make her points, and 
thinks that political humour can be both conservative and contribute to maintaining 
the status quo as well as be liberating and subversive. This way, humour is both 
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violating and affirming cultural norms and values.129 Her finding is that women 
stand-up comedians (and other minority stand-up comedians) must appear as non-
threatening fools in order to get access to the stage, and suggests that there is a 
difference between making the master laugh and undermining his power position. 
She considers the fool to have a double role – as a satirist to encourage critical 
self-reflection, and at the same time entertain to relieve tension.  
Gilbert distinguishes between the victim and the butt of a joke.130 They can be the 
same, but not necessarily. Although a victim might be a woman, the butt might be a 
man, or society. Another thing she points out is how the “just joking” can be a 
defence that disguises attacks, something I will return to later.131  
Although Gilbert acknowledges humour’s ability to express subtle critique in a non-
threatening way, and mentions that humour can be a “rehearsal for the revolution”, 
she does not believe in any “comic activism.” The very existence of female stand-
up comedians is a subversive act, and is contributing to demolition of the 
hegemonic wall, but in itself it will not change real power relations. Even subversive 
humour will never be taken seriously. For this reason she thinks that “true 
believers” in any cause will never be good comedians.132 I think the following 
pages will prove her wrong. Although these political activists are not professional 
comedians, their humour is still good enough to make many people laugh. 
Someone who has more faith in the potential to affect power relations through 
humour is Anna Johansson. In a chapter in a Swedish book about resistance 
studies, she writes about humour among Nicaraguan women living in a workers’ 
area of the city Leon.133 She investigates how humour has a potential to both 
strengthen established power relations and resist them. The kind of humour the 
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women in Nicaragua produce is very often about men, and it is done behind their 
backs. Johansson uses James Scott’s concept of hidden transcripts to analyse the 
situations. She shows how it is possible to see the joking about men’s sexual 
relations with other women as revenge. Johansson does not think that humorous 
resistance is a question of either-or. The humour she observed in Leon certainly 
reinforced existing stereotypes of how men are and what masculine behaviour is. 
But at the same time their humour is part of an everyday resistance against male 
domination. The women overcome their fear through humour, which makes men’s 
power and domination seem less dangerous. However short and fragile the 
moment is, everyday resistance humour is a play with existing power structures, 
and a break in the routine of men’s domination.   
In an article called “Laughing when it hurts: Humor and violence in the lives of 
Costa Rican Prostitutes”134, Pamela J. Downe looks at how sex workers in Costa 
Rica use humour. Just like Johansson, her main focus is the women’s everyday 
lives, and the group solidarity they build among themselves. The prostitutes use 
humour behind the scene to laugh at violent costumers and ridicule them when 
they are not present. In the very beginning of the text Downe also provides an 
example of how the prostitutes used humour during a demonstration to protest new 
laws that required them to carry a medical health card. The women thought that the 
government was neglecting the abuse and violence directed against the sex 
workers, and focusing too much on them as a problem, in spite of prostitution being 
legal in Costa Rica. During the demonstration, one politician came out to talk to the 
women, and in a prepared action, one woman used a balloon looking like a penis 
to mock the politician. 
A different performance described in the text was conducted by another woman, 
who during the national AIDS day started a street performance telling jokes about 
prostitutes being a problem in Costa Rica. Dressed for work and in a self-
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deprecating tone, she focused on how prostitutes spread disease. When she had 
the attention of the mainly female audience she changed the style and instead 
attacked the prejudice of the women, accusing them of ignoring the fact that it was 
men like their own husbands who are her customers. The audience stopped 
laughing, but she still had their attention. Although she was not a professional 
stand-up comedian like the women in Gilbert’s book, her self-deprecation became 
a way of raising serious critique.  
A perspective which is not very different from Gilbert’s is Case and Lippard’s 
article, “Humorous Assaults on Patriarchal Ideology”.135 This is a description of a 
research project about women/feminist humour, and categorises American jokes of 
this kind. More than 60 percent of the collected jokes are about male stereotypes, 
where men are useless, stupid, hypersexual or disgusting. Very few of the jokes 
are about “feminist subtleties”, that is questioning gender hierarchy or about equal 
rights. The authors conclude with noticing that almost all of the humour they have 
recorded upholds stereotypes about men and women being very different from 
each other, and this way contribute to sustaining divisions. However, they also see 
the very existence of this kind of humour as a proof that men’s supremacy and 
patriarchy is being challenged. 
The research on humour done within gender studies shows that there are different 
opinions regarding humour’s ability to affect gender relations. Disagreement is also 
apparent within organisational theory concerned with humour and employer-
employee relations which is the next theme. 
Organisational theory and humour 
Within organisational studies, there has also been some research on humour. 
Taylor and Bain in their article “Subterranean Worksick Blues: Humour as 
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Subversion in Two Call Centres”136 from 2003 includes a good overview of this 
literature. Their own research, using ethnographic data collection methods, shows 
how humour can be part of resistance in two call centres. In one call centre, 
humour was used to undermine management, for example by circulating emails 
which clearly suggested that management did not do its work properly. Another 
habit which challenged management ideals was to mock customers behind their 
backs but within earshot of the other workers.  
Taylor and Bain’s other case study is even more interesting from my perspective. 
In a call centre where management actively worked against unions, a group of 
workers consciously used humour as a tactic to undermine management and 
create support for a union. Taylor and Bain document how it was difficult for 
management to find appropriate responses, especially towards one openly 
homosexual man. He made use of prejudice and ambivalence towards gay men to 
get away with things for which others would have been punished. The humour was 
sometimes very hostile, but was used against people in superior positions. The 
authors demonstrate that humour can contribute to collective resistance even in a 
working environment as controlled as a call centre. An example of a collective 
humorous action was directed against new regulations demanding that the workers 
wear a shirt and tie. Since this is a call centre, the workers found it unnecessary. 
On the first day with the new regulations, a large number of workers did come to 
work in shirt and tie. But they had collectively organised to look as unprofessional 
as possible, by selecting patterns and colours not considered to go well together.  
In their article “Having Fun? Humour as resistance in Brazil”137, Rodrigues & 
Collinson argue that in the work place, workers’ humour is not just a way to let off 
steam, something they find to be a persistent idea in organisational theory. 
Through a case study from Brazil, they show that humour is complex and can force 
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management to change practices. In a big company, the union newspaper used 
humour (primarily cartoons), to expose bad management practices. This kind of 
humour was not encouraged by the leadership. By drawing on familiar images from 
mainstream Brazilian culture, such as comparisons with animals, the anonymous 
cartoons made such an impression that the company management was forced to 
improve working conditions and to change a practice regarding selection of 
employees.138  
Another article which primarily draws on organisational theory is “Jokes in a 
Garment Workshop in Hanoi: How does Humour Foster the Perception of 
Community in Social Movements?”139 by Nghiem Lien Huong. In spite of its title, 
the article has no references to social movement literature. The author analyses 
two jokes from a garment factory in Hanoi and the most important point is that the 
jokes help to foster a sense of community among workers on the shop floor and 
reflect a collective reality. Huong thinks that the jokes help to relieve tensions in a 
tough working environment. In the two jokes which are mentioned, the workers 
joke about themselves (in one of them about their perceived stupidity), while at the 
same time the jokes illustrate how terrible the working environment is, and how 
workers are pressured to lie to working condition inspectors. The author also 
claims that these kind of jokes lie somewhere between obedience and resistance, 
that they are neither one nor the other. However, that the jokes are told among the 
workers and not a way of confronting the employer makes it difficult to see how 
they can be more than part of Scott’s hidden transcript of not-yet declared 
resistance.140  
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Humour as nonviolent resistance 
The basic question that this thesis asks is what happens when political activists 
use humour in an encounter with persons and institutions they consider more 
powerful than themselves. Among scholars of humour, the opinions about this 
issue diverge considerably, and scepticism towards the rebellious potential of 
humour is not unusual. Billig, for example, wants to show how humour also serves 
to enforce social order through ridicule and mockery, a subject he thinks has been 
neglected in humour research.141 Some of the researchers who focus on political 
jokes or medieval folly also have a tendency to become sceptical.142 However, as 
shown above, studies with organisational theory as their point of departure found 
that there can be much humour in the workplace at the expense of those on top of 
the hierarchies, including in places with very hard working conditions and 
systematic suppression of unions.143 
In her book Irony’s edge, Linda Hutcheon calls irony transideological, meaning that 
in itself irony is not radical or conservative. It is not a mode of oppression or a 
mode of resistance; it is just a particular way of communicating. Irony can be 
labelled in all sorts of ways depending on how it has been applied, and who you 
ask to have an opinion about it.144 Although not all humour is ironic, I think that this 
particular observation is valid for all kinds of humour. 
The dismissal of humour’s rebellious potential is still going on. Tsakona and Popa 
in their introduction to Studies in Political Humour from 2012 continue the 
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argumentation of people like Benton, Davies and Hong, although in a slightly 
moderated phrasing. They claim to identify this myth: 
Political humour is considered to be subversive and leading to 
political change: by offering a different perspective on political 
issues, it not only leads the audience to question the effectiveness 
of political decisions and practices, but also serves as a means of 
resistance to, or even rebellion against, political oppression and 
social injustice.145  
In their introduction they say that all of this is just a popular myth and claim that 
even when humour conveys criticism, it “recycles and reinforces dominant values 
and views on politics”146 This might be a fair conclusion based on the data they 
have looked at, but it should not be generalised to all political humour. It is 
especially problematic when they are basing it on a literature review that neglects 
findings that point in a different direction. So while Hong’s findings (which are 
based on just two personal diaries) are referred to at length, they do not include 
Barker, Branagan, Downe, Huong, Rodrigues & Collinson, Taylor & Bain, Stokker 
and Sørensen in their review.147  
What is particularly problematic about these humour scholars’ way of discussing 
what happens in political humour is the dichotomous understandings of power, 
resistance and change underlying their line of argumentation. They do not appear 
to take into consideration that power, change and resistance is not a question of 
either-or.  
James Scott’s concept of hidden transcripts and everyday resistance is one of the 
most nuanced yet also very concrete ways of explaining the complexity. Scott 
developed the idea of the hidden transcripts as a way to describe the behaviours of 
people in extreme subordinate positions, such as slaves and serfs, behind the 
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backs of their masters. In the public transcript which they display to their masters, 
they might appear humble, subdued and passive, but when they are out of sight, 
they might work slower, steal and ridicule the master. In Scott’s opinion they are 
wise to do this behind the scenes. These sorts of resistance activities might never 
become an open confrontation, but according to Scott it is unlikely that a public 
declaration of resistance is going to happen without being preceded by a well-
developed hidden transcript.148  
Asef Bayat is another author who has nuanced perceptions of what resistance can 
look like and how organised it has to be in order to have an effect. Although Bayat 
criticises Scott for his emphasis on intention, they do have much in common. Bayat 
has coined the expression quiet encroachment of the ordinary to describe the way 
for example street vendors and slum dwellers in the cities of the global south carve 
out niches of public space for themselves in order to improve their lives. They 
spread out their businesses on the pavements, sell merchandise comprising major 
brands, build their homes without permission and illegally tap into the power grid. 
People do this as part of their everyday lives, individually and fragmented and 
without guidance from ideology or leaders. Because they are so many, the 
practices change societies. This quiet encroachment of the ordinary Bayat calls 
social nonmovements. What they do is not an obvious political protest, since they 
are not protesting on the streets demanding to get a better life, but day by day 
creating it. Like Scott, Bayat gives much agency to ordinary people who 
“understand the constraints yet recognize and discover opportunities and take 
advantage of the spaces that are available to enhance their life-chances.”149 Only 
when their gains are under attack do these social nonmovements act collectively, 
for instance in defending their homes and business opportunities. The social 
nonmovements might one day become social movements, but that is not what is 
most interesting about them. Bayat’s major contribution is to document how their 
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impact can be measured by the way they transform societies through the quiet 
encroachment.150 Bayat’s findings are not of direct relevance to the study of 
humorous political stunts which are not part of ordinary, daily activities, but his 
studies broadens the horizon when it comes to understanding the complexities of 
resistance. Just as the slaves and serfs that Scott writes about, the resistance of 
the urban poor is more successful the more discreet and unnoticed it manages to 
be. A major implication of Scott’s and Bayat’s work is that hidden resistance might 
have an influence even if it does not lead to immediate results or is organised.   
People like of Benton and Tsakona & Popa imply that only a more organised 
resistance is real resistance. However, much resistance is covert, opportunity 
based, and goes on behind the scenes. It is in its nature not to be discovered. It 
can happen totally without humour – but humour is also likely to be part of the 
folklore that keeps the cultures of resistance alive. 
In my own previous work I combined Scott’s concept of hidden transcripts with 
theory of nonviolence to develop a framework for understanding humour as 
nonviolent resistance to oppression.151 I documented how those who think like 
Benton have too simple a view of power and resistance when they claim jokes are 
a vent which cannot contribute to resistance. I suggested that humour as a form of 
nonviolent resistance to oppression has three different functions:   
1. As a way of reaching out to people who are not already part of a nonviolent 
resistance movement, it can facilitate outreach and mobilisation.  
2. Within an already established resistance movement, humour can facilitate a 
culture of resistance by building solidarity and strengthening the individual’s 
capacity for participating in resistance. Colin Barker in his book chapter “The 
Making of Solidarity at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk” about the emergence of the 
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independent trade union Solidarity in Poland in 1980 explains how political jokes 
were an expression of distrust in the ruling system that contributed to people 
distancing themselves emotionally from the regime.152 His findings support my own 
stance, and provide a challenge to authors such as Davies and Benton who 
dismiss the potential contribution of whispered jokes to resistance. Political jokes 
themselves do not automatically lead to resistance, but they can potentially be 
crucial in shaping independent thinking that assists moves towards open 
resistance.  
3. Humour can affect the relationship between the nonviolent resistance movement 
and the oppressor. This last function has the most powerful potential, because it 
can affect the relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed.  
This framework was originally developed to understand humour which was part of 
a resistance to oppression, and its main source of empirical data was humorous 
actions carried out by a Serbian group called Otpor between 1998-2000. These 
actions were successful as part of a strategy to resist the dictatorship in Serbia 
during the rule of Slobodan Milošević. However, I now find that the dichotomy of 
oppressor-oppressed is too narrow and simplistic to adequately address relations 
of power. I provide a less dichotomous definition below.  
The only other major work which explicitly analyses the use of humour within 
nonviolence theory is Janjira Sombutpoonsiri’s PhD thesis “The Use of Humour as 
a Vehicle for Nonviolent Struggle: Serbia's 1996-7 Protests and the OTPOR 
(Resistance) Movement”.153 It is a thorough documentation of the use of humour in 
Serbian nonviolent resistance to the rule of Milošević in the late 1990’s and 2000 
based on interviews with the organisers of the nonviolent actions and analysis of 
media reports. It investigates how humour was used or not used in different cities 
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and towns depending on Otpor’s cooperation or lack of cooperation with the 
opposition parties, NGO’s and access to independent media. Sombutpoonsiri 
places the use of humour in its cultural context, characterised by Serbian black 
humour, absurd theatre and the political situation for the opposition in the 1990’s. 
Sombutpoonsiri is well aware that her findings based on a single case study cannot 
be generalised to all use of humour in nonviolent struggles without testing them on 
other cases. With this in mind, she offers the following theoretical contribution: 
… humour works as a vehicle of nonviolent struggle in three ways. 
First, it subverts the propaganda of ruling elites, enabling 
protesters to turn that propaganda against its creators. Second, 
humour channels the antagonistic atmosphere of street protests 
into cheerfulness, helping to avoid clashes between protesters and 
the security forces. Third, humour offers a metaphor of 
emancipation from an oppressive polity, encouraging the 
oppressed to make this metaphor become reality.154 
Sombutpoonsiri uses the concepts of excorporation and the carnivalesque to 
analyse humour’s unique contribution to nonviolent resistance. The concept of 
excorporation was introduced by John Fiske, and by applying that to the use of 
humour in nonviolence, Sombutpoonsiri takes critiques of Sharp’s theory of 
consent into consideration. Excorporation means that resistance to a system does 
not require a total withdrawal from that system, something which critiques of Sharp 
said was not possible. Sombutpoonsiri writes:  
’Excorporation’ suggest a method of subverting hegemonic power 
without suspending the entire system of domination. The concept 
is based on the understanding that domination and resistance can 
take place in the same space.155  
Sombutpoonsiri documents many examples of Serbian use of excorporation 
through satire and parody against Milošević’s regime, both in the 1996-97 protests 
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and in Otpor’s street skits. It twisted the regime’s propaganda thus invalidating its 
truth claims without making the critique explicit.156  
During carnivals, Sombutpoonsiri thinks that multiple voices can exist at the same 
time thus fostering an atmosphere of dialogue despite the existence of prejudices 
and antagonism. She explains “The carnivalesque world offers a scenario where 
alternative realities to the seemingly fixed present one may just be possible”.157 
Again this is thoroughly documented with many examples of how the carnivalesque 
speaks to the imagination of other possible realities and channels anger into 
positive emotions.158 A joyful atmosphere transforms hostility between protesters 
and authorities and helps maintain nonviolent discipline. It also becomes a way for 
protesters to overcome the dilemma between their anger and frustration over the 
situation, and the seemingly impossible demand from advocates of principled 
nonviolence to “love the enemy”. Sombutpoonsiri expresses it this way:  
In a nonviolent conflict, carnivalesque humour constitutes an 
alternative means of expressing emotion that overcomes the 
dilemma of choosing between getting angry at those responsible 
for the oppression being resisted, or loving them in spite of it.159 
In spite of the limited interest in humour from scholars of nonviolence, some other 
studies that are relevant exist. They use social movement theory as their point of 
departure rather than theory of nonviolence. In 2007, an interesting collection of 
articles were published in the book Humour and Social Protest edited by Marjolein 
‘t Hart and Dennis Bos,160 containing both historical and contemporary examples of 
humorous protest. Some of them I have already mentioned in the relevant sections 
about jokes, occupations and organisational theory. The introduction to the book 
includes an overview of the study of humour and protest and suggests the social 
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movement theory concerned with identity and emotions as an interesting tool for 
analysing humour and protest. Thomas Olesen in his article “The Funny Side of 
Globalization: Humour and Humanity in Zapatista Framing”,161 shows how the 
Zapatistas’ humour was one strategy for framing their struggle in a way which 
could be understood globally. They used a universal humour referring to humanity 
and human beings’ shortcomings in order to have resonance with their audience, 
thus using the symbolic and emotional aspects of humour to bridge differences 
between them and their audience.  
Lisiunia A. Romanienko’s contribution “Antagonism, Absurdity, and the Avant-
Garde: Dismantling Soviet Oppression through the Use of Theatrical Devices by 
Poland's Solidarity Movement”,162 is also using a frame of social movement theory 
to highlight how the Polish group Orange Alternative through their absurd 
happenings in the late 1980’s found a way of protesting which was difficult for the 
Polish authorities to respond to. In his book A Carnival of Revolution - Central 
Europe 1989, Padraic Kenney shows how groups like the Orange Alternative, the 
Society for a Merrier Present in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Children 
contributed to a carnivalesque atmosphere in Central Europe and a transformation 
of “how to do protest” in the late 1980’s. The change was essential for preparing 
the ground for the revolutions of 1989 and is neglected in most accounts of the 
events.163  
The Orange Alternative is a group whose stunts will be analysed in Chapter 3. 
Another scholar which has used the Orange Alternative as a case study is M. Lane 
Bruner in his article “Carnivalesque Protest and the Humorless State”.164 Bruner 
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thinks that conditions need to be favourable in order for carnivalesque protest to 
succeed, but when they are, this form of protest can be the most effective way to 
challenge corruption. Also he notices that humour, in contrast to serious protest, 
can be difficult to respond to, since arresting elves and turtles means bad publicity 
for the state. In his discussion about carnival he points out (like Zijderveld) that 
although authorities might intend carnivals to be an outlet for frustration and a way 
of retaining social control, they have no guarantee that they do not end up as a 
challenge to power. The same conclusion is reached by Anna Lundberg in her 
contribution to Humour and Social Protest. In “Queering Laughter in the Stockholm 
Pride Parade”165 she also finds that carnival has a political potential because of its 
rejection of what is considered normal.  
Simon Teune is also interested in how the use of humour affects the relationship 
between a social movement and the authorities it reacts against. In “Humour as a 
Guerrilla Tactic: The West German Student Movement’s Mockery of the 
Establishment “he investigates how the student movement in the conservative and 
authoritarian Republic of Germany was influenced by the concept of Spassguerrilla 
(fun-guerrilla) towards the end of the 1960’s.166 He uses examples of actions 
carried out by Kommune 1, the most widely known group that to a large degree set 
the tone in the early stages of the student movement. Their ironic actions provoked 
strong reactions from the state and from the populist media, and in this way 
radicalised members of the student movement and drew new members to it. 
Kommune 1 used their court cases to continue ridiculing authority, and in this way 
showed how difficult it is to respond to humorous attacks. However, their tactics 
were not embraced by everyone in the student movement. The biggest student 
organisation preferred a strategy of rational argumentation, and did not perceive 
the ambiguity and irony that Spassguerrilla represented as a fruitful path to pursue.  
                                            
165
 Anna Lundberg, "Queering Laughter in the Stockholm Pride Parade," International Review of 
Social History 52, no. S15 (2007). 
166
 Simon Teune, "Humour as a Guerrilla Tactic: The West German Student Movement's Mockery 
of the Establishment," International Review of Social History 52, no. SupplementS15 (2007). 
89 
 
An early attempt to point out that humour is an under researched area of social 
movement studies was done by Harry Hiller in his article “Humor and Hostility: A 
Neglected Aspect of Social Movement Analysis”.167 He set up a model for how to 
explain humour and used the case study of the Western Canadian separatist 
movement to illustrate how most of the humour used by social movements ought to 
be considered resistance-oriented and can be a way of expressing hostility in a 
social conflict. At the time of his case study in the early 1980’s, many people in 
Western Canada felt that they were being neglected by the Canadian central 
authorities in spite of their contributions to the national economy. Hiller looks at 
humorous novelty items such as bumper stickers, t-shirts and caps from a social 
movement working for independence for Western Canada. A message like 
“Republic of Western Canada” on a cap is ambiguous because people cannot be 
sure if the person who wears it is serious or making fun of this idea. This ambiguity 
means that the carrier of this message is not held responsible the same way she 
would normally be, and that people can adjust to the idea of an independent 
Western Canada slowly. Even if some will wear it because they are committed to 
the idea, others will buy it because they like to play with an idea they are not yet 
fully committed to.  
Marty Branagan in his article “The last laugh: humour in community activism”168 
writes from his own experience as a participant in social justice and eco-pax 
movements in Australia. He describes many positive functions of using humour as 
a supplement to serious communication, especially relating to internal dynamics in 
the movements. He observes that humour makes popular education more 
interesting and contributes to a more inclusive movement. It can also make 
activism more sustainable by preventing burnout, contribute to transforming anger 
into more positive emotions and help maintain nonviolent discipline in spite of 
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provocations. In relation to people who are not involved in a movement 
themselves, he notes how the use of inclusive humour improved relations with 
police during events he observed.  
Culture jamming, pranks and tactical carnival 
Research traditions (and practices of activism) that frequently include humour but 
are not limited to humour are culture jamming, pranks and tactical carnival. These 
genres share a playful attitude towards expression of dissent and use various 
creative or artistic ways of communicating. A couple of activist accounts and 
documentations are Joel Schechter’s Satiric Impersonations169 and a collection of 
stories and interviews about “creative disruption of everyday life” called The 
Interventionists.170 Many examples of these practices are also included in the 
handbook Beautiful Trouble: A Toolbox for Revolution.171 
The boundaries between various forms of art, interventions, and pranks are 
porous. In her book Satire and Dissent: Interventions in Contemporary Political 
Debate, Amber Day writes about the differences and similarities between some of 
them.172 She primarily uses US examples, and focuses on parody news shows 
(like the The Daily Show), satiric documentaries (like Michael Moore’s movies) and 
ironic activism (similar to what I call humorous political stunts).  
An important inspiration for many of these activist-artists was the Situationist 
International, which originated in France from 1957 and worked against the way 
that society had become a spectacle, a phrase introduced by Guy Debord.173 As 
part of the spectacle, citizens were expected to consume ready-made cultural 
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products instead of inventing their own. The situationists found that people were no 
longer important as workers and producers; their major role was as consumers.174 
Responding to this development, the situationists aimed to deconstruct the ready-
made, and had several strategies for this. The most well-known is 
détournement.175 Harold defines this as “a detouring of pre-existing Spectacular 
[sic] messages and images in an effort to subvert and reclaim them.”176 That 
means an altering of original concepts into something different that can express a 
deeper message.  
The French situationists and Debord’s détournement were important inspirations 
for what later became known as culture jamming and the idea of the detour is 
present in many humorous political stunts. The American Yippies have been a 
similar inspiration coming from a different direction. The group was not formally 
founded until December 31st, 1967, but already earlier in 1967, two of the would be 
yippies, Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman, had been the front figures of 
performances that would fit into my definition of humorous political stunts.  
On August 24, 1967, Abbie Hoffman and a group of people entered the New York 
Stock Exchange, and from the gallery threw dollar bills down on the floor. What 
actually happened and how the stockbrokers reacted has been the subject of much 
mythmaking – and Hoffman has deliberately been vague about it. However, the 
lack of exact documentation has most likely caused many to imagine greedy 
stockbrokers crawling around on the floor to grab the money. No media were 
inside, and there are no photos of the event. One person claimed that they threw 
1000 dollars, others that it was just 30-40 one dollar bills. Hoffman himself wrote 
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that the stock dealers “let out a mighty cheer,”177 while the New York Times 
reported mixed reactions of smiles and shouts.178 After being escorted out, the 
activists also burned dollar bills outside of the stock exchange. Although this was 
certainly not the first time performers tried to blur the line between audiences and 
performers, according to Duree, the demonstration created “a form of protest that 
happened in the midst of the spectators, whether the spectators wanted to be 
involved or not”.179  
Later culture jammers have mainly focused on resisting corporate control of public 
space, for example through billboard liberation. The involved groups and networks 
have been numerous and frequently anonymous. An early Australian example was 
Billboard Utilising Graffitists Against Unhealthy Promotions, or for short B.U.G.A 
U.P, which in the 1980’s especially targeted cigarette commercials and was 
influential in changing the laws regulating cigarette advertising in Australia.180  
A few years later, Naomi Klein’s book No logo181 and Kalle Lasn’s Culture Jam182 
quickly became classics for activists from the global justice movement. Today 
companies rely on branding to sell their products – Coca Cola is not just a soft 
drink, and Nike not just a shoe, but brands that aim to sell an image of a cool 
lifestyle filled with beauty, youth and happiness. Companies spend millions of 
dollars on developing their brands, but the brands also become vulnerable to 
attack by so-called subvertising.183 Well done subvertising does not just express a 
general critique of consumerism, but use parody to attack the vulnerable aspects of 
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a particular product. Subvertising uses the brand’s own imagery to talk back to it, 
and reveal consequences of consuming the product or the production methods 
which the producers would prefer to keep away from the public mind. This can be 
to connect cigarettes with cancer or Nike with sweatshop production where 
workers in the global south work long hours in horrible working conditions and are 
paid wages they cannot live on. Harold quotes Robert Phiddian to suggest that the 
parodies do not destroy a brand, but instead deconstruct it by making potential 
consumers associate the brand with something other than what was intended.184  
Harold herself suggests the term rhetorical jiu-jitsu to catch how the force of the 
brand is turned against itself like in the martial art.185 Harold does not refer to 
Sharp, but this is an echo of his concept political jiu-jitsu from theory of nonviolent 
action. When the company Calvin Klein was advertising the perfume Obsession 
using a very thin young female model, the magazine Adbusters’ parody ad used 
the brand’s own style to attack it. In Adbusters’ version, the skinny model is not just 
young and pretty, but vomiting over the toilet bowl, indicating that in order to look 
like the skinny models, women develop eating disorders.186 To do this kind of 
subvertising in a way that makes sense to the audiences, requires familiarity with 
the brand and its ads, otherwise they just become meaningless.  
Harold also points to the limitation of this type of activism – it does not provide 
alternatives, since there is no suggestions of how to replace the desires the brands 
tempt with. There is also a risk of co-optation, of the anti-logo becoming the new 
cool logo for those who are the avant-garde trendsetters. Already the situationists 
were aware of this risk. They wrote that the spectacle was so sophisticated that it 
would be possible for the companies to take over the critique and make it their 
own, re-package it in a slightly different version and sell it back as the latest 
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trend.187 Today the rebels, culture jamming and anti-logo culture itself become cool 
and you can buy merchandise with jams. This all leads Harold to ask: “I can only 
wonder: Is the rhetoric and imagery of rebellion bankrupt?”188  
 
Illustration 3. Parody of Obsession ad that uses skinny model. © 
Adbusters, reprinted with permission. 
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Harold refers to Derrida when she says that the parodies are not really 
deconstructions, because a real deconstruction requires a double reading, not just 
the sabotaging of the establishment.189 In search of deconstructions that do not 
provide the recipe of what is “correct thought” and where the 
performer/artist/activist does not talk down to the audience, Harold turns to pranks, 
hoaxes, and comedy. She writes: “Whereas the parodist attempts to change things 
in the name of a presupposed value, the comedian diagnoses her situation and 
tries something to see how people respond.”190  
An example of a prank in Harold’s understanding is the Barbie Liberation 
Organization which since 1989 has liberated the Barbie doll and the G.I Joe action 
figure from gender stereotypes. A group of people bought a number of talking dolls, 
and switched the voice boxes from these two figures around. Afterwards they put 
the boxes back on the shelves without the staff noticing, an activity called 
shopdropping. When the children opened their Christmas presents, Barbie said 
“Dead men tell no lies” instead of giggling “let’s plan our dream wedding.” G.I Joe 
said things like “I love shopping.” The reaction from Mattel that produces Barbie 
was to downplay it all and say they had had no complaints from customers.191  
In this example of shopdropping, like many types of pranking, the pranksters are 
not explicit with why they do this. The whole idea is to stimulate independent 
thinking without telling people what to think. The deception is all part of the drama, 
and serves an important purpose – when people realise they have been exposed 
to a prank, and maybe temporarily fooled by it, their daily routines are broken.192  
In his book Electoral Guerrilla Theatre: Radical Ridicule and Social Movements L. 
M. Bogad identified what he calls electoral guerrilla theatre, as a recently added 
tactic in the repertoire of contention. Electoral guerrilla theatre is used by activists 
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within liberal democracies to ridicule these highly ritualised arenas, either by 
attacking the whole electoral system or sabotaging a particular candidate’s 
possibility for being taken seriously. Bogad uses three case studies from the 
Netherlands, Australia and USA to show how this has been an innovative way for 
social movements to confront a right wing candidate in Australia (Pauline 
Pantsdown ridiculed Pauline Hanson), criticism of heteronormativity in the US 
(drag queen Miss Joan Jettblakk) and confronting the establishment in the 
Netherlands (the Kabouters).193  
Bogad has also analysed various performance elements in traditional 
demonstrations, calling them tactical carnival. It is both a way to confront some of 
the dogmas within the traditional left and can contribute to opening up public space 
as well as “create a joyous counterculture that can sustain long-term participation 
in a movement”.194 The goals of tactical carnival are to occupy space, present a 
friendly face to outsiders, provide an alternative to the existing world order, help 
overcome fear and create a culture of active defiance.195 In Queer Political 
Performance and Protest, Benjamin Shepard is not concerned with a particular 
tactic, but shows how performance, show and the carnivalesque have a long 
tradition within queer protest in the US. The group ACT UP, focused on HIV and 
AIDS, was crucial in setting the example for how protest could be performed in a 
more carnivalesque atmosphere.196 The carnivalesque is one way of doing 
aesthetic politics as Kenneth Tucker calls it. In his book Workers of the World, 
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Enjoy! he ties the increase in aesthetics to the crisis in modernity where truth and 
knowledge are no longer given.197 
Theoretically, Bogad makes a distinction between the Bakhtian carnival that turns 
the world upside down, and the tactical carnival that suggests that other worlds are 
possible. The tactical carnival of today is not the same as the carnival carried out in 
medieval times or as described by Bakhtin. Instead it is a reclaiming of the idea of 
carnival for the purpose of the activists.198  
From a similar activist-academic performance studies tradition, Kristina Schriver 
and Donna Marie Nudd write about their experiences with the Mickee Faust Club in 
Florida in the US.199 One of the two examples they give is a prank where some of 
the performers made an intervention in a controversial parade. They suggest a 
distinction between celebratory and interventionist types of protest performances 
but unfortunately they do not eleborate on this distinction.  
In their article “Performing vs. the Insurmountable”, Benjamin Shepard, L. M. 
Bogad and Stephen Duncombe enter the debate about power and effective 
activism from the perspective of playful activism. This type of activism has been 
accused of the same shortcomings as humour – not being effective and taking 
away energy from forms of activism which really matter. The three authors, who all 
have participated in playful organising for social change, use their own experiences 
to show how playful activism can increase outreach to media, recruit new members 
by inviting them in to play, contribute to creating communities of resistance and 
play with relations of power. They write that:  
At its most basic level, play as political performance is about 
freedom – of the mind and the body – from any number of 
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repressive forces, from the state to the super ego, the cop in the 
head.”200  
In an article Shepard wrote on his own, he emphasised joyfulness as an important 
aspect of community organising.201  
Shepard, Bogad and Duncombe write that “play and political performance creates 
spaces where activists feel compelled to challenge seemingly insurmountable 
targets”.202 One of the criticisms they counter is that only the middle class can 
afford to play.203 Instead of seeing the playful as something alien to the struggle 
itself, they show how it is an integrated part of people’s lives and struggles and 
playful elements in protest can make people remain committed over a long period 
of time. And even if much creativity is directed towards the already converted, it 
helps make these networks denser.204 
In their text Shepard, Bogad and Duncombe reflect together with Jennifer Miller, 
founder of New York based Circus Amok, about the importance of doing 
something, even if it is not the most “effective” way of behaving: 
“This insurmountable thing is where cynicism comes from,” Circus 
Amok founder Jennifer Miller concedes. “It’s insurmountable, 
we’ve got to become capitalists.” Yet, the flip side of such thinking 
remains. The logic of play is that it defies conventional logic. It 
invites people to stay engaged within subjects that are far more 
serious than can be dealt with in an earnest fashion. Some issues 
are far too important to be dealt with a straight face. Rather, 
jokes, ridicule, and play may be the most post potent tools 
activists have, especially in the face of overwhelming obstacles. 
Such a spirit of defiance is sometimes all one can do; sometimes it 
is just enough. “That opens up space for activism,” Miller reflects. 
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It makes the predictable not so predictable for just a minute. “It 
makes working in the face of the insurmountable a reasonable 
choice [. . .] It’s not the most efficient thing to do, but its the only 
thing we can do [. . .] there is so much joy in being able to shout 
in our anger together.205 
Finally, with a reference to Schechner, Shepard, Bogad and Duncombe write that 
“Much of the politics of play involves shifting debate about who plays, on what 
terms, by whose rules, and on whose playing field”.206 
This section with the overall heading “humour, politics, protest and social conflict” 
has included seven subheadings aimed at summing up and discussing the 
possibilities and limitations of a number of different academic traditions relevant to 
the subject of humorous political stunts. It has included perspectives from studies 
of political jokes, traditional folly, humour in occupations, gender studies, 
organisational theory, nonviolent resistance and finally culture jamming, pranks 
and tactical carnival. After this long introduction, I will conclude the chapter by 
defining the central concepts of the thesis and discussing the ethical aspects of 
humour.  
Power, resistance, activism and discourse  
Power is one of the most contested terms in social science. My approach to the 
issue is inspired by a number of authors, including the scholars of nonviolence that 
I referred to above. Steven Lukes’ classic essay Power: A Radical View and the 
three views on power he presents are a good starting point for a multifaceted 
understanding of power.207 Chapter 4 in April Carter’s book People Power and 
Political Change208 gives a good overview of the limitations with the consent 
perspective dominant in theory of nonviolence. Foucault’s thinking on power has 
inspired Vinthagen, but otherwise his perspectives are rather absent in theory of 
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nonviolent action. Foucault worked from the assumption that power only exists in 
people’s relations to other people, which means that power is multi-dimensional.209 
Although Foucault wrote very little about how power can be resisted, he did point 
out that resistance was a place to start investigating how power works.210 An 
interesting application of Foucault’s perspective in relation to nonviolence can also 
be found in Bleiker’s concept of transversal dissent.211   
Power is not something people have or do not have, and therefore resistance 
cannot be a question of either or. Nevertheless, some people appear more 
powerful than others. A person or a group of people might perceive themselves to 
be in power, and others might view them as extremely powerful. If this dominant 
group control resources, and can induce other people to do things that are in the 
interest of these apparently powerful, then this becomes a self-reinforcing cycle. 
Those already in power get the opportunity to set the agenda, and become the 
representatives of dominant discourses. This does not imply that the resisters are 
powerless, that alternative discourses are non-existent or that the power relations 
cannot change. Nevertheless the activists themselves experience their position as 
marginal, subordinate and asymmetric. The apparently powerful can experience 
moments of slipping control, but under most circumstance this is only temporarily. 
Dominant discourses are those well-established “truths” and taken for granted 
knowledges which rule a certain domain without being appreciably affected or 
displaced by challenges. I will not discuss in detail how the dominant discourses 
manifest themselves and to what degree they dominate. Sufficient for the purpose 
here is to recognise that some people consider them dominant enough, and are 
disturbed enough by this dominance, to set out to challenge them. 
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Although dominant and apparently powerful, even in the most brutal dictatorship or 
situations of oppression the dictator cannot have total control. Dissenters always 
manage to carve out small niches outside of the apparently almighty’s control. 
These pockets of resistance are important for expanding resistance. As an overall 
name, I refer to these dissenters as “activists”. Most of the activists that appear in 
the examples here are from groups concerned with social justice, peace, anti-
consumerism and the environment since they appear to be the ones using 
humorous political stunts in their activism. However, activists can just as well be 
marginalised right wing extremists and conservatives and I do not exclude the 
possibility that they can use humorous political stunts as well.  
In most arenas the activists are subordinate towards representatives of the state 
and big companies who control resources like money, land, legal violence, well-
educated employees, and have the law on their side. In spite of these enormous 
obstacles, activists are not just fighting against people and groups who are more 
powerful than them, but also the discourses of what is true, right and just that the 
apparently powerful uphold. In order for the writing not to become monotone, I will 
refer to these interchangeably as “dominant discourse”, “truth” and “rationality” and 
to the people who represent these views as “representatives of the dominant 
discourses” and “the powerful”. Sometimes I will modify with “apparently powerful” 
and similar expressions.  
In order to take these nuanced understandings of relations of power into 
consideration when studying political humour, it is necessary not just to judge the 
immediate outcome of telling a joke, painting a humorous graffiti or doing a 
humorous action in public by its ability to change policies or actual circumstances. 
One also has to ask if humour contributes to reaching out to various audiences, 
mobilising new activists and creating a culture of resistance that makes activism 
sustainable. And in what ways can humour be part of challenging established 
relations of power and undermine dominant discourses? 
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Humour and ethics 
In the context of political humour it is also relevant to raise the question of ethics. In 
2005, two scholars independent of each other published books about ethical 
considerations regarding laughter and ridicule. Michael Billig’s Laughter and 
Ridicule: Towards a Social Critique of Laughter is written from the perspective of 
critical sociology, and sets out to question common sense beliefs that humour is 
necessarily positive and good.212 The Pleasure of Fools: Essays in the Ethics of 
Laughter by Jure Gantar213 takes a very different approach. His point of departure 
is philosophy about ethics. For Gantar there is no question that some laughter is 
unethical, but he wants to investigate if this is a characteristic of all laughter, or if it 
is possible to have constructive and inclusive laughter.214 The sources for Gantar’s 
investigations are various forms of classic literature – from Greek comedies to 
Oscar Wilde. 
Gantar finds no shortage of people who throughout history have considered 
laughter unethical, and he writes that “Of all these different kinds of laughter the 
one that is most frequently associated with the unethical is satirical laughter”.215 
Since much political humour involves satire, Gantar’s findings are of interest. The 
reason satire is considered unethical is because its target is very often a real 
person, and satire is based on contempt for this person. No matter how much they 
deserve it, there is always someone who gets hurt by satire. As an example, 
Gantar notes how Adolf Hitler was upset by Charlie Chaplin’s movie The Dictator. 
However, Gantar emphasises that it is also possible to argue that satirical laughter 
is most ethical. Satire is social correction, and it corrects what is morally wrong.216  
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Gantar also recognises humour’s subversive potential, and thinks that it can be 
ethical to laugh at the oppressor.217 He then proceeds to see if there will be any 
laughter at all in Utopia, when all social inequality has been abolished. He finds 
that the prospect for laughter is bleak in the perfect world that various authors have 
dreamed about.  
Gantar’s conclusion is both interesting and surprising. After he has carefully 
demonstrated how all types of laughter can potentially be unethical, he declares 
that he has found himself at “an epistemological dead end”.218 The problem is that 
ethical criticism of laughter either ends up censoring laughter, or keeps looking for 
an innocent laughter that does not exist. He concludes that the subject of ethics “is 
incapable of dealing with laughter.”219 The reason is that ethical criticism does not 
have the capacity to distinguish between a joke and an insult; it will all look the 
same. So Gantar ends up concluding that “When we laugh, we should not care 
about offending. And when we investigate laughter critically, we should forget 
about ethics”.220  
Billig’s approach to laughter and ridicule differs greatly from Gantar’s, since his 
starting point is not ethics, but critical sociology. His aim is to question the taken for 
granted assumption that humour is something good and positive which is dominant 
in today’s western societies. He reminds his readers that much humour also serves 
to enforce social order through ridicule and mockery, and that this aspect is a 
neglected area in studies of humour.221 Billig is aware that humour can both disrupt 
and impose social order. However, in the tradition of critical sociology his focus is 
the social control he thinks others have neglected and what appear to be contrary 
to dominant common sense beliefs. Nevertheless, this one-sidedness becomes 
problematic because Billig almost ends up with the opposite one-sidedness. He 
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makes generalisations from everyday ridicule which cannot be justified to apply to 
humorous political stunts as well.  
Billig shows that the concept of a good sense of humour as a positive character 
trait historically is a rather new phenomenon, which was first used in the 1840s, but 
did not become common until the 1870’s. In his critical investigation, Billig also 
points out that contrary to common sense impressions, the medical evidence on 
the benefits of humour is “weak and inconclusive”.222 He claims that the idea that 
humour helps us heal and prevents diseases, as stressed by many self-help 
books, is not based on solid evidence. Psychology’s focus on the individual’s 
capacity to handle stress and negative events by laughing and looking at what is 
positive is also problematic. Such a perspective of learning to live with whatever 
the problem is and get the best out of the circumstance is an implicit 
discouragement of struggles for social change.223 The origin of many people’s 
problems is not a lack of capacity to cope, but their social position in an unfair and 
unequal world where wealth is the privilege of the few.  
Previously I mentioned Palmer’s point that humorous intent does not automatically 
mean that the audience agrees that something is humorous. Differing perceptions 
of the same situation are also a theme for Billig who points out that ”one person’s 
harmless bit of teasing will be another’s cruelty”.224 This is most obvious when it 
comes to ridicule and mockery. In everyday interactions, few people are willing to 
admit that they ridicule and mock others. What the target considers inappropriate, 
the person who is responsible for it instead refers to as “friendly teasing”. When 
someone is accused of mocking or ridicule during the interactions of daily life, 
many respond that no harm was meant or that they were “just joking”.225 Billig has 
named this response the tease spray, which the person offending can spray 
around her to cover up the bad smell of ridicule. Billig’s arguments about how 
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children learn this behaviour by being mocked and ridiculed by their own parents 
through their upbringing are convincing226, and there is little doubt that the same 
“tease spray” is used by political activists. On the other hand, people exposed to 
ridicule do not have to laugh, but can turn to what Billig calls unlaughter. 
Unlaughter is not the same at not laughing because one does not understand; it is 
a way of showing disapproval when others laugh.227 Unlaughter easily becomes 
the target of ridicule, as will be apparent in chapter 3 about humorous political 
stunts.  
Billig belongs to the group of humour researchers that think that instead of 
producing “real” rebellion, humour becomes a safety valve.228 The problems with 
this position were addressed in detail above and Billig does not add anything new 
to the debate. He suggests that there are some life circumstances people ought to 
rebel against. Nevertheless, his focus on how ridicule maintains social order in 
daily life has led him to sound as if ridicule is always something morally 
problematic. He acknowledges that ridiculing a child as a form of discipline might 
be considered a milder form of punishment than violence, but this is not discussed 
in relation to humour’s rebellious potential.229 If the example of the ridiculed child is 
transferred to societal level, the equivalent would be that a mocking would be 
better than a violent crackdown on protesters. Although he provides an example of 
a child ridiculing its parent this is not transferred to an ethical discussion about 
what it means when a subordinate political group ridicules those in power.  
Conclusion  
Both nonviolence and humour have been researched academically as 
multidisciplinary fields. Humour as a form of protest has caught the attention of 
many authors, studying themes as diverse as political jokes, traditional folly, culture 
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jamming and humour during occupations. They come from various backgrounds, 
including everything from sociology, folklore research and gender studies, to 
organisational theory and community studies. Many scholars have contributed with 
insights through case studies focusing on particular circumstances or specific 
forms of humour, but few have been interested in humour as an aspect of 
nonviolent resistance.  
Theories of Sharp and Gandhi were used to introduce the variety in approaches to 
nonviolent action. These theories range from viewing nonviolence as a pragmatic 
choice, which increases the odds for success, to the only morally acceptable way 
to strive for social change, involving the activist’s whole life. The four rationalities of 
dialogue facilitation, power breaking, utopian enactment and normative regulation 
suggested by Vinthagen provide a framework for understanding nonviolent action 
which takes its complexities into consideration. In chapter 7 I will investigate how 
the different rationalities might be affected by diverse forms of humour.  
Within humour studies what is called the incongruity tradition is most dominant, 
and this aspect is also included in the definition of humour used here. However, the 
opposite of humour is routinely called “serious” both in academia and everyday 
language – a use of terminology which creates an artificial and misleading 
dichotomy between the “serious” and the humorous. I consider it more useful to 
refer to the opposite of humour as “rational” or “non-humorous”, a distinction that 
takes into account that some humour is indeed deadly serious.   
There are two important works on the ethics of humour. Billig thinks that ridicule 
plays an underestimated role in social control, but has not investigated political 
humour aimed at kicking upwards. Gantar concluded that it is impossible to judge 
humour through the lens of ethics.  
Often the data for analysing humorous protest has been whispered jokes, which by 
their very nature do not engage with the opponents. The emphasis of this source of 
data is probably one reason why there have been so few investigations into the 
interactions between humorous nonviolent resisters and their opponents.  
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For decades it has been debated whether humour contributes to resistance or if it 
is “just” a vent for frustration that either has no impact or is counterproductive 
because it takes time and energy away from activities that would make a real 
difference. For me it is impossible to frame this as a question of either-or. Some 
political humour probably has very little influence on relations of power, but to claim 
humour will never contribute to resisting dictatorship, abuse and injustice is a very 
strong statement. Those who are proponents of these ideas seem to have a 
rudimentary understanding of power and resistance. The insights that authors such 
as Foucault, Scott and Bayat have provided about the complexity of power and the 
subtle and discreet ways that resistance is practiced behind the scenes are absent 
from these scholars’ writings. In addition it is not clear what they actually think 
constitutes “real” change and resistance.  
Dominant discourses and powerful institutions are unlikely to be dismantled 
overnight, but through the centuries, social movements have succeeded in 
changing societies dramatically. The question is not if humour can create this 
change by itself, which is of course very unlikely, but rather the question guiding 
my research: What role can humour play in facilitating resistance to dominant 
discourses and powerful institutions and people?  
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Chapter 2: A methodology for emancipation and 
social change 
Introduction 
The literature review revealed that relatively little is known about my research 
questions regarding subordinate and marginalised political groups’ use of humour 
in public to expose, ridicule and influence those they consider more powerful than 
themselves. This chapter outlines how I have gathered information and discusses 
the possibilities and limitations to the knowledge that can be generated based on 
this data. My case study data collection strategy is described, followed by the 
methods used for later chapters. Afterwards I discuss the assumptions behind the 
decisions I made along the way.  
Data collection – a case study strategy  
In the previous research on the role of humour in nonviolent resistance done by 
myself and others, the Serbian group Otpor had been used as a single case study 
to discuss the relations between humour and nonviolence.230 This time I wanted to 
broaden the data in order to discuss the questions on a more general basis and not 
be limited by the circumstances around this or another particular case. I decided to 
look at many instances of the use of humour and in addition explore how humour 
was used in relation to other non-humorous methods of challenging relations of 
power. Conducting several case studies appeared to be a way to approach the 
subject.   
In “The Case Study and the Study of Social Movements” Snow and Trom describe 
what they call the “the core defining characteristics of the case study” as:  
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(a) investigation and analysis of an instance or variant of some 
bounded social phenomenon that (b) seek to generate a richly 
detailed and “thick” elaboration of the phenomenon studied 
through (c) the use and triangulation of multiple methods or 
procedures that include but are not limited to qualitative 
techniques231  
The “bounded social phenomenon” that I study is political activists’ use of 
humorous political stunts. Chapters 5 and 6, the case studies of Ofog and KMV, 
illustrate how two different but comparable “instances and variants” of this 
phenomenon have utilised humour in their struggles against militarism.232  
Snow and Trom write that using case studies is a research strategy rather than a 
particular method:  
a case study is not a method per se as are ethnography, survey 
research, laboratory experimentation, and historical/comparative 
research. Rather, we argue that the case study is more 
appropriately conceptualized as a research strategy that is 
associated with a number of data-gathering methods or 
procedures.233  
This means that researchers who use case studies as a data collection strategy 
still have to specify what methods they have used in order to collect the data for 
the case study. For both my case studies I have used a triangulation of methods 
which is described in detail below. 
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In order to get even more information about the social phenomenon of humorous 
political stunts, I also collected the examples that are part of chapter 3. They are 
not detailed and “thick” enough to deserve the label case studies, but illustrate a 
part of the diversity of the phenomenon of humorous political stunts, thus 
broadening the study and making it possible to generalise more than what would 
have been possible with just the two case studies.  
I have not used any quantitative methods, for the simple reason that they would not 
be appropriate in order to gather useful information about this subject. Although 
qualitative and quantitative methods do have a different epistemological history, I 
agree with Howard S. Becker that the difference is not as big as some people 
make it. “Practitioners of qualitative and quantitative methods may seem to have 
different philosophies of science, but they really just work in different situations and 
ask different questions.”234 At the moment, so little is known about humour and 
political activism that little valuable information can be gathered through a method 
like a large survey. 
Selection of cases 
Why these particular cases? With so little information about humorous political 
stunts available, I aimed to look for case studies that are rich in information and 
where it was possible to establish that humour had been or is playing a role for the 
political activists. This means that I have used what Patton calls “Extreme or 
deviant case sampling”, a special type of purposeful sampling.235 These cases are 
not to be considered typical of the way that grassroots political activists use 
humour. The two groups in the case studies use or have used humour to a much 
larger degree than the average political activist group. At the same time, I was 
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interested in the interplay between humorous and non-humorous activities, which 
ruled out groups that have humour as their primary strategy, such as the Yes Men 
and Billionaires for Bush.  
Many factors play a role in a sampling strategy. As a PhD student, I was 
constrained by a time limit and limited economic resources. I also felt it was 
important that I use my skills with Scandinavian languages to prioritise 
Scandinavian experiences in order for these to be included as research available in 
English. 
It was not a sampling criterion that the political activists were concerned about the 
same or similar themes, but as it turned out, both Ofog and KMV are/were radical 
anti-militarists organised like networks that work as marginalised groups within a 
democratic setting. Even among radical activists they are quite marginal. These 
similarities have led me to offer some conclusions that would not have been 
possible with less comparable cases. Nevertheless, there are also major 
differences. An obvious one is the separation in time, so while Ofog is still an active 
network, KMV dissolved many years ago. The most decisive difference for my 
analysis is that KMV worked on a campaign with one particular aim in mind, while 
Ofog’s focus is much broader.  
The purpose of the 15 examples in Chapter 3 is to illustrate the diversity of the 
phenomenon of humorous political stunts with examples that cover different 
political issues, varying political circumstances and differing across time, 
geography, culture and language. Other differences have more to do with the way 
the stunt was carried out – the humorous techniques, mediums used and degree of 
professionalism. This number of examples is not required to establish that the 
phenomenon I have labelled humorous political stunts exist, but they are useful to 
illustrate how much such stunts can vary.  
In the selection process for the examples in Chapter 3, I started out with cases that 
are described in the literature on nonviolent activism or well known via the mass 
media. After I started researching, many activists, researchers, friends and family 
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pointed me towards examples I had not heard about before. When deciding on 
which cases to include and which to leave out, my criteria for inclusion were that 
they:  
 Illustrate the diversity of the phenomena when it comes to the type of stunt 
or humorous technique 
 Contribute diversity in terms of geography, time, language or culture 
 Are not well described in academic literature already   
However, although this was the ideal, in reality there is an apparent excess of 
European and Scandinavian examples. Those not European are all from the 
English speaking part of the world. Another limitation is that the majority of the 
examples come from groups concerned with social justice, peace, human rights 
and the environment. These selection biases might be because it is mainly this 
type of groups that uses humorous political stunts, but especially when it comes to 
language it is also a reflection of my language skills and the spheres of interest for 
people who have suggested cases to me.    
Some well documented cases, such as Yes Men, are also included because they 
are useful illustrative cases for certain types of stunts, or when the reactions to 
them can contribute to a better analysis. Almost all new examples I have come 
across fit within the model since they use one of the five types of stunts. It is a 
limitation of the study that it does not include more examples from the “global 
south” something which would in all likelihood have shown an even greater 
diversity. However, other scholars and activists can in the future investigate to what 
degree this typology of humorous political stunts is valid outside of the “western 
world”. 
Data collection process for the case study with Ofog 
Chapters 4 and 5 present the results from the case study I did together with the 
Swedish anti-militarist network Ofog.  
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Sandra L. Kirby, Lorraine Greaves, and Colleen Reid in their book Experience 
Research Social Change: Methods Beyond the Mainstream identify three different 
techniques for gathering information in qualitative research: 1. Listening (such as 
interviews) 2. Observing  and 3. Examination of records and historical traces.236 In 
this case study, I used all these three techniques in order to gather data. However, 
the overall approach was participatory action research and the intention to produce 
knowledge that can contribute to social change. I consider participatory action 
research a strategy more than a method in itself, the same way that Snow and 
Trom speak about the case study as a strategy rather than a method per se. This 
way of understanding participatory action research is also in line with McTaggart 
who writes that  
Action research is not a ‘method’ or a ‘procedure’ for research but 
a series of commitments to observe and problematize through 
practice a series of principles for conducting social enquiry…237  
In the sections below I describe this overall approach of participatory action 
research and the methods of participant observation, semi-structured interviews, 
workshop facilitation as well as data collection from written documents. I also 
describe what expectations the Ofog activists had of the research project and me 
and how the research developed.  
Participatory action research 
The term participatory action research can be used in different ways, but starts 
from the assumption that research should contribute to creating change for the 
better. Participatory action research is a collaborative process that people do 
together and on equal terms in spite of differences in formal qualifications and 
training. It is used in many different fields such as education, social work and 
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development work. Usually one avoids loaded terms that indicate that a neutral 
researcher do research on someone else. In the end of this chapter I have included 
a discussion on the theoretical aspects of research and power and the 
epistemological assumptions behind the whole thesis. In this section I discuss the 
way participatory action research inspired the case study with Ofog in practice.  
Bridget Somekh’s eight principles of action research sum up nicely what 
participatory action research is about:  
1. Action research integrates research and action 
2. Action research is conducted by a collaborative partnership of 
participants and researchers 
3. Action research involves the development of knowledge and 
understanding of a unique kind 
4. Action research starts from a vision of social transformation and 
aspirations for greater social justice for all 
5. Action research involves a high level of reflexivity 
6. Action research involves exploratory engagement with a wide range 
of existing knowledge  
7. Action research engenders powerful learning for participants 
8. Action research locates the inquiry in an understanding of broader 
historical, political and ideological contexts.238 
These eight principles guided the research process with Ofog, but translating the 
ideals into a concrete project within a specific context that set certain limitations 
was a challenge.  
In the “ideal” action research situation, the person who initiates the research is 
herself part of an already established group, for example a group of colleagues or 
volunteers. If this ideal is followed, there is no boss who can dominate or direct the 
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process or an outside expert who knows how research is supposed to be done. In 
reality, this spontaneous formation rarely happens, and the action research 
process is initiated by outsiders.239 Another ideal is that the research is carried out 
collaboratively by the whole group, on a subject that they together have decided is 
worth researching. However, much research is done under the label participatory 
action research where one of more of these premises is set aside. This was also 
the case with my work together with Ofog, where none of these three ideals were 
in place. Although I was a long term “insider” to the peace movement, I did not 
know anybody in Ofog well and thus approached the group as an “outsider”. In 
addition, I already had a particular topic that I considered worth researching – the 
use of humour as a way to challenge people in power. Since the premises for the 
case study divert so much from the ideals, I consider the case study to be inspired 
by participatory action research rather than an example of participatory action 
research, although in the beginning I did talk with Ofog about it as if it was a 
participatory action research project. However, the principles of combining action 
and research, contributing to greater social justice for all through a highly reflexive 
learning process on equal terms were indeed guiding the process. Therefore the 
project were in many ways more “faithful” to other important principles of 
participatory action research than many projects that do not hesitate to use this 
label. I will return to some of these critiques of specific action research projects 
shortly.    
Because the participatory element is so important to participatory action research I 
will describe the research process at some length. This is both a story about how I 
have become a part of Ofog, and how we together approached the subject of 
humour.  
I had been aware of the existence of Ofog for a couple of years before I started this 
research project through my own involvement in War Resisters’ International 
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(WRI), a network of pacifist and anti-militarist organisations from around the world. 
I had been active in WRI for more than a decade, and Ofog was in the process of 
becoming an associate organisation.  
When I started to look for case studies for this project which would be rich in 
information and the groups open to working together with me, Ofog came naturally 
to mind since my impression was that it was a network which was expanding and 
favouring creative radical anti-militarist work. I had met a couple of people who 
were active in Ofog, and contacted one of them about my research project and 
asked him if he thought Ofog would be interested in working with me and how I 
should proceed to find out. He suggested presenting the project on an open email 
list, which I did. Already in this first document I stressed that I was interested in 
doing participatory action research with Ofog, and not research on them. When I 
did not get any response I asked the same person again if he had suggestions for 
people I could contact directly. He gave me a name, and shortly afterwards I was 
invited to a meeting in Gothenburg. After the meeting, I summarized our agreement 
this way: 
Ofog expectations: 
1. In the day to day work of the organization, Ofog activists 
generally don’t spend enough time on reflecting on their 
work. Actions are often prepared at short notice and under 
time pressure. They would like support from Majken in 
facilitating a process for reflections around how Ofog has 
used humor in the past and can use it in the future. Ofog 
also welcomes the idea of trying to evaluate the use of 
humor in order to try out improved methods in the next 
round. 
2. Ofog likes the idea of Majken presenting an overview of how 
different humorous methods have been used by different 
groups across time and space.  
3. Ofog expects that the documentation of their experiences 
that Majken will do through her thesis will be reflected back 
in a form that is accessible for nonviolent activists both in 
Sweden and in other places. 
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The mutual agreement is now: 
Majken certainly aims to fulfil the expectations mentioned above.  
Ofog and Majken will investigate the potential of humour together. 
Majken will facilitate the process, and the experiences will be 
documented in Majken’s PhD thesis at Wollongong University, 
Australia. In the thesis, Ofog will be identified as an organization, 
but all individuals will be anonymous unless they have agreed 
otherwise.  
The first step will be a workshop to take place in mid May 2011. 
Majken will facilitate the content of the day, Ofog Gothenburg will 
arrange a place to meet and invite participants from other parts of 
Sweden. The day will focus on 1. Lessons learned from past 
experiences of humour from Ofog, 2. introduce examples of 
humour as they have been used in other places and contexts, and 
3. try to develop ideas that can be used during the action camp in 
Luleå in July. 
The research method that Majken uses is called participatory 
action research. This means that Majken is a participating 
observer in the process. In addition to this, she will also interview 
people. Before the workshop in May, Majken would like to make 
some interviews with people.240  
I immediately felt very welcome in Ofog, already after this first meeting. When we 
talked about the possibility of going through Ofog’s archive, one person said to me 
that “we never let journalists into this office. When we meet with them, we meet 
somewhere else. But you are one of us.”241 I am not sure where this trust in me 
came from, but have assumed that it was based on my background in the peace 
movement. However, to my knowledge I was never checked to make sure that I 
was not an infiltrator.  
Although this project differs from the ideal participatory action research project 
because I was not a part of Ofog beforehand and already had decided on the topic 
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of our research, I think the process has worked well and benefited both me and 
Ofog. Although I was going to earn a degree with the material, the project has not 
been haunted by many of the power problems that other projects labelled action 
research struggle with. Graham Webb, for instance, is critical of how so-called 
action research is used in the area of staff development, where the staff developer 
functions as a catalyst or consultant. To Webb, this means that the staff developer 
automatically has the upper hand. To him, the idea of equality is a myth which 
might be declared in various “ground rules”, but disguises that the established 
power relations remain intact.242  
A related critique is articulated by Richard Weiskopf and Stephan Laske243 who 
analysed the power dynamics of a project they were involved in. They think that 
action research that does not take unequal power relations into consideration 
easily contributes to a reproduction of power. In the project they worked on, a 
major employer had to close down, but reopened as a cooperative run by the 
former workers. Weiskopf and Laske’s project was about how the new cooperative 
could survive in the tough business environment and they were given the role as 
consultants and outsiders rather than insiders. Their interest in the project differed 
heavily from that of the former workers and it turned out to be difficult to create an 
environment free from power and domination. According to them, the label action 
research became a camouflage for new power relationships.244 Weiskopf and 
Laske found that thanks to their academic schooling they and the former 
management were the ones who got to name the problems instead of those who 
worked on the ground. Although there was a mutual dependence between the 
researchers and the workers who needed each other to “succeed” with the project, 
it was still an unequal relationship with no common interest regarding what 
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constituted success. As an example they mention that written reports are not a 
neutral medium of communication, but favour those who are most familiar with 
producing and reading text.245  
Although there is much to say about power within a network like Ofog, it was not 
the challenges mentioned by Webb, Weiskopf and Laske that were most 
problematic in this research project. Although some might say that affiliation with a 
university and status as a researcher will automatically give one more power, I 
definitely did not feel that I had a more powerful position. On the contrary, I was 
totally dependent on Ofog for getting data, the network was not depending on me 
in any way, and I had not yet proven that I had the “qualifications” that give status 
within Ofog.  
My status as a PhD student was probably a plus and gave me undeserved respect 
among a few people in the beginning, but within Ofog academic schooling is not as 
prestigious as in many other settings. My impression was that most Ofog activists 
were indifferent towards research and did not expect social science to contribute to 
developing more effective nonviolent activism. My history with WRI probably gave 
me more credibility than doing a research project. About six months into the 
research process, I made a list of five things that appeared give status within Ofog: 
 Time spent on Ofog work per week and over the years 
 Self confidence 
 Having done civil disobedience  
 Having been to prison for a civil disobedience action 
 Having been convicted to pay huge amounts in criminal damage for a civil 
disobedience action246 
Since I had not spent any time working for Ofog, never been to prison, no criminal 
damage and only did my first civil disobedience action after I became involved with 
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Ofog, this only left me with a bit of self-confidence and general social skills to rely 
on. I reflected: 
My lack of history with Ofog and civil disobedience make sure that 
I’m not something special. To me it is quite obvious that I need 
Ofog in order to get data much more than the rest of the group 
needs me (…) I have no way of imposing anything on Ofog. People 
do as they please anyway.  
The last sentence reflected my feeling that even if I had tried to pressure for more 
use of humour in order to get more data to work with, it would have been unlikely to 
work in this network of independent local groups and affinity groups. 
There is one particular area where the research I did is unquestionably an 
unavoidable exercise of power, and that is the interpretation of the material. 
Although all readers of Ofog’s mailing list were given the opportunity to comment 
on drafts of this thesis, only one person did. However, these comments were not 
about the conclusions regarding Ofog’s use of humour. This lack of interest in 
commenting is a power issue that is seldom addressed. The emphasis on long 
written texts within academia is potentially a much bigger barrier than the status 
that comes with academic degrees. 
Relationships in research projects like this develop over time. After the initial 
workshop focusing on humour, I participated in a couple of meetings and 
interviewed some of the most active participants in the Gothenburg group. The 
next big event I took part in was a summer peace camp in July 2011 in Luleå in the 
north of Sweden. During this camp I noticed that I switched from talking about Ofog 
as “them” to “us”, clearly identifying as a participant myself.  
My interaction with other people in Ofog has taken various forms during the 
research project. Below I distinguish between four different types of methods I 
used for data collection together with Ofog. 
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Participant observation 
Participant observation has a long tradition and is a well-established method within 
anthropology and ethnography. In the introduction to Contemporary Field 
Research: Perspectives and Formulations,247 Robert M. Emerson traces its history 
back to the 19th century and British and American interest in the “natives” and 
“savages”. The principles of participant observation have developed much since 
then and previous ideas of naturalistic observing and recording abandoned. They 
have been replaced with reflexivity and acknowledgement that an “observer” will 
influence the situation in the field. Another obvious point which is now widely 
recognised is that two people are unlikely to make exactly the same observations. 
Because researchers know little about humour and political activism, participant 
observation within an action research framework seemed like a good way of 
supplementing other methods of data gathering. Participant observation is usually 
used to observe various forms of everyday life, and is also suggested as a method 
to gain insights into a subject that little is known about.248 Introductions to the 
method emphasise that the researcher should aim at being a natural part of the 
everyday that disturbs as little as possible, striving towards becoming an insider of 
whatever group is of interest.249 However, in a setting like Ofog it is impossible to 
be an “insider” without “disturbing” both the group itself and the society that Ofog 
aims to change. To sit passively in a meeting, taking notes and not participate in 
the discussion would be more disturbing to the social interaction and everyday life 
of Ofog than to contribute with personal opinions. 
Between May 2011 and October 2013 I participated in a number of the meetings in 
the local group in Gothenburg and in most of the bigger activities at the national 
level such as camps, the celebration of Ofog’s 10 year anniversary and yearly 
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national meetings that decided on organisational matters and made some plans for 
the future. I also participated in some humorous actions, but not all. In this way, I 
was very much a participant observer of the everyday life of Ofog. However, 
because I was not interested in studying Ofog as a group, but in working together 
to study the phenomena of humour, this is not a traditional ethnographic study. 
Much could be written about the interactions and dynamics within Ofog, but that 
would be a different study. After each meeting or action I wrote field notes, but the 
only topics I systematically wrote about were ideas about humorous actions that 
had been suggested and attitudes towards the use of humour.  
As a result of this participation through two and a half years, I have indeed become 
an “insider” in the sense that I consider myself a fully accepted participant in Ofog 
in my own right, and not just as a researcher. At the end of the research project, I 
am also very likely to continue my involvement in the group. However, I write the 
term “insider” in quotation marks because I agree with Kirby, Greaves and Reid 
that it is more helpful to speak about reflexivity than a rigid insider-outsider 
dichotomy.250 By reading and discussing methodology with other people in 
university environments I have developed my ability to have a reflexive attitude 
towards both my own and others’ taken-for-granted assumptions. By sometimes 
taking a step back from my “insider” role, I can “travel” back and forth between the 
different positions. This is not a skill that one acquires for good, but an attitude that 
requires continued attention. As someone who is now an active participant in Ofog, 
I aim to present the point of view of other “insiders” as accurately as I can. 
Although I do not claim to speak for everyone in Ofog on all subjects, it is possible 
to present the point of view of other people relatively accurately without having 
lived exactly the same experience. 
The advantage of being part of Ofog myself is that I see from the “inside” how 
people talk about humour and how humour is treated as a subject when I or 
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someone else have come up with humorous ideas. Nevertheless, being so close 
also has some disadvantages. Especially as time passed, my impression is that 
many people came to view me more and more like any other Ofog activist, and 
less and less as a facilitator of a research process we were doing together. This is 
of course a very good sign of trust and acceptance, but it also meant that I lost the 
possibility of being seen to be an “outsider”.  
Participant observation regarding peace, war and conflict is not unusual.251 Patrick 
Coy’s study of Peace Brigades International, an organisation that offers 
accompaniment to peace, union and human rights activist in high risk 
environments, discusses a number of ethical dilemmas.252 Although his work is a 
traditional ethnographic study in a situation of armed conflict that does not involve 
participatory action research, some of the dilemmas he faced have similarities with 
mine. For instance, Coy had to juggle with the issue of having more than one 
“agenda”. He appears to have been a committed participant in Peace Brigades 
International during his time in Sri Lanka and writes that he was more involved in 
the work of the organisation than what is usually the norm in ethnographic 
studies.253 From his writing it seems obvious that he valued the interests of those 
he was there to protect as well as his fellow activists high. Nevertheless, like me, 
he also had his research agenda, and for Coy that influenced the risks he was 
willing to take.  
Barrie Thorne in her research on the draft resistance movement in the US in the 
1960’s encountered some of the same challenges when she decided to avoid 
participating in activities that meant a risk of spending time in jail.254 In my research 
project with Ofog, the dilemma has not been what kind of risks I was willing to take, 
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but how much I should encourage the use of humour. I truly believed (and still do) 
that carefully planned humorous political stunts would be a very effective method 
for us to use. At the same time, I continually had to consider if I argued in favour of 
humour because I thought it to be a wise strategy, or because it would generate 
interesting data for me to analyse. In the chapters on Ofog I have aimed to 
describe my own involvement in the discussions, development and performance of 
the humorous political stunts as accurately as possible.  
Coy also discusses the dilemma of informed consent in fluid arrangements where 
participants come and go and consent has to be renegotiated continually.255 In my 
case, Ofog’s network structure and lack of a formal hierarchy on some occasions 
made informed consent problematic. Because of its decentralised structure, very 
few decisions in Ofog are made at the national level. As described above, it was 
the Gothenburg group that agreed to do the participatory action research project 
together with me. When meeting new people at the national level or when new 
people joined the Gothenburg group, I have done my best to tell them that I was 
doing this project. Nevertheless, it is very likely that there are some people who 
have never heard about it (for example if they only participated in part of a 
meeting) or maybe forgotten that I told them. When it came to particular humorous 
actions and I was part of an affinity group, I was careful to obtain oral consent from 
everyone else in the group to use material from our joint action in my thesis. I 
described what I was writing about, the basic principles of participatory action 
research and promised that I would not disclose their names or any other 
information that could identify them in anything I wrote.  
A final theme that Coy raises which is also relevant for me is the integration of the 
activist and academic self. For Coy, his research project together with Peace 
Brigades International made it possible for him to combine his long-time interest in 
                                            
255
 Coy, "Shared Risks and Research Dilemmas on a Peace Brigades International Team in Sri 
Lanka," p. 578. 
125 
 
peace and justice with his academic career.256 In an article specifically about 
activist academics, Divinski et al. define these as “academics who attempt to 
integrate their academic and activist identities”.257 The authors outline some of the 
problems of conflicting roles and expectations. The main obstacle to integration of 
activist and academic selves is that academic’s work for social change is seldom 
rewarded academically and that academic institutions generally uphold the status 
quo rather than work for change. Obstacles also occur when activist organisations 
do not see the relevance of academic research to their work. For example, 
expectations may differ considerably when it comes to timing and complexity. 
Academic research takes time and emphasises complexity, while activists 
frequently are concerned with the need for immediate action and conclusions that 
can be boiled down to a bumper sticker slogan.258 Although it has sometimes been 
a challenge to integrate my activist and academic self, my experience of working 
together with Ofog on the use of humour is that it has made it possible to combine 
my passion for radical anti-militarist peace work with my academic interest.  
Semi-structured interviews 
The second method for data gathering I have used within the overall strategy of 
participatory action research in the case study on Ofog has been to make formal 
semi-structured interviews with ten people about the use of humour.  
Semi-structured interviewing is another well-established method used to get a 
number of different types of information.259 With interviews it becomes especially 
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obvious that data are not something which is just “out there” waiting to be 
collected. It is created through the interviewer’s and the interviewee’s interaction.260  
All interviews were done on a one-on-one basis, except one where two persons 
were good friends, had participated in many of the same events and preferred to 
do the interview together. Most of the interviews took place in quiet environments 
either at Ofog’s office or in the activists’ own home or a friend’s home. Two of the 
interviews were focused on a certain action I wanted to know more about. The 
remaining eight were longer interviews about many aspects of humour. I had 
prepared a set of questions to be asked and tried to make the conversation as 
natural as possible. I aimed to focus on events that the interviewees had 
participated in, but some also spoke more generally. Very often people on their 
own initiative brought up themes that I had planned to ask later, and I did not have 
the opportunity to phrase the question exactly as I had planned. I just made sure 
that we had covered all the themes that interested me. The great benefit of the 
semi-structured interview is the possibility for people to describe things in their own 
words, and for the opportunity to ask them to elaborate on interesting or 
unexpected things.  
The eight longer interviews were audio recorded and some parts transcribed. The 
purpose of the interviews was twofold. They provided facts about events that I had 
not observed myself and they gave an impression of what the humour means to 
those who tell about it. When it comes to research about perceptions of humour, I 
have aimed to be as accurate as possible. Becker writes that all researchers 
attribute points of view to those they do research together with. The question is not 
if they should or not, but how well they do it – how accurate they are. Nobody can 
be perfect, but a good researcher does better than zero when describing what 
other people think.261  
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Some informants are quoted at length in order to give the reader as vivid an 
impression of the situation described as possible, especially when it comes to 
particular humorous political stunts. This also gives the reader the opportunity to 
agree or disagree with my interpretation and analysis. In other places I chose to 
paraphrase what someone said in order to provide a better flow in the text.  
Everyone I interviewed signed a written consent form before the interview. After 
deciding what to include I send a draft of the text about Ofog to everyone I had 
interviewed so they could see any direct quotes or a paraphrasing of something 
they had said within the context of what others said and my analysis. Everyone 
was invited to check the quotes and paraphrasing and given two months to reply. I 
explained that if I did not hear back from them, I assumed that it meant that they 
were satisfied with the way I had used the interviews. Almost everyone responded 
saying that it looked fine. To me this indicates that the interview data in this chapter 
are reliable and have a high credibility. After this initial round I edited the text 
considerably, and I also decided that it would increase readability without 
disturbing the meaning to edit the transcribed quotes to some degree. Since the 
purpose of the quotes is not a word by word analysis, it was more important that 
they are easy to read also for readers who are not used to reading oral accounts. 
Thus natural parts of oral language, such as ehh, uhh, etc. have been removed. I 
also cut out repetition and instead of putting implied meanings in square brackets, 
as is common, they are included in the text in most places. Everyone I interviewed 
were given the opportunity to comment on the final version of the text as well. 
In the case study on Ofog, all the informants have pseudonyms. In the other case 
study, some of the informants insisted that I use their real names and I have 
respected this wish. The reason I have not done the same regarding the interviews 
with Ofog activists is first and foremost that no one has asked me to. As well, many 
of the Ofog activists I spoke to have not been exposed much in media and even if 
they had insisted that I use their names, it would have taken much convincing for 
me to agree. Even if someone had insisted it would have been problematic to 
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present some with pseudonyms and others with their real names, making it too 
easy for the rest of Ofog to identify everyone I had interviewed. 
The development of the research process  
The third type of method that I used for triangulating information was facilitating 
workshops about humour with Ofog. Workshops are not a standard data gathering 
method for researchers, but a common way of sharing knowledge among activists. 
Workshops can be done internally within a group where people already know each 
other, or can be a way to bring together activists who are not familiar with each 
other to share knowledge about a particular topic. The facilitator does not 
necessarily have special knowledge about the subject but is there to guide the 
process. However, often someone who has a special interest in a topic offers or is 
asked to facilitate a workshop about it.262 To use workshops as a method seemed 
to be very much in line with the letter and spirit of participatory action research and 
a familiar way of working together and organising collective learning in Ofog.  
The workshops that I facilitated were a type of participant observation where I took 
a leading role and the purpose specifically was for us together to learn more about 
humour. In practice a workshop shares many similarities with a focus group 
interview where a researcher usually interview 6-10 people about a particular topic 
in order to gather information efficiently both from the individuals and from the 
discussions that arise among the participants. Sometimes the people in the focus 
group know each other, but frequently they have not met before.263 The major 
difference between a workshop and a focus group interview is that in a workshop 
the purpose is to share knowledge that everyone will benefit from. A focus group is 
conducted in order for outside researchers to gather data and if anyone happens to 
learn something from the experience that is just a side effect.   
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Early in the research process with Ofog I facilitated three workshops in 
Gothenburg, Luleå and Malmö between May and September 2011. At the time I 
described how I would implement the approach of participatory action research to 
my colleagues at the university like this: 
In the context of my thesis this means that I sit down with 
activists and ask: What questions are you working on? What is 
important to you? If you should try to do something humorous, 
what could it be? Do you want to try out your ideas? Afterwards I 
will continue: How do you think it went? Is there anything you 
would do differently if you should try this again?264 
The first four questions were addressed in the workshops in Gothenburg and 
Malmö as well as in the interviews. These two workshops lasted about six hours 
each and were structured as a sharing about past experiences of humour and a 
one hour talk by me presenting a number of humorous political stunts carried out 
by others to inspire. The longest part of the workshop was spent working on the 
question “If you should try to do something humorous, what could it be?” Many 
ideas and suggestions came up, but most of them were never carried out. The last 
two questions had the character of an evaluation and I aimed to address them in 
the affinity groups I participated in that actually carried out humorous political 
stunts. The workshop held in Luleå was considerably shorter than the others and 
the purpose was to inspire the activists participating in the camp rather than a 
genuine sharing. 
In order to get an impression of what perceptions people in Ofog had about 
humour and political activism, I started both interviews and workshops by asking 
what people thought could be achieved by using humour, before saying much 
about my own ideas. However, the very action of asking the network to be part of 
the research project and inviting participants to a workshop on humour provides 
the idea that this is a topic worthy of their time and thoughts. I have no illusion that 
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I have not been an “influence” from the very first email, and I assume that I have 
caused more talk and thoughts about humour than would otherwise have 
happened. Lena, who I interviewed after the first workshop in Gothenburg, 
mentioned this spontaneously during our conversation. Spending a whole day on 
humour had made her realise how much humour Ofog used, and it had been very 
revealing for her to think about Ofog’s activities along those lines.  
Informed consent for the workshops was sought in a tacit way. In all written 
invitations to workshops there was a reference to the fact that the workshop was 
part of an ongoing participatory action research project and the insights from the 
workshop would be used in my thesis. 
The four questions to the participants in the workshops were phrased like this:  
1. What is the best example of a humorous nonviolent action that you 
know of?  
2. What do you think can be achieved by using humour as a method in 
nonviolent actions?  
3. How can humour influence relations with the military, media, arms 
producers and police in nonviolent actions?  
4. Can there be any problems with using humour as a method in 
nonviolent actions?  
The answers to question 1 became background information for me. During the 
analysis the answers to numbers 2 and 3 were divided into the four categories:  
a) facilitating outreach and mobilisation  
b) facilitating a culture of resistance  
c) challenging power relations   
d) others 
These categories are almost equivalent to subheadings in Chapters 4 and 5 and 
together with information from the interviews some of the answers are included 
here as part of the analysis of the effect and meaning of humour.  
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Participant observation, interviews and the workshops were all part of the 
triangulation. I also used the interviews in the spirit of participatory action research 
to ask people what expectations they had of the project and of me as a researcher. 
Some focused on what had been mentioned already during the initial meeting – 
that they would like more focused discussions about strategy, and how humour 
could be part of that. Another recurring topic was to be inspired and learn about 
how humour had been used by other groups in other contexts. In addition, there 
were also suggestions for particular ideas to look more into. Two of them can also 
give an impression on how the research process worked. Clowning was a theme 
that came up in almost all interviews and many expressed interest in developing 
this further. When I specifically asked if they thought it would be interesting to look 
at clowning in connection with counter recruitment (discouraging people from 
enlisting in the military), I received several positive responses, and it is something 
we worked on during the workshop in Malmö. Therefore it is also an idea I spent 
time investigating and contributed to organising.  
It is a natural part of the process of discussing ideas that some of them have not 
been carried out and maybe never will. Several people expressed interest in 
looking into another topic, how humour could be used in the legal system, for 
instance during court cases. So far Ofog had always been very serious during the 
court procedures and tried to appear as otherwise “ordinary” citizens who were 
only breaking a particular law. However, in a research process like this such a 
suggestion requires not just that it is an interesting idea, but that someone who has 
a court case coming up would like to carry it out, and that did not happen.  
Asking people how they would like to work with humour is an unusual starting point 
in an activist context, and this is also the source of the biggest tension in the 
project. My primary interest was to explore humour, and it did not matter much to 
me if it was done in relation to military exercises, arms production or military 
recruitment. For everyone else in Ofog, this was a strange order of things, since 
they wanted to start either with a particular theme that they were most concerned 
about, like recruitment, or think strategically about areas where they thought Ofog 
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could have most influence. When I asked Lisa if she was interested in participating 
in humorous actions directed outwards, she is the one who expressed this most 
directly when she said: 
I really don’t know at all, I don’t know what I want to do with Ofog 
in the future. That depends on what most people seem interested 
in doing and if I feel inspired by that in particular. I really can’t 
say that I want to do something funny, because it is not that I 
want to be funny (…)I want to do what I think is best, (…) 
otherwise it is a bit like a weird end to start in. 
When I started the project I had expected that it would result in more use of 
outward directed humour than what it did. Of course it is not possible to say what 
kinds of humorous political stunts, if any, would have been carried out without the 
research project. But in my naïve perception about what role I could play, I had 
hoped that my enthusiasm for humour would be more contagious. As it turned out, 
Ofog had a peak event in July 2011 quite early in the process. After that some of 
the most driving people reduced their commitment to Ofog.  
My original idea was to do follow-up workshops, but it never became possible to do 
them the way I planned. In Malmö, the small group was hibernating when it was 
time to do a follow-up workshop a year later. In Gothenburg the group was still 
active, but with considerably less activity than the year before. For this reason I 
decided to suggest a one hour feedback of the preliminary results rather than push 
for a longer event where very few people were likely to show up. This short session 
took place in September 2012. None of the participants were interested in focusing 
particularly on humour in the near future, but together we identified a need for a 
workshop about strategy. Although some humorous ideas came up here, most 
people considered it more important to work on long term organisational issues 
where humour would not be appropriate. I think this was a wise strategy although it 
meant that I obtained less data than I originally expected. 
My attempt to honour the wish that material from the research project became 
available to activists in a non-academic form has also taken different formats. The 
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first was a booklet called “Humour and political activism – inspiring examples from 
around the world”. It includes examples which are described in chapter 3. The first 
version of this was printed in July 2011 and sold for a very reasonable price to 
cover printing costs during the camp “War starts here.” The second type was the 
one hour feedback mentioned above where I presented my findings relating to 
Ofog and the typology presented in Chapter 3.  
Other methods 
The three methods of participant observation, interviews and workshops generated 
a rather large amount of data about the use and perception of humour in Ofog. In 
addition I collected written documents like press releases and photos produced by 
Ofog as well as media coverage of Ofog actions provided by newspapers, radio or 
websites. This material supplements the data from the three other methods. 
Chapter 4 focuses on Ofog’s experiences with the rebel clown army. In order to 
make comparisons with the original British Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown 
Army (CIRCA) and other ways of using clowning in political activism I also 
analysed 10 videos from YouTube featuring rebel clowns. The main purpose was 
to document how seldom rebel clowns use incompetence in their performances, 
something which is a staple ingredient in traditional clowning. The videos were all 
downloaded from youtube.com on October 22 2013. It is a random selection of the 
videos that appeared when searching for “clandestine insurgent rebel clown army” 
and where it was obvious from the picture and/or the description that they were 
about rebel clowning. I picked out videos from different clown actions in different 
cities, taking place between 2005 and 2013. 
As part of the joint effort with Ofog to understand humour better, I also did another 
type of interview/observation that is neither participant observation nor semi-
structured interview. In August 2012 while other Ofog activists did a gym session 
against the military training area in the north of Sweden called NEAT, I dressed as 
neutrally as possible and talked to people who stopped to watch the performance. I 
was able to talk to 15 people during the 45 minutes the action lasted and get their 
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impression about what they were watching. The purpose was to find out to what 
degree the action was successful in getting the anti-militarist message across. 
Data collection process for the case study on KMV 
The case studies on Ofog and KMV have some similarities, but also obvious 
differences. With KMV the events now belong to history with all the advantages 
and disadvantages that poses for a researcher. Looking from a distance, some 
things become clearer. With KMV, it is easier to see the role of humour within an 
overall approach – when it comes to Ofog, the events are too close both 
emotionally and time-wise to get the same clarity. Most of the key people in KMV 
are still alive, but 30 years is a long time for busy people who since then have 
moved on with their lives. People who only encountered KMV in the outskirts of 
their life are likely to remember this time as even more distant.  
KMV’s history and role in the Scandinavian peace movements is hardly 
documented at all, except that one of the participants has written a little about it.265 
For the triangulation of this case I have used four types of sources: Newspaper 
reports from the period, KMV’s own documents, interviews with four key informants 
– three activists and one representative from the government – as well as the 
official documents about the law change that eventually took place. 
Newspaper reports of KMV’s activities  
Analysing written documents is a standard method for data gathering, especially 
used by historians who trawl the archives for information. However, searching the 
official archives is not likely to produce much evidence of KMV’s existence. Official 
documents from the ministry of justice would be about individual men who refused 
conscription, not about the organisation. Although the media are not known to be 
the best source for facts, in this case they provide the most reliable data available 
                                            
265
 Åsne Berre Persen and Jørgen  Johansen, Den Nødvendige Ulydigheten (Oslo: FMK, 1998); 
Jørgen Johansen, "Humor as a Political Force, or How to Open the Eyes of Ordinary People in 
Social Democratic Countries," Philosophy and Social Action 17, no. 3-4 (1991). 
135 
 
about when things happened and approximately how many participated. The 
newspaper coverage also gives an impression of how some of the activities of 
KMV were perceived by the surrounding society. I have used the articles to better 
understand KMV’s use of humour rather than a content analysis of the media 
coverage. My main interest has not been what the media write about KMV and 
why, but to get closer to KMV, the thinking within the group and what responses 
the authorities provided through the media.   
The limitation of this data source is that the newspapers’ objective is to sell as 
many papers as possible, inclining them to focus on the issues they think their 
readers will be interested in. The decisions about what to print reflect the fact that 
news production is geared towards writing about conflict rather than reconciliation 
and the spectacular and unexpected rather than the everyday and ordinary. Thus 
they covered spectacular actions carried out by KMV, but not the more hidden or 
less conflict oriented aspects. The newspapers, for instance, do not write about 
internal organising or lobbying activities. The materials I have obtained from 
newspapers also reflect that some individuals within KMV had a greater wish to 
and were more skilled at generating attention toward their individual conscientious 
objector cases than others.   
The news reports are from both local, regional and national Norwegian 
newspapers. In addition I have included one TV report which two people I 
interviewed considered very important. Most of the articles I have obtained from 
KMV participants’ personal archives; the TV broadcast I bought from the 
Norwegian national TV archive. Although I knew KMV activists themselves had 
collected most of the published material, I was interested in finding out if the 
coverage was as extensive as some of the people I interviewed thought. For this 
reason I also did a wide search for KMV in seven selected mainstream regional 
and national newspapers for the period 1980-1989 (Aftenposten, Adresseavisen, 
Hamar Arbeiderblad, Klassekampen, Morgenbladet, Nationen, Nordlys and 
Stavanger Aftenblad). These newspapers can be searched electronically at the 
National Library in Oslo. For these wide searches I used the search words 
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“Kampanjen mot verneplikt” (campaign against conscription), “siviltjeneste i 
fengsel” (substitute service in prison) and “nektet siviltjeneste” (refused substitute 
service). In the same newspapers I also searched specifically for two particular 
actions, narrowing the search period to June 24-27 1983 and September 20-21 
1983, but with the broad search words “fengsel” (prison) and “aktor” (prosecutor). I 
also searched manually through the microfilms of six other national and regional 
newspapers (Arbeiderbladet, Dagbladet, VG, Finmarksposten, Fædrelandsvennen, 
and Bergens Tidende) for the same narrow time periods. Neither the manual nor 
the electronic searches are perfect, which I discovered by doing both for the two 
newspapers Nordlys and Stavanger Aftenblad. In the first, I found an article in the 
manual search that did not appear in the electronic search. In the second, I found a 
piece in the electronic search that I had missed with the manual. Nevertheless, 
although there is a possibility that I have missed some small mentions here and 
there, I feel confident that I have had access to the large majority of the relevant 
news coverage.  
KMV documents 
The most central source for this case study is the documents produced by KMV 
itself. The newsletter Rundbrev266 which was distributed to all subscribers with 
irregular intervals from 1 to 6 times per year, turned out to provide valuable 
information. I am especially grateful to Ulf Norenius and Jørgen Johansen for 
giving me a complete collection of the KMV newsletter from 1982-1990 as well as 
many other documents. The information in Rundbrev includes minutes from the 
grand meetings which were KMV’s “decision making body”, invitations to various 
meetings and reports and documentation of the network’s activities. Some items 
were produced by KMV, but frequently the newsletter contained photocopies of the 
newspaper coverage. Where it has been possible to identify which newspaper it is, 
these articles are referenced as a regular newspaper article. On the few occasions 
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where KMV photocopied them without writing which newspaper or which date I 
have not prioritised tracking down this information, but instead referred to the 
relevant newsletter. Where this is the case it is clearly indicated in the footnotes.  
KMV also produced some posters, flyers and a booklet. This type of data are 
characterised by being made for an immediate purpose. It gives a very good 
impression of what was considered important information to the participants of 
KMV at the moment, a snapshot of the group’s daily life. Unfortunately these items 
were usually not dated. This means that they give an impression of KMV in the 
1980’s, but it would be very difficult to use them to trace developments in the 
arguments KMV used over time.  
Both KMV’s own documents and the newspaper coverage are mainly descriptions 
of events and include almost no analysis. The details of the debates about what 
KMV activists thought would be most effective are lost. The only thing left as 
“evidence” is what was actually done – presumably what KMV considered most 
effective given the human and economic resources available.  
The most analytical document is the booklet Verneplikt: Statlig Tvangsarbeid 
(Conscription: State forced labour) published for the launch of KMV in 1981, which 
explains conscientious objection as a strategy against militarism.267 KMV’s own 
documents include almost no self-evaluation and analysis of what is effective. Only 
several years later did one of the participants, Jørgen Johansen, analyse his 
experiences in two different pieces of writing.268  
Interviews 
The third type of data gathering technique for the KMV case study is interviews 
with three of the most central activists from the early 1980’s and one person who 
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represented the Norwegian state and the department of justice in questions 
regarding conscientious objection.  
Like in the case of Ofog, these four interviews were done in a semi-structured way. 
The interviews with the three KMV activists provided information about some of the 
aspects of KMV activities not captured by the news coverage and internal 
documents. For many of the individuals concerned these activities were central in 
forming them as politically conscious members of society. They can provide 
detailed memories of events and their thinking about them. Nevertheless, the time 
gap of almost 30 years means that much has been forgotten and many events 
“rewritten” in the participants’ minds. They have been told as a good story many 
times, but 30 years later the order of things, the time that lapsed between certain 
events, the number of participants and so on are no longer reliable.  
My awareness of the case of KMV and the humorous political stunts they 
performed stems from my close relationship with one of the most active 
participants in the group. Jørgen Johansen has been my partner since 1999, and I 
have heard him tell some of the stories in this chapter on numerous private and 
public occasions. There is therefore a risk that my account and analysis of the 
events are biased towards his version. However, both his and the other oral 
accounts have been cross checked against the written documentation. Generally I 
have considered Rundbrev and newspaper coverage of facts such as dates, times 
and numbers more reliable than the interviews.  
My relationships with Johansen made it easy to contact other key people in KMV, 
and they readily agreed to be interviewed and help with access to their personal 
archives. Other researchers might have experienced intense questioning about 
their motives for doing this research and be met with a more reserved attitude. On 
the other hand, there is a possibility that our relationship can have caused some to 
withhold information about the personal dynamics within KMV. However, since it is 
the outward directed activities that are the focus here rather than the internal 
organising, this has had little if any impact on the analysis and conclusions.  
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Johansen was one of the driving forces within KMV, and some of the activities 
where he was a key figure take up much space in this chapter. I have carefully 
considered whether he is getting undue attention and come to the conclusion that I 
have not given him and his case more space than what is required to give a fair 
account and analysis of KMV. The only exception is the description of his first court 
hearing. The reason that it is his case and not someone else’s is simply that 
Johansen’s personal archive includes extensive media coverage from the local 
newspaper that would have been time consuming or maybe even impossible to 
obtain through a library search on another case.  
By only interviewing three of the most central participants in KMV, there is a risk 
that the material is biased towards those who took on leadership roles in this 
otherwise non-hierarchical network. It does not include the perspectives of those 
who only participated for shorter periods of time or observed from the periphery. 
This is a conscious decision reflecting my wish to talk to people who might 
remember discussions about the choice of strategy and the role of humour rather 
than get an overall impression of how KMV worked – that is an issue for future 
research. For this chapter, I discussed with the informants how to treat their 
identity. I considered it unlikely that people who had been active in KMV and knew 
Johansen would not be able to guess who I had talked to. Promising total 
confidentiality was not realistic. All three informants also said that they would like 
me to use their real names. I ended up deciding this would be the most ethical 
thing to do. These people are grownups who spent many years of their adult life 
organising KMV activities. They have appeared with names and photos in 
countless media interviews, and are very proud of what they did. 
The first interview with Ulf Norenius was done in 2012 before I had finished writing 
up the events described in the written documentation. I was surprised that he did 
not remember more details and discussions, and therefore decided to postpone the 
rest of the interviews while I did some more writing. Before I interviewed Johansen 
and Øyvind Solberg, I asked them to read a draft of chapter 6 so we could begin 
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the interviews with their comments and reflections on that. Interviewing the two 
good old friends together also seemed to prod their memories. 
Solberg suggested several people who represented the Norwegian state that I 
could talk to, and one of them was willing to be interviewed. This person is 
introduced with the pseudonym Jens Jensen. Because of the time that had passed 
there were many details that he did not remember. However, when he looked at 
the timing of various events he did not doubt that it was the total resisters 
themselves that played the decisive role in bringing about the law change that they 
were working for. This interview is an important confirmation of what appear as a 
logical conclusion from the official documents about the law change. 
Official documents 
KMV’s major success was a change in the law that sent the total resisters to prison 
for 16 months but did not call it a punishment. In the archive of the Norwegian 
parliament, Stortinget, I tracked down all the relevant documents about the 
preparations for the law change, including white papers, official reports, 
suggestions for decisions from the justice committee and the transcription of the 
debate in parliament.  
Epistemological assumptions 
After this detailed tour through all the data collection methods and selection criteria 
for case studies and examples, I finish this chapter on methodology with some 
more general reflections on the epistemological assumptions underlying the thesis 
and a discussion about research and power. 
Generally speaking, normative approaches to research are more the rule than the 
exception – most research in medicine and social work is either explicitly or 
implicitly conducted with the purpose of improving people’s lives.269 As a peace 
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and nonviolence researcher, I use what Abigail Fuller calls an “emancipatory 
methodology”.270 In addition to contributing to an increased scholarly 
understanding of nonviolence and humour, I also hope my findings will be 
meaningful to nonviolent activists who are interested in developing their strategies 
and experiments with humour as a way to challenge power.  
There are many labels in use for methods claiming to work in the tradition of 
emancipation: Action research, participatory action research, feminist action 
research, institutional ethnography, anti-oppressive research, participatory 
research, collaborative research to name some of the most popular. Action 
research is probably the most well-known of these, and has also inspired my 
approach. The term was first used by sociologist Kurt Lewin in 1946 in an article 
about the problems that minorities in the US faced.271 Many authors have traced 
the historical developments of the different types of emancipatory research 
strategies and identified the finer points of their differences and similarities.272  
Emancipatory research approaches has been used most frequently in the areas of 
education, social work and development where researchers have worked together 
with marginalised and subordinate groups in order to improve their situation.  
Examples of introductions to these approaches include Participatory Action 
Research by Alice McIntyre273, Action Research by Ernest T. Stringer274, Action 
Research: A Methodology for Change and Development by Bridget Somekh,275 
Revolutions in Development Inquiry by Robert Chambers,276 and New Directions in 
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Action Research edited by Ortrun Zuber-Skerritt.277 The research on nonviolence, 
social movements and humour introduced in chapter 1 rarely makes use of these 
normative research methodologies. Even within a well-established field such as 
social movement research where one might expect to find emancipatory research, 
this is not the case. For instance, none of the approaches named above is 
mentioned in Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg’s book Methods of 
Social Movement Research, which solely focuses on methodology for social 
movement research. The book otherwise offers introductions to everything from 
surveys to semi-structured interviews and historical research.278 Jason MacLeod’s 
recent PhD thesis is an exception. MacLeod carried out an extensive participatory 
action research project together with the resistance movement in West Papua to 
explore the potential of nonviolence.279 
Dorothy Smith and the feminist standpoint theory she developed has been another 
inspiration for my investigations. In this tradition one acknowledges that there is no 
neutral point from which to start researching and that people’s position in the social 
world determines how that world looks and what constitutes the right kind of 
knowledge. For Smith, this meant doing sociology from the perspective of women’s 
everyday and experiences. The result was sociology very different from what was 
the norm of her time where the so-called neutral and objective sociology in reality 
almost exclusively reflected the standpoint of white affluent men with a Eurocentric 
perspective. In the volume Sociology for Changing the World280 Caelie Frampton 
and her co-editors celebrate the legacy of Dorothy Smith’s work related to 
institutional ethnography. This in turn led George Smith to his work on the ruling 
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regimes and ruling relations.281 Although the research I present here is not a piece 
of institutional ethnography, institutional ethnographers’ attempt to bridge the gap 
between academia and activism and produce knowledge which is useful for 
activists has been a great inspiration and in that sense I attempt to follow their 
lead.  
Another inspiration has been Leslie Brown and Susan Strega’s book Research as 
Resistance: Critical, Indigenous and Anti-Oppressive Approaches.282 They use the 
term anti-oppressive research, but are engaged in a similar journey towards a 
methodology that emphasises social justice in a world of unequal power relations. 
They want to engage in the discussion about what constitutes knowledge and 
write:  
Framing the discussion about what constitutes knowledge within 
the discourse of positivism obscures important questions about 
how the development of knowledge is socially constructed and 
controlled, how knowledge is used, and whose interests 
knowledge serves.283  
Brown and Strega are concerned with what they call “research from, by and with 
the Margins” and continue:   
Marginalization refers to the context in which those who routinely 
experience inequality, injustice, and exploitation live their lives. 
Being marginalized refers not just to experiences of injustice or 
discrimination or lack of access to resources. In the research 
context, it acknowledges that knowledge production has long been 
organized, as have assessments of the ways producing knowledge 
can be “legitimate”, so that only certain information, generated by 
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certain people in certain ways, is accepted or can qualify as 
“truth”.284  
What Brown and Strega say here is that traditional types of research contribute to 
upholding the status quo, even when researchers have no intention of this, as long 
as it keeps limiting what are “real” truth, knowledge and science. For them, it 
means that any researcher who wants to claim that he or she is doing anti-
oppressive research also has to look towards unconventional research 
methodologies: “We take the position that research cannot challenge relations of 
dominance and subordination unless it also challenges the hegemony of current 
research paradigms.”285  
Although I agree with Brown and Strega that traditional ways of researching have a 
strong tendency to limit what can be considered “real” knowledge and that the 
voices of the marginalised are seldom heard, I think their picture is very black and 
white with little space for nuances. Blaming certain methods for the ways they have 
been applied is like blaming the gun for a murder. For instance, statistical analysis 
– a conventional research method – can contribute to liberation. An example of this 
is the study by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan about nonviolent resistance 
that was introduced in Chapter 1.286 They used statistical analysis to document 
how nonviolence is more effective than violence, a finding which has a strong 
potential for contributing to emancipation when this knowledge spread among 
activists.   
Kirby et al. define research as a “systematic inquiry into a phenomenon of 
interest”.287 They identify three research paradigms: 
1. The instrumental paradigm, the traditional positivist paradigm which is often 
based on quantitative methods. Here the emphasis is on controlling the 
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environment in a way which means that other researchers can reproduce the 
research and get the same results.  
2. The interactive paradigm, which includes constructionist and ethnographic 
approaches. Here the focus is on lived experience and the construction of 
meaning. The theoretical base is in phenomenology, symbolic interactionism and 
grounded theory. For the researcher importance is on credibility.  
3. The critical paradigm focuses on reflexive knowledge and is founded on 
materialist, structural, feminist, and queer theory. Here the focus is on power 
relations as well as what is right and just.288  
My approach to this study has been inspired by the critical paradigm. I wanted to 
explore how activists use humour to challenge established relations of power. But I 
was also interested in activists’ own reflections about humour, and the meaning 
they attribute to it. This part of the research belongs in the interactive paradigm and 
is mainly included in the case study with Ofog.  
In the concluding chapter of Research as Resistance: Critical, Indigenous and Anti-
Oppressive Approaches Karen Potts and Leslie Brown provide three statements 
that convey what it means to be an anti-oppressive researcher: 
 Anti-oppressive research is social justice and resistance in process and in 
outcome 
 Anti-oppressive research recognizes that all knowledge is socially 
constructed and political 
 The anti-oppressive research process is all about power and relationships289 
These statements are very radical and have far reaching consequences for how 
research should be done. However, as the introductions to the methods above 
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indicated, it is not so much the choice of a particular method that makes the 
difference, but the way it is applied in practice, the assumptions about knowledge 
that is behind it, who is going to benefit from the research and what the goal of the 
research is. Also crucial is the choice of what topic to study, something seldom 
discussed in the focus on methods. 
In her call for peace researchers to conduct emancipatory research, Fuller refers to 
Dorothy Smith and feminist standpoint theory as the epistemological background 
for suggesting that in order to work for social change, one needs to work together 
with the oppressed in order to get results which are more scientifically valid.290 
Researchers do not start their projects from a neutral point. Their own position in 
the world determines what they consider worth researching, and how the research 
is carried out. Both the choice of subject and the interpretation of the results are 
influenced by who the researcher is and knows. Interpretation is not just something 
one does when the data have been collected, but part of the research process from 
start to finish. What researchers consider important to ask guides what kind of 
information they are able to gather. All researchers construct meaning, and what 
kind of meaning they are able to see and make sense of depends on the point from 
where they look. Methods are not just a toolbox to pick and choose from, they all 
come with assumptions about the world and what can be known about it.291  
Researchers have a standpoint in relation to their research whether they declare it 
or not, and even if they are not aware of it.292 When choosing the subject for my 
thesis, I made a conscious decision to investigate a subject that I thought would be 
of interest to nonviolent activists striving for social change, and enable activists to 
make informed decisions about the possibilities and limitations of using humour as 
a strategy in the struggle. I strongly believe more knowledge in this area can 
contribute positively to activists’ goals and make activism more fun, effective, 
                                            
290
 Fuller, "Toward an Emancipatory Methodology for Peace Research," pp. 295, 99. 
291
 Kirby, Greaves, and Reid, Experience Research Social Change: pp. 4-5. 
292
 Kirby, Greaves, and Reid, Experience Research Social Change: p. 37. 
147 
 
sustainable and welcoming to newcomers. My background for this choice was that 
I had been an activist and organiser, contributing to peace and anti-militarist work 
for almost two decades before I embarked on this research journey. There are 
some disadvantages with choosing a subject I feel so passionately about. It has 
been a constant challenge to distinguish between what I and other activists would 
like to be the result of humorous political stunts and perceive have happened, and 
what conclusions it is reasonable to draw based on the information available. 
However, this is a problem many researchers face when studying groups they 
personally support. The proximity to my area of study has made me acutely aware 
of the limitations with the data, an awareness that might not have been so obvious 
for researchers who believe they have a greater distance to the subject of their 
inquiry.  
Much of the literature on emancipatory methodologies mentioned above speaks 
about conducting research which is meaningful to subordinate groups or the 
margins as Brown and Strega call it. Talking about “margins” can give a wrong 
impression, since in some cases the “margins” are actually the numerical majority, 
for instance in some of the nonviolent revolutions mentioned previously.  
In these texts, subordination is either explicitly or implicitly understood to be poor or 
disadvantaged communities, or victims of discrimination and harassment. Although 
some of these subordinate groups take up nonviolent struggle and might be 
inspired to use humour effectively, many nonviolent activists whose stunts are 
included here are not subordinate in this sense. On the contrary, they are 
frequently well educated, white, have middle class incomes and no problem 
speaking up for themselves. Nevertheless, activist groups working on peace, 
justice and environmental issues are indeed subordinate and highly marginalised in 
relation to the governments, multinational corporations, and authorities with state 
backing that they are challenging.  
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Research and power 
That power is a complex phenomenon became clear already in Chapter 1 when I 
discussed power, resistance and the possibilities for change through humour. The 
Foucaudian perspective on power as relational and multidimensional that I 
advocated clashes somewhat with part of the action research tradition. Action 
research has its roots in the Enlightenment and ideas of progress, reason and 
improvement that Foucault was critical of and only saw as contributing to ever 
more sophisticated ways of exercising control. However, some researchers have 
drawn from both approaches. Somekh’s inspiration by Foucault is reflected in the 
eight principles of action research quoted above. She emphasises that power is not 
something negative, but constructed in social interaction. It is not something one 
person does to another, but part of social formations.293 In “Exposing Discourses 
through Action Research”, Leonie E. Jennings and Anne P. Graham try to reconcile 
the modern tradition of action research with based in rationality and progress with 
the postmodern “moment” and Foucault’s poststructuralism. They remind action 
researchers that postmodern ideas are not a rejection of struggles against 
oppression and suggest discourse analysis to be a useful way for action 
researchers to deconstruct established dominant discourses. There might be more 
than one “truth” and interpretation, depending on which perspective one look from. 
They also draw attention to some of the commonalities between action research 
and postmodern approaches, such as concerns with power and knowledge.294  
Many action research projects work from the assumption that the conditions for the 
marginalised can be improved. This is also the normative approach taken in this 
research project. However, in some of the literature on participatory action 
research and related approaches, there seems to be an assumption that policy 
makers will change policies towards social justice once they know better and if they 
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are included in the process.295 This implicit or explicit assumption appears rather 
naïve, but can probably be explained by action research’s roots in the 
Enlightenment. Policymakers might sometimes change laws and regulations when 
better informed, but there is nothing automatic in this process. In a chapter about 
young people’s transition from care, Deb Rutman et al. write:  
… the common objectives in doing participatory action research 
are for shared ownership, learning and action. This often pits 
researchers and clients/subjects against authority and resources; 
indeed, the solutions to issues that emerge do not have to be 
acceptable to those who hold power and control over resources.296  
Some issues are more contested than others, and it would probably be difficult for 
Rutman et al. to find policymakers who do not use rhetoric about providing the best 
transition from care as possible. The disagreements would arise about the best 
way to do it and how this service should be prioritised when compared with other 
tasks competing for the same resources. In the Scandinavian countries where my 
case studies were carried out, it would be difficult to find a politician who would say 
that acting against poverty and discrimination is undesirable. Research on poverty 
and discrimination might be areas where these politicians would change policies if 
they are better informed and included in the process of finding solutions together 
with disadvantaged groups. However, when it comes to areas such as arms export, 
military exercises and conscription, the political rhetoric is very different. Here one 
should be careful not to underestimate the vested interests in upholding the status 
quo and the active and deliberate marginalisation of those who want to change it. 
As Fuller writes, “historically those with power have not been known to relinquish 
it.”297  
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Robin McTaggart writes that people underestimate how much oppressive 
structures are upheld deliberately by those who actively strive to avoid change and 
how much time must be spent on just avoiding regression. In his response to some 
of the criticisms of action research he also points out that there are frequently 
unrealistic expectations about what can be achieved in a short time.298 The radical 
peace and anti-militarist groups whose humour is the core of this thesis are very 
aware that they are considered peripheral by those in power. The voices of these 
volunteer networks are easily drowned when they stand up to companies, states 
and institutions that have enormous economic and human resources at their 
disposal. Any conclusions about the effects of humour also have to reflect this 
inequality. It is quite unrealistic to expect a handful of anti-militarist activists armed 
with a humorous political stunt to overturn such a dominant discourse as militarism 
overnight. Finally McTaggart stresses that emancipation is not some ideal stage. 
For him the central question is not “are we emancipated yet?” but “are things better 
than they were?”299 For some contexts, one could also ask, “did we prevent it from 
getting worse?” 
Another way the term “power” is relevant when discussing methodology has to do 
with the way research is carried out. The research approaches emphasising 
emancipation and change that I have referred to above are becoming increasingly 
popular, but sometimes they are now used in ways which dilute concepts of 
change and participation of meaning and very far from their roots of liberation.300 
For instance, Ortrun Zuber-Skerritt writes about how action research can make 
organisations more effective.301 It is a major problem with her approach that she 
talks about more effective organisations without discussing what these 
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organisations are doing. Where is the emancipation in becoming more effective if 
this effectiveness is used to become even better at being violent and destructive? 
Developing more effective gas chambers together with Adolf Hitler during World 
War II using an action research model would probably have been quite possible. 
But it would never become emancipatory as long as it is based on the Nazi 
ideology and the result is more effective killing of Jews, homosexuals, gypsies and 
others considered unworthy of life. This is an extreme example, but many 
institutions, also in democracies, have at least some goals that might have violent 
and destructive consequences. Weapons manufactured in Sweden are used in 
wars around the world, although the companies’ stated intention is to make a profit 
and not that people die. When the Norwegian court system functioned smoothly 
regarding the total resisters, it contributed to upholding a law that sent young men 
to prison for 16 months because of their beliefs.        
A final power issue to make note of is that unequal relations of power do not just go 
away because one is aware of their existence. It is not enough to have good 
intentions about including the marginalised and subordinate in a research process 
in order to make it happen in reality.  
Conclusion 
Using a case study strategy as my main approach, I have used many conventional 
methods for data gathering, such as participant observation, semi-structured 
interviews and document analysis of newsletters and media reports. In addition I 
have relied on some more unconventional methods as part of the participatory 
action research project I did with Ofog, for example facilitating workshops about 
humour and nonviolence.  
Another researcher would have approached this subject in a different way, but by 
being open about my own standpoint and role in the research process others have 
the possibility to follow the development of the project and judge the way data have 
been gathered and analysed. My long-term commitment to the peace movement 
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has provided openings for me that would not have been there for others, but it also 
has some limitations.  
Humorous political stunts take place within a context, and my perspective has 
primarily been from those who initiate these stunts. The research hardly includes 
any firsthand accounts about how they were perceived from the “other side”. When 
analysing the responses and reactions, I have relied on what can be observed and 
what is stated in public, and this is probably the biggest limitation with this project. 
Hopefully future research can get closer to those who are the targets of the 
humorous political stunts.    
This research process has been guided by an epistemological assumption about 
social science’s obligation to contribute to creating a society based on respect for 
diversity and social justice for all. A positivist research paradigm seldom contribute 
to this emancipation, but instead is a part of upholding the status quo by 
accrediting more value to a certain kind of knowledge gathered by certain kinds of 
people. Although not all research that claims to be participatory and liberating is 
this in reality, awareness of the power relations in a research project should 
increase the chance that these relations do not determine what will count as 
valuable knowledge. By focusing on humour’s role in nonviolent action my hope is 
to develop knowledge which is meaningful and useful for nonviolent activists in 
their struggles for more peaceful and just societies.  
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Chapter 3: Humorous political stunts 
Introduction 
Humorous political stunts are confrontational performances/actions carried out 
openly which attempt to undermine dominant discourses. An original model 
consisting of five different types of stunts provides the structure for this chapter. 
Before the model is presented I described how I developed the concept of the 
humorous political stunt and discuss how to define it.  
The five types in distinct ways challenge the prevailing order and transcend 
established power relations. I have named them supportive, corrective, naive, 
absurd and provocative. Each category is presented with two to four examples 
from different political contexts that can illustrate some of the diversity within each 
type of stunt. Supportive stunts are framed as ostensible attempts to help and 
protect from harm. Corrective stunts present an alternative version of the power 
holders’ truth, and the naive stunt challenges from behind a pretended innocence. 
The absurd stunt defies all rationality and in the provocative stunt the pranksters 
transcend power by appearing not to care about the consequences of infuriating 
the powerful. In all instances, humour is the tool of serious dissent and protest 
attempting to humiliate and undermine the powerful. The model is based on the 
way the stunt relates to the perception of what is true, rational and logical that the 
representatives of the dominant discourses aim to uphold.   
In the analysis of 15 examples I start with identifying the humorous techniques they 
use to generate an amusing incongruity. Then a metaphor of theatre is applied to 
these “plays of politics”. The theatre metaphor has four different dimensions that 
analyse the cases from the perspectives of who the actors are, what stage they 
play on, how the audience is included and interpret the performance and the timing 
of the whole affair. 
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After the analysis of all the individual examples, the similarities and differences 
between the different types of stunts are discussed in relation to a table that 
summarises the core characteristics of the different types of stunts. Humorous 
political stunts are very diverse when it comes to the mediums they use, the 
settings they take place in, and the degree of professionalism in the performance. 
Identifying this complexity helps illustrate how power and resistance cannot be 
considered a simple question of either-or, but is a multi-dimensional struggle. 
In the end of the chapter the humorous political stunts are discussed in relation to 
public jokes, theatre and graffiti. 
Defining humorous political stunts 
This is what I mean by humorous political stunts: 
A humorous political stunt is a performance/action carried out in public 
which attempts to undermine a dominant discourse. It is either so 
confrontational that it cannot be ignored or involves a deception that blurs 
the line between performers and audiences. It includes or comments on a 
political incongruity in a way that is perceived as amusing by at least some 
people who did not initiate it.  
The discourses which are challenged can be major and all-pervading discourses 
like militarism, consumerism or neo-liberalism, or it can be more limited discourses 
controlled by a powerful political party. This challenge can be directly aimed at a 
person or institution considered an opponent, or it can be communicated to other 
audiences using a variety of media. That the humorous political stunt takes place in 
public means that this is more than a humorous critical comment or joke whispered 
in secret. One can observe someone doing something without hiding it, although 
they might try to hide their identity. The stunts are political in the broad sense that 
they comment on a political theme of how society should be organised. Humorous 
political stunts also have to be humorous. Since what people consider funny varies 
greatly, not everyone will necessarily find the stunts below amusing.  
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Among nonviolent activists and scholars the type of activity which I refer to as 
stunts are known as actions, but within cultural and performance studies terms 
such as performance, happening, hoax or prank are more common. I decided on 
the term stunt because it is not so clearly associated with one particular activist or 
academic tradition. I have not used Day’s notion ironic activism because not all of 
the humorous political stunts rely on the technique of irony. Later I compare 
humorous political stunts with conventional/ordinary protest. With these terms I 
refer to the stereotypical ideal type of non-humorous, rational routine 
demonstrations, speeches, posters, blockades and leafleting. Of course non-
humorous protest can be creative, disruptive and everything but ordinary and 
conventional, but nevertheless a rather big proportion of political activism usually 
consists of these stereotypical activities. 
The focus here is on stunts performed by grassroots political activists, but in order 
to illustrate the potential two stunts performed by professional comedians are 
included as well. These stunts could have been performed by grassroots activists 
since they do not in themselves require access to a professional stage, although in 
these cases it certainly helped spreading the ideas. Humorous political stunts 
seem primarily to be a tactic chosen by those who communicate critiques or 
alternatives to the prevailing order from a subordinate or marginal position, aiming 
to disrupt or transform the status quo. I have not identified any stunts in favour of 
the status quo, but this possibility is not excluded by the definition.  
The logic of humorous political stunts differs from what goes on in theatre 
performances, graffiti, stand-up comedies and cartoons that can also be examples 
of political humour. The stunts include a confrontation or blurring between 
audiences and performers which is usually absent in political humour that uses 
these traditional mediums. Stand-up comedies are based on jokes which can be 
repeated from one stage to the next. The stand-up comedy can be provocative, but 
the audiences remain audiences and the comedian the comedian. As long as the 
comedy happens on stage there is usually not enough confrontation to create a 
humorous political stunt. The act of making graffiti or a political cartoon can be 
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confrontational, but the images that result are clearly distinct from their viewers. In 
most theatre performances there is a distinction between the actors and the 
audiences. An exception from this is the “invisible theatre”, which does blur the 
lines when people are not aware that they have been exposed to a piece of 
theatre.302 Invisible theatre is usually not amusing, although it does provide 
interesting avenues for humorous political stunts.  
A stunt is not a joke, a text or an image which can be transferred from one stage or 
show to the next and have the same effect. The performance of a humorous 
political stunt is in itself the critique, and although it can be turned into a narrative 
that can be retold, the critique and confrontation occur in the original encounter, not 
in the retelling. Thus, if something is a stunt or not depends very much on the 
situation it takes place within. Some comedians (like Michael Moore, Mark Thomas 
and The Chasers) perform stunts which are filmed and included in their TV shows 
in order to reach a larger audience.303 Repetitions can also have effect on power 
relations, but it is not the encounter which is repeated, only the story about it.  
Humorous political stunts have much in common with phenomena such as culture 
jamming, satiric theatre and news show parodies, and some examples of 
oppositional counter culture like graffiti painting or protest music. When I started 
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researching humorous political stunts I did not have a name for this phenomenon. 
The definition and explanation developed over time. I knew that there was a type of 
actions and performances taking place which to me was different from other forms 
of political humour. I had an idea about what my ideal types were – the actions 
carried out by Otpor which I had studied before, the Yes Men identity corrections 
and CIRCA’s clowning that will appear below, and the KMV actions I will return to 
in Chapter 6. When I came across examples of political humour they sometimes 
fitted my ideal type, but frequently they did not. Cartoons, theatre, TV and movies 
were seldom relevant, although there were a few exceptions.  
The definition was developed by going back and forth between the theoretical 
definition and the examples, trying to narrow down what they had in common and 
what separated them from related phenomena that others had described in the 
literature under labels such as culture jamming and tactical carnival. In a 
conceptual exploration like this, I have intentionally been clear about what is the 
core of the phenomenon, but vague about the borders. The purpose of this is to 
remain open about what can possibly be counted as a humorous political stunt in 
order not to exclude what might shed light on the subject. I have also taken the 
point of departure in the practice of what activists actually do, rather than a 
theoretical desk definition. Further research might make it clearer where the 
humorous political stunt ends.  
Analysing humorous political stunts as “play of politics” 
This chapter presents and analyses 15 examples of humorous political stunts 
according to my model of five different types of stunts. The distinction between the 
different types developed during the process of defining what a humorous political 
stunt is. Through this process I approached the examples from different 
perspectives. An important one was to look at the 45 different techniques of 
humour which Arthur Asa Berger had identified in his book An Anatomy of 
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Humor.304 Berger divides the 45 techniques in four categories, depending on 
whether they have to do with language, logic, identity or action. 
In an attempt to understand the examples better, I started out identifying what 
techniques they use in order to generate their humour. Berger’s framework is 
widely known within humour studies and professes to be a tool to understand all 
types of humour. Although Berger’s techniques were useful to describe what is 
funny in most of the examples, I also have some cases which did not fit very well. 
However, Berger did not have political humour in mind when he described the 45 
techniques, so that should be no surprise that this technical framework is not 
enough when one wants to investigate what happens in power relationships where 
humour is involved. I do not intend to engage in a discussion about whether 
Berger’s techniques are appropriate for describing all kinds of humour or if this is a 
good description of them, but those that I have drawn on are useful for analysing 
these examples. In addition to the techniques described by Berger, I suggest a few 
additional techniques necessary to explain what makes some of the examples 
funny. 
When the technical approach to humour did not bring new insights about the power 
relationship, I started to look at the ways the activists use humour to undermine 
and transcend dominant discourses. Above I described how I went back and forth 
between the theoretical definition and the examples I had as my ideal types until I 
could narrow down what I was interested in. In parallel I also noticed that even 
within the phenomenon of the humorous political stunt that I wanted to study, there 
was a huge variation in how they were performed and carried out. I found that the 
pretence that the stunt is not a form of protest was a central element in almost all 
of them, and arrived at five different ways that this pretence is presented, each 
challenging the relations of power in different ways.  
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The five types in my model are not based on the humorous techniques they use, 
but on the different ways they attempt to undermine the discourse of their 
opponent, and transcend the established relations of power. They are not meant to 
replace the techniques identified by Berger, since they meet a different need. As 
with all categorisations, some cases are more clear-cut than others. Nevertheless 
these five types transcend power relations in distinct ways, independent of the 
techniques used to generate the humour. For example, exaggeration and irony are 
central in much political humour and can be found in several of the categories.  
The 15 examples included here are not intended to be representative of all 
humorous stunts, but to illustrate their diversity.305 Many groups are well known for 
performances that fit into my definition of humorous political stunts, but not 
included here. Among those are US Reverend Billy and his “church of life after 
shopping”,306 and the Guerrilla Girls that drew attention to the lack of women in the 
US art world from 1985 and onwards.307 Billionaires for Bush, who change their 
name depending on the situation and for instance became Billionaires for Bailouts 
during the 2008 Wall Street meltdown, are a well-documented case.308 A historic 
example is the dropping of dollar bills at the New York Stock Exchange mentioned 
in chapter 1. Other individuals, networks and organisations are radical 
cheerleaders309, Raging Grannies310, Laboratory of Insurrectionary Imagination311 
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and The Space Hijackers.312 The recent Spanish M15 movement has used much 
humour in its protests about the financial crisis313, and in Russia and Belarus, when 
people were banned from demonstrating in 2012, the idea spread about toys 
holding a protest.314  
Several authors have suggested that pranking, culture jamming and creative 
activism are becoming more frequent, constitute a new type of activism and are 
spreading all around the world.315 I am not convinced these types of activities are 
all that new – some of my examples go back 40 years – and it is difficult to judge to 
what extend it is global since primarily European and US examples have been 
studied. However, academic interest in the phenomena certainly seems to have 
increased, at least as measured in the number of publications.   
Supportive stunts are framed as ostensible attempts to help and protect from harm 
by exaggerating and over-emphasising the discourse and claims to truth upheld by 
those in power. Corrective stunts also use exaggeration to present an alternative 
version of the power holders’ truth, but they hijack the identity or message of those 
in power and declare their protest from this disguise. In the naïve stunts, the 
challengers put forward their critique from behind a pretended innocence that 
seems unaware that a dominant discourse exists. It provides the possibility to act 
as if the pranksters do not understand that what they do can be interpreted as 
protest. Absurd stunts attempt to defy all rationality and ignore all dominant 
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discourses. Finally, in the provocative stunts the pranksters transcend power by 
appearing not to care about the consequences of infuriating the powerful. 
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Table 1. A schematic overview of five different types of stunts. Short 
version that shows how those who carry out the stunts position 
themselves in relation to the dominant discourses.  
Type Description Position in relation 
to dominant 
discourse 
Dominant 
humorous 
techniques 
Supportive Activists appear 
supportive and pretend 
to support, celebrate, 
help, or protect from 
harm, but the stunt is a 
way of invalidating the 
target 
Exaggerate the 
dominant discourse, 
play along with it, 
overemphasise it 
Irony, 
parody, 
unmasking 
Corrective Activists appear rational 
but hijack the identity 
or message of their 
target in order to reveal 
a correction 
Exaggerate the 
dominant discourse, 
play along with it, 
overemphasise it 
Unmasking 
Naive Activists appear naive 
and innocent and 
pretend not to 
understand that their 
action can be 
interpreted as a protest 
Appear not to 
understand 
dominant discourse 
Pretended 
coincidence 
Absurd Activists appear as 
innocent clowns that 
point towards 
absurdities 
Ignore dominant 
discourse altogether 
Absurdity, 
slapstick 
Provocative Activists openly act as 
provocateurs in order 
to expose 
vulnerabilities 
Don't care about 
dominant discourse 
Ridicule, 
insult 
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Table 1 presents a summary of my model. After looking at the 15 examples I will 
return to an expanded version of this summary table.  
For each example I have aimed to do a number of different things. First of all the 
humour is explained within its context in order to enable readers to grasp what is 
going on. Without knowing what the situation is about, most of the examples here 
become meaningless. Where it has been possible to identify the goals of the 
activists and reactions from the audiences these are included in order to analyse 
the dynamic of the interaction. In addition to identifying the techniques used to 
generate amusement 316, I also explain what makes a certain stunt supportive, 
corrective, naïve, absurd or provocative. Finally the examples are analysed using a 
metaphor of theatre in order to better understand what happens when a humorous 
political stunt is staged.  
In his ground-breaking study about how individuals keep up a certain front, Erving 
Goffman showed how metaphors of play, drama and theatre can be used to show 
how individuals stage their own appearance in front of others.317 Studies of social 
movements have also used theatre metaphors to describe and analyse the 
interactions between movements and their audiences318, and it is not unusual to 
refer to politics as a game where politicians play politics on the public stage.319 
Since humorous political stunts are performed in public they literally make political 
issues into a piece of theatre, when their attacks on dominant discourses disrupt, 
subvert, oppose and transform what I call the play of politics.320  
Dominant discourses operate almost unchallenged on the political scene. The 
representatives of these power formations decide who play the lead roles and the 
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minor roles, and what props should be on the stage. Under all political 
circumstances there are also some people who will insist on playing roles such as 
opposition, protesters and critical journalists. In democracies, these roles have 
been written into the play, although representatives of dominant discourses do their 
best to control or sideline them. Journalists are handled through carefully scripted 
press conferences and well prepared answers in interviews, and protesters are 
tolerated or even welcomed as a sign of true democracy. Mass demonstrations 
and marches get police escorts and the organisers cooperate with the 
representatives of the dominant discourses for the protest to be carried out in an 
orderly manner without risks for the participants. These types of protests are all 
part of the ordinary play of politics, and although the participants might be satisfied 
by this staged opportunity to express their opinion, it can also be understood as 
what Marcuse called repressive tolerance.321  
Although the activists are those who disrupt the usual play, they are not the only 
ones “playing”. The metaphor also takes into account that those who are already 
on the stage representing a dominant discourse perform and enact a drama when 
they are conducting “business as usual”.  
Sometimes, someone shows up and interrupts the ordinary drama, insisting on 
playing a part not included in the script at all. What is at stake during the 
interruption is the ability to determine what is right and wrong, true and false 
regarding the issue. The surprise does not have to be humorous, but one type of 
unexpected disruption is the humorous political stunt. When the usual rules of the 
game are broken the ordinary play being performed changes, since the challengers 
on stage have to be dealt with somehow. How the play unfolds in these cases 
depend on many factors, some controlled by the newcomers, some outside of their 
control. Four major aspects for the theatre can be identified – 1. the stage, 2. the 
actors, 3. the audiences and 4. the timing. These four aspects are ideal type 
                                            
321
 Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," in A Critique of Pure Tolerance, ed. Robert Paul 
Wolff, Barrington Moore, and Herbert Marcuse (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969). 
165 
 
analytical categories developed to assist the analysis, but since they are all part of 
the play of politics they are closely linked to each other and the choices activists 
make in relation to one will influence what is possible in the others.   
1. What type of stage is it that the pranksters attempt to enter or create? Is it a 
physical location, or is it a virtual stage like a TV show or a webpage? What 
significance does this stage have? Is it a major, established stage with high 
symbolic value such as a national parliament or a world famous building already 
closely observed by media, politicians and political commentators? Is it a little 
scene outside of the spotlight? Or do the challengers try to establish their own 
stage and capture attention from there, regardless of which venues others consider 
important?   
Space and location have a high significance for many forms of resistance. Certain 
places are associated with those in power, while other locations are traditional sites 
of protest. As will be apparent in some of the examples, there is a high symbolic 
value when certain places are “invaded” by pranksters. In Scott’s concept of the 
hidden transcript it is significant that resistance is invisible and happens under the 
radar of those in power. In the humorous political stunt, it is a characteristic that it 
takes place openly and can be observed by various audiences, frequently 
attempting to temporarily control a space usually controlled by others.322  
2. Who are the actors performing in the play of politics about to be disrupted? 
Lead actors considered very important, such as presidents, royalties and other 
celebrities, or minor characters who might be important on their own little stage? 
Sometimes it can be difficult to separate the factors of stage and actors, since lead 
actors have a tendency to create a major stage wherever they go because of their 
fame. The new actors in the show who initiate the stunt I have termed the 
challengers, and their identity matters as well. Are they already famous or well-
known from other plays, such as professional comedians? How many are they, 
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how unexpected is their appearance, how convincing are they in their new roles, 
and what is it that they do, once they have gained access to the stage? How much 
have they prepared their script, and how good are they at improvising?  
An important element is how well the challengers play their roles in the new drama. 
Do they manage to take it all the way when they have chosen a certain path? It is 
not uncommon that activists who are used to playing the ordinary role of protester 
find it hard to leave this role behind. If they bring symbols of protest along in the 
stunt, there is a risk of the stunt losing focus: it is neither a pure traditional protest, 
nor a pure humorous stunt.   
In Chapter 1 the complexities of understanding relations of power were discussed. 
Applying this metaphor of theatre by looking at both the apparently powerful and 
the challengers as people performing roles highlights how much impressions of 
who is powerful are in the eye of the beholder. It becomes more obvious that in 
order for a discourse to remain dominant, the actors who uphold it also have to 
convincingly perform as if they believe the discourse to be right and true. 
3. The audiences include many different people who can be friendly, hostile or 
indifferent from the outset. In his article about parody’s role in sustaining a 
democratic public culture, Hariman speaks about the audience as “unruly, mixed, 
possibly drunk or stoned, maybe crazy, and at times also stupid, deluded, out of 
work, or otherwise deviant from the norms of serious, respectable, daytime 
routine.”323 Seldom do activists take such diversity into consideration. Audiences 
include both people who already know about the issue and those who are new to it. 
Kathleen Blee and Amy McDowell have written about how social movement groups 
construct their audiences and how that construction can develop over time. Blee 
and McDowell emphasise the performance studies perspective that focuses on the 
interaction taking place in the encounter: “… audiences typically do not exist a 
priori, as natural or given categories of social life; rather, audiences are discursive 
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constructions, created by social actors through social interaction.”324 Even more 
importantly, social movements have perceptions about who their audiences are 
and how they want them to think and react. One of the findings of Blee and 
McDowell is that social movements seldom have a neutral perception of their 
audiences. If they are not constructed as people who can fulfil a need for the 
group, such as providing more activists or serving as allies, then they are seen as 
“needy” of knowledge and information.325  
In some instances where a stunt is about to take place, the audience is not aware 
that a piece of theatre is going on at all. In other cases, the audience has already 
directed its attention towards a stage or an actor, expecting something to happen. 
Stages with a significant symbolic value are frequently under constant surveillance, 
and major actors have a tendency to draw a big audience wherever they go. An 
interesting question is also how the challengers treat the audience – as an 
audience, or as part of the play? Challengers frequently design their stunts to 
appeal to the type of audience with access to media, in order to be able to reach 
larger audiences, but some challengers are more concerned with reaching out to 
the general public and communicating directly with them.  
Perhaps the most important aspect regarding the audience is how they interpret 
the performance according to their own previous knowledge, cultural references, 
experiences and expectations. What do audience members think is happening and 
what does it mean to them? In order for a humorous political stunt to succeed, the 
challengers almost always depend on challenging audience expectations. The 
interruption of the ordinary drama includes a surprise which turns the world upside 
down.  
4. Finally, the timing of the whole affair matters: Is the stage already occupied 
when the new actors enter, or do they sneak in while the spotlight is off? How long 
do they stay, and how frequently do they appear? The answers to these questions 
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determine how the dynamic of the power relations between the challengers and the 
old actors will develop. The timing can also be analysed in a broader perspective – 
are the humorous political stunts part of a social movement expressing similar 
kinds of critique, or is it a one-time event? 
The theatre metaphor does not in any way indicate that the play of politics is not 
serious. All the actors, both those who represent a dominant discourse and the 
challengers, consider this game highly serious. As discussed previously, that some 
activists decide to use humour in no way implies that they are not serious about the 
issue. However, using the theatre metaphor allows us to take a step back in order 
to better see what happens in the unscripted meeting when the “non-protesting 
protesters” enter the stage.   
Supportive Humorous Stunts 
Supportive humorous stunts are framed as attempts to help, support, protect from 
harm, and celebrate. Those who carry out supportive stunts appear supportive and 
rational, but what happens is that the target is invalidated. On the political scene, 
those assumed to be in power and control are joined up front by the pranksters. 
Apparently the pranksters do not dismiss the truth and rationality the 
representatives of the dominant discourses present, instead it is exaggerated and 
overemphasised. Usually irony plays an important role in supportive humorous 
stunts, since they are not supportive at all, but instead attempt to disconfirm their 
targets. The targets will know that they are being watched, and the audiences are 
presented with an image of the power holders’ vulnerable sides. Here the 
protesters do not appear irrational in their relation to what they actually oppose, 
they are constructive, helpful and supportive. By acting in this way they attempt to 
undermine their opponents’ claims to truth and transcend the unequal relations of 
power. Compared to conventional political protest, at first glance supportive stunts 
look like real support, but a closer look reveals an underlying message that 
exposes and disconfirms. Below are three examples of supportive stunts from 
Australia, Britain and Belgium challenging the dominant discourses of a 
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conservative prime minster, the Indonesian government’s denial of human rights 
abuses and a bank’s investment in land mines and cluster munitions. 
John Howard Ladies’ Auxiliary Fan Club 
Australia’s conservative prime minister from 1996 to 2007 had an extraordinary fan 
club consisting of four young women plus their driver and camera women. In 
character as Bea Wight, Bea Wright, Bea Rich and Bea Strait they mocked him 
and his politics during the last part of his time as prime minister. In an interview, the 
women explained how the names “reflect the key pillars of Howardism – being 
white, right, rich and straight.”326 The women were provoked by Howard’s 
conservative politics and what they saw as his attempt to bring Australia back to 
the 1950s. They set out to confront his politics in an unusual manner, starting with 
the 2004 election. Dressed up in silly hats, pearls, long white gloves, lots of 
makeup and frocks, representing the stereotypical Australian housewife of the 
1950s, they tried to confront him with these ironic personas. In 2004 they did not 
get closer than 50 metres, but in the following years the characters were 
developed. Prior to the 2007 election campaign, they did their first public 
performance on a tram. Here they launched the “White blindfold campaign” and 
explained to the passengers “Now, this is the official John Howard view of history. 
What happens with the white blindfold is that you put it on and you can’t see a 
thing. It completely whites out everything. All you can see is white.”327 Then they 
had a “patriotic” Australian history quiz, satirising Howard’s perception of what 
Australia’s history was like. Responses from the passengers were positive, and 
even Howard supporters thought it was funny.328  
Getting a chance to get close to Howard during the election campaign was difficult, 
since his schedule was kept secret, but in 2007 they finally found themselves at the 
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right hotel. While the journalists were waiting for Howard, the women got a chance 
to introduce themselves as the John Howard Ladies’ Auxiliary Fan Club. They had 
a number of gags, e.g. playing on the electoral Viagra they had prepared for Mr. 
Howard and the race card that he could play during the election (which Howard 
had done in previous elections) and uranium export to Iran and North Korea. Later 
that day, they finally met him in the botanical gardens in Melbourne. Bea Wight 
asked Howard if he would like some yellowcake, referring to a form of uranium 
concentrate powder, and Howard’s recent signing of an agreement with Russia 
about export of Australian uranium. Bea Wight explains what happened: “He 
looked at us and smiled as though all his dreams had come at once. He smiled. He 
was happy, just for one split second, and then he realised – ‘Electoral Viagra’ – 
that we were evil.”329  
The fan club continued to follow Howard, including by going to a horse race he 
attended. Here they found their way into the exclusion zone with their pink fluffy 
hats and white gloves in order to encourage Howard to play the race card. When 
security guards wanted to escort them out, they explained that “Johnny” had asked 
them to be there, and that they were his fan club.  
Next time they tried to get to Howard, their costumes helped them though several 
security points, since they looked cute and harmless. That gave the four ladies 
time with Howard’s people and an opportunity to offer them xenophobia pills, with 
words like "Are you afraid of muslims dear, please take this pill it will help you.” 
They had white pills for fear of muslims, pink for gay people, purple for feminists 
and red ones for communists and unionists – all minority groups the fan club 
thought were attacked by Howard’s politics.330 
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The fan club managed to get away with many stunts without being arrested or 
fined, and made it to the national TV news.331 They think themselves that because 
they presented themselves as absolute Howard lovers and behaved so non-
threateningly, they were perceived more as performers than as activists. It also 
helped that they were four small white women.332 And they were convincing. A 
news reporter starts her account of the offering of yellowcake “Even if their 
message is not quite your cup of tea, it’s hard not to admire the commitment of the 
four mothers of the John Howard Ladies Auxiliary Fan Club.”333 
Mark Thomas’ PR training for dictatorships 
Mark Thomas is a British professional comedian who has done numerous 
humorous political stunts. His work combines serious investigative journalism with 
deeply felt opinions about what is right and wrong. He has disclosed his 
investigative findings in his immensely popular performances as a stand-up 
comedian and in TV shows. In his book As used on the famous Nelson Mandela334 
Thomas describes his “underground adventures in the arms and torture trade.” 
One of the adventures led Thomas and his colleague Chris Martin to the Defendory 
Arms Fair in Athens in 1998. Here their self-invented PR company McKintosh 
Morley offered advice to the arms dealers and potential buyers on how to deal with 
accusations of human rights violations. The organiser of the arms fair thought it 
was very interesting to have a PR company for the first time and told them that “PR 
is absolutely vital.”335 
With two large posters proclaiming “Are you ready when Amnesty International 
comes knocking on your door?” And “Who’s Winning the War on Words?” outside 
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their stall, Thomas and his helpers tried to attract attention from customers from 
countries with a record of human rights violations. They presented their services 
with words like: 
We offer media training and advice on how to minimise the 
negative impact of the human rights industry. We teach crisis 
management, damage limitation, pre-crisis preparation, and we 
focus on training the trainers so that when we leave our work 
continues. We can’t solve your problems with Amnesty but we can 
teach you how you can solve them.336  
Arms fair participants who showed interest got a realistic free media training, where 
Martin interviewed them in front of a camera, while Thomas gave them advice on 
how to improve their public appearance. Their basic advice was that when accused 
of human rights violations, it is better to admit a little of the truth – the part that is 
least damaging – than to deny everything. One of the visitors to the free media 
training in the stall was a high ranking officer from Kenya who in front of the 
camera told Martin and Thomas that beating your wife is a way of showing love 
and affection, and that the women really want it. This episode made its way into 
Thomas’ show. However, their biggest exposure came when Major General 
Widjojo from Indonesia visited the stall.  
Indonesia has a long record of severe human rights violations. From 1965 to 1998 
the country was ruled by a military dictatorship, headed by President General 
Suharto. Amnesty International had many reports on human rights violations in 
Indonesia, but no official had ever admitted to them in public. During the media 
training, Thomas and Martin gained Major General Widjojo’s trust and on video he 
appears to be an open-minded officer who is willing to learn something new. 
Apparently he really believed that they had skills to offer that would help him cover 
up human rights abuses.   
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During the interview Thomas had different relaxation exercises for the officer. This 
included making big waves with his arms, which meant that he made a fool of 
himself in front of the camera. He was also given different toys as a positive 
reinforcement when Thomas judged that he did something well. All the time, 
Thomas was playing his part as the self-help coach and his colleague that of a 
reporter asking critical questions. In the end of the training, Major General Widjojo 
admitted in front of the camera that occasionally the Indonesian army practiced 
torture, and that it was “in order to protect the security of the society”. When asked 
why they did this, he said that the Indonesian government occasionally needed to 
torture some people in order give other people freedom of expression, freedom to 
move and the right to education.337    
After the interview, Major General Widjojo was pleased with the experience, and 
inquired if it would be possible for McKintosh Morley to come to Jakarta to teach a 
six week military media course. This did not go ahead, but Major General Widjojo’s 
positive experience became the entry ticket for McKintosh Morley to meet Defence 
Attaché Colonel Halim Nawhe at the Indonesian Embassy in London. Major 
General Widjojo was a friend of his, and Colonel Halim Nawhe was easily talked 
into trying the free media training himself, this time in a studio in London.  
The advice to Colonel Halim Nawhe was the same as to Major General Widjojo – 
admit to some of the minor things you are accused of, and continue to lie about 
what is most grave to you. With Colonel Halim Nawhe in the studio, Thomas and 
Martin gave him a list of some of the recent troubling accusations. He was then 
asked to decide what was most sensitive and should be lied about, and pick a few 
that he considered the least damaging. One of the issues that Thomas and Martin 
presented him with was the use of British produced military equipment in East 
Timor during Indonesian occupation. For years, this had been a controversial case 
in Britain, and the British government had been assured that British produced arms 
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had not been part of the occupation. However, this was one of the things on the list 
that the Colonel said he could admit to, and he confessed that tanks made in 
Britain had been used in East Timor. As Thomas wrote “The colonel’s selection of 
‘sensitive’ issues is based on what would be most embarrassing to the Indonesian 
government. They are not, however, the issues most sensitive to the British 
government.”338     
In spite of these confessions, nothing changed regarding the export of British 
produced arms to Indonesia. Both Colonel Halim Nawhe and Major General 
Widjojo denied the confessions.339 A British newspaper reported that:  
Diplomatic sources in Jakarta said that the programme was a "set-up". "The 
officers were entrapped and were co-operating with the PR company in the 
spirit of a game, almost," said an Indonesian spokesman. "This does not 
prove anything."340  
Mark Thomas is an unusual comedian, who is not even sure if he would rather be 
called an activist or an investigative journalist. One reviewer of his work calls him 
an investigative comic.341 Where many comedians pride themselves of being ready 
to ridicule everything and everyone, Thomas has strong opinions about how to 
choose the subject of his humour. To him, everything is political. As he says, “it’s a 
political decision to believe that people just want a good night out without having to 
think.” 342 He does not believe in objectivity, on the contrary. Looking at the state of 
the world, his duty as a comedian is to present a critical corrective of the ruling 
elite. In addition, people should have a good laugh and be encouraged to work for 
change themselves.343   
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Searching for landmines at the Belgian bank AXA  
In Belgium a network working against landmines and cluster munitions sent a 
landmine clearance team to the headquarter of AXA, a bank which had increased 
its investment in mines while other banks where reducing their investment in this 
industry. In the press release they wrote: 
Today, 18th October, activists from the campaign “My Money. 
Clear Conscience?” symbolically demined the headquarters of AXA 
in Brussels. A landmine clearance team went in search of 
landmines, cluster munitions and other controversial weapons. 
This action is needed more than ever, as research from Netwerk 
Vlaanderen reveals that AXA invests heavily in two new US 
landmine producers.344 
The demining team of approximately 10 people used orange and white tape to 
close of the area and displayed signs saying “danger, mines” and “demining in 
progress”. In a three minute video about the action which enabled the continuation 
of the performance across time and space, the employees in AXA show emotions 
like bewilderment, surprise, amusement and worry.345 It seems apparent that they 
do not know what to do with the deminers. Landmines and cluster monitions is a 
serious issue, and there should be no doubt that the organisation is serious in its 
critique of AXA’s continued investment in this type of weapons. At the time of the 
action the Ottawa Treaty, an international ban on anti-personnel landmines, had 
been in place for 8 years. Netwerk Vlaanderen had been campaigning for more 
ethical investments for three years, and while most banks had decreased their 
investment in weapons, AXA had not been willing to cooperate with the group.346 
To make this more public, the group decided to do the demining action.  
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Although this was only pretence and the employees seemed more bewildered than 
scared and we as viewers knew that the landmine clearance team would not find 
any landmines or cluster munitions at the AXA headquarters in Brussels, it is 
obvious that they approached the conflict with a logic which differed from 
conventional protest.  
Confronting power through support 
In order to better understand the incongruity that generates amusement in the 
examples above, Berger’s list of 45 humorous techniques is useful. Both Netwerk 
Vlaanderen and the fan club used the technique of irony.347 They say that they are 
there to search for landmines and profess to love Howard and his politics although 
the real purpose is to highlight AXA’s investments and critique Howard’s social 
politics. A standard definition of irony is to say one thing but mean something else 
or in another way make a gap between what is said and what is meant. 
Encyclopædia Britannica distinguishes between verbal irony and dramatic irony. In 
verbal irony, “the real meaning is concealed or contradicted by the literal meanings 
of the words.” Verbal irony arises from a sophisticated or resigned awareness of 
contrast between what is and what ought to be. In dramatic irony, “there is an 
incongruity between what is expected and what occurs.”348 However, Linda 
Hutcheon suggests understanding irony in relational terms. She is critical both of 
those who focus on the ironic intent and the skills of the one who aims to be ironic 
as well at those who understand irony to require a certain competence from the 
interpreter. Instead she says that irony “happens” when the ironist and the 
interpreter share enough knowledge about the subject being ironised about, that 
they belong to the same “discursive communities”. For irony to happen, 
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competence is not the key word, but everyone involved shares at least some 
assumptions about the world and about communication.349  
All humour risks being misinterpreted and there is always a chance that the 
audiences will not “get it”. This risk appears to be especially present when it comes 
to the technique of irony where the fact that the literal meaning can be the 
complete opposite of the intended meaning poses an extra risk.350 Most other 
techniques will just generate confusion or bewilderment if the signals to indicate 
humorous intent are not communicated obviously enough to the audience.  
Impersonation is another technique used in several of the supportive stunts. 
Impersonation can be “theft” of a person’s identity or of a profession (occupational 
identity). The three examples illustrate how diverse the “theft” can be. Mark 
Thomas impersonated a PR consultant, the deminers impersonated the role of a 
mine clearance team, and the fan club appear as caricatures of a white middle-
class Australian woman from the 1950s.  
In addition allusion is used to hint at AXA’s investment in landmines. Allusions are 
hinting at something, referring to something which is not present. Much everyday 
humour consists of allusions, where just the mentioning of the name of a person 
who has done something stupid is enough to cause laughter. The fan club used the 
technique of exaggeration, which is to make things smaller, bigger, higher, worse, 
better etc. than what the audience expects them to be or what is generally 
considered “normal”.  
Unmasking and Revelation of Character is also a technique used by both Thomas 
and Netwerk Vlaanderen to reveal the true colours of the AXA and the Indonesian 
military. Berger describes it this way: “The emphasis in unmasking is on the 
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process and effects of discovery (…) what is revealed or discovered often leads to 
embarrassment and humiliation.”351 
Thomas is a popular comedian, and his shows draw large audiences. This episode 
was not just causing little smiles; his professional skills when it comes to timing and 
building up expectations meant that the episode was hilarious. The techniques are 
the mistakes that the officer makes. The audience is aware that this is a trap, and 
enjoy that a highly disliked figure makes the mistake of thinking this was real. 
Mistakes can be humorous when someone shows poor judgement, does 
something considered stupid or makes an error. Berger thinks that we laugh at 
others’ mistakes because we feel superior to them.  
Identifying these techniques might help understand what is funny to the audiences 
in these cases, but it does not tell anything about the relationship between the 
different actors and or their power relationship. 
Conventional protest can easily be identified as such by the use of leaflets, 
posters, critical speeches, blockades etc. Ordinary protesters use rational 
argumentation in their efforts to convince others to join them. In contrast the 
activists performing these supportive stunts offered help, support and concern for 
other’s safety. The landmine clearance team, dressed in orange wests, protective 
helmets and equipped with instruments for mine detection looked out for the safety 
of the employees of AXA, while John Howard Ladies’ Auxiliary Fan Club was there 
to support their hero through difficult times. Mark Thomas did not appear to criticise 
human rights abuses, but to support those who carry them out. This way, they all 
engaged with their opponent by applying a different type of logic to what the 
conflict was about, although in very different ways. 
Applying the theatre metaphor it is obvious that the fan club tried to enter the stage 
where “Australian politics” was being played, casting one of the main actors – the 
prime minister. He did what he could to ignore his fan club, but could not avoid 
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them getting attention nevertheless. Because they used irony and said they were 
his biggest supporters, it was difficult to force them into the ordinary protester role 
and the political play was disrupted in a way that transformed the meaning of 
support and opposition. What happened with the landmine action had both 
similarities and differences. The activists did not play the usual protester role here 
either, but entered a scene where they were not expected at all. Their apparent 
help made it easier for them to remain on the scene in order to stage their own play 
about landmines than would have been possible had they acted as conventional 
protesters. Mark Thomas’ strategy was different yet. He entered an established 
scene (the arms fair) under disguise, and managed to set up a “sub-stage” where 
he was in control of the rules. He lured important participants from the main stage 
onto his sub-stage. One must assume that McKintosh Morley’s presence on the 
main stage made the Indonesian Major General less cautious than he would 
otherwise have been. The real intentions of Thomas was not revealed until he was 
on stage as himself months later, so there was no direct confrontation where 
anyone had to decide how to respond to the stunt – no one was aware that they 
have been subjected to a stunt until it was too late.   
The audiences for these stunts varied a lot. In all three cases there were 
immediate audiences, for example passing by and bank employees. However, all 
these humorous political stunts were filmed, making it possible for many more to 
watch the confrontations. When it comes to the factor of timing, it was important for 
the fan club to time its activities around the schedule of the prime minister. The PR 
training depended on being present at the arms fair, while Netwerk Vlaanderen had 
the possibility to show up at AXA bank any day they liked, since the investment in 
landmines was ongoing.  
Corrective Humorous Stunts 
Corrective humorous stunts aim to transcend the inequality in power by presenting 
an alternative version of “the truth”. They hijack the identity or the message of their 
target in order to reveal a correction. This type of stunt unmasks the dominant 
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discourse by disclosing a more nuanced version of persons, institutions or 
messages. Just like in the supportive stunt, this happens when the discourse and 
rationality of the target are exaggerated and overemphasised. Returning to the 
metaphor of theatre, the pranksters do not enter the scene right in the face of the 
powerful as in the supportive stunt, but sneak in behind their back while the main 
actors look the other way or are busy somewhere else. Then they reveal what they 
consider a more correct version of who the target really is. They choose a scene 
usually controlled by the powerful. This way, the pranksters communicate to the 
power holders that they are being watched, but the correction is usually more 
directed towards the audience to whom the true colours of the target is revealed. 
Corrective humorous stunts frequently share their goal with conventional protests – 
they want to inform the public about an alternative version of the truth.  
Corrective stunts subvert a dominant message by using a distorted version of the 
message that those in power use. The dynamics are illustrated below with 
examples from two groups: The Yes Men hijacked the identity of the World Trade 
Organisation and a multinational corporation and Netwerk Vlaanderen created a 
bank that invested in arms, oil and child labour.  
The Yes Men: Hijacking WTO and Dow 
The Yes Men is a small US based activist group which has challenged the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) and multinational corporations with different stunts in 
order to expose the shortcomings of their neoliberal ideology. The predecessor to 
what is now the WTO was called GATT, and in first years after the change, it was 
not uncommon for people to talk about GATT meaning the WTO. The Yes Men 
established a web site on www.GATT.org, which was a parody of the WTO. 
Through this site, they have been contacted by conference organisers who thought 
they had come to the official WTO site and wanted to invite a speaker. The Yes 
Men have posed as WTO representatives on several occasions, and have been 
able to say the most outrageous things apparently without anybody taking notice. 
At a conference in Salzburg in Austria they suggested the idea of making 
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democracy more profitable – that a voter should be able to sell his/her vote on an 
auction to the highest bidder. At another occasion they announced “might equaled 
right… that there ought to be a market in human rights abuses.”352  
The Yes Men were surprised by the lack of response, so when they got a new 
invitation to the WTO they decided to do something more spectacular. The 
Tempere University of Technology in Finland was hosting a textile industry 
conference in August 2000, and Andy Bichlbaum went together with his colleague 
Mike Bonnano. Bichlbaum was posing as Hank Hardy Unruh, and this time they 
wanted to visualize the ridiculousness in what he said from the podium. In his 
speech, Bichlbaum told the participants that slavery was inefficient in producing the 
economic results that their owners wanted, and that exploitation of third world 
labour was much more efficient. New technology would make it possible for 
management to control their workers by keeping them under constant surveillance, 
transferring the idea of the prison panopticon to the new technology. He then 
presented the Management Leisure Suit as the WTO solution to management 
difficulties. He tore off his ordinary clothes, and underneath the audience could see 
his golden leisure suit. He continued to introduce the audience to the core features 
of the suit, and when he unzipped the front of it, a three foot long golden phallus 
was inflated in front of him. The audience clapped. Hank Hardy Unruh then told his 
audience about the Employee Visualisation Appendage which with an electronic 
device could communicate with chips implanted in the worker’s bodies.353    
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Illustration 4. Andy Bichlbaum from the Yes Men posing as Hank Hardy 
Unruh, representing the WTO at Tempere University of Technology in 
Finland, August 2000. The photo is in the creative commons. 
In this stunt, the Yes Men used a traditional conference lecture as their medium, 
and the potential audience was expanded when film was used to spread the story 
of the stunt. Their agenda was to attack the WTO and its promotion of neo-liberal 
economics. At this occasion it was the abuse of cheap labour in the sweat shops of 
the textile industry which was under attack. The Yes Men did not seem to design 
their action to make the conference audience laugh, but just to make them react 
and be outraged at what they head. But that failed, as it had done before when the 
Yes Men criticised free trade and the idea that it should be possible to make a 
profit from anything. Only the people who were present know what they actually 
thought about the situation. From the data available there is no way of telling if they 
were upset by the speech but too shy to stand up and say that this was ridiculous. 
They might have understood this was a stunt, been amused but chose not to say 
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anything. All we know is that the audiences who watch the movie are amused, but 
they have also been given many clues that this was a stunt about to happen.  
The WTO could either choose to ignore a stunt like this, or make a public 
announcement that this is not their opinion. From the WTO point of view, it was 
probably wise to ignore it.  
In 2002, the Yes Men thought it was time to end their careers as WTO 
representatives, and decided to do it properly by shutting down the organisation. 
After the event in Finland, the WTO had put a warning on their website about 
www.gatt.org, and the Yes Men did not expect to get any more invitations. 
Nevertheless, an accountants’ association in Australia invited the WTO to Sydney 
to talk about “Agribusiness Globalisation”.354 When the Yes Men arrived as WTO 
representatives they explained that there had been a change in plans that 
prevented them from talking about the topic of agribusiness. Instead Bichlbaum, 
this time going by the name Kinnithrung Sprat, explained that the WTO had 
initiated an internal evaluation of its work, and that the conclusion was that the 
organisation would close down shortly. The speech went through much 
documentation of the shortcomings of the WTO and the neo-liberal doctrine of “free 
market” and how it had been unjust and prevented poor countries from prospering. 
Sprat announced that the WTO would be re-launched under the name Trade 
Regulation Organisation, but that much was still uncertain about this new 
organisation. However, it would certainly have its basis in the UN Charter of 
Human Rights, in order to secure that the needs of all human beings counted more 
than profit and free trade.355  
Also after this stunt, the Yes Men were surprised by the reactions. The audience 
was actually happy to hear this announcement, thought it was a good idea and 
came up with many suggestions for how to make the new Trade Regulation 
Organisation good. The stunt was convincing enough to make a Canadian MP ask 
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in parliament what the consequences of the closure of the WTO would be for the 
Canadian people. The official WTO had to reply to at least one journalist that this 
was a hoax.356 
Another Yes Men stunt had its background in serious accident which took place in 
the city Bhopal in India on December 3rd, 1984. Poisonous gas leaked out from a 
pesticide plant that was owned by the company Union Carbide. 5000 people died 
immediately after the accident, while 15,000 more died over the next 20 years as a 
result of the gas. Another 120,000 are estimated to need lifelong medical care. The 
victims of the disaster have fought for compensation and a clean-up of the site ever 
since. Union Carbide left India shortly after, and in 2001 the company was sold to 
another company, Dow Chemical.  
20 years later, on December 3rd 2004, the BBC asked the company for a comment 
about the case. On live TV from Paris, the Dow Chemical representative Jude 
Finisterra appeared. To everyone’s surprise he said that Dow Chemical was finally 
ready to take full responsibility for cleaning up and paying compensation to all the 
victims. At the same time he apologised that it had taken so long for the company 
to take this step. On film it looks as if the BBC reporter was quite surprised by the 
announcement, and in the next hours the value of Dow on the stock exchange fell 
with two billion American dollars.357 Jude Finisterra turned out to be Bichlbaum 
from Yes Men, and again appeared live on BBC, this time posing as himself. He 
explained the rationale behind the action – that the Yes Men were helping Dow 
improve. The Yes Men received some criticism for bringing the victims false hope, 
but argued that it was Dow that denied the victims what they deserved. Just as in 
the case with the WTO, it was the Yes Men’s alternative webpage for Dow and a 
mistake by the BBC that made the stunt possible at all.358  
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Illustration 5. Andy Bichlbaum from the Yes Men posing as Jude 
Finisterra on the BBC in 2004. As a spokesperson for Dow Chemicals, 
Finisterra announced that the company would finally take full 
responsibility for the Bhopal catastrophe. The photo is in the creative 
commons. 
The message of the Yes Men is difficult to argue about: That Dow should take full 
responsibility for compensating victims and cleaning up. Their medium of choice for 
communicating this message is not unusual – activists around the world dream 
about access to the BBC to communicate their message.  
ACE bank for ethical investments 
In the category of supportive stunts, Netwerk Vlaanderen’s demining of AXA was 
one example. The same organisation was behind a more elaborate deception. 
Focusing on the same issues as when searching for landmines – banks’ 
responsibilities for what they invest in – they decided to set up a new bank, ACE 
bank. The bank opened an office in central Brussels and advertised that it was 
investigating if there was a market for its special way of doing banking. The bank 
wanted to specialise in investments in dubious areas such as arms and oil 
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production as well as child labour. It claimed to be ethical and transparent because 
in contrast to other banks it did not try to hide what it invested in. On the contrary, 
they exclusively invested in these areas in order to provide the best possible 
interest rate to their customers. In a video about ACE bank the viewer sees 
potential bank customers being introduced to the idea. Some are very sceptical; 
others appear seriously interested, some thought it was a parody. The new bank 
made headlines in the TV news and in newspapers – but after a week of 
speculation it was closed down by the Belgian bank authorities. Apparently furious 
about the decision, ACE bank called for a press conference. Here they named all 
the major banks and their investment in similar products and demanded that if ACE 
bank had to close because of its investment practices, then all the other banks had 
to be closed as well. Finally they revealed that it was Vlaanderen Netwerk which 
was responsible.359  
Confronting power by correcting it 
Returning to Berger’s techniques, impersonation was used in most of the examples 
of the corrective stunt, just as it was a popular technique in the supportive stunt. 
Yes Men impersonated WTO and Dow representatives, and Netwerk Vlaanderen’s 
activists took on the role of bankers when they created ACE bank. 
Exaggeration is another technique that appeared again, this time in the Yes Men’s 
performance at the textile conference in Finland where they exaggerated the neo-
liberal policies of the WTO in order to provoke a reaction from the conference 
participants. When Berger describes this technique, he mentions that exaggeration 
has to be combined with one or more other techniques in order to be funny. Here 
they combine it with absurdity. The giant golden penis was so absurd that it seems 
unbelievable that the conference audience did not understand that this was a joke. 
This way, the technique to make the spectators of the movie laugh is the ignorance 
of the conference audience. According to Berger, ignorance works as a technique 
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because we like to feel superior to those we consider stupid.360 The absurdity in 
the speech is created by the extreme exaggeration of the possibility and wish for 
control. No matter what one thinks about the WTO, their statements have not yet 
been as outrageous as what the Yes Men made them say. 
ACE bank is a parody of the real banks. In Berger´s understanding of the term, 
parody is a “verbal mimicry” of a particular person, where his or her style is 
imitated. ACE bank is not an example of this kind of parody, but a parody of an 
institution. 
Unmasking is another technique used in examples of both supportive and 
corrective stunts. The Yes Men showed that it would in fact have been possible for 
Dow to offer compensation to the victims in Bhopal, and in a similar type of 
unmasking, Netwerk Vlaanderen exposed the double standards of the ordinary 
banks. Some audiences might also have enjoyed the mistakes of the potential 
customers which were fooled by the false bank.   
The Yes Men themselves write about what they do as “identity correction” 
(although someone suggested the term to them after they had already done some 
of their stunts). Amber Day talks about “identity nabbing”.361 Dow and the WTO 
uphold an image of themselves that the Yes Men do not think covers the whole 
truth. The WTO neglects to talk about some of the devastating consequences of its 
neo-liberal policies, and Dow pretended that it could not do anything about Bhopal. 
The Yes Men set out to correct this self-presentation by revealing the true colours 
or providing alternative causes of actions.   
At one point, it was suggested to me to call this category honest – however, that 
implies that those who are being corrected are lying. Although they might 
frequently do this, corrective stunts can also be used in cases where someone 
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make statements they themselves believe in. Therefore it is more appropriate to 
talk about different understandings of the truth rather than the truth.  
On the surface, the corrective stunt seems to be acting within the frame of logic 
and rationality, and again the metaphor of theatre can be useful for illustrating what 
is going on. The stages that the pranksters entered vary a lot: The play that the 
Yes Men attempted to disrupt was an ordinary conference about textiles. ACE 
bank set up an alternative stage and lured their audience in there, just like Mark 
Thomas did in his supportive stunt. Who the correcting activists considered the 
audiences and what they wanted to communicate differed, but they all had in 
common that they wanted to provide an alternative. The Yes Men wanted to 
present a more correct picture of what the WTO is, and what ideology the 
organisation represents. The activists behind ACE bank wanted to bring the issue 
of banking investment practices in dubious areas to the attention of the general 
public. On these various stages, no one appeared to be playing a protester role, 
neither did they want to “help” in the way the participants in the supportive stunt 
did.  
What they did was different again, and the timing of the stunts was important. They 
had to appear at exactly the right moment and control the stage for a while in order 
to communicate an alternative point of view to the audience. Netwerk Vlaanderen 
brought in a new actor – a new bank – in order to expose the old banks already on 
the scene. The Yes Men did not change the play by bringing in new actors; they 
just let one of the ordinary actors exaggerate his part. In the direct interaction with 
the conference audience, this failed when nobody seemed to notice anything 
wrong. They were not even treated like ordinary protesters and ordered out of the 
conference room. The WTO was not put in a position where they were forced to 
react. From this perspective, the prank was a complete failure. Nevertheless, the 
Yes Men reached a much larger audience through their film: viewers were given 
the clues that this was a joke.  
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When it comes to the audience element of the play metaphor, it is difficult to know 
if members of the general public changed their perception of the neo-liberal 
discourse targeted by the Yes Men because of these stunts. Neither will we ever 
know if ACE bank influenced investment habits in Belgium. Even if it is possible to 
trace a change in behaviour people can always claim that this is a coincidence or 
that other factors caused the change. However, although it might be due to a 
selection bias it is striking that the examples of corrective stunts I have come 
across have been very effective in getting media attention.362 It would be worth 
investigating further if there is something about this type of stunt that is especially 
appealing to media. 
Naïve Humorous Stunts 
Naive humorous stunts deal with the power holders’ truth and rationality in a way 
which differs from the supportive and corrective stunt. By appearing naïve and 
innocent, protesters pretend not to understand that what they do can be interpreted 
as a protest and this way point to the unequal relations of power by only hinting at 
them. Where the supportive and corrective stunts exaggerate and overemphasise 
the rationality of the power holders in order to get their message across, those who 
carry out naïve stunts pretend that they are not aware that they have challenged 
any power. In terms of the theatre metaphor, they enter a scene but pretend that 
they are not aware that there was a play going on. If anything looks like a protest, 
that must be a coincidence. The story of the good solider Svejk who challenged the 
authority of the army without ever framing his actions as protest is a classic literary 
example of a naïve prankster.363  
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 Jaroslav Hašek, The Good Soldier Švejk and His Fortunes in the World War (New York: Crowell, 
1974).  
190 
 
The purpose of the naïve stunt is not to present a more correct version or 
unmasking, but under the disguise of naiveté to simply utter a dissenting message. 
Below four short examples illustrate the diversity of the naïve stunt. The first is an 
advertisement for sausages during the Nazi occupation of Denmark, followed by a 
Serbian blood donation action. The third example involved a number of Poles who 
took their TVs for a walk. I conclude with another Danish example where Santa 
came to town just before Christmas in 1974.  
Innocent advertising during the Nazi occupation of Denmark 
During WWII, both Denmark and Norway were occupied by the Nazis from 1940-
1945. In these countries, jokes ridiculing the occupation forces were widespread 
and to some degree contributed to creating a culture of resistance. Examples of 
humour which was public and therefore part of an interaction with the German 
occupier are less common. In his article about Danish occupation humour, which 
mainly focuses on whispered jokes, Hong provides an unusual example from a 
butchers van in the town Esbjerg. On the back of double doors the butcher had 
written:  
“Salted down sausages. N.S Jensen, Butcher. Delivery Anywhere. 
England Road 22, Esbjerg.” But when the right door was opened, 
the words on the left door then read “Down with N.S [National 
Socialism], Long Live England.364 
This anti-Nazi message, which is also a support of England, took place under very 
serious conditions. Repression from the Nazis was harsh and the butcher was 
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taking a great risk. The medium used in this case was a traditional advertising on 
the door, which should not pose any threat to the Nazis. Only upon closer 
inspection does the message turn out to be far from innocent.365  
Donating blood to avoid bloodshed in Serbia 
In November 1996 there were elections in Serbia, and at the local level the 
coalition Zadjeno opposing Slobodan Milošević won in more than a hundred 
municipalities, including Belgrade and other important cities. When the regime 
refused to accept the result, this sparked more than three months of mass 
demonstrations. The students played a major role in bringing a carnivalesque 
atmosphere to the protest. One event, called blood transfusion, was an example of 
a naïve stunt. It was based on a statement by Mirjana Markovic, the leader of the 
Yoguslav Left Party and the wife of Slobodan Milošević. She had threatened to use 
violence against the protesters when she said that “a lot of blood had been shed 
for the introduction of communism into Yoguslavia and that it [the Communist 
Party] would never go without blood”.366 Some students initiated a campaign to 
collect blood and then said “here is our blood, now you can go”.367  
Poland – taking the TV for a walk 
The independent trade union Solidarity in Poland called for a boycott of the official 
TV news in 1982. Since the creation of Solidarity in August 1980, the union had 
been a huge challenge to the communist government. On December 13, 1981, the 
enforcement of martial law put a temporary stop to the democratization movement 
when tanks rolled through the streets of Poland. However, this was not the end of 
resistance. From underground, Solidarity called for a boycott of the news on TV, 
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which was filled with lies from the regime. But how would anybody get an idea 
about how many people participated in the boycott?  
In the town of Swidnik in the east of Poland, the inhabitants started the habit of 
going for a walk, just as the half-hour news report began at 7.30 pm. The streets 
would be full of people chatting with each other. Before they went out, some people 
would place their TV in the window, pointing to the street with a blank screen. 
Others took their unconnected TV with them in a stroller for children or something 
else with wheels. The habit soon spread to other places, and apparently the 
authorities were furious, but felt there was little they could do. After all, the chance 
of being ridiculed increase even more if you decide to arrest people for taking their 
TV for a walk.  
The authorities’ “solution” was to move the start of the curfew forward from 10 pm 
to 7pm. The answer from the people of Swidnik was to take their walk during the 
5pm news instead.368 
This humorous twist to a boycott depends on many people participating in order to 
have an effect, which it apparently did have in Poland in 1982 – if not, why should 
the regime had bothered to change the timing of the curfew?  
The message from the people is straightforward – we don’t believe in your news, 
therefore we don’t want to watch it and by taking our walk where everybody can 
see us, we show you (and each other) how many we are.  
Santas hand out gifts from the shop shelves 
In the week leading up to Christmas 1974 100 Santas visited Denmark’s capital 
Copenhagen. This week long action/performance was created by the theatre group 
Solvognen that wanted to bring public attention to the rising unemployment and 
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commercialisation of Christmas.369 The action had many different parts, ranging 
from friendly Santas singing to the elderly and giving away hot chocolate to a 
symbolic attack on the court of industrial relations which were renamed a class 
court.   
The culmination came late afternoon on December 22, when the army of Santas 
visited the shopping centre Magasin. The place was filled with people buying last 
minute presents, and here Santa set out to do what Santas are supposed to do, 
hand out presents. The Santas had brought some books with them, but also picked 
books from the shop shelves and handed them to the customers with a “merry 
Christmas” and words like “no, today it does not cost anything, today it is free.”370 A 
film about the event shows how some customers smile and laugh, some ignore the 
Santas, and over the loudspeaker system the management of Magasin declares:  
Announcement to all our customers. Please be aware that the 
persons in Father Christmas costumes that hand out goods from 
the shelves, do not belong to the staff of Magasin. We kindly 
request our customers to return items they have already received 
at the checkout counters. The police have been called.”371  
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Illustration 6. The Santas marching through central Copenhagen with 
their Christmas goose, December 1974. ©: Nils Vest 1974, reprinted 
with permission. 
The police arrived and children cried when the Santas were arrested and rather 
roughly led out with their arms behind their backs. Outside the shopping centre, the 
passers-by which had stopped to watch were on the side of Santa. They sang 
Christmas carols and tried to prevent the police from taking the Santas to the 
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waiting police vans.372 A group of Santas who had not been arrested proceeded to 
another shopping centre called Illum, where they repeated the performance before 
they were arrested as well.     
The shopping centre did not want to press charges against the Santas for theft, but 
the prosecutor raised a case for disturbing public order against 45 Santas. In the 
first trial they were acquitted, but when the prosecutor appealed the case they were 
later convicted and received small fines.373 
During the week of the action, Solvognen succeed in gaining extensive media 
coverage that to a large degree was fair and unbiased.374 Later there was much 
debate and even more coverage after Solvognen received a grant from a stately 
art fund. More than 30 years later the stunt became part of the Danish cultural 
canon. The performance is considered one of 108 cultural expressions that is part 
of the Danish cultural heritage.375   
Confronting power with naiveté  
It is more difficult to explain what causes amusement in the naïve stunts using 
Berger’s techniques than with the supportive and corrective stunts. Although 
pretence plays a role in most humorous stunts, it is crucial for understanding the 
apparently naive, and none of the 45 techniques captures pretence. In order to 
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stay within Berger’s technical perspective, one would have to add categories that 
included the pretended coincidence and pretended innocence present in these 
cases. Berger does describe techniques for coincidences, innocence, 
misunderstandings and ignorance, but the way he uses the terms varies 
considerably from what is happening in the examples above. For instance, Berger 
explains a kind of coincidence which is based on embarrassment, and in his 
description of ignorance people laugh at those who are ignorant.376 That situation 
changes when someone is pretending to be innocent or ignorant – instead of 
laughing at them, we laugh with them. In the donation of blood episode in Serbia, 
Markovic intended to mean “blood by using violence”, an implicit understanding 
which the students pretended not to understand. Berger has a technique for 
ignorance where people laugh because they feel superior to others who are 
stupid.377 But here we laugh at Mira Markovic, not the activists who pretend to 
misunderstand her statement. Therefore it is inappropriate to talk about mistakes 
and misunderstandings as the techniques used, since the Nazis, Polish, Danish 
and Serbian authorities were not fooled and fully understood that this was only 
pretended innocence.  
Berger mentions pretence when he writes about taking on a different identity, like 
impersonation, but that differs from the mechanism of defining the whole situation 
as something else. In the Polish example, the timing of the TV walk with the 
beginning of the TV news was crucial, although it of course was a “coincidence” 
and not intended as a protest – should anybody from the authorities ask. The 
Danish butcher wrote an innocent message which by “mistake” happened to be 
anti-Nazi. 
Although Berger’s techniques are inadequate for fully explaining these examples, 
some of his techniques are present. The result of the Danish butcher’s “mistake” is 
an insult to the Nazis, something which can be funny to an audience when they 
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dislike a person or a group, but generally it has to be combined with some other 
technique in order to be amusing. The TV walk is both an example of the absurd 
and eccentric. I will return to the technique of absurdity when describing the absurd 
stunt, but eccentricity is a technique that builds on people’s eccentric behaviour or 
appearance. It would have been eccentric to walk around with your TV in a stroller 
had the circumstances been different. Had it happened out of a context like this, 
we would not have made much sense of it. It is a technique which in many ways is 
similar to the absurd, but Berger operates with a distinction between strangeness 
connected to identity (eccentric) and our sense of logic (absurdity).  
There is also a literalness of the boycott of the TV news. To Berger, literalness is 
when the same word or statement gets a different meaning when you look at the 
actual words. However, it is possible to understand the technique of literalness 
much more broadly than Berger, and not just connected to language.  
These types of stunts are naive – not because the activists would be called naïve 
by their opponents, on the contrary, but because they frame what they do so on the 
surface they are not doing anything wrong at all. They pretend to avoid the logic of 
power and protest altogether. This can be by doing something which is actually 
quite normal, like advertising sausages, donating blood and Santa handing out 
presents. In other cases the behaviour cannot be called normal, such as taking the 
TV for a walk, but it can still be framed as completely harmless.  
Solvognen’s army of Santas played on Danish mythology where Santa is naive, 
friendly, helpful and more than anything else associated with giving away gifts to 
children. The humour in the stunt arises when Santa performs his role in a way 
which clashes with other societal norms, such as not stealing. When the police was 
called out to perform their law enforcement role and did that dutifully, it became 
funny because Santas in handcuffs being taken away by police is completely 
incongruous with the image of the naïve gift-giving Santa. 
Most of the examples of naïve stunts that I have come across took place in 
situations of relatively severe oppression. For those living with oppression, framing 
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oneself as naïve might be the only possibility for protest they consider available at 
all. The Santas in Denmark are an exception and together the four examples show 
how diverse the naïve stunts can be.  
Returning to the theatre metaphor, it is not the major stages that these activists aim 
for, but whatever scene that seems to be within reach. The Danish butcher used 
his own van, the Polish TV walkers their own streets and their own TVs. The 
Serbian students provided their own blood, but were depending on media coverage 
in order to spread the message of what they had done. The same was the case 
with the Santas. The cases from dictatorships attempted to disrupt the pieces of 
theatre called “everything is normal” which these dictatorial regimes aimed to 
uphold, and any disruption, however minor, fulfilled this purpose. They did not 
attempt to hijack the character of someone else as in the corrective stunts, and 
there were no major actors like prime ministers and presidents nearby. There is 
little data to tell how the audiences reacted and interpreted the stunts taking place 
in severely oppressive circumstances. In the Santa example Solvognen received 
extensive media coverage, and the media reported that many of the customers 
who witnessed the event were supportive, although many was confused about 
what was going on and some accused the Santas of stealing.  
In some of the examples, timing was important – had the Poles walked out with 
their TV half an hour later it would not have made any sense, and the Santas 
depended on it being Christmas time. The Serbian students could have donated 
their blood at any time after Markovic’s statement, but the closer in time the more 
sense it would make. For the butcher timing was less crucial – the ad would work 
during the whole occupation. 
The naive stunt has a different way of refusing the rationality of those in power than 
the corrective and supportive stunts; those who carry it out simply appear not to be 
aware of how the play of politics works. However, since there is logic to what they 
do, which presents an alternative message; they do leave themselves vulnerable to 
persecution, and the authorities can respond accordingly. There is no 
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documentation of what happened to the Danish butcher. For the Polish regime, 
there was no obvious way of reacting when the TV walkers entered and started 
their absurd play. The communist regime had seen plenty of protest in 1980-81 
and knew how to react to strikes and other outspoken protests, but since this was 
different, it did not seem wise to remove them with force. But the theatre of 
normalcy was disrupted enough to cause a change in the curfew time.  
Absurd Humorous Stunts 
In absurd humorous stunts, the activists frame themselves as innocent clowns who 
point towards society’s absurdities. Their relation to the rationality of the dominant 
discourse is to defy it altogether. The absurd stunt shares some similarities with the 
naïve stunt regarding the apparent naiveté of the activists, but whereas the 
participants in the naïve stunt appear not to understand, the absurd pranksters 
refuse to acknowledge any kind of rationality. Returning to the theatre metaphor, 
those who carry out absurd stunts can capture any stage, anywhere. They might 
invade a major scene right in the power holder’s face, or they might sneak in 
behind someone’s back on a smaller and less guarded scene. Their message is 
that the whole world is absurd, including the apparently powerful. All claims to 
power and truth are challenged with silliness, slapstick or total craziness. Everyone 
is assumed to be participants in the play and no one is being chased away, but the 
previously prevailing rules and roles are altered. The absurd pranksters are 
unlikely to suggest that this has anything to do with protest; it is only the context 
and the audiences’ interpretations which can reveal any critical intent. The Orange 
Alternative’s happenings in Poland during the late 1980’s and the British 
Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army serve as examples of this type of stunt. 
Poland’s Orange Alternative 
During martial law in the early 1980’s in Poland, at around the same time as the 
inhabitants in Swidnik took their TVs for a walk, graffiti in favour of the now illegal 
trade union Solidarity was quickly painted over by the authorities. This left “blobs” 
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on the walls, so that everyone knew that they covered graffiti. Activists who 
identified with a new group called Orange Alternative started to work on the blobs 
by giving them arms and legs so that they became little elves. According to 
Kenney, who has written about the Orange Alternative and its place in the fall of 
the communist regimes in central Europe, elves made passers-by “consider the 
point of the struggle over wall space, and wonder why little elves were threatening 
to the communists”.378  
Several years later, the elves came to life at an Orange Alternative happening on 
Children’s day, June 1st 1987, one of the happenings which became what Kenney 
calls a “catalyst” for the Orange Alternative. An invitation to the happening was 
distributed at schools and universities around the city Wroclaw, and almost 1000 
young people showed up. Here they got a red cap, and then they became elves. 
Since it was Children’s day, they handed out candy to people, danced and sang 
children’s songs. The leader of the Orange Alternative called himself Major 
Fyderych, but he could not be present himself this day, since he was arrested just 
before the happening began. Nevertheless the happening went ahead and the 
guitar player Jakubczak, another central person in the Orange Alternative, played 
and sang with the crowd. When the police started to take the elves to the police 
cars they followed without protesting, kissing the police and throwing candy out 
through the windows. Then the crowd started to shout “elves are real”, and 
accounts of this surreal celebration of Children’s day went around Poland in the 
underground press, providing new images of what protest could look like.379  
Orange Alternative was a small group that mainly worked in the city Wroclaw, but 
later spread to other cities in Poland. They initiated happenings which brought 
colour and carnival to the greyness which characterised both the communist 
regime and the opposition in Solidarity. Instead of staging a protest march or a fast 
as other protesters did, they arranged events which involved the audience. In 
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addition to candy, on other occasions they also handed out toilet paper or sanitary 
pads (scarce under communism). The concept of socialist surrealism mocking the 
socialist realities guided the happenings, but the Orange Alternative was a co-
organiser of events, not the organiser, since the police and passers-by also had a 
say in what was to happen.380 The happenings were never an open expression of 
dissent, but any independent organising, no matter the reason, was a threat to the 
communist desire for total control. 
In 1987 and 1988, there was a happening on average once or twice a month,381 
and another major event took place on February 16, 1988. This was carnival time, 
and Orange Alternative invited everyone to the surreal version of carnival in 
socialist Poland – the “ProletaRIO Carnival”. This time the only dress code was 
carnival costume, and the crowd of 3-5000 people included a skeleton, Ku Klux 
Klan men, smurfs, and Red Riding Hood together with a wolf. Official radio first 
reported the invitation, thinking it was an idea invented by the authorities. Finally 
bluehelmet police joined the crowd, but they were not there to party, but to take the 
carnival to the police station. In the official press the events was framed as student 
foolishness that had to be stopped in order not to create traffic chaos in the 
afternoon peak period.382 
In contrast to Solidarity, Orange Alternative was unpredictable and the regime 
never knew what would come next. The little elves did not resist arrest, but they 
kissed the police and gave them flowers. This way, they became difficult for the 
regime to suppress, since arresting someone for playing an elf seems ridiculous, 
even for the communists. In the beginning, Orange Alternative was not just critical 
of the communist regime, but also of Solidarity and the church because of its belief 
that the Bible provided the answers.  It was the regime itself which pushed the 
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Alternative more and more in the direction of protest.383 The happenings became a 
training ground for protest and socialised people to the idea of speaking out. They 
encouraged people to come out on the streets where they noticed that a few hours 
of detention was not that dangerous after all.384 This way, by lowering levels of 
fear, Orange Alternative prepared people for toppling the regime a few years later. 
CIRCA – Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army  
Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army (CIRCA) is a UK based network of 
clowns that uses nonviolent action against symbols of capitalism and militarism, 
e.g at military recruitment offices and G8 meetings.385 They explain why they are 
clowns: 
We are clowns because what else can one be in such a stupid 
world. Because inside everyone is a lawless clown trying to 
escape. Because nothing undermines authority like holding it up to 
ridicule (…) We are circa because we are approximate and 
ambivalent, neither here nor there, but in the most powerful of all 
places, the place in-between order and chaos.386  
Clowning is visual, so to experience CIRCA, one needs to see it rather than read a 
description. At the very least, it is worth quoting one clown’s own description of 
what happened at a military recruitment office in Leeds in the UK. Kolonel Klepto 
from the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army explains:  
…15 clownbatants from the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown 
Army (CIRCA), dressed head to toe in combat gear delicately 
trimmed with pink and green fuzzy-fur and sporting sparkling steel 
colanders helmets, had marched into the [recruitment] centre and 
asked the recruiting officers if they could join up. In high pitched 
clown voices we told them about our previous experience in the 
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clown army, displaying skills such as silly salutes, showing 
subversive slapstick drills, exhibiting the art of telling jokes that 
disarm and explaining that where their bombs fail we might be 
able to succeed with laughter (…)But they hadn't taken our desire 
to join their army seriously, and a very large and extremely un-
amused commando from the Royal Marines tried to throw us out 
of the centre with the help of a growing number of police officers. 
But it's hard to move a rebel clown, they don't resist in a 
conventional sense, but tend to slip out of the clutches of 
authority like wobbly jelly and distract them from their duties with 
loud gaffaws and stinging mockery. The more our pleas to join the 
army fell on deaf ears - "Please teach us how to liberate people!" 
"Where are the application forms? " "Why can't we have really 
really big guns like yours?" - the more chaotic the scene in the 
recruitment office became. Very long sausage ballons started 
screaming across the space sounding like ammunition about to 
explode, sherbert filled toy aeroplanes did manic loop the loops 
over the RAF desks, one clown crawled around the floor polishing 
soldiers boots with his feather duster while another read out loud 
the latest communique from CIRCA…387 
Confronting power with absurdity 
In CIRCA’s action in the recruitment office, the 15 clowns participating used a 
number of different techniques. The whole situation with its chaos and unexpected 
behaviour can be called an example of slapstick, which might best be described as 
the refusal to let someone be comfortable in their role as adults. Berger explains:  
Slapstick is physical humour, often involving degradation by action 
(…) It is an “attack” on our claims to adulthood, importance, and 
status of any kind. As such, it feeds on an inner sense of 
egalitarianism we have (…) a kind of “democratic” degradation 
that is tied to a sense we have that we are all humans…388  
When CIRCA turned the situation in the recruitment office into chaos, they refused 
to let the military and police carry out their adult roles with dignity. CIRCA also uses 
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irony, a technique already encountered in other examples. The clowns asked to 
learn how to become soldiers, but they did not really want to be recruited. Another 
technique they used is ridicule of military behaviour and statements, for example 
when they said “please teach us how to liberate people.” Ridicule happens when 
we expose people in a way that put them in a bad light. No one likes to be 
ridiculed, so humour which humiliates people risks causing strong reactions. 
Berger calls ridicule a ”direct verbal attack against a person, thing or idea”389 and 
mentions different forms of ridicule, such as mocking, taunting and deriding. 
Ridicule and its consequences will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
Berger also includes the technique of absurdity in his list, something also found in 
these two examples of absurd stunts. Absurdity is a common technique for creating 
humour, and occurs when something or someone seems completely out of place. 
We find things absurd when we think it is obvious that they do not belong together 
in any way. Berger explains how the absurd causes us to be puzzled and 
sometimes amused when our sense of order and logic is challenged. He also 
thinks that the absurd is used to communicate human beings’ “possibilities in an 
irrational universe.”390 Watching CIRCA, there is absurdity in the contrast between 
the clown figures and the military recruitment office, especially between the military 
uniforms and the little silly clowning attributes that go with them, pink and green 
fuzzy fur. Also the idea that their experiences from the clown army should make 
them fit for military service is absurd. The whole episode is one big incongruity 
between military behaviour and expectations, and clowning behaviour and 
expectations.  
The incongruity which Orange Alternative exposed was between the everyday life 
under communist rule and the propaganda of the regime. The technique they 
primarily relied on was absurdity, evoking images from people’s childhood which 
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were transformed into the socialist surrealism of the Alternative. Sometimes they 
also made parodies of communist slogans and ideology.  
The role of the clown is familiar to a western audience: just the sight of red noses 
and other clowning paraphernalia increase expectations of being amused. Many 
people automatically shift to the play frame and expect certain behaviour.  
The absurd stunt is not a direct confrontation, but an attempt to be an eye-opener. 
It is the type of stunt which is furthest away from protest, since it might just as well 
expose hierarchies, rigidity and domination within a protest movement. To the 
degree it is possible to talk about design at all with this type of stunt, it is designed 
to make people question everything they hear and see. The absurd stunt does not 
provide any answers, but questions dogmas.  
The absurd stunts refuses rationality altogether, and in this tradition the activists 
respond to all reactions from those in power with further absurdity, as both CIRCA 
and the Orange Alternative did. When trying to give rational responses, the 
opponent finds herself confronted with even more silliness and absurdity, with the 
world turned upside down. The only thing predictable is that the performers will 
continue to be unpredictable. All attempts to deal with this as conventional political 
opposition will only contribute new components to their absurd plays. However, 
since the absurd is bound to remain within the absurd, it cannot suggest 
alternatives and improvements without leaving its position. If the participants in an 
absurd stunt suddenly should decide to suggest solutions to a problem in a rational 
way, they leave themselves vulnerable to critique that they are (mis)using the 
absurdity for their own purposes, and not ready to criticise all and everyone.  
CIRCA in the recruitment office appeared where there were already other actors 
performing their own play. Unlike prime ministers and gatherings with many 
politicians, recruiting officers are not even used to the usual role of protesters 
appearing in their daily show. The recruiters felt forced to shut down the 
recruitment office and get someone to carry the clowns away. The daily show had 
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been successfully interrupted from CIRCA’s point of view, but police and military 
insisted on treating them as ordinary protesters and removing them from the 
scene. This episode did not generate big headlines, presumably because the 
police and military description of them as ordinary protesters was accepted. The 
description and video of the episode is available to everyone who is interested, but 
CIRCA did not force themselves upon a scene with world leaders, and as soon as 
the clowns were removed they could be ignored. However, clowns appearing at 
every recruitment office every day for an extended period of time would probably 
be a different story.  
Through their happenings, Orange Alternative took their play right into the 
everyday life of the Polish people. Just like CIRCA, Orange Alternative depended 
very little on what others did. Any reaction, also being ignored, contributed one way 
or the other. In these two examples, everyone who came along – police, passers-
by, recruiting officers - was treated as partners in the show. Accounts of these two 
examples include some descriptions on reactions from part of the audience, the 
authorities. Both the Orange Alternative and CIRCA expected to be removed from 
the scene by the police. However, these arrests just added to the absurdity that the 
activists apparently attempted to point towards. After all, clowns and elves should 
hardly pose any threat to a communist regime and the military. These absurd 
stunts did not depend on any particular timing – the recruitment office could have 
been visited any day to the same effect, and the Orange Alternative could always 
find an excuse for a happening, although its particular design could be fitted to the 
circumstances.    
Provocative Humorous Stunts 
Provocative humorous stunts are the type of stunt closest to conventional protest 
since they generate their humour simply by daring to directly confront those in 
power, usually without the pretence that is so central to the other stunts. The 
pranksters do not deny the unequal relations of power as in absurd stunts or 
present any alternatives like the supportive or corrective stunts; they simply appear 
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not to care. In this way they amuse and impress parts of their audiences with their 
boldness and devil-may-care attitudes. The “almighties” become ridiculous when 
they turn out not to have total control anyway. The activists openly act as 
provocateurs in order to expose vulnerabilities and hurt big egos. They capture any 
scene, openly or secretly, and aim to control it long enough to humiliate the target. 
They speak a message of lack of fear both to the target and to other audiences. 
Three examples from Serbia, Russia and Belarus illustrate what humorous 
provocations can look like when the secret police forces are insulted and teddy 
bears fall from the sky. 
Otpor: Dinar za Smenu  
Earlier Serbian students’ action to donate blood was mentioned as an example of a 
naive stunt. A few years later, the youth and student-led movement Otpor, which 
played a decisive role in bringing Slobodan Milošević from power, carried on the 
tradition of humorous political stunts. One of Otpor’s popular actions was mocking 
an initiative taken by Milošević’s government. To support agriculture, Milošević 
placed boxes in shops and public places asking people to donate one dinar (the 
Serbian currency) for sowing and planting crops. As a response, Otpor arranged its 
own collection called Dinar za Smenu. Smenu is a Serbian word with many 
meanings: Change, resignation, dismissal, pension and purge. This action was 
repeated several times in different places in Serbia, and consisted of a big barrel 
with a photo of Milošević, a stick and instructions for passers-by to use the stick to 
hit the barrel after donating one dinar. On at least one occasion, the sign 
suggested that if people did not have any money because of Milošević’s politics, 
they should bang the barrel twice. Another day it suggested to hit harder. Usually 
there were no activists present, something which decreased the risks. When the 
police removed the barrel, Otpor said in a press release that the police had 
arrested the barrel. They also claimed that the action was a huge success, 
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because they had collected enough money for Milošević’s retirement, and that the 
police were going to hand over the money to Milošević.391  
President Milošević himself, as the prime symbol of bad government in Serbia, was 
the target in this example. Although the action did not make much sense on its own 
other than expressing hostile feelings towards Milošević, it was part of a larger 
campaign to de-legitimize the regime in Serbia, expose its double standards and 
show how its politics was damaging to ordinary Serbian citizens. The regime had 
the choice between removing the barrel, and thereby exposing their intolerance to 
critique, or let it stay and continue a public display of disapproval.  
Voina: Insulting bridge painting  
In Russia, an art collective called Voina has made itself loved and infamous 
because of its creative stunts that expose Russian authorities. In June 2010, they 
painted a giant penis on Liteiny Bridge in St. Petersburg in just 23 seconds. Liteiny 
Bridge is a bascule bridge, and the action was done just before it was opened to let 
a ship pass. When that happened, the penis was standing erect for several hours 
just in front of the unpopular secret police (FSB) headquarters in St. Petersburg. 
Members of Voina are facing prison sentences for this and similar actions.392  
The circumstances in authoritarian Russia make this different from performing the 
same stunt in a more democratic country.  
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Illustration 7. Voina’s penis painting on Liteiny Bridge in St. Petersburg, 
June 2010. Courtesy of http://plucer.livejournal.com. 
Teddy bears over Belarus 
In July 2012, a small airplane took off from Lithuania and flew over Belarus. On 
board were two Swedish PR management consultants turned human rights 
activists. The plane was loaded with 879 teddy bears each in a parachute and 
carrying the message “We support the Belarusian struggle for free speech” in 
English and Belarusian. The stunt was a response to naive stunts performed inside 
Belarus earlier in the year. Local activists from the campaign “Tell the Truth” had 
arranged stuffed animals at Minsk’s Independence Square with little signs telling 
President Lukashenka to "free the people!", asking "Where is freedom of the 
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press?" and saying "Toys against lawlessness" and "Cops tore my eye out."393 One 
person, who says he was just watching the toys, was later sentenced to 10 days in 
prison for holding an unsanctioned toy protest.394 
 
Illustration 8. Toy protest in Belarus. Courtesy photo. 
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Illustration 9. Teddy bears in parachutes landing in Belarus in support 
for human rights July 2012. Photo reprinted with permission from Studio 
Total.  
 
One of the Swedes who dropped teddy bears over Belarus in support of the stuffed 
animals said to a Norwegian TV station, “Our campaign was to support the teddy 
bears [in Belarus], from teddy bears all over the world”.395 To Euronews, he said “A 
dictator can be feared and he can be hated, but when people start to laugh at him, 
his days are numbered. So, that was the objective.”396 He and his colleagues run 
Studio Total, a Swedish PR and marketing company. On its webpage, the 
company says that they did this pro bono in support of the Belarusian opposition, 
and tells how the PR consultants became interested in the fate of the Belarusian 
opposition by a coincidence. When it turned out that no pilot was willing to risk 
                                            
395
 Birger Henriksen, "Svensker Teddy-Bombet Hviterussland " [Swede teddy-bombed Belarus] 
www.TV2.no, August 2 2012. 
396
 Euronews, "Swedish Activists Behind Belarus Teddy Bear Stunt," euronews.com, August 2 
2012. 
212 
 
dropping the teddy bears, they decided to learn how to fly and bought a little 
airplane.397   
Belarusian authorities first denied that the stunt had taken place, but soon said that 
it was a provocation. The stunt had direct consequences for high ranking officials 
and journalists in Belarus. The heads of border control and the air force were 
sacked,398 and two people detained accused of assisting the Swedes and 
publishing photos of the teddy bears on the internet.399 The affair also turned into a 
diplomatic crisis between Belarus, Sweden and other members of the European 
Union. Although the stunt was not mentioned specifically, shortly afterwards the 
Swedish ambassador to Belarus was expelled from Belarus and accused of having 
too close relations with the opposition. As a response, the new Belarusian 
ambassador to Sweden was no longer welcome.400 
For this stunt, there is a little information available about Belarusian citizens’ 
support for the event. The group Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and 
Political Studies made a survey shortly afterwards about Belarusian attitudes to 
Russia and the European Union which included the question: “In July a group of 
Swedish citizens made an unauthorized flight to Belarus and dropped teddy bears 
over Ivenets and Minsk with slogans that called for freedom of speech in Belarus. 
How do you evaluate this action?”401 1502 people were asked, and about one third 
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replied that they did not know about the action, and 13.8% that it was a provocation 
by Western intelligence. 23%, almost one in four, considered it “a courageous 
protest against the violation of human rights”. However, the largest group, 31.7% 
responded that “it was a silly action”. This category is rather ambiguous and 
reflects the general problem with both academic and everyday understandings of 
humour mentioned previously. The categories in the survey are not mutually 
exclusive since it is quite possible to think it was a silly action and in addition 
consider it either a courageous protest or a provocation by Western intelligence. In 
spite of this methodological problem with the possible answers, the 23% that 
express a supportive attitude by accepting the word “courageous” can be 
understood as a relatively high level of support for the action.402 
Variants of answer
403
  %  
It was a silly action.  31.7  
It was a courageous protest against the violation 
of human rights.  
23.0  
It was a provocation by Western intelligence.  13.8  
I don’t know what you are talking about.  31.2  
Difficult to answer.  0.3  
Confronting power with provocation  
Applying Berger’s techniques to these three provocative stunts, new techniques 
appear. In Otpor’s Dinar za Smenu action five different techniques are present 
simultaneously. The action was both a parody and a ridicule of the government’s 
campaign, as well as an insult. In addition, it used a wordplay on the word smenu 
with its multiple meanings. Puns/wordplay happens when one word can have more 
than one meaning. Such words differ from language to language, but in Serbian 
smenu is such a word. When the barrel was removed, the word play continued 
when Otpor activists said that Milošević had accepted the money and was now 
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going to retire, playing on the pension meaning of smenu. The word play also 
contains an allusion to Milošević’s retirement.  
A technique used by Voina was the grotesque, in the form of an over dimensioned 
phallus. Placed on the rising bridge, it became a severe insult to the FSB. Berger 
explains that the grotesque can be both comic and scary, and that the framing of 
the grotesque determine our response. As with the other giant penis that the Yes 
Men used at the conference about the textile industry, this is a loaded sexual 
symbol. Under these circumstances it can hardly be interpreted as anything else 
than a provocation. Of course the Russian authorities had the option to ignore it, 
but taking their usual reactions to protest into consideration, it is doubtful that the 
option was considered.  
Like the absurd stunt, the provocative stunt also refuses rationality. As described in 
the examples above, the provocative stunts display a devil-may-care attitude which 
causes amusement when the almighty, such as the Russian secret police, 
Belarusian or Serbian regimes, are shown to be unable to prevent such attacks 
right under their noses. Even those supposed to exert total control can be brought 
down from their pedestals.  
Although the corrective, innocent, constructive and absurd stunts are 
confrontational as well, the provocative stunts appear to depend especially on 
whether the audiences recognise the irreverent attitude of the activists. Therefore it 
is no surprise that the technique of insulting is present in two of the provocative 
examples.  
From sympathetic bystanders, provocative activists get a “wow, how courageous”. 
However, many other nonviolent actions can generate that feeling without being 
humorous at all. For instance, the Freedom Flotillas that in 2010 and 2011 
attempted to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza were also considered bold actions. 
In 2010, nine activists were killed during this attempt to bring humanitarian aid to 
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Gaza. The convoy was attacked by Israeli soldiers while it was still in International 
waters.404 The Ploughshares is another example of a nonviolent movement that 
has not involved any humour and might be considered courageous by some. Using 
hammers as a symbolic reference to the Bible verse of turning swords into 
ploughshares, they enter arms factories and military areas in Europe and the US in 
order to start the disarmament process themselves. Afterwards they await the 
police. Especially in the US, these actions have resulted in long prison terms, 
causing numerous people within the peace movement to understand these acts as 
bold and courageous.405 They are also provocative, but not humorous at all, so 
there is more to the provocative humorous stunt than boldness and courage.  
What makes the provocative stunts different are the initiators’ attitude towards 
those they attack, and their expectations of reactions. The Freedom Flotilla 
movement and the ploughshare activists care a great deal about the reactions of 
states and companies and thereby indirectly recognise their power and the 
rationality they represent. Although their actions use much symbolism, they are not 
just a performance and their approach to their opponents is rational. In contrast, 
the participants in a provocative stunt do not appear to be concerned about the 
power of the institutions they attack at all and deny them their claims to rationality. 
The provocative stunts do not seem to have any other purpose than to provoke 
and communicate to a large audience: “We do not care very much about potential 
consequences.” The actions by Voina, Studio Total and Otpor tease and humiliate 
the target with the message “You are not that powerful after all, because we can do 
this right under your nose, and we refuse to be scared of you.” And to the wider 
audience it adds “Why are you so scared?” “See, they just pretend to be powerful! 
Why do you believe that?” With this refusal to be intimidated they contribute to 
transcending the rationality of the so-called powerful. When someone finally says 
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that the emperor has no clothes, people’s fear may start to decrease. In addition 
some of these stunts include other humorous techniques, such as the parodies and 
wordplays in Otpor’s Dinar za Smenu action, and the absurdity and naïveté in the 
Belarusian case. 
The case with dropping teddy bears over Belarus is a little different from the other 
two examples. It is certainly provocative, but because the Swedes behind it are not 
a local activist group that has to continue working inside Belarus, the edge of “we 
don’t care” is not so sharp as in the other provocative stunts. Although there was a 
risk involved, as soon as their plane left Belarus they were safe, meaning that the 
typical statement of “what are you afraid of?” to the audience was lost. People who 
live in Belarus would have reason to be afraid if they had done this. Just publishing 
the photos on the internet got one blogger in trouble.406 The way the humour is 
generated in this example is also different from the other provocative stunts where 
what causes amusement is ridicule and insults. Although the authorities are 
insulted, the stunt would not have been humorous if the Swedes had just violated 
the airspace to show that they could. It is the teddy bears – a symbol of naïveté – 
that causes amusement when they parachute to Belarus in an absurd show of 
solidarity from the teddy bears around the world.    
The provocative stunt does not attempt to appear as a serious threat to those in 
power – from a rational point of view what authoritarian state leader would be 
scared because someone drops teddy bears, paints a giant penis or shows 
contempt by hitting a photo of them? After all, they have armed police and military 
troops ready to back them up. Nevertheless, that authorities bother to react can be 
interpreted as a sign that these types of humorous stunts are indeed considered 
threatening. One can understand them as kind of guerrilla attack, but not a violent 
physical attack. Instead they are attacking the dominant discourse as part of the 
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discursive guerrilla war.407 With this concept I mean to say that if one believes 
Foucault to be right when he claimed that the most important way of dominating a 
society is through discourse, then it also follows that an important way to resist is 
by combatting dominant discourses. All humorous political stunts can be 
understood from this perspective, but the attack is perhaps the most obvious in the 
provocative stunts. 
The provocative stunt is the least friendly and dialogue oriented type of stunt. The 
laughter it generates is not based on wittiness and inclusiveness, but on 
establishing a clear we and they divide, where “the other” can be mocked and 
ridiculed. Although it happens without violence and against violence, there is no 
aspect of the type of nonviolence that aims to include the opponents and win them 
over. 
Stunts overlapping different categories 
This typology of five different kinds of humorous political stunts divides the 
examples according to the way the pranksters relate to the power holders’ 
rationality and claims to truth. In some cases, it is possible to identify traces from 
more than one type of stunt in work at the same time. Where this is the case, I 
have included them in the type of stunt which is most prominent. For instance, I 
have placed the Polish TV walkers in the naive category, because naiveté is the 
most crucial aspect in their way of relating to the authorities. However, it does have 
some absurd elements as well with the TV’s in the strollers in the street. In the Yes 
Men’s hijacking of the WTO the corrective aspects of the stunt were most 
dominant. However, the Management Leisure Suit that they introduced was also a 
way to “help” managers keep better track of their workers, and the outfit was rather 
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absurd, showing traces of the supportive and absurd stunt as well. The dropping of 
teddy bears over Belarus in support for the opposition was mainly a provocative 
stunt, but did also include absurd and naïve elements – the teddy bears are naïve, 
and the idea of them protesting and showing solidarity is rather absurd.  
One stunt in particular that I have come across is difficult to place in only one 
category. A performance by the comedians from The Chaser team during an APEC 
meeting in Australia in 2007 draws on aspects from both the corrective and 
supportive stunt.  
In 2007, the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) held a summit in 
Australia. Representatives from the 21 member states gathered for a week in 
Sydney for Leaders week. Many heads of state participated, and security in 
downtown city was supposed to be tight. Official figures show a cost of 170 million 
Australian dollars for security arrangements.408 The popular comedy team The 
Chaser and their TV show The Chaser’s War on Everything decided to do a stunt 
to ridicule the security arrangements, although they had been warned not to do 
it.409 Posing as Canadian participants in the summit, they made it through several 
security checkpoints with their motorcade of three black limousines and a 
motorcycle. Their ID cards were stamped with the word joke clearly visible. When 
they arrived ten metres outside Intercontinental Hotel where the US participants 
were staying, a Chaser team member dressed as Osama Bin Laden stepped out of 
one of the cars and said to the police “I’m a world leader. Why haven’t I been 
invited to APEC too?” 
Julian Morrow who directed the stunt later said: “It was an attempt to satirise in a 
silly way the very heavy security and the spin surrounding that security. It was a 
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test of the old adage that if you want to get in somewhere the best way is right 
through the front door.”410 
Australian authorities refused to be amused and charged the team with offences 
under the new security laws. In Australia the action caused much debate, and later 
all charges were dropped. The rationale was that when the police did not stop the 
comedy team at the checkpoint, it had given “tacit” permission for them to be in the 
restricted zone. The Chasers have themselves said that they were surprised by 
their own success. When they planned the stunt, they had prepared for every 
possible scenario along the way, except this. They have also claimed to have 
regretted the prank, saying that it was stupid and went too far.411   
The Chaser’s stunt was a ridicule of the whole APEC summit, especially the 
security arrangements. Talking about security is absurd if it is possible for 
someone who looks like the world’s most wanted man to pass security check 
points with an ID card stamped joke. In this case, the target of the ridicule was not 
a particular person, but absurd security arrangements around a summit of world 
leaders. Since the Australian authorities were responsible for security, they were 
the ones who ended up humiliated. 
Members of the The Chaser team do not consider themselves political activists, but 
are professional comedians ready to ridicule everyone and everything.412 However, 
no matter what their intentions were, the message of the action is a critique of the 
security hysteria, and forces its audience to ask questions like: When people speak 
about security, what is it they expect will create a safe environment – and for 
whom? Just for world leaders, or for everyone? Why are some people’s lives 
considered worth more than others? How to create a world where everyone is 
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safe? How can fences and weapons which separate people instead of uniting them 
bring more safety? 
The comedy team used their professional characters to make a stunt. The incident 
became widely known because they brought their TV crew with them and it later 
became part of their TV show. Almost three million viewers watched this episode of 
the show.413  
The stunt is difficult to place in the typology of humorous political stunts. The way 
they hijacked the identity of bin Laden resembles the hijacking of identities for 
corrective purposes, but although they suggest that bin Laden ought to have been 
invited as well since he was a world leader, this was not their message. The other 
corrective stunts have a serious intent in their correction, but no one really thought 
that the Chaser’s cared if bin Laden was present or not. Neither did they sneak in 
on the scene as is one of the characteristics of the corrective stunt; they invaded 
the major scene in Sydney, right in the face of the authorities. This is more closely 
related to the provocative stunt. The way they made their way through the security 
arrangements with an identity card stamped joke brings the absurd to mind, and 
the provocative aspect of the stunt might warrant a place in the provocative 
category. However, it did not have the element of “what are you afraid of?” that the 
other provocative stunts have. That the Chaser’s stunt is ambiguous and does not 
fit in the typology might be a reflection that the Chaser’s do not really have a 
political message apart from ridiculing the security arrangements.  
There is nothing in this typology preventing activists from combining aspects from 
the different types of stunts and having overlaps. However, in most cases there is 
an internal logic within each type, and the stunts dilute their meanings if this 
coherence is abandoned. The rebel clowns don’t suddenly explain rationally what 
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the clowning is about, and John Howard’s Fan club do not step out of character to 
announce “we don’t really mean this”.  
The APEC stunt showed that it was quite easy to challenge security arrangements, 
and afterwards this became the main issue. A real Osama Bin Laden with bad 
intention could have caused a lot of damage, so the stunt easily plays into the 
hands of the advocates of even more security.  
The diversity of humorous political stunts 
As one would expect, context matters a lot for understanding humour. Language 
and political situation are probably two of the most important circumstances. 
Hearing about people who take their TV for a walk during the news broadcasting 
make little sense if one is not aware of the political situation in Poland at the time 
and know about the appeal for a boycott of the TV news. Serbian word plays need 
explanation in order to become comprehensible for non-Serbian speakers. That 
context matters might sound obvious, but comedians, activists or anyone else 
aiming to produce humour need to take into consideration what the intended 
audience knows in advance – especially if an international audience is involved. 
Likewise, awareness about cultural differences regarding what are acceptable 
objects of humour matter for everyone aiming to produce humorous political stunts. 
There seems to be no limit to the mediums available for political humour. 
Everything from a lecture, a bridge, a double door, or a shopping centre opens up 
possibilities for the creative prankster. It is also likely that the more creative the use 
of the medium is, the more attention one will get. Most of the examples presented 
here were communicated via mass media – if not to the whole world, then at least 
to a national audience. But even in times with less media attention, local messages 
can have an effect if many people participate. The numerous Polish TV-walkers got 
their message across. The Danish anti-Nazi writing on double doors were 
apparently a one-time only experiment from a creative butcher. But had it been 
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used systematically in half the shops in occupied Denmark, who knows what would 
have happened?  
When a medium is unusual or is used creatively there is a risk that the medium 
receives more attention than the issue the actionists want to raise awareness 
about. The Chaser´s APEC stunt put more focus on them being in the restricted 
area than on the reason for establishing such a zone. A similar observation can be 
made regarding the Yes Men on the BBC as a Dow representative – the discussion 
ended up being about how Yes Men created false hope for the victims of the 
disaster, not about the company’s responsibilities for cleaning up and 
compensating victims.  
Some individuals have easier access to mass media than others. Professional 
comedians already have an established platform that they can use for political 
humour. Some of them use this platform to make fun of all dogmatism no matter 
who is behind it, whereas others have an agenda. Joanne Gilbert in her writing on 
women stand-up comedians suggests that “true believers” in any cause will never 
be able to joke about what they believe to be right because they take it too 
seriously.414 Although the Chaser’s might agree with Gilbert, and some people 
might choose not to joke about what is most sacred to them, there is little doubt 
that the majority of the activists presented here are dedicated to seriously 
challenging their targets and that their style appeals to many people’s sense of 
humour.415 
The examples I have given above all carry a message that I personally support. As 
Peter Berger writes, “Those who laugh together, belong together”416, and that 
people laugh more at humour expressing political messages they support than 
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ones they disagree with should be no surprise. Nevertheless, what people 
appreciate also depends on what techniques are used, and what kind of 
techniques they prefer. Most people can find things funny if they recognise the 
stereotype they are based on or because they like certain techniques without 
agreeing with the message of a piece of political humour.417  
Humorous political stunts and the play of politics 
Humorous stunts are games of pretence, interpretation and appearance. They 
operate within a play frame, and depend on establishing a resonance with one or 
more audiences that this is humorous, and that ambiguity and multiple meanings 
and interpretations are acceptable. Nevertheless, the play frame and humour do 
not mean that stunts are not serious, in some cases even deadly serious for the 
people involved. Some of the games are played with regimes such as the Nazi 
occupiers which did not hesitate to kill those who dared challenge their version of 
truth. The examples provided here point to the need to question the idea within 
humour studies that the contrast to the humorous is the serious. Humorous stunts 
are just one method in a larger struggle which is not playful at all. What is at stake 
is a question of life/death; of democracy/dictatorship; of censorship/freedom of 
speech.  
The humorous political stunts illustrate a shortcoming with a purely technical 
approach to understanding why something is funny. Although one or more of the 
techniques described by Berger could be found in most of the aforementioned 
cases, the techniques were not sufficient to explain the political context the stunts 
are an integrated part of. In particular the provocative and naïve types do not make 
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sense from a purely technical point of view. Humorous stunts are so much part of a 
power struggle that one cannot fully understand them without analysing them 
within their context.  
My model with a classification of five different types of stunts provides a starting 
point for analysing how pranksters relate to those they confront. The essential 
aspect of this typology is the way the activists present themselves and position the 
different stunts in relation to the rationality, logic and claims to truth that the 
different representatives of power aim to uphold in this play of politics. The purpose 
of including so many examples has been to illustrate that there can be much 
diversity also within each type of stunt, although each one still depends on the 
same logic.  
In reviewing the different theories of humour, I mentioned how the incongruity 
tradition is today considered the most important theoretical perspective when 
explaining what causes amusement. The humorous political stunts fit well within 
this theory. In these examples, the incongruities that cause the audiences to smile 
and laugh are closely connected to the relations of power. Those who consider 
these episodes funny are likely to enjoy watching the pranksters from the minority 
position outsmarting the apparently powerful and almighty companies, 
governments, institutions and agencies. A reason for the enjoyment is for a short 
while seeing the roles turned upside down and the established relations of power 
challenged. At least temporarily, these representatives of vested interests with so 
much money and/or force at their disposal are brought down to earth by a few 
clever activists.  
More specific incongruities can also be identified. In the example of the John 
Howard Ladies’ Auxiliary Fan Club there is an incongruity connected to the use of 
irony. The fan club members present two incompatible statements of critique and 
celebration at the same time. Returning to Mark Thomas and his exposure of the 
Indonesian military officer, there is an enormous incongruity between the 
seriousness of the human rights abuses he uncovered and the relaxation exercises 
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he convinced Major General Widjojo to perform. The Yes Men at the textile 
conference made an incongruous presentation where the apparently serious 
message of the presentation did not correspond with the absurd outfit.  
As mentioned earlier, the cases included here are not representative. However, a 
hypothesis that can be tested by future research is whether the same five 
strategies for dealing with power holders through humorous stunts are relevant in a 
variety of cultural contexts.  
In all examples, pretence is a central element, since no one wants to play the 
ordinary protester on the stage of the political theatre. These five types of stunts 
represent different ways of undermining dominant discourses and thereby 
transforming the play of politics, at least temporarily. They attempt to disrupt, 
subvert or transform relations of power because they highlight the contradictions 
and weaknesses of the dominant discourse, using a format that is recognisable 
and accepted as humorous. 
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Table 2 is an expanded version of table 1. In addition to the columns of description, 
position in relation to dominant discourse and dominant humorous techniques 
which were included in table 2, the table now includes a summary of the theatre 
metaphor, the “statement” that the stunt can be understood to make to power 
holders as well as other audiences. Finally, in the last column I have suggested 
some examples of each stunt that can be said to be typical and show all the 
characteristics of this particular type of stunt. 
Both the supportive and corrective stunts position themselves as rational and 
logical, but exaggerate, play along with and overemphasise the discourse of those 
in power. In the corrective stunt, this is done by hijacking the message or the 
identity of the target, whereas in the supportive stunt identification with the target to 
help and support is the key. The supportive stunt happens right in the face of the 
powerful, while a characteristic of the corrective stunt it that it usually happens 
behind the power holders’ back. In these two types of stunts the messages to the 
audiences are also similar – to expose the powerful and show who they really are. 
On the surface both the supportive and corrective stunts appear as if their 
statements should be taken at face value. But that is only at first glance. After that 
initial apparent acceptance of the discourse of the powerful, they base their 
challenge to power on the moment where the audiences must ask themselves if 
this is meant to be taken literally, or if someone is joking. Although this is an area 
that has not been studied yet, the people who carry out these stunts assume that 
something important happens in that moment of uncertainty. When a reader or 
viewer asks herself “is this serious? Do they really mean this?”, the perception is 
that she is more open to new information and new perspectives. When political 
arguments are presented rationally using traditional ways of disseminating 
information such as leaflets, posters and speeches, most people meet the 
arguments with an already formed opinion. However, humour can provide a 
cognitive “detour” or a “psychological circuit breaker” creating this moment of 
openness. If that moment will really change a person’s view and deepen the insight 
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depends on a number of factors, but at least there appear to be a possibility for 
getting the audience to re-examine its assumptions. 
The naïve, absurd and provocative stunts each has a different way of relating to 
the discourse of those they aim to challenge. Those performing naïve stunts 
appear not to understand that what they do can be interpreted as a challenge of 
anyone’s rationality, whereas the absurd pranksters defy rationality altogether. 
Initiators of provocative stunts seem not care about the rationality and logic of the 
powerful at all. 
In both the absurd and naïve stunts the pranksters appear as innocent clowns. In 
the absurd stunts, those who carry them out can partly protect themselves from 
prosecution because there is usually little logic to what they do. This possibility is 
not available to those performing a naïve stunt, since there is usually a logic behind 
their naiveté which can be disclosed. It is not the mistakes of the authorities which 
cause laughter, because they are not fooled, but the daring to challenge and hide 
behind the innocence which appeals to friendly audiences. This boldness is 
something the naïve stunt has in common with the provocative, but they differ in 
how they display their courage. Whereas the provocateurs of the provocative stunt 
seem not to care, the innocent appear not to understand. 
Through the theatre metaphor, other differences between the stunts become 
visible. In the supportive stunt, the pranksters invade any scene right in the face of 
the power holders in order to show their apparent support. For this type of stunt, 
there would be no point in hiding away, and they are depending on the sharing of 
the scene with the representatives of the dominant discourse. If the power holders 
are not there, they cannot offer their help, support and protection. If the political 
situation makes it too dangerous or too difficult to invade a scene right in the face 
of the power holders, potential pranksters can consider trying other types of stunts. 
In the corrective stunt, the pranksters also aim for a scene usually controlled by the 
power holders. However, in order to display the correction that they want to 
communicate, they depend on capturing and holding this scene for a while. In 
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order to do this, they calculate on not being discovered or removed from the scene 
for as long as it takes to generate the confusion about whether this is a joke or not.  
A characteristic of several naïve stunts are that the pranksters sneak in on the 
stage and display their message more or less in secret; if they did it openly it would 
rather be a provocative stunt. However, the Santas are an exception since the logic 
of their stunt depended on the gifts being given away openly. In their case, the 
naiveté was generated by the use of the mythological Father Christmas figure. For 
the absurd stunts, there is no specific scene to aim for, and the absurd performers 
can stage their play anywhere. Everyone who happens to be present or show up 
will become part of the absurdities. Depending on the situation and what point they 
want to make, they can be bold and invade a scene, or they can sneak in on the 
stage and remain discreet until it suits them to reveal themselves. A characteristic 
of the provocative stunt is that the provocateurs attempt to capture or invade a 
scene as loudly as possible; it would be a contradiction if they tried to be discreet.  
The audiences to the humorous political stunts are numerous. They can include 
the target/butt of the prank, media, people on the scene, random passers-by and 
other activists. Sometimes those who initiate a stunt have a specific audience in 
mind, but most of the stunts presented here appear to have the general public as 
their main target and the aim is to encourage a critical perspective on the dominant 
discourse. In many of the stunts the initiators deliberately aim to blur the line 
between audiences and performers. Everyone who happened to be present on the 
street when Orange Alternative staged their happenings became part of the event. 
The employees at the AXA bank and the visitors to the arms fair in Greece became 
unwilling main characters in the shows when Netwerk Vlaanderen and Mark 
Thomas showed up with their land mine clearance team and PR training.  
Within social movement research there has been much focus on how activists 
frame their activities and messages, but relatively little is known about how 
audiences actually perceive it. From media studies it is well known that audiences 
are not “empty vessels” waiting to be filled with propaganda, but actively interpret 
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what they see and hear depending on their own previous knowledge, experience 
and expectations.     
Whether audiences accept something as humorous is not straightforward and self-
evident. There is a struggle over what meaning to attribute to what is said or done, 
and the outcome depends on the context, as Palmer has pointed out.418 The 
example from the Yes Men at the textile conference in Finland showed that humour 
is a fragile thing. With the original conference audience, the stunt was a complete 
failure. Not until the film reached a different audience was it recognised as humour. 
Palmer does not say that the butt of the joke or prank has to agree that something 
is funny, but either the situation demands or the audience agrees that this was 
humorous. When audiences are moved from the rational mode to the humorous 
mode, they laugh. Laughter has the potential to undermine the dominant discourse, 
when it changes the scene of the political play so much that the ordinary play is 
temporarily disrupted. So far, no one has interrupted the play permanently, but that 
does not mean it cannot be done. 
That protesters manage to interrupt the ordinary play of politics so much that they 
take over the scene is not unusual. This happened in Seattle in 1999, when the 
neo-liberal discourse was under attack and the WTO meeting was disrupted by 
60,000 protesters. Many aspects of these protests had a carnivalesque 
atmosphere, for instance the 250 turtle people who contributed to reducing 
potential violence.419 However, from the point of view of the WTO, these 60,000 
still performed the usual protester roles; they just got out of control. And as long as 
most of the activists frame their actions as protest, this image will not be changed 
by a minority of clowns, Santas and turtles.  
In most of the examples provided here, the situation is different from conventional 
protest because of the pretence that this is not a protest. The disruption through 
pretence opens up possibilities for transformation rather than opposition. Maybe 
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except for the provocative stunt, the use of humour means that it is much more 
difficult for representatives of the dominant discourse to frame these actions as 
ordinary protest, although they certainly try and frequently succeed. Since non-
protesting protesters cannot easily be categorised with the other protesters, the 
show on the scene is interrupted in a different way. The fan club was not protesting 
Howard’s politics, they were celebrating him. The Yes Men did not disrupt WTO 
meetings, they just clarified WTO’s neoliberal position. The Polish TV walkers did 
not strike or march in a demonstration, they just took their TVs for a walk at a 
certain time. CIRCA did not say that war was wrong, they just wanted to contribute 
with their skills in the army as well. Therefore they did not fit into the ordinary play 
called “dominant discourse tolerates protest.”  
But what is different? The humorous techniques bring in new ideas on the stage, 
and if they cannot be considered part of the usual show, something else has to 
happen. Actors cannot continue playing Shakespeare when someone appears on 
the stage performing a children’s play. Then they either have to stop playing and 
wait for security to remove the new actors, or improvise a completely new play.  
The borders of the humorous political stunt  
There is a close relationship between the concepts of culture jamming, pranking, 
creative activism and tactical carnival presented in chapter 1 and the humorous 
political stunt. Some of the examples provided by authors who write about these 
concepts obviously fit within the definition of humorous political stunts. There is 
especially a big overlap between culture jamming and the type of humorous 
political stunts I have called corrective. Åsa Wettergren considers fun and humour 
key ingredients in the culture jammer’s resistance towards late capitalism’s 
commodification of feelings. In culture jamming there is an emphasis on creating 
pleasure which is opposed to the pleasures that consumerism can buy.420 The 
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Adbusters version of the obsession ad mentioned in chapter 1 becomes a 
humorous political stunt when it is placed in public places. However, in 
Wettergren’s definition it is not a requirement that culture jamming is humorous, 
and she restricts it to anti-corporate forms of protest.421 That excludes the anti-
militarist and regime-critical stunts included above.  
Much of what takes place as part of the tactical carnival is humorous, but funny 
slogans, songs and posters generally lack the confrontational aspect that cannot 
be ignored which is required for something to be a humorous political stunt. Neither 
do they include a deception that blurs the line between the artists and the 
audiences.  
The notions of culture jamming and tactical carnival were invented to investigate 
something other than relations of power and are not first and foremost concerned 
with how activists challenge power by positioning themselves humorously in 
relation to the rationality of dominant discourses. Figure 1 schematically sums up 
the relationship between the humorous political stunt and other concepts. It shows 
the overlap between culture jamming and the corrective stunts. All the types of 
humorous political stunts are placed within the circle creative activism which is a 
much broader concept. The two boxes to the left illustrate that the mediums for 
communicating political humour and the techniques used to generate amusement 
are independent of the humorous political stunts. 
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Figure 1. The relationship between the humorous political stunt and 
other concepts. 
Political humour comes in many different forms, and much of it is not humorous 
political stunts in spite of it being both amusing and political. As mentioned in the 
beginning of the chapter, I have intentionally been clear about what I consider the 
core of the definition and the ideal type of a humorous political stunt and included 
examples that are indisputably included in the definition. On the other hand I have 
deliberately chosen to be vaguer about the borders in order for future research of 
the margins to be able to bring new insights to the phenomenon. This section 
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discusses some of the borders and grey zones using a few examples: political 
jokes told in public; theatre; and graffiti. 
In some places and contexts, comedians perform at great risk to their own 
freedom, and just the telling of a joke in public becomes a political act. On several 
occasions, Burmese comedians who have criticised the military regime have been 
imprisoned. One of the most well-known is Zarganar (which is a stage name that 
translates as “tweezers”). Even from prison, Zarganar´s jokes spread to the 
community. The prison guards enjoyed them, and passed them on to other 
people.422 An example of a joke Zarganar´s friend Htein Lin told to a visitor 
concerns electricity. Burma regularly has power cuts, but according to the official 
newspapers there is no shortage of power, and the opening of new power plants is 
regularly celebrated. So the story goes:  
Htein Lin once shared a house with Zarganar. One day they visited 
a teashop, run by another former political prisoner. As they drank 
tea, Zarganar told Htein Lin about a friend who had died. “That’s 
terrible,” said Htein Lin. The teashop owner overheard. “Poor 
guy,” he said, “what happened?” Zarganar replied: “He touched a 
newspaper and was electrocuted”.423 
The punch line here makes a Burmese audience laugh, but can be puzzling to 
outsiders. The point is that the only way Burmese people get in touch with 
electricity is through the newspapers.  
Other comedians have also had trouble with the military junta in Burma. The 
Moustache Brothers is a trio where two members have served several years in 
prison for their political humour. Now they only perform in their own home, where 
foreign tourists can watch the show and bring their criticism to the outside world. 
An example of their humour is this:  
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Lu Maw is in pain. A toothache has robbed him of food, sleep and 
sanity; only a health professional can bring relief. Summoning the 
last of his strength he escapes across the Burmese border to 
Thailand, hoping that there he’ll find the treatment he desperately 
needs. Finally Lu Maw finds a clinic. The dentist is perplexed. “Why 
have you come this far?” he asks. “Surely they have dentists in 
Burma.” “Sure they do,” replies Lu Maw, his face stretching to a 
grin. “But in Burma we’re not allowed to open our mouths”.424 
Although clearly political and humorous, these jokes from Burma are not humorous 
political stunts even when they are performed in public. The element of deception 
which blurs the line between performers and audience or is too confrontational to 
be ignored is missing. That comedians perform is courageous and obviously 
confrontational, but the humour is not generated by the confrontation of doing a 
show, but the content in the show. It is what they say from the stage which is 
funny, not being on the stage.  
Another arena for professional satire has been the theatre. Italian playwright and 
performer Dario Fo does not perform stunts the way I have defined them here, but 
his theatre production during half a century is obviously political. It is firmly 
grounded in a tradition of carnivalesque subversion,425 but concerned with serious 
subjects such as rape, war and police repression. His use of the comic to explore 
these issues caused many to be surprised when he in 1997 was awarded the 
Nobel Prize for literature.426 During years of writing and performing he has been 
condemned by both the communist party in Italy and the Catholic Church. Fo’s 
work has been dominated by a concern for the poor and downtrodden and aimed 
at exposing the establishment.427 He is especially concerned with restoring 
people’s pride in their folk culture and is inspired by Bakhtin’s work on carnival and 
Gramsci’s work on hegemony. The process of hegemony devalues folk culture and 
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make what is considered “culture” reflect the oppressor’s view of the world.428 Fo’s 
performances and plays include both one man farces where Fo plays all the roles 
himself, and more traditional plays staging several actors.  
An example of the later is “The Accidental Death of an Anarchist” which is a farce 
based on real events in Milan in 1969. The police claimed that the railway worker 
Giuseppe Pinelli, suspected of bombing a bank, felt so guilty that he committed 
suicide by throwing himself out of the window. Fo’s play exposes all the 
contradictions in the official explanations and inquiries into the death.429 Much of 
Fo’s work are border cases of humorous political stunts. Just like with the jokes 
told by comedians in Burma, Fo’s plays are humorous, political, told in public and 
confront authorities. However, because they are performed on stage they can be 
ignored, and again there is no deception blurring the line between performers and 
audiences. The incongruity is not created by being on the stage, but by what is 
being said from the stage.  
A final example to explore the borders of the humorous political stunt is taken from 
the world of graffiti. Like adbusting, graffiti is based on the idea that the streets 
belong to everyone. People who create graffiti speak back to all the advertising in 
public spaces dominated by commercial interests.430 Some graffiti carries an 
obvious political message that goes beyond saying “no”, and some graffiti artists 
reach world fame. The prime example is Banksy who started his career in Bristol in 
the mid 1980’s, and is now well known around the world. Today he is considered 
an artist rather than a rebel, and his pieces are no longer removed from public 
spaces. 
In his work, Banksy criticises everything from established art museums to war, 
consumerism and surveillance. Most of his pieces do not have an obvious political 
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message, and they are not funny either. But some of his work is both political and 
amusing. Take for example the piece on the cover of the book Wall and Piece431, a 
guy in a black jacket, with his face covered and his arm raised to throw something. 
What most people expect him to throw is a stone, but what appears in his hand on 
the back cover is a bunch of flowers with yellow, red, blue and green. The 
contradiction between expectation and what is actually in his hand is amusing. 
In 2005 Banky painted on the separation wall which Israel has built on occupied 
Palestinian territory,432 and in 2007, he was back to make more images in 
Bethlehem. One of them is an image of a little girl in a pink dress who is body 
searching an Israeli soldier in uniform. The incongruity in this situation, the 
unexpected reversal of roles makes this an amusing image to some people. It is 
also an image that can be used to discuss the borders between humorous political 
stunts and other political humour because it changes depending on the situation 
the image is placed in. When the painting appears in a place where it is seen by 
IDF soldiers passing it, it is a challenge to the power they practice every day 
towards civilians and can be understood as a humorous political stunt. However, 
now that it is a famous painting, it is used in many different places. I have it as a 
poster on my wall, and I find it both amusing and political. However, having it on 
my wall at home is not a stunt. Just like the jokes and the theatre play the image is 
not an amusing confrontation, but a picture of an amusing confrontation that does 
not blur the line between artist and audiences. 
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Illustration 10. Banky graffiti from Bethlehem. Photo by Pawel Ryszawa. 
Reprinted under GNU Free Documentation License.  
Do humorous political stunts really make a difference? 
In her book about irony, Hutcheon raises a puzzle about this particular mode of 
communication. Why bother with irony when it is so complex and the intentions can 
so easily be misunderstood?  
Why should anyone want to use this strange mode of discourse 
where you say something you don’t actually mean and expect 
people to understand not only what you do mean but also your 
attitude toward it?433 
Not all irony is humorous, and not all humorous political stunts are ironic. 
Nevertheless, Hutcheon’s question is also relevant when it comes to humorous 
political stunts and in particular when the aim of a nonviolent action is to engage 
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people in dialogue. Why use this method instead of saying what you mean without 
making communication more complicated? There are probably just as many 
answers to this as there are humorous activists, but a general answer is that the 
potential benefits are greater than the risks.  
In chapter 1 I introduced the discussion within humour theory concerning whether 
humour really poses a challenge to those in positions of power, or if it is merely a 
vent for frustration. I indicated that it is necessary to leave the either-or dichotomy 
behind and instead discuss what role humour can play under what circumstances. 
Looking at one particular form of political humour, the humorous political stunt, and 
dividing it into different types is one way of probing the complexities of humour. 
Also the play metaphor and all the cases in this chapter can contribute to 
illustrating how complex it can be to analyse the effect of humorous political stunts 
on relations of power. 
Some of the factors that are likely to have an influence can be approached through 
the theatre metaphor: Was the scene empty or were there already lead actors on 
the stage when the humourists attacked? How long did the disruption last? How 
frequent were the disruption(s)? How many people wanted to play a role not 
included in the script? How did those in power respond to the challenge? Were the 
lead actors put in a situation where they felt they themselves had to stop the play, 
or did the humourists stop it?  
It seems that the more the challengers managed to enter the stage when there 
were already lead actors present, the easier it was to get attention from mass 
media and a large audience, something which the John Howard’s Ladies Auxiliary 
Fan Club and Yes Men on BBC experienced. But if it is too difficult or too 
dangerous to interrupt lead actors, this can potentially be compensated by 
frequency or number of people, as shown in the example with the TV walkers. 
Maybe CIRCA could have increased its influence by performing more plays at the 
same time. Another factor affecting success is the new actors’ ability to keep the 
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focus on the dominant discourse, and not divert all attention to themselves or their 
way of performing.  
The use of pretence combined with the ambiguity, incongruity and contradictions 
necessary for generating humour means that the attack on the dominant discourse 
can be both direct and indirect at the same time. The pretence that this is not a 
protest means that it is indirect. But sometimes there is a direct link between the 
technique used to generate the humour and the discourse to be undermined. The 
humorous techniques directly contribute to the deconstruction, at least for a little 
while, and serve to illustrate that the dominant discourse is not as almighty and 
unchallengeable as it appeared. The Fan Club used impersonations of a 
stereotypical idea of what women were and should be to satirise and exaggerate 
what they considered Howard’s old fashioned vision for Australia. When the Polish 
people took their TVs for a walk, the absurd image of the TV in the stroller also 
directly dealt with the issue of false news on TV. The Yes Men’s golden leisure suit 
with its Employee Visualisation Appendage was also in its own absurd way directly 
linked to the issue of workers’ rights that the group wanted to highlight. CIRCA’s 
slapstick was a direct attack on the military recruiters’ claim to adulthood, and their 
clowning embodied values that directly contradicted the discourse of militarism. 
However, the link is not that strong in all cases. Voina’s ridicule of the FSB via a 
bridge painting did not communicate what in particular they thought was wrong with 
the FSB, and Otpor’s Dinar za Smenu did not show what the activists thought was 
problematic with Slobodan Milošević’s regime. 
Not surprisingly, the representatives of these dominant discourses did not agree to 
improvise a new play, but sometimes they were forced to do it. They did not accept 
the children’s play but insisted on continuing with Shakespeare. In some cases it 
was possible to ignore the new actors, because they were too few, or because they 
presented themselves when no important actors were already on the stage. With 
ACE bank, Netwerk Vlaanderen could gain the attention of the general public, but 
they did not disrupt the functions of the major banks whose practice they wanted to 
criticise, and the banks could ignore them. In the Yes Men’s stunt at the textile 
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conference, WTO could also safely ignore these new actors. However, that those 
in power are not directly affected does not necessarily mean that a stunt has no 
effect. Other audiences might be directly or indirectly affected when they encounter 
the stunt on the street or through a YouTube video.  
In some of the other cases, the activists interrupted the ongoing play so much that 
the representatives of the dominant discourses felt some kind of reaction was 
needed. The Fan Club, CIRCA and the Santas were physically prevented from 
being present on the stage where they wanted to be. In Poland, people from the 
Orange Alternative were arrested and put in detention, and in the case with the TV 
walkers, the government changed the rules for when the stage was open by 
changing the curfew time. 
The question of effectiveness is important, but extremely difficult to estimate. In 
some cases, the pranks can be disruptive enough to catch world attention and 
force a reaction from those being undermined, something which happened to the 
Yes Men when they went on the BBC as representatives of Dow, and when The 
Chaser team were charged with offences under new security laws after the stunt 
ridiculing security during the APEC summit in Sydney. However, even when 
humorous political stunts are “just” short and symbolic interruptions, they are still 
contributions to the discursive guerrilla war that the activists are engaged in.  
Summing up, it should by now be clear that a large number of factors are involved 
in determining the impact of a humorous political stunt. It is not just a question of 
directly challenging established relations of power, but also concerns the activists 
themselves and their commitment to a cause, as well as media, other activists and 
the general public.  
Conclusion 
Humorous political stunts are attempts to disrupt the smooth dominance of 
prevailing power formations. They are a unique type of resistance due to the way 
they utilise humorous incongruity. Except in the cases of provocative stunts, the 
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pretence that this is not protest means that it is a challenge for those in power to 
frame these actions as ordinary protest. Because it is difficult to treat non-
protesting protesters in the same way as other protesters, the play of politics either 
has to continue in a different way or be temporarily broken down and exposed as a 
play that is not totally dominant after all.  
Humorous political stunts can be powerful stories because they frequently speak to 
the imagination. In Sweden, homosexuality was officially classified as a disease 
until 1979. The story goes that the movement for homosexual rights therefore 
organised a campaign where they asked people to call their employers and say 
that unfortunately they would not be able to work today, since they were feeling a 
little gay.434 As a naïve stunt, this exposed the hypocrisy of considering 
homosexuality a disease by pretending that it was not meant to be considered a 
disease which should prevent people from working. In connection with an 
occupation of The National Board of Health and Welfare in 1979, a few people did 
indeed use this argument, but there is no basis for the stories of thousands of 
people calling in sick. However, the story strikes so many keys that several people 
independently of each other have told it to me as a true story. Likewise, the story of 
the Yippies throwing dollar bills in the New York Stock exchange has created 
images of greedy stock brokers crawling on the floor in many people’s imagination.  
Humorous political stunts are related to phenomena such as culture jamming and 
tactical carnival that other scholars have studied, but these concepts were 
developed with a different aim in mind. Although there are many overlaps these 
notions speak about something else. Likewise, Berger’s 45 techniques of humour 
can provide insights about how the amusing incongruity is generated in a 
humorous political stunt, but his framework does not have much to say about 
humour and relations of power.    
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This chapter has identified the ideal type of a humorous political stunt where a 
dominant discourse is openly challenged by a confrontational performance/action. 
It is either so confrontational that it cannot be ignored or involves a deception that 
blurs the line between performers and audiences. I have intentionally been clear 
about the core of the phenomenon, but vague about the borders in the hope that 
future research on borderline cases can bring more insight about the core as well. 
The many different examples showed that even within this ideal type, there is room 
for much diversity.  
I formulated, examined and illustrated five main categories of humorous political 
stunts. Supportive, corrective, naïve, absurd and provocative types of stunts 
position themselves in relation to those in power in distinct ways. Almost all 
examples of humorous political stunts can be placed in one of these types because 
there is an internal logic to them, but the example of the Chaser’s APEC stunt in 
Sydney demonstrates that this is not always the case.  
The type of stunt says something about the broader picture, but by introducing so 
many different examples it also became apparent how much variety there can be 
within one type of stunt. Take for instance the three supportive stunts by the John 
Howard Ladies’ Auxiliary Fan Club, Mark Thomas and the landmine clearing team 
in the AXA bank. They have the supportiveness in common, but even within this 
category there is much variety. Similarly for all the other four types.  
The theatre model is a way of analysing the dynamics of each individual stunt. 
Investigating the four factors of stage, actors, audiences and timing separately 
brings insights about each stunt, but understanding the way each of the factors 
influences the others and how they play together shows how the humorous political 
stunt can be varied and how many possibilities there exist for creative activists. It 
also shows the complexities of power and resistance and how it is unfruitful to 
consider resistance a question of either futility or impact. Even when those in 
positions of power do not change their behaviours because of a single humorous 
political stunt, the pranks can be part of broader social movements. They can be 
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inspiring, uplifting events in the discursive guerrilla war that bring attention, new 
energy and perhaps most importantly demonstrate the existence of alternative 
discourses.  
The following chapter analyses rebel clowning, a particular type of an absurd 
humorous political stunt, in more detail. The two subsequent chapters are the case 
studies of Ofog and KMV. In all these chapters the five types of humorous political 
stunts and the theatre metaphor are tools that serve to analyse the humorous 
political stunts performed by these organisations.  
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Chapter 4: Radical clowning as humorous political 
activism  
Introduction 
In Chapter 3 I presented the British Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army 
(CIRCA) as an example of an absurd stunt. This chapter explores the phenomenon 
of radical clowning in more detail, drawing primarily on Ofog’s experiences with 
clowning435 and relating this to findings from the academic literature on CIRCA.  
The analysis takes its point of departure in Peacock’s clown theory with its focus 
on three central clown elements – play, otherness and incompetence and adds a 
fourth element which is prominent in Ofog’s and CIRCA’s clowning - ridicule. It 
shows under what circumstances rebel clowning can contribute to facilitating 
outreach and mobilisation, a culture of resistance and challenging relations of 
power. The chapter concludes with a discussion of clowning in relation to 
Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolence and the contradictions and limitations of radical 
clowning. 
Radical clowning with Ofog 
The “clown army” is a concept that the Swedish anti-militarist network Ofog has 
used frequently during its nonviolent actions, both before and during our joint 
research project. It was often one of the first things people from Ofog mentioned 
when I talked with them about humour. Ofog’s radical clowning is directly inspired 
by the British CIRCA.  
The literature on clowning as a form of protest is growing. Poul Routledge and L. 
M. Bogad have both analysed their own and other “clownbattant” experiences in 
CIRCA in academic writing in their respective fields of critical geography and 
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performance studies. The rebel clowns have also been used as a case in order to 
discuss citizenship436 as well as humour and nonviolent resistance to 
oppression.437 Routledge has described how the clowning is developed within a 
tradition of direct nonviolent action emphasising independent organising through 
affinity groups, a tradition that Ofog is also part of. These affinity groups take care 
of training, preparations and the participants’ emotional well-being through what he 
calls sensuous solidarities.438 CIRCA’s activism has been placed within a larger 
trend of joyful, carnival-like protest that has been termed carnivalesque439, the 
ethical spectacle440, and tactical carnival441 as described previously.  
Bogad traces the history of CIRCA back to London 2003 and the recruitment tour 
through Britain that resulted in about 150 clowns participating in the protests 
against the G8 summit in Edinburgh in 2005.442 In addition to contributing to the 
goals of tactical carnival, clowning is considered a way of countering our society’s 
focus on individualism and celebrities. Since it is difficult to recognise people 
behind the makeup, clowning is seen as an equaliser.443 The clowns in these very 
special armies dress in a mixture of military and clown clothing and use attributes 
from the clowning sphere. While they are clowns in their hearts, their curiosity 
draws them to the exciting world of everything associated with police and military 
authority. Their absurd performances become a different way of challenging the 
discourse of militarism as well as police and military personnel that uphold this 
discourse. Clowning frequently opens up possibilities for interaction which are not 
available in the same form to “ordinary” protesters.  
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The people who initiated CIRCA had a well thought through idea about what they 
wanted to do and the purpose of the clowning. CIRCA’s own statement About the 
army is a long explanation of the name Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army. 
Clandestine signifies a refusal of celebrity and resistance of surveillance, and 
Insurgent that “we have risen up from nowhere and are everywhere”.444 Rebel 
sends signals of changing the world in a rebellion that will continue forever and 
promise always to disobey those in power. Clown “because what else can one be 
in such a stupid world. Because inside everyone is a lawless clown trying to 
escape. Because nothing undermines authority like holding it up to ridicule.”445 
Finally, in the section about why they are an Army, CIRCA says that a single clown 
is pathetic, but together an army of clowns is dangerous and can declare war on 
the absurdity of the world where money counts more than people and there is an 
absurd war going on in Iraq.446  
Since CIRCA first introduced the idea of rebel clowning to the global social justice 
activist community in Europe, the idea has spread to many different struggles and 
under different circumstances in the so-called western world. Ofog’s use of 
clowning is part of this spread and adapts the idea of rebel clowning to local 
circumstances.  
In the written comments I collected during the first workshop with Ofog about 
humour, someone wrote: 
As clowns we are more unpredictable, one moment we imitate 
police, the next moment we play with each other and the third 
moment we play with the police(…) it is also possible to push the 
limits more as for example clowns, like passing barriers.  
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Unpredictability is a central aspect of the clown army, just as it is in conventional 
circus clowning. When clowning within Ofog was new to me, I wrote in my research 
notes: 
Ofog has used the concept of the clown army several times, and 
found it a useful way to question power and authority. (…)It is a 
good way to get a lighter tone, ease tension and get out the 
human side of the policeman or woman, who will maybe start to 
juggle with the clowns. Most people become happy when they see 
a clown, but sometimes the police get annoyed as well.447 
Subsequently, I have explored the concept and the various ideas in the quotes 
above by interviewing people about their clowning experiences and through 
participatory observation as a clown. 
None of the people with clowning experience that I have interviewed have had 
much training or referred to any theory about clowning. Within Ofog, there is 
knowledge about CIRCA, but little connection to the whole tradition of clowning. 
The three clown army actions in Luleå, Gothenburg and Belgium where I was a 
participant observer were organised in a typical Ofog manner. Preparations were 
done with short notice, ad hoc and with a mix of more and less experienced 
clowns. This way of preparing has its advantages and disadvantages. More people 
can participate if they are not required to spend long hours rehearsing and 
preparing. On the other hand, the performances might not be as good as they 
could otherwise have been. For example, Emma and Maria who participated in 
Luleå found it difficult to go in and out of their clown roles in different situations.448 
More training could probably have prepared them how to handle this. 
For some Ofog activists it has been important to let the clowning be a way of taking 
action that everyone can participate in. Peter, who was an experienced clown 
when he joined Ofog, thinks that it is important that the clowning is unpretentious. If 
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some people in an affinity group have clowned before and others not, people learn 
from each other:  
You can walk in there and just stand there, and then you still fulfil 
a function. Everyone does not have to do the same, go in to 
influence or establish a relation or do something more 
advanced.449  
People engage in the clown army with multiple aims in mind, and there may be as 
many opinions about the purpose of clowning as there are clowns.  
Peacock’s clown theory 
Several books provide instructions and practical exercises for people who want to 
practice clowning or other physical comedy450, but academics have made 
surprisingly few attempts at theorising clowning. An exception is Louise Peacock’s 
book Serious Play: Modern Clown Performance, which has a few pages on CIRCA. 
However, more interesting is her attempt to define the unique features of all 
clowning, including ceremonial clowning, the traditional circus clown, clowns in 
theatre and the recent use of clowns in hospitals. According to Peacock, clowning 
“allow[s] us to connect with deeper truths about human existence”451, and she 
explains that: 
The clown clowns not simply to amuse his audience but because 
he [sic] has observations about the world, about life, to 
communicate to them, and play becomes a conduit to aid that 
communication.452  
This wish to communicate observations about the world can also be found in 
CIRCA’s aims. Kolonel Klepto, echoing CIRCA’s webpage, explains: 
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CIRCA aims to make clowning dangerous again, to bring it back to 
the street, reclaim its disobedience and give it back the social 
function it once had: its ability to disrupt, critique and heal society 
(…) creating coherence through confusion - adding disorder to the 
world in order to expose its lies and speak the truth.453  
Peacock has identified three central aspects of clowning which will be the point of 
departure for my presentation of Ofog’s clowning:  
The clown is distinguished from the actor by his or her ability to 
play with the audience and to create a sense of complicité with 
them by using play to connect with them. There is always 
something of the ‘other’ about clowns. This may be expressed in 
the way that they look different from ordinary everyday people 
(through make-up, costume, the use of a red nose), but the most 
striking feature of the clowns’ ‘otherness’ is their attitude to life 
as expressed through their performance. Whilst the clown often 
fails to achieve what they set out to achieve, their failure is 
framed by their optimism and by the simplicity of their approach 
to life.454  
I have emphasised the three concepts I consider central in Peacock’s definition 
with bold - play, otherness and failure. Below I treat them as techniques that can 
be more or less operationalised in a performance and apply them to the data from 
Ofog. Later in her book Peacock uses the expression incompetence 
interchangeably with failure, incompetence is a word I find more appropriate and 
will use subsequently. In addition, I present the fourth concept of ridicule which 
Peacock mentions, but did not find so prominent in traditional clowning that it is 
included in her definition.   
It is the combination of play and otherness that sets this type of activism apart from 
what I have called conventional/ordinary protest and also from most other 
humorous political stunts. Playful elements are part of many stunts, but they are 
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seldom as central as in radical clowning. Likewise it is not unusual to emphasise 
otherness in some types of activism, for instance queer performance, but then it 
frequently has an angry tone that is not part of the clown performances the original 
CIRCA and Ofog have tried to foster.  
Working on humour together with Ofog I have come across three different contexts 
where radical clowning has been used. In legal demonstrations clowning has been 
a way to deescalate tensions and reach out to police officers. In civil disobedience 
actions clowning has served the additional purpose of physically challenging 
access to restricted space. In so-called counter-recruitment when Ofog has 
attempted to disrupt military recruitment of young people clowning has been a way 
to demonstrate the absurdity of militarism. In all these situations two of the basic 
clowning concepts – play and otherness – are important features.  
Play 
Play is probably the most crucial element in clowning generally, and for rebel 
clowning too. By playing with each other and inviting others to play clowns can be 
understood to reach out. I observed how play can work for the first time during an 
international summer camp called “War Starts Here” organised by Ofog near Vidsel 
Test Range in July 2011. Vidsel Test Range, at the time known as NEAT (North 
European Aerospace Test range), is Europe’s largest overland military test site, 
with an air space almost the size of Belgium.455 This huge area in the north of 
Sweden is administered by the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) 
and is routinely rented out to other countries’ military forces to train and test new 
weapon systems.  
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During the day of direct action, 200 people held a pink carnival just outside the 
restricted test area.456 I was part of an affinity group with 8 clowns which had two 
goals: 1. Challenge police perceptions of their own role, by trying to reach to the 
human beings behind the police uniform, and 2. distract the police to make other 
affinity groups achieve what they wanted, e.g. climb the fence in order to get to the 
military runway. I will return to the problematic aspects of trying to do these two 
things simultaneously.  
The clowns were dressed in a mixture of clowning and military clothes, and brought 
jump ropes, soap bubbles, feather dusters, balloons etc. with them to play with. 
When all the 200 activists arrived outside of the restricted area, the clowns 
immediately spotted the police blocking the road, and decided to “help”. As 
members of the clown army the idea was to show how they felt a community with 
others in uniform, although much of what the police do perplexes the clowns. 
Forming their own line across the road just in front of the police, the clowns 
assisted in stopping the rest of the activists from proceeding and helped direct the 
traffic that was allowed to pass where the protesters could not go. At this point all 
activists had agreed to respect the police line so the clowns’ “help” did not really 
make a practical difference. 
Most of the police seemed quite relaxed around the clowns, although they declined 
to try the soap bubbles and most of them politely said “no thanks” when offered 
sultanas and chocolate. Emma, who was part of our group, tells that when she 
started to clean the shoe of one policeman with her feather duster, to her surprise 
he just put forward his other foot as well.457 However, one particular policewoman 
had been very hesitant in her interaction with the clowns. When they moved 
towards her, she moved away, and she definitely did not want chocolate or  
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Illustration 11. Ofog. Luleå July 26, 2011 clowns and police. 
 
sultanas. However, a breakthrough came when the clown Sara claimed that her 
shoes were bigger than the policewoman’s shoes and without words indicated that 
she wanted to measure. When Sara sat down on the ground, the policewoman 
followed her lead and put her boot against the clown’s boot, revealing that Sara did 
in fact have the biggest shoes. A little while later, this same clown pretended to get 
stuck half way through the fence into the runway, were a number of activists where 
sitting under arrest and waiting to be escorted out. This performance was so good 
that I thought Sara actually was stuck. It is the only example of a radical clown 
deliberately using the idea of incompetence that I have come across. 
Later in the day, a group of around 50 people, including some of the clowns, 
decided to participate in a civil disobedience action when they entered the 
restricted military area by walking on the main road which leads through the zone. 
Cars can go through but are not allowed to stop. The place had been declared off-
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limits to Ofog, but the handful of police had no chance of stopping the group. On 
the walk to the fence which separate the road from the military run way, these 50 
people were escorted by only two police officers – a man walking and a woman 
driving the police car. During this five kilometre walk, some of the clowns walked in 
the heels of this lonely policeman, sometimes one, sometimes three in a line, 
imitating his every move. If he walked fast, the clowns walked fast, if he talked in 
his radio, the clowns talked in their make believe radios. If he turned around to see 
what was going on, the clowns turned around as well. From the clown perspective, 
this was a game of “follow John”, but in all likelihood it looked rather different from 
the policeman’s point of view. His strategy for dealing with the clowns seemed to 
be to ignore them to the extent possible, and engage in conversations with the 
“civilian” protesters.  
Another example of clown play during a civil disobedience action was described to 
me in several interviews. Bofors is one of Sweden’s biggest arms manufacturers, 
and Ofog had held a demonstration against the company in June 2008. The police 
had closed off a zone in front of the building with red and white tape. A small 
delegation from the activists had just tried to deliver a letter to the CEO, but was 
driven out of the enclosed area. Everybody was a bit tired, it rained a little, and the 
activists were discussing if they should go home. Suddenly, three rebel clowns 
from the clown army arrived. All three did their best to hide together behind a small 
tree branch on this huge open parking lot. Pretending that they were invisible to the 
police, the three clowns snuck into the enclosed area, hid behind a flower pot and 
started playing clown games. Then the clowns became bolder, and tried to engage 
the police in their games and imitate the way the police officers stood and moved. 
Some of the police officers started to move differently in order to get the clowns to 
imitate them, and one policeman even blew soap bubbles that a clown offered.  
Vera reflected about the episode: 
And then we appear, a group of clowns and kind of hide behind 
little twigs and roll around and fool around and we can stay there, 
and we reflected on that. But they just removed someone, and I 
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don’t think it was because the police got tired, they understood 
that it would probably be easier to let us stay in there. 458 
As Vera interpreted the situation, the police thought it would be easier to let the 
clowns stay inside the enclosed area and let them play since they did not do any 
harm. That the police apparently accepted the clowns as harmless meant that they 
had been successful in communicating their nonviolent intentions. Lena, another 
Ofog activist who participated in the same clown group, adds how the situation was 
perceived by the “ordinary” Ofog activists who were holding the demonstration 
outside of the enclosed area: 
 
Illustration 12. Ofog. The clown army succeed through camouflage and 
silliness to get inside the enclosure. Outside arms producer Bofors’ 
headquarters in Karlskoga June 17 2008459 
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We kind of snuck in, you know we were very visible because it was 
a totally open parking lot, but we pretended to sneak in and came 
all the way to the house and really played theatre. It was like a 
show for the others in the manifestation because it rained a little 
and was kind of “should we go home or what” atmosphere. 460 
Peter described a similar challenging of space in Luleå in 2009, where he and 
other clowns hid behind twigs and pretended to be completely hidden, in order to 
cross the police line.461  
Peacock’s emphasis on play and the rebel clowns’ attempts to get the police to 
engage in play with them is also supported by John Wright’s understanding of 
clowning. His book Why Is That So Funny? A Practical Exploration of Physical 
Comedy462 provides many practical exercises for performers to help them find their 
inner clown. To Wright it is important that clowns are not acting, they just “are”. 
Clowns exist in the here and now without pretence.463 All clowning takes as its 
point of departure the simple clown whom he characterises as “fun-loving, childlike, 
amoral, irresponsible, mercurial, bizarre, destructive, chaotic and anarchic”.464 
Central to the simple clown is stupidity, naivety and constant bafflement about what 
life has to offer.  
Otherness 
The second keyword from Peacock’s definition of clowning, otherness also 
resonates well with radical clowning. By wearing parts of military uniforms, the 
clown army is partly like soldiers, but the clowning attributes and especially the red 
noses obviously make them part of the community of clowns. Ofog and CIRCA 
clowns belong everywhere – and nowhere. The otherness is also expressed in part 
of CIRCA’s description of itself quoted in Chapter 3: “We are circa because we are 
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approximate and ambivalent, neither here nor there, but in the most powerful of all 
places, the place in-between order and chaos.”465  
A telling example of otherness comes from Vera when her clown character 
pretended to fall in love with one of the police officers. She looked at him and flirted 
by hugging herself, and felt it was a breakthrough that made him relax: “For me the 
symbolism became: You are here, but you are not my enemy. I rather think you 
should be with us instead.”466  
A comparable expression of radical clowning can be found in one of Bogad’s 
articles. The clown Trixi confronted a line of very serious police in riot gear during 
the G8 summit in Edinburgh in 2005. During a rather tense situation, Trixie went 
along the line of police and kissed the plastic shields of all the policemen in the 
line, just after the shields had been used to shove people away in order to recreate 
police control of a street. A photo of this episode went around the world the next 
day as part of many reports of the protests. Bogad comments that the police who 
were exposed to Trixie and her fellow clowns expressed reactions ranging from 
amusement and surprise to asking her to “step away, from the shield please”.467 
The clown performance continued with a number of different games, and after a 
while the police withdraw from this part of Edinburgh’s streets. Bogad adds that 
there might have been other factors than clown magic involved, but for the people 
present it was a powerful moment. 
Both Vera and Trixie used typical expressions of flirting to disarm and 
communicate friendliness. It is part of both traditional and rebel clowning to divert 
from established social norms in various ways. Peacock writes that “clown actions 
can also involve sexual antics which involve a level of obscenity that would not be 
acceptable in everyday society.”468 However, even if kissing and flirting are 
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associated with sexuality, when done by a rebel clown confronting police it 
becomes disconnected from its ordinary use. Instead of the kisses’ conventional 
associations with sexuality, they become a sign of otherness when social 
conventions about relations between protesters and police are broken. 
Clowns behave in different ways, depending on the person underneath. They 
communicate multiple and sometimes contradictory messages which get 
interpreted in various ways by different audiences. As a minimum almost all rebel 
clowns aim to communicate a non-threatening attitude, something that can be 
achieved through the play and otherness apparent in their actions and attitudes. It 
is impossible during the heat of the moment to communicate sophisticated 
understandings of nonviolent action such as the whole of Vinthagen’s theory, but 
most people that Ofog’s rebel clowns have encountered seem to understand that 
no harm is intended. 
Some clowns go further and want to express friendliness and demonstrate that 
police and protesters should not consider each other enemies. Vera was one of the 
people from Ofog I interviewed who expressed this aspect of clowning most 
clearly. When talking about clowning during larger demonstrations, she said she 
prefers to take the role of the curious clown who wants to include everyone in what 
is going on. She likes the clown figure because it does not make her “a hard and 
angry activist”469, a notion she used to describe the stereotype of political activists. 
She wishes to communicate that the police are not the object of the activists’ 
anger; they are just something that people in Ofog have to deal with as part of their 
anti-militarist activism. Vera is also the kind of clown who leaves police officers 
alone if they don’t want to play, as she expresses it: “you know, it is not as fun to 
play with someone who thinks you are very annoying.”470 When Vera clowns, she 
gives everyone a chance to see what her intentions are:  
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For me the point is that it should not just be fun for me, it has to 
be something that the police can appreciate as well. It should not 
exceed the limits, so if they don’t seem to understand that after 
they have had the opportunity, then I leave them alone.471  
Vera also explained how she used her high-pitched clown voice to communicate 
the potential bond between activists and police with words: “But if you take a 
helicopter, and you fly in over here, then you can let us down in the area of the 
arms factory where we would like to be, that is a good idea, isn’t it?”472 She thinks it 
is easier to get acceptance for the idea that activists and police have something in 
common when she is clowning compared to when she is in “civilian”. Even if Vera 
never displays anger herself, her experience is that she is perceived as angry by 
the police when she is not clowning. However, she only pretended to fall in love 
with one particular policeman. With others she thought looked stricter, she 
practiced standing in line just as them. If she did not get any response she moved 
on to the next one. But everyone got a chance to see what her intentions were, 
including the head of the police.  
Incompetence 
According to Peacock, “failure or ‘incompetence’ is a staple ingredient of clown 
performance”, and the third central aspect of clowning she identifies.473 Weitz also 
describes how the western clown is inspired by the country bumpkin and draws on 
“physical, intellectual and social incompetence”.474 However, failure and 
incompetence are almost absent from the data about rebel clowns. Although 
CIRCA’s recruitment video includes a sentence about “learning how to be 
stupid”475 and CIRCA’s statement has a reference to failure when discussing why 
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they are clowns476, the incompetence is not mentioned in the academic literature 
on CIRCA. As mentioned earlier, Sara getting stuck in the fence surrounding Vidsel 
Test Range/NEAT is the only example of incompetence I have observed or heard 
about. Since this is rather striking, I systematically looked for episodes of 
incompetence in ten randomly selected YouTube videos documenting rebel clown 
actions.477 In none of them did I find anything resembling incompetence.    
Peacock herself does not engage in a systematic discussion about the similarities 
and differences between what she describes as central clowning concepts and her 
analysis of CIRCA. Thus, she mentions how CIRCA clowns are playing and how 
they parody the military, but does not comment of the lack of incompetence in 
CIRCA clown behaviour.  
There are most likely several reasons why there is so little incompetence in rebel 
clowning. Activists who have little knowledge of the clown tradition are unlikely to 
have thought much about what ought to be “staple ingredients” in their clowning. It 
also takes more practice and skills to be funny by appearing incompetent than 
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most amateur rebel clowns have. In addition it requires a type of action/situation 
where there is enough time to establish a contact with the audiences. It is also 
possible that amateur clowns who are used to being “ordinary” protesters might 
find it relatively easy to play and ridicule others, but a challenge to humiliate 
themselves by appearing incompetent. However, it would require more research to 
know why incompetence is almost absent from rebel clowning.   
An interesting question is if more use of incompetence would improve the rebel 
clowns’ likelihood of achieving their goals. It would probably contribute to 
communicate the clowns’ otherness at the same time as it reaches out and 
emphasises that we are all humans who can fail, activists and representatives of 
authorities alike. Where the non-humorous activists usually find it hard to deal with 
failure, this would be easier for clowns. Since clowns are constantly bewildered by 
the state of the world and their lack of success, they could serve as an 
embodiment of all activists’ common failure to change the world. Likewise, daring 
to show incompetence, even though it in fact requires great skill to do it well, would 
make it more difficult to interpret the clown activists as self-righteous.  
Ridicule 
If incompetence is missing, rebel clowning instead includes a fourth feature which 
does not take such a prominent place in Peacock’s theory, namely ridicule. Clowns 
standing next to police and military personnel and imitating their every move are a 
“staple ingredient” in actions I have observed and heard about. Peacock’s clown 
theory does mention ridicule, but in radical clowning the use of ridicule is more 
striking than in conventional clowning. Rebel clowns address the issue of high and 
low status with their parodies of police and military signs of importance and 
prominence, for instance when body posture and ways of walking are imitated. The 
parodies ridicule law enforcement officers’ attempts at displaying authority and for 
most people they come across as funny without much explanation. As Emma 
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expressed it: ”If you see a person with a red nose standing in exactly the same 
position, then it looks comical.”478 
Lena was one of the people I interviewed who emphasised how ridicule can be 
used to expose the ridiculousness in the police and military roles. She talked about 
a clowning experience from Luleå in 2009 this way:  
A lot of military personnel stood there guarding the military airport 
and we were mainly there to make fun of them. We had our own 
little exercise a kind of “practice peace” where we encouraged the 
soldiers to come with us and practice peace instead of practicing 
war. But we were also just hanging around them. You know, when 
you are dressed like a clown it is quite rewarding just to stand 
next to a police or a military, and then you kind of make them 
look stupid just by standing next to them.479 
This use of ridicule is also outspoken when clowning has been used as so-called 
“counter-recruitment”. This is a term used within the peace movement for activities 
aimed at providing alternatives to or facts about military recruitment of young 
people. The purpose of clowning in this context is to engage directly with the army 
as an institution and not “just” interact with the police present at larger 
demonstrations and civil disobedience actions confronting military exercises or 
arms production.  
During the interviews I asked some people what they expected would come out of 
clowning counter-recruitment, something which Ofog had not practiced before and 
we were planning to do. Gustav who had not been clowning himself, but was 
interested in doing it as part of the counter-recruitment, explained his expectations 
of the clown figure like this:   
It is a way of ridiculing, or show (…) that militarism and military 
recruitment is quite silly. Especially if it is a clown which is 
recruiting I think it can be interesting. And first and foremost I 
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also think that you can make people reflect a little more, hopefully 
ask “what is this really, why do they do this?” It is actually quite 
sick that you have people who recruit people to war.480 
Here Gustav described how ridicule is part of rebel clowning, and the purpose of it. 
Contrary to Lena he did not find it so interesting in itself to ridicule people in 
uniform, but saw it as an opportunity to make the audiences wonder what the 
clowns are doing, what they mean. Instead of providing a definite statement that 
military recruitment is bad, the absurdity of the clowns might make the audiences 
think for themselves. 
The use of ridicule is not unproblematic. It is one of humour’s darker sides, and its 
existence is often downplayed in writings focusing on the positive aspects of 
humour.481 Below it will become apparent how ridicule is ambivalent in relation to 
the playful and friendly aspects of clowning, and in Chapter 5 I return to the risks of 
ridicule being experienced as abuse. 
Analysis: Clowning the way to hearts and minds? 
The first part of this chapter took its point of departure in Peacock’s clown theory. It 
showed how radical clowning uses two of the three core features of clowning she 
identified: play and otherness. These two aspects of clowning are central in 
communicating friendliness and nonviolent intentions. However, Peacock’s third 
feature, incompetence, is almost absent in radical clowning. Instead I identified 
ridicule as a fourth central feature, which sends very different signals than 
playfulness. In the analysis I will investigate how play, otherness and ridicule 
contribute to or hinder the clowns’ ambitions when it comes to: 
a) facilitating outreach and mobilisation  
b) facilitating a culture of resistance  
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c) challenging power relations482   
Towards the end of the chapter I discuss play, otherness and ridicule in relation to 
theory of nonviolent action.  
Facilitating outreach and mobilisation 
Frequently activists are very interested in getting media attention, since this is 
considered the gateway to getting information about an action to the general 
public. Although some activists are cautious about focusing too much on 
mainstream media because the journalists have the possibility to distort the image 
that the activists would like to present, few activists claim that unbiased or 
supportive coverage does not matter.  
Bogad’s experience from CIRCA in Edinburgh was that the clowning received a 
less hostile media coverage than most of the other protesters, and CIRCA’s 
promise to “amuse, bemuse, but never bruise”483 was quoted in several media 
reports.  
On April 1st 2012 Ofog participated in an action called NATO Game Over in 
Brussels in Belgium. It was organised by a Belgian group and had participants from 
many European countries. We were a group of six clowns from Ofog, but there 
were several other clowning groups. The action was announced beforehand as a 
humanitarian intervention, and was a civil disobedience action where 500 people 
attempted to enter the headquarters of the military alliance NATO by climbing the 
fence. There were numerous journalists, film crews and photographers present 
while the action was taking place. They were filming and photographing the 
attempts to climb the fence and the arrests of the 500 activists. The number of 
photos showing clowns is out of proportion with the actual number of clowns, 
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leaving the impression that clowns in handcuffs make good photos.484 However, 
even if the media like the clown photos, clowns’ relationship with media is 
ambivalent. It can be difficult to understand what the clown army is there for, 
something Johanna has noted: 
 
 
Illustration 13. Action pour la Paix. The author in clown handcuffed 
together with her buddy and taken away by a policeman. 
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It is probably very difficult for media to comprehend why we are 
clowns, that is kind of a standard question from journalists, “why 
are you clowns?” I think the question is understandable because 
we work on something as serious as war preparation.485  
Johanna continued reflecting that the clowning tries to communicate many different 
things about the military structures and encourages people to reflect on this by 
twisting things around and taking a step back, and concluded that “It is difficult to 
explain all aspects quickly in a few sentences to a journalist in an interview.”486 
However, explaining clowning is not just a challenge when it comes to journalists, 
but to all outsiders. It is like explaining a joke. As soon as you try to explain the 
punch line rationally, the joke falls to pieces. However, some clown performances 
are clearer than others.  
In November 2011 I contributed to organising a group of rebel clowns that wanted 
to stand next to the military and recruit to the clown army at a big career and 
education fair in Gothenburg. We produced a recruitment flyer which was a parody 
of some of the elements in the military’s recruitment. The Swedish armed forces, 
Försvarsmakten, advertises itself with a focus on the high tech equipment it uses, 
team work, and peace. It presents itself as a good employer with many career 
opportunities, with almost no mention of war or armed combat. The clown army 
took up the competition with motivations such as  
a job in the clown army is not like any other job. With us you don’t 
get pay and pension. Instead you get material benefits such as 
your own water pistol, a becoming red nose, a whole bottle of 
bubble soap and a totally round hula hoop. In addition, you 
become part of the amazing clown community.487 
At the education fair, a group of six clowns and two civilian Ofog activists were 
ready to enter the fair in order to recruit for the clown army next to the regular 
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army. However, someone had been keeping an eye on Ofog and knew we were 
coming, so the clowns were turned away in the door. Nevertheless, one of the 
advantages of humorous political stunts is that an apparent defeat can easily be 
turned into a success. Ofog could claim that Försvarsmakten was scared of 
clowns.488   
When the clowns were not allowed inside, they and the two civilian Ofog activists 
spent an hour outside handing out leaflets. However, the parody in the clown flyer 
got lost when the military’s flyer was not being handed out right next to it. In spite of 
this, the civilian Ofog activists commented in the evaluation that the clowns had 
drawn a lot of attention from passers-by, making it easier for them to engage 
people in a conversation.489 So even if the action did not achieve its goal of 
challenging a dominant discourse, the clowns still contributed to outreach. 
Peter is one of the most experienced rebel clowns in Ofog. Talking about outreach 
he said that clowning has a huge potential, and it is a shame that it is not used 
more:  
The potential is to be able to reach to those you encounter in a 
different way. To loosen up the boundaries for what is allowed, 
and also to be able to create an atmosphere in an action that is 
positively appealing. Not only with police or military or other 
protesters, but also if there is someone watching. In the kind of 
environments where there are other people, then it becomes a 
little more appealing with clowning. After all, clowns are 
something people recognise, and it is more difficult to make a 
hostile caricature of clowns. Dangerous clowns do not really exist, 
so it becomes more difficult to talk about dangerous protesters. 
Clowns are something different.490 
Here Peter mentioned several different aspects of clowning that he thought 
increased the potential. Clowns can reach to others in a way that is different from 
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other forms of protest because the clown figure creates certain associations for the 
passers-by. It is difficult to frame clowns as dangerous and demonise them 
because they are something people recognise and generally have a positive 
attitude towards. However, among activist clowns it is seldom mentioned that some 
people are scared of clowns or that the clown figure has been heavily 
commercialised (think of the McDonald’s clown Ronald McDonald). Neither is it 
addressed that the ambivalence of the clown figure has been used as an extremely 
scary figure, for instance in Stephen King’s novel It or as the bad guy “the joker” in 
one of the Batman movies.  
One of the potential problems with the spread of rebel clowning that has been 
raised is that little or no preparation means that people dress up as clowns rather 
than find their inner clown and stay in clown.491 A bad performance influences 
many aspects of clowning, among them how it is perceived by others. Ofog has 
been less systematic than the British CIRCA when it comes to clown preparations 
and I suspect that some observers might be critical of the way the preparations are 
done in Ofog. Routledge for instance is critical of how the idea of CIRCA has been 
copied in other parts of the world and the lack of training. Not only does it take 
practice to stay in clown, but to Routledge CIRCA was a method that was 
developed for the specific context of the “war on terror” and the G8 protests in 
2005.492  He thinks the concept becomes less coherent when people attempt to 
transfer the idea to a different time and place. The example of clowning that he 
appears to be most critical of was during the demonstrations against the UN 
climate talks in Copenhagen in 2009. I agree with Routledge that it is difficult to 
explain the clown army in the context of climate change, but the concept goes well 
with everything to do with war and war preparations, not just the war on terror. For 
Ofog radical clowning has also worked well in spite of short training sessions. Of 
course training makes it easier to stay in clown, but one should not underestimate 
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the trouble at least some outsiders will have with understanding the clown army 
concept no matter how good and well thought through the performance is. 
Facilitating a culture of resistance 
Facilitating a culture of resistance is about the way groups build internal community 
and strengthen the individual’s capacity for participating in resistance. In the 
example from Bofors mentioned above, Lena felt the performance of the three 
clowns gave new energy to the rest of the Ofog activists. In literature on CIRCA it 
is frequently noted how clowning affects the clowns themselves. Routledge 
reflects:  
CIRCA was not an excuse for activists to dress up as clowns and 
bring color and laughter to protests. Rather, the purpose was to 
develop a form of political activism that brought together the 
practices of clowning and non-violent direct action. The purpose 
was to develop a methodology that helped to transform and 
sustain the inner emotional life of the activists involved as well as 
being an effective technique for taking direct action.493  
Whereas Routledge emphasises activists’ emotional life, Bogad speaks about how 
CIRCA training sessions are a way for the participants to find their clown personas, 
something which goes beyond taking on a role in the moment of the action. In 
addition to figuring out how one should look and act as a clown, Bogad mentions 
the mutual relation between the individual and the group: 
It is also a much longer and deeper process that involves a great 
deal of thoughtful/playful exploration. Putting on the makeup 
before an action is a crucial part of the transformation, the re-
entry into one’s alternate clown persona. This celebration of 
individual creativity and identity through the development of one’s 
own clown can hopefully enable CIRCA members to express 
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themselves in the moment and mode of carnival while still feeling 
part of a larger group identity.494 
These types of comments about the purpose of the training sessions have not 
been made by the Ofog activists I interviewed. The explanation for this is probably 
the much more ad-hoc approach to clowning that Ofog has had than CIRCA. 
However, all the clowns I interviewed said that clowning is fun and that they have 
enjoyed it themselves. Clowning and other types of humour have been important 
for many activists in finding the energy to keep working on such a depressing issue 
as war. 
To see how clowning can be a personal liberation, some of my field notes say a lot. 
In my “normal” life, I am usually quite intimidated by representatives of authorities. 
During demonstrations I prefer to keep in the background and let others handle the 
interaction with the police. However, as a clown my fear was reduced considerably. 
At my first clowning experience in Luleå described above, I ended up interacting 
with the police in ways I had not even thought I would dare the day before. Straight 
after the action, I wrote in my hasty field notes:  
I found myself in new situations that I had not imagined [the day 
before]. I was imitating a policeman for several kilometres by 
following in his heels, and interacting with many of them.  
Also during the NATO Game Over action in Belgium mentioned previously, 
clowning made me less scared of the encounter with the police. I thought that the 
chance of the police beating up clowns was smaller than violence against 
“ordinary” activists, something which Bogad also has noted. What is even more 
interesting is that I have been able to take this experience of fearlessness from my 
clowning persona and subsequently use it also in my “normal” life. 
However, clowning is not necessarily personally liberating for everyone if people 
find it hard to find a way to use the clown role under the circumstances they 
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encounter. Emma and Maria felt a little superfluous as clowns in Luleå in 2011 
when there were so many protesters and so few police. When Emma had been at 
the action in Luleå two years previously, the atmosphere had been very different 
and there had been police and conscript soldiers everywhere. Maria had decided 
to be part of the clown army in Luleå in 2011 as a personal challenge, since she 
has never liked the clown figure much, not even as a child. Although it felt a bit 
strange for her to be a clown with this attitude behind her, she is glad that she tried. 
Sometimes during the action she had a good flow and it was cool, but at other 
times she did not really know what to do and would have liked to have more 
training and scenario planning beforehand.495  
To sum up rebel clowning’s impact on facilitating a culture of resistance, it can be a 
way to contribute to more energy and sustainability to the group, and a personal 
liberation for some clowns. However, it depends very much on the circumstances 
what the clowns can do.   
Challenging power relations on the ground 
Through play and otherness clowns present their friendliness and nonviolent 
intentions, but as soon as ridicule is added the whole affair becomes more 
ambivalent. When it comes to relations of power, the accounts of rebel clowning 
first and foremost attest to the way activists perceive and interact with police and 
military on the ground, since they are the representatives of dominant discourses 
that rebel clowns actually get to meet.  
Although the police and soldiers on the ground are rarely what concerns activists 
the most – in the case of Ofog the main target is the dominant discourse of 
militarism – relations with the police frequently become the major topic for rebel 
clowns. Law enforcement officers respond to clowns in many different ways, but 
according to the clowns there is something disarming about the clown figure. Vera 
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experienced this already when she was performing as a clown for the first time. 
She described how by being in her role as a clown, the police that she interacted 
with became more relaxed. Her experience was that at first they were quite stiff, 
but once they understood that the clowns did not intend to do anyone any harm, 
they responded by moving in ways which they expected the clowns to imitate.496  
Earlier I described the action at Bofors’ headquarters in 2008 where three clowns 
“snuck” inside the enclosure. Vera experienced a change in the dynamic of the 
interaction with the police: 
And we had very much fun, and in the end the police started to 
interact with us and blow soap bubbles. When we imitated them 
they started to do funny things because they knew we would 
imitate them, and it became an interaction instead of an angry 
demonstration.497 
To Vera, situations like this show something about what it is that clowns can do 
that other protesters cannot do, and how disarming the clown figure can be: 
I experienced how big the difference can be between being a 
clown and an ordinary activist, and I thought it was really intense 
and cool. Not because it is very cool in itself to cross the enclosed 
area, but there is something very disarming with this figure, the 
symbol that the clown is.498  
Lisa, an activist who observed this episode, viewed it as a little victory regarding 
space because the clowns managed to get a little further than what was allowed. 
That victory felt important, since the year before someone had been arrested and 
convicted just for being a few meters inside the enclosed area.499 However, there is 
a limit to the clowns’ ability to influence relations of power. Vera used the term 
disarm metaphorically to describe how the clowns charmed the police into a mutual 
recognition of each other as human beings. However, in spite of this 
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“disarmament”, the police literally remained armed and it is hard to imagine 
anything the clowns could have done that would change that.  
 
 
Illustration 14. Ofog : A police blows soap bubbles outside Bofors 
headquarters.500 
The challenge of space was mainly symbolic, since the clowns themselves did not 
have any clear plans about what they wanted to do once they were inside. It was 
the crossing itself that was seen as a victory, because it challenged the authority 
that the police was trying to uphold. Some people might consider this childish 
mischief, but in this context where the police were there to protect a big arms 
producer against nonviolent protest, and there was no obvious reason for having 
the restricted area exactly where it was placed, the challenging of space became 
an undermining of the rationality that the police were trying to uphold. By physically 
crossing the line of authority, the clowns showed that the location of the line was 
artificial and negotiable, since some people could be there and others not. By using 
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an absurd humorous political stunt, they pointed towards the absurdity of the 
situation.  
However, clowning will not have this effect of negotiating space in all types of 
situations. At the NATO Game Over action in 2012 the clowns found little space to 
manoeuvre because everything happened so fast and there was little we could do 
as clowns. I doubted how useful the clowning was because the timing of the action 
meant there were only a few minutes when we could interact with the police. My 
field notes describe how my clown character offered sultanas to a policewoman on 
a horse in this very short moment of opportunity:   
Then I tried to approach the police to offer my sultanas, but did 
not get very far before three police horses were cutting me off and 
I became a very small and scared clown. However, as a 
determined friendly and peaceful clown I still offered sultanas, and 
even in a situation like this the policewoman actually felt obliged 
to say “no thank you”. That is an interesting observation, and 
although the police of course react individually, friendly clowning 
definitely helps break through. But no chance of imitation or 
playing games.501  
My interpretation of the policewoman’s polite reaction was that I had succeeded in 
communicating the nonviolent values that I intended to, and to me it felt like 
“breaking through” to the person behind the police role. It is possible that this is an 
over interpretation and she might have been friendly anyway, but during the heat of 
the moment I was satisfied with being able to bring about this reaction.  
After the NATO Game Over action outside of NATO’s headquarters we had to walk 
half a kilometre to an enclosure. On the way I tried to talk to several of the police. 
Some responded and some did not speak English or pretended not to. I asked 
them if they were scared of clowns, and when they said no as expected that 
became an opportunity to ask why they then arrested the clowns. No one 
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Illustration 15. The author in clown offering sultanas. Photo by Olivier 
Vin, heymana.com. 
answered that, but some of them smiled. I interpreted the smiles as if they did see 
the absurdity in the situation. However, another episode was a bit more peculiar 
and difficult to interpret. Before being put on the bus to the police detention, 
everyone was searched and everything that said “NATO Game Over” or otherwise 
expressed a critical opinion of the military was taken away and thrown in a pile. By 
then I had decided to stop clowning, and had put the red nose in a bum-bag. When 
I was searched, the policewoman threw away my soap bubbles and my red nose, 
and no insisting that they were mine would bring them back. In my notes I wrote: 
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This was just really ridiculous but that must be scary material, 
how else to interpret such an overreaction? It shows that clowning 
has some impact on them although I’m not sure what impact.502 
I enquired of other clowns if this had been a systematic approach towards all 
clowns, but it appeared to be a random decision by one particular police person.   
In several of the interviews, people from Ofog also commented on police reactions 
to clowns. Again it becomes obvious that clowns generate many different 
reactions. Emma and Maria observed the policeman in Luleå who walked several 
kilometres with one or more clowns in his heels. Emma’s impression was ”I think 
he thought it was quite comical,”503 and she thought that he had a good attitude 
because he talked to some of the “civilian” demonstrators. To her it looked like he 
tried to interact a bit with the clowns, and smiled a little. Maria added that he was 
quite tolerant and did not overreact, but treated us like a good father when his kids 
were a bit naughty or out of line.504  
Johanna had not been close to the police herself as a clown, but has observed the 
various responses to clowns: “The police laugh, and I think it is very difficult not to 
do that. However, I have also seen police who did not dare to laugh.”505  
As Johanna interpreted the police, most of them could not help but laugh, and in 
her opinion those who did not laugh did not dare. An alternative interpretation is of 
course that they were just not amused.  
Peter’s experience has been that police and military do not really know how to 
react to clowns. According to him clowning creates uncertainty because they 
cannot react as they do with conventional protesters. 
I think there is such a liberty in the role of a clown. First of all, the 
limitlessness, what you can do as a person, it becomes more like 
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play. I have noticed that police and soldiers do not really know 
how to meet clowns, they can’t really behave as they usually do 
when they meet demonstrators. Instead they become a bit more 
cautious. They don’t know exactly how to react, and therefore you 
can get away with more things than you usually would. It 
becomes a little less hostile.506  
Peter has also had the experience that the police attempted to make the clowns 
become serious, asking them to stop clowning and being foolish. When I asked 
what he and the other activists did as a response, Peter painted a picture of the 
dilemma that absurd clowns pose to police who know how to deal with rational 
protest, but have little experience with absurdity:  
Peter (laughs): Then you just continue, that is the point. To be a 
clown is about giving those you meet a perspective on their own 
role, on how they react. So when I walk and pretend to be a 
soldier, and place myself next to a soldier then maybe they get a 
perspective. That is a part of the action as well, that you can reach 
to the human being in a different way. You go in as a clown and 
play either police or military or demonstrator, so everyone can see 
themselves in what they do. 
Majken: Have you seen any episodes where you have felt that 
break through the police role and reach the person who is behind 
it? 
Peter: That is difficult, because you never really know, actually. 
You feel that the police are uncomfortable, you can feel that. And 
then you have reached through in some way, because then they 
are not so certain in their role. Then you have kind of broken 
through, but it is difficult to see if there is any personal 
connection. But you feel that they must in some way reflect on 
how to react to this. And then you have reached across in some 
way.507 
Peter thought it was difficult to know to what degree he and other clowns had 
connected with the persons behind the police role, but had the feeling they became 
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uncomfortable and Peter interpreted the uncertainty as a kind of breakthrough. 
This is Peter’s understanding of the situation, but to make someone who is usually 
sure of themselves and how to handle various situations uncertain is a big 
achievement from the clowning perspective. It is worth noting that Peter’s 
experience is that when it comes to meeting clowns, confusion lead to less 
hostility. It is easy to imagine other situations where uncertainty would lead to more 
aggression.  
 
Illustration 16. Ofog. Luleå July 26, 2011. The clown army “helps” the 
police stop the protesters approaching Vidsel Test Range. 
Emma also spoke about the confusion clowning can create. She mentioned the 
example from the 2011 action in Luleå, where the clowns “stole” the police task of 
directing the traffic, and played police who told the other activists where they could 
be and not be (while the clowns were on the side where the activists could not 
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be).508 It became difficult for the police to uphold authority when clowns are 
standing next to them and performing the task that the police consider their job.  
Maria brought up another theme connected to the relationship with the police which 
she had encountered when she tried to explain the clowning to some of her family 
members who are not familiar with Ofog. They asked if clowning were not 
counterproductive if it risked making the police annoyed and angry? Even if 
clowning feels good for the clowns and the other activists, Maria suggested that 
clowning risks turning the focus too much on the police. She added something that 
many people in Ofog agree to: “I’m not involved in Ofog to be against the police.”509 
Maria both saw the risk of clowning turning our attention away from the goal, and 
that the police get provoked and become rougher with protesters.510  
Peter acknowledged the risks that Maria identified, but was not so worried about 
provoking the police and military. 
That can maybe happen, but it is not a general response I have 
felt. As a clown one’s task is to touch somebody on a tender spot, 
ridiculing people, so of course that can happen. You are more 
challenging as a clown than as an ordinary political activist or 
protester, clowning is the weapon. It becomes more personal for 
the person you meet, that is obvious. If you meet a person who is 
a little more defensive, and feel that this is touchy, then of course 
that person can become more outward-reacting in an aggressive 
way. But it varies very much from person to person among the 
police, and generally I have not been met with more hostility from 
their side when I have been clowning.511 
Among the clowns there is a worry of not being understood and concern that the 
clowning might backfire into hostile reactions to the clowns. However, those who 
have had most encounters with the law enforcement as clowns have felt that 
although they might cause confusion , they have not been met with hostility.  
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When it comes to the relations with the police, both Bogad and Routledge mention 
many of the same things that Ofog activists have told me and that I observed. 
Clowning changes the dynamic of the interaction when the police are not sure how 
to react, and it is an attempt to reach to the human being behind the uniform. 
Bogad explains how the clowns refuse to behave as “ordinary” protesters when 
they do not show fear or turn to anger: 
As the clowns greet the police as ‘friends’ and fail to either melt 
away in fear or raise the tension in anger, a shift in the paradigm 
and pattern of confrontation ensues. The true challenge is to stay 
‘in clown’ even when conventional power relationships assert 
themselves.512 
Other protesters told Routledge how clowning can diffuse tensions and reach out 
to the human being behind the uniform:  
Various protestors at the G8 protests told us that such tactics had 
helped diffuse tense situations between them and the security 
forces during the protests. Moreover, CIRCA clowning attempted 
to access the person behind the police uniform. During CIRCA 
operations, I witnessed police officers smiling and laughing in 
interaction with rebel clowns, and even mimicking the clown 
salute.513 
It is a challenge to sum up the reactions to clowns from authorities because so 
many factors are involved. There is the “big picture” about what type of action the 
clowns are involved in, since it makes a major difference if the clowns participate in 
a big legal demonstration, an attempted counter-recruitment or a civil disobedience 
action. It also matters a great deal how much time is available during the 
encounter, what the activists are planning to do, and what instructions the police 
have received from their superiors. Adding to the complexity is also the interactions 
at the individual level. Behind every clown and police officer is an individual who 
responds to micro signals from another individual – signals that might be intended 
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or unintended and whose interpretation depends on how they are perceived. A 
clown like Vera thought it was ok to pretend to flirt and fall in love with one police 
officer, but she did not do it with others. A policewoman in Luleå had been hesitant 
towards all clowns, but finally gave in to a clown who was particularly skilful and 
convinced her to sit down and measure shoes.  
Above Emma and Maria expressed concern that clowns might provoke anger. 
However, a problem that was not really addressed by anyone in the interviews is 
the risk that clowning focuses on the interaction with the police and diverts 
attention away from the issue the activists are concerned about. After all, the 
discourse of militarism is the main interest of Ofog, not the individual low-ranking 
soldier or police officer.  
Lena emphasised that it is not the people on the ground she wants to confront, but 
systems and people on top of the hierarchies. As an example she mentioned that 
she has never understood why people who are against the politics of former US 
president George W. Bush get hung up on his alcoholism or dyslexia, when what 
should be the focus is his politics. About the clowning and the soldiers she said:  
These food soldiers are furthest down the hierarchy, and it is not 
them as persons we want to get at. We want to reach those who 
decide about the structure.514 
Nevertheless it is mainly those at the bottom of the hierarchy who are exposed to 
the clowns’ mocking and ridicule of authoritative body language and commands, 
since the clowns usually do not have access to those on top of the hierarchies. 
This creates a contradiction between what the clowns intend to achieve and what 
they are actually able to do. Although the clowning is directed at the role that police 
and military perform, it is the individual police officer or soldier who knows how the 
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experience feels for them.515 Some police officers might laugh or smile at the 
ridicule if they have enough critical self-distance, but they can also be genuinely 
offended.  
Clowning – an absurd humorous political stunt 
The accounts above illustrate that the clown army has multiple meanings for the 
people who engage in it. Some emphasise the playful and friendly aspects of 
clowning, others the ridicule. People get involved in rebel clowning with a huge 
variety of aims in mind to do with both the atmosphere within Ofog and with 
relations to other people, especially the police and military who are the state 
representatives that Ofog activists meet when they take action. The reactions to 
clowns also vary a lot – from indifference to laughs, smiles and play, as well as 
being told to stop being silly.  
Maybe clowns are trying to do so many different things at the same time that it 
becomes almost incomprehensible to others. Certainly journalists have expressed 
confusion. However, to confuse someone who is usually sure of themselves and 
what they do is in the clowning perspective an achievement in itself. This is 
something that Peter touched on when he experienced the police’s uncertainty 
about how to handle the situation as something positive.  
Radical clowning is a version of the absurd stunt as described in Chapter 3, and 
challenges all claims to rationality and logic put forward by the police and military 
with a refusal to accept this perception of the world. Clowning aims to transcend 
established power relations using slapstick and absurdity. Through ridicule, parody 
and imitation, the police and military are denied the dignity of being adults in 
uniform performing their job. Clowns are “others”, who do not dress and behave 
like the people uniformed officers usually have to deal with, but have adopted a 
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role quite contrary to associations with both crime and conventional protest. This 
means that the police do not just go ahead and react as they usually do. Although 
representatives of law enforcement are unlikely to be fundamentally scattered in 
their view of the world, they have been placed in a position where there is no 
response that seems quite right.  
When Vera pretended to fall in love, or suggested that the police help the activists 
get into the arms factory by providing a helicopter, she transcended the usual 
relations between these groups of people. Of course everyone involved is aware 
that the clown army is a performance and that the red nose is not real, but since all 
protest is a performance, at least for some clowns it becomes a way of including a 
sincere wish to communicate in the performance. Whether this intention comes 
across is of course another matter.  
However, the absurd stunt and the clown role have some limitations. Clowns 
cannot attempt to present alternatives to militarism in rational terms at the same 
time as they are clowning. Here one is forced to choose. Rationally explaining the 
purpose of clowning requires that one bring along civilian friends or stop clowning. 
In traditional clown performances, aggression and violence can be part of the 
show,516 but the initiators of the original British CIRCA did not include this in their 
concept of rebel clowning. That nonviolence was central is indicated by the slogan 
“amuse, bemuse, but never bruise”517, and any sign of violence would have been 
an obvious contradiction to the nonviolent values that the activists wanted to 
communicate. Had the clowns been aggressive in their play, this would have been 
a potential source of huge misunderstandings.  
In his writing about the background to CIRCA, Bogad places it within the carnival 
against capital.518 In this carnivalesque protest there is a focus on do-it-yourself 
direct action, taking personal control and protesting in ways that is not permitted by 
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the state. Although most of what happens is nonviolent, this type of activism 
sometimes ends in vandalism and rioting.519 In an account of a network of cycling 
clowns in New York, Shepard, Bogad and Duncombe mention an episode of a 
biking clown who intentionally hit a man who had parked on the bike lane.520 They 
do not reflect on this, but such episodes are potentially much more damaging for 
the clown army concept than the lack of training which has been brought up as the 
biggest problem. It is one thing if the performance is confusing or meaningless, but 
if clowning becomes associated with what most audiences consider vandalism or 
assault, then there is a considerable risk of losing sympathy from otherwise friendly 
audiences who respond positively to the clown figure. Good-will might be lost if 
they perceive clowning as a disguise for vandalism, rather than a sincere wish to 
communicate the absurdity of the world order. Clowns who engage in or gets 
associated with violence have left the innocence of the clown figure behind. 
To my knowledge, this type of incident is not something Ofog activists have 
experienced, and there is nothing that indicates that this happens frequently in 
rebel clowning. However, when searching for traces of incompetence I came 
across the video You Can Not Give an Anarchist Clown Directions (Especially 
While Wearing Riot Gear).521 It shows a man with clowning face paint arguing with 
a policeman. According to most observers the policeman is not wearing riot gear 
as the title suggests, but a bicycle helmet and an ordinary police uniform. The 
person who is identified as an “anarchist clown” called Gen'ral Malaise of the 
Salish CIRCA in the explanation that goes with the video seems to have left all 
playfulness behind. Instead of playing tricks with the policeman or teasing him, he 
is engaging in a relatively aggressive conversation that has nothing to do with the 
humorous mode. There is no absurdity, play, otherness or even ridicule. The film 
clip shows the limits of clowning. The person is obviously upset about an episode 
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where a protester was hit by a policeman522, but his clown persona found no way 
of dealing with this frustration within the limits of the role. Other clowns might have 
been able to use their clown roles to express their grief and horror about what had 
happened.   
Just like with other aspects of humour and the carnivalesque, clowning’s 
subversiveness has been debated and there is no consensus.523 Not surprisingly 
there is a tendency to frame this as either-or, rather than ask under what 
circumstances clowning can be subversive. Weitz discusses different 
interpretations of traditional clowning, and finds that the clown can be seen as a 
way of enforcing social control that teaches children the “correct” response to 
failure – to be ashamed and disappointed. However, he adds that “it is also 
possible to read the clown’s buoyant attitude toward setback as somehow 
liberating, shrugging off social expectation to shoulder the world playfully.”524 Weitz 
claims that even if the clown can get away with much “the status quo reasserts its 
primacy in the end, with the reins still firmly in the hands of the dominant discourse 
– yes, we have had a good laugh, but what has changed?”525 
What has changed is that some of the children grow up and take the liberating 
potential they saw with them into adult life. The very existence of the idea of rebel 
clowning shows how the clown figure has been an inspiration for resistance. It is a 
traditional figure that has been modified and interpreted in the context of protest, 
and if this is the result it is irrelevant that academics have found it to mean 
something different. Although clowning might be a way to enforce social control 
and teach children “correct” behaviour, at least some of the children later 
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remember the subversive potential it showed them when they took clowning into 
their political activism.  
Play, otherness, ridicule and theory of nonviolent action 
Above I discussed the possibilities and limitations of clowning when it came to 
facilitating outreach and mobilisation, a culture of resistance and challenging power 
relationships based on their expressions of play, otherness and ridicule. In chapter 
1 I presented Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolent action with its four different 
dimensions. A nonviolent action (1) is dialogue oriented at the same time as (2) it 
aims to break power. An ideal nonviolent action is (3) an utopian enactment that 
demonstrates that (4) violence is not necessary and not normal.526  
Above it became clear how many clowns use their clown personas to be dialogue 
oriented when they use play and otherness to express their nonviolent intentions. 
Even when clowns stay within the absurd in their relation with the police, some 
aspects of the ridicule might be considered a strong contradiction to nonviolent 
values and the dialogue oriented element of the action. Radical clowns might reach 
out to individual police officers, and be received in an atmosphere of mutual 
recognition of friendliness. Nevertheless, when the clowns at the same time aim to 
distract police officers in a dishonest attempt to divert attention away from what the 
police are there to do and thus prevent them from doing their job, they jeopardise 
the trust they have just built. The police are most likely perfectly aware of this 
double role of the clowns and never fully let their guard down as long as they are 
on the job. The clowns will never know if they have just failed a potential ally. The 
individual police officer might consider policing protest an undesirable aspect of her 
job that just has to be dealt with and support the activists’ demands for global 
justice or nuclear disarmament – viewpoints that might be weakened if police feel 
badly treated. That clowning also can break power, at least temporarily, became 
apparent when it turned out to be difficult for the police to find an adequate reaction 
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to the three clowns who “snuck” inside the enclosure outside Bofors. These clowns 
could be in places where other protesters were not allowed. 
It is in the third dimension of Vinthagen’s theory, the utopian enactment, that 
clowning is outstanding and quite distinct from other types of both humorous and 
non-humorous protest. According to Vinthagen, the power of utopian enactment is 
frequently underestimated and neglected when activists prepare for actions. An 
utopian enactment as part of a nonviolent action directly displays what an 
alternative reality would look like if the activists’ vision of the world came into being. 
The activist should both believe and behave as if even the most brutal opponent at 
some point will be willing to change. This corresponds well with the naiveté and 
stupidity inherent in the clown role. Both traditional and rebel clowns should always 
behave as if the world is actually going to treat them well, an optimism which is 
emphasised by both Peacock and Wright. The nonviolent action should make 
visible that the utopian situation is possible in principle, at least for a short moment 
while the action is being carried out. Instead of making abstract demands, one 
shows that world, even if just as a vague hint or fleeting glimpse. Good nonviolent 
actions help all parts in a conflict deal with hatred and enemy perceptions and 
undermine the idea that violence is normal. At the same time as the activists fight 
injustice, they should – to the degree it is possible – build the society they long for. 
The rebel clowns embody a vision of the world with space and tolerance for 
innocence, otherness and play.  
Another aspect of the utopian enactment that Vinthagen emphasises is his 
modified version of the self-suffering that was important to Gandhi. In Vinthagen’s 
theory the self-suffering is associated with the willingness to risk suffering and even 
death for one’s cause. Looking at the clowns from this perspective, one can also 
speak about activists-as-clowns running a risk. Although the clowns ridicule others, 
the clowns also expose themselves considerably. Through their otherness, clowns 
accept the role as the outcast of society in order to comment from a marginal 
perspective. This aspect of the clown has not been explored in the literature on 
CIRCA or discussed in Ofog, but it is a way for the clowns to make a unique 
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contribution to the nonviolent action. This self-accepted outcast role is of course 
limited because it is only temporary – radical clowns can slip back into their usual 
life as soon as the face paint and costume are removed – and is not comparable 
with risking death. Although the rebel clowns take their outcast position seriously, it 
is a privilege to be able to decide yourself when you are willing to be seen as an 
outcast. 
Keeping the utopian enactment dimension of nonviolent action in mind, one should 
not underestimate the power of a hint of a better world. It is part of the “nature” of 
clowning that it cannot do more than hint. As an absurd humorous political stunt it 
is bound to remain absurd. As was pointed out above, convincing clowns have to 
stay in clown and perform from this position. It is impossible at the same time to 
give rational talks about how society ought to be organised. 
Although hints of a possible better world are important, clowning certainly has its 
limitations. Peacock claims that the effect of CIRCA was limited527, and Bogad 
reflects that in themselves, performances like these can only hint at a better world: 
These carnival-inspired power-plays can be problematic. While the 
experience of training and playing with CIRCA, or with 
carnivalesque protest in general, can be liberating for individual 
participants, these actions in and of themselves only hint at a 
better, possible world. Tactical carnival in and of itself does not 
change the fundamental relations of production or distribution in 
the greater society. The liberatory spaces it creates are quickly 
dispersed, either by the force of the state or by the inevitable 
need of its participants to eventually get back to work.528 
It is important to be cautious when judging the effects the clowns have had. 
Creating friendly relations with the police might be considered an important aspect 
of a good nonviolent action, but it can hardly be the goal in itself. Of course a few 
clowns here and there cannot be expected to dismantle the discourse of militarism, 
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but Ofog’s clowns did not even get to meet representatives of NATO or Bofors and 
communicate the absurdity of the situation directly to them. Such a “meeting” only 
took place indirectly through the media. Thus, the most generous interpretation 
possible is to say that the clowns in these cases might have contributed to 
reaching out and created a little more attention to the issues of NATO and Swedish 
arms production and export. Clowning was also a positive experience for most of 
the activist clowns and can potentially contribute to creating a culture of resistance. 
Finally, radical clowning can under some circumstances break established 
relations of power when it becomes a way of negotiating physical space. 
Conclusion 
Ofog’s clowns are an application of the rebel clown army concept developed by 
CIRCA. Rebel clowning is part of a tradition of tactical carnival and playful protest 
which appears to be increasingly popular in the global justice movement in the so-
called western world. Rebel clowns can play a natural part in bigger actions like the 
pink carnival in Luleå or the humanitarian intervention in Belgium where they 
provide some of the colour and playfulness which are elements in the world that 
the activists strive towards. In the counter-recruitment actions the ridicule of military 
personnel provides a more obvious and direct challenge where clown values clash 
with the ideals that militaries uphold. Unpredictability is part of the clown figure and 
clowning can be varied considerably, but like with all other types of actions it is a 
challenge for clowns to remain unpredictable and not become yet another routine 
within the repertoire of contention.529  
Peacock’s definition of clowning with its key concepts of play, otherness and 
incompetence was a useful starting point for investigating Ofog’s rebel clowning. 
Both play and otherness were found in abundance, but incompetence was almost 
absent. A possible explanation for the absence of incompetence is that 
                                            
529
 This term which is frequently used in social movement theory was first coined by Charles Tilly, 
Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
290 
 
convincingly pretending to be incompetent requires performance skills that most 
activists have not acquired. However, rebel clowning has another core feature, 
ridicule, which Peacock did not find prominent enough in traditional clowning to 
include in her definition.  
The way individual rebel clowns and clown groups perform their versions of play, 
otherness and ridicule influence how the interactions with various audiences 
unfold. Although clowns cannot control the reactions of others, the ways they draw 
on these core features determine to what degree radical clowning can contribute to 
outreach, a culture of resistance and challenging relations of power. 
When it comes to outreach, clowns appear to be confusing to media, at the same 
time as they are recognised as good images for photos. Since most audiences 
associate clowns with something positive, they are a way to communicate 
nonviolent values and present a non-threatening face to outsiders. Regarding the 
culture of resistance, clowning can be a personal liberation for individual activists 
and bring new energy that can be spent on other types of activism.  
For those who engage in rebel clowning, the most interesting aspect is its ability to 
challenge power. Since the police are the state representatives Ofog activists meet 
most often when they take action, interactions with them become the centre of the 
clowns’ attention. Rebel clowns have been met with many different types of 
reactions from authorities. At the education fair in Gothenburg, the clowns were 
turned away at the door. Offerings of food have been politely declined. The 
policeman in Luleå who walked for almost five kilometres with clowns imitating his 
every move ignored them most of the time. Some police officers respond to the 
clowns by moving in ways they expect to be imitated.  
Many factors influence to what degree the clowns can reach out to the police and 
other audiences and if they succeed in challenging established relations of power. 
The time available to build a relationship with the audience, the skills of the clowns 
and the interactions that arise between individual clowns and audiences all matter. 
The varied reactions to clowns reflect the ambiguity of the clown performances and 
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how they constantly shift position. It is part of the role to be unpredictable and be 
difficult to place in a box. However, this also makes it difficult to predict exactly 
what the reactions might be, and the clowns’ own focus on interaction with police 
officers can potentially risk diverting attention away from the issue the activists 
were originally concerned about.  
I also investigated how the use of play, otherness and ridicule can be understood 
in light of Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolent action. Some parts of clowning, 
especially play, make it dialogue oriented, while ridicule sends a contradictory 
message. However, it is especially when it comes to the aspect of the utopian 
enactment that clowning is highly unusual. The clowns show what another world 
can look like at the same time as they often aim to speak to a shared humanity that 
transcends roles of activists and police officers. Although clowning may only hint at 
another world, one should not underestimate the power of showing potential. It is 
part of the logic of absurd stunts that you cannot simultaneously be rational. 
Even when they are considered annoying, nonviolent rebel clowns at some level 
appeal to the shared experience of what it means to be human. The clown figure 
can potentially speak to both the comic and tragic aspects of human life in addition 
to standing out from other types of humorous as well as non-humorous protest. 
However, it is not enough to put on a red nose and start imitating the police – the 
relations are still fragile, and if the performance is not experienced as sincere the 
possibility will collapse. That is why just a single violent clown should be a concern 
for the whole community of rebel clowns. 
Militarism is a dominant discourse that manifests itself through a number of military 
institutions, most notably the armed forces. No single action or method is likely to 
significantly change that in the short term. It would be naïve to expect a group of 
clowns to do more than contribute to change, no matter how skilful and dedicated 
they are. However, it is worth taking into consideration that the experiments 
CIRCA, Ofog and similar groups have done so far have been small scale. Of 
course it is impossible to dismantle the military institutions and the discourses of 
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militarism and neo-liberalism with 8 clowns here and 150 clowns there. However, it 
would be an interesting experiment to evaluate what effect a “standing army” of 
1000 trained, creative, unpredictable yet persistent clowns could have in 10 years.  
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Chapter 5: Ofog - playful anti-militarist mischief 
Introduction 
The case study of the anti-militarist network Ofog begins with an introduction to 
what type of activities members of the network carry out, Ofog’s nonviolent 
platform and views on civil disobedience, organisation and who Ofog activists are. 
The purpose of this is to place the use of humour within a broader context. In 
Chapter 4 I presented Ofog’s clowning, a particular type of absurd stunt. In this 
chapter many of Ofog’s other humorous political stunts are introduced together 
with a discussion of their place within Ofog’s overall way of working and what 
meaning they have to Ofog activists. 
Seven different public humorous actions or campaigns are presented. The type 
and amount of information are uneven: some are introduced briefly while others 
are discussed in great detail. The data about the actions originate from the 
interviews, workshops and participant observation I carried out as part of the 
participatory action research project supplemented with information from press 
releases, newspaper coverage and Ofog’s webpage.530  Although this is not an 
attempt to write the history of Ofog, I have chosen to include many details and 
anecdotes that are not documented elsewhere to give a fuller context for 
understanding Ofog’s use of humour.  
After summing up the findings from these humorous political stunts through the 
theatre metaphor I proceed to analyse Ofog’s use of humour according to its ability 
to facilitate outreach, mobilisation, a culture of resistance and challenging power 
relations. Finally I discuss some interesting findings, namely how the distinction 
between humour and other types of creative activities is experienced as artificial, 
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and the risks with using humour in political activism. The conclusion sums up the 
chapter and points towards some possible future research areas.   
The anti-militarist network Ofog 
Ofog is a Swedish network of anti-militarist individuals and affinity groups doing 
direct action for peace in Sweden and abroad. The targets of its anti-militarism 
include NATO, Swedish arms production and export, military exercises and 
militarisation of Swedish society. The network uses methods such as participation 
in public debates, education and training in nonviolence as well as civil 
disobedience in its attempts to simultaneously challenge and raise awareness 
about the discourse of militarism and the institutions that uphold this worldview. 
The network was formed in 2002 when a group of people began to participate in 
international peace actions in various places in Europe, such as “Trident 
Ploughshares” blockades of UK nuclear weapon facilities in Scotland and England 
and the Belgian “Bombspotting” campaign. Ofog started doing actions in Sweden 
in 2007 with a disarmament camp in Karlskoga, near the headquarters of one of 
Sweden’s biggest arms producers, Bofors.531 At this point, Ofog already had a 
tradition of combining the serious issues of anti-militarism and opposition to nuclear 
weapons with prankish ways of carrying out protest.   
The name “Ofog” in itself is playful and has a humorous touch to it. On its 
webpage, Ofog explains its name this way in English: 
”Ofog” literally translates into ”mischief”. But Ofog is also a play 
with words. “Foga” is a Swedish verb meaning to conform, to 
obey. But in Swedish, if you put an O before a word, you turn it 
into its opposite. “Foga” also means, roughly, fixating things 
together in a decided and unchangeable form, so in this meaning 
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of the word, when we put the O before, this is an allusion to our 
function as a flexible, dynamic network.532 
Ofog is a network and not a formal organisation. Anyone who agrees with the 
platform can take action in the name of Ofog. The first part of Ofog’s platform 
states: 
Ofog struggles for disarmament, international solidarity and a just, 
peaceful world. We work against the world’s largest military war 
organisation NATO and the growing militarisation of the EU, 
against nuclear arms and the arms industry, the Swedish as well 
as the global. 
We are a network independent of religious societies and political 
parties, where everyone who endorses our platform is welcome to 
participate. Within the guidelines of the platform everyone is 
welcome to build their own group and carry out actions in the 
name of Ofog.  
Ofog’s activities happen locally through independent local groups, 
nationally through coordinated actions and camps and 
internationally by travelling to actions in other countries and 
cooperation with antimilitaristic networks and organisations in 
other countries. 
We work for peace through peaceful means, through opinion 
building, public awareness raising, active nonviolence, civil 
disobedience and other forms of peaceful direct action. Our 
working methods are characterised by openness, responsibility 
and respect towards everyone involved and care for our own and 
other’s safety. 
We think it is important to challenge the obedience that makes 
repression, abuse and injustice possible. Because some laws allow 
abuse to be perpetrated some of us sometimes choose to take 
action which breaks the law. Breaking laws is one of the many 
tools of resistance and that Ofog as a network sometimes break 
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laws does not mean that everyone who participates in our 
activities choose to do so.533 
My impression from the participant observation is that there is congruity between 
the way Ofog present itself in the platform, and the way the network operates in 
reality. The platform emphasises Ofog’s network structure where affinity groups 
take action independently. The embracement of civil disobedience in the platform 
shows how some members are ready to take radical steps in order to achieve 
change.   
Civil disobedience 
From the platform it is apparent that civil disobedience is central to Ofog. Although 
many of the network’s activities are also focused on awareness raising, 
participation in public debates, education about nonviolence and organising cafes 
and seminars, the active support of civil disobedience is one of the keys to the 
“feeling” of Ofog. Another central aspect is the light-heartedness where the use of 
humour plays an important part.  
A few Ofog activists have done disarmament civil disobedience actions – which the 
arms producers call sabotage. The most extensive actions of this type so far in 
Ofog’s history occurred in the Disarm campaign from 2008-2010, where five people 
in three different actions disarmed parts of grenade launchers and canons, and 
attempted to disarm a fighter plane, all produced in Sweden. For this the activists 
were convicted to a combined total of 2 years and 3 months in prison and 944,774 
Swedish crowns in criminal damage (approximately 140,000 Australian dollars).534  
However, the majority of those who decide to break the law limit their disobedience 
to activities that result in relatively small fines, such as entering a restricted military 
area to do a citizen inspection or mark out that war starts here. In spite of relatively 
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minor direct consequences of this type of civil disobedience, for most of us these 
decisions to break laws do not come easily, and only after careful deliberations.535  
On its webpage, under the heading “Civil disobedience”, Ofog says:  
Ofog works against nuclear weapons and arms export in various 
ways, but our main form of action is civil disobedience. By civil 
disobedience we mean in openness and without violence breaking 
a law, an order or a tradition, with a political purpose. Why have 
we chosen this approach? 
There are many arguments in favour of civil disobedience against 
nuclear arms and arms export. Ofog has not made a joint 
statement; everyone has their own reason for working with the 
network.536  
This is followed by a list of different arguments in favour of civil disobedience.  
In this description of what is meant by civil disobedience, Ofog refers to four key 
concepts which are standard in most literature on civil disobedience: 1. openness, 
2. without violence 3. break a law 4. with a political purpose. 
These four components do not differ considerably from John Rawls’ classic 
definition: 
I shall begin by defining civil disobedience as a public, nonviolent, 
conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the 
aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the 
government.537 
Ofog’s understanding of civil disobedience is also quite consistent with a standard 
Scandinavian definition suggested by Persen and Johansen: 
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Civil disobedience (…) [involves] conscious, nonviolent, illegal 
actions done openly with the purpose of influencing social or 
ethical conditions considered serious by the participants. It is 
actions that fulfil at least five criteria: 1. Openness, 2. Nonviolence 
3. Breaking the law 4. Serious conviction 5. Social and/or ethical 
purpose.538 
The literature then continues with long discussions about these criteria, and when 
civil disobedience is justified and not. Although there might be disagreements 
about the finer points of the terminology, these definitions mean that civil 
disobedience differs considerably from other types of law breaking since it is not 
done for the benefit of the individual, but for what the participants consider 
important social or ethical reasons.  
In Ofog’s civil disobedience actions, activists act out of strong convictions and 
feelings of personal responsibility to prevent arms produced in Sweden reaching 
war zones and wars from being prepared in Sweden. The subsequent court cases 
are also grave affairs where people frequently argue that they take action in self-
defence539 in order to prevent war crimes. I have not observed humour playing any 
role in this important aspect of Ofog’s actions. 
Ofog activists and activities 
People in Ofog are diverse when it comes to age, gender, backgrounds and the 
lives that have led them to Ofog. The people I interviewed have been or are 
involved in a number of other issues including union work, prisoners’ rights, animal 
rights, refugees, anti-racism, the environment, feminism and LBGTQ (Lesbian, 
Bisexual, Gay, Transgender, Queer) rights and activism. No one I interviewed had 
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been involved in any other organisations that had the same style as Ofog or used 
humour to the same degree. 
I have not tried to do a survey of people’s backgrounds, but within the organisation 
there is a self-consciousness that Ofog is white, young and with a middleclass 
background. The network has an outspoken aim to be inclusive, and looking at the 
network as a whole reveals an age range from 16-75, and a more or less equal 
representation of men and women. However, even within networks like this, 
informal hierarchies emerge based on personality and experience. Ofog has tried 
to counter this by rotating roles and responsibilities and actively encouraging 
newcomers to contribute with ideas and share their points of view. This said, during 
the time of my fieldwork there did seem to be a core of people who others turned to 
when they had questions and there were uncertainties. These people might well 
disagree much among themselves, but my impression is that some people’s words 
carried more weight than others on some occasions. This is probably unavoidable 
and it does make sense that others listens more to the experienced activist who 
has spent much time with Ofog than to the newcomer. What gives “status” in Ofog 
is how much time you spend working on Ofog’s issues and if you have done civil 
disobedience and been to prison for it. Nevertheless, I have never spent time with 
any other group that makes such a conscious effort to be inclusive and take 
consensus decision making so seriously.  
This atmosphere of tolerance and sharing creates an environment that stimulates 
creativity, including the use of humour. Although it is difficult to prove this causal 
relationship, it is probably not a coincidence that Ofog is a network that uses more 
humour than other organisations, according to the people I interviewed. Ofog’s way 
of organising means that there is much less chance of someone saying no and 
disapproving of different ideas. Although other participants might not find an idea to 
be optimal, they are unlikely to express this loudly as long as there is an affinity 
group that wants to go ahead with the suggestion. In a hierarchical organisation 
where someone at the top makes the decision, there is a much higher risk that 
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someone will say no. It only takes one leader that disapproves of humour whatever 
the reason for the whole organisation to turn away from humour.  
Although civil disobedience actions are important and contribute to making Ofog 
different from other peace organisations in Sweden, locally much work is focused 
on opinion building and awareness raising, both with and without humour. To give 
some examples: In Stockholm the local group in December 2011 arranged a Nobel 
walk to all the places in Stockholm that contribute to war.540 In Malmö, they 
arranged a five week summer course in nonviolence together with a local folk high 
school. One Christmas, they hung toy automatic weapons wrapped as gifts on the 
public Christmas tree. Under the banner “Sweden sends hard gifts to the world’s 
children again this year,” they collected signatures against arms export from the 
general public. They have also been present at the local arms producer which 
manufactures red dot sights exported to armies around the world. Here they have 
lit candles, read out the names of victims of the war in Iraq and tried to talk with the 
workers and leadership of the factory. During a trial against Ofog activists that had 
climbed the fence to the same factory they rented a jumping castle and arranged 
“jump for peace”.541 In Umeå they sang Christmas carols with a different text 
before Christmas 2011, and in Gothenburg the group has regularly arranged “anti-
mili” cafes with various themes and speakers. 
Ofog’s public humour 
In this section some of Ofog’s campaigns and actions are presented with an 
emphasis on the use of humour. In some cases it becomes clear that humour is 
not easily defined, and that a campaign or action can have humorous elements 
although these are only a minor part. For each example I identify which type of 
stunt it is according to the model presented in Chapter 3 and apply the theatre 
metaphor to analyse them.  
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 Ofog, "Stadsvandring I Krigsföretagens Och Fredsinitiativens Stockholm,"  
http://ofog.org/nyheter/stadsvandring-i-krigsforetagens-och-fredsinitiativens-stockholm. 
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 Interviews in Malmö September 2011. 
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Reality AB 
In the North of Sweden near the town Luleå, the Swedish Defence Materiel 
Administration (FMV), operates Europe’s largest overland military test site now.542 
In 2009, NATO had permission to use this huge area, something which Ofog 
considered a sneaking erosion of Sweden’s tradition of neutrality.  
Ofog pretended to start a new company called “Reality AB”, which saw this NATO 
exercise as an opportunity to do business. Although NATO had of course done 
everything possible to make its exercise realistic for its soldiers, Reality AB would 
help them make it even more realistic. With the company slogan “We die for you”, 
what they could offer were the missing civilian victims – dead, wounded and 
traumatised. On the main street in Luleå, Ofog activists showed up dressed as 
serious business people to provide information about this new opportunity for a 
summer job in Luleå as a civilian victim of “collateral damage”. Reality AB was 
especially eager to get women and children, and had a questionnaire for people to 
fill in where they could write about the kind of job they would prefer – did they want 
to die, be injured or get post traumatic stress disorder? On a couple of occasions 
they created a scenario in the main street in Luleå of civilians getting killed. Once 
they enacted the bombing of a wedding in Afghanistan, another time the NATO 
bombing in 1999 of a train with civilians in Grdulice in the South of Serbia. At the 
bottom of the invitation to participate in this scenario, it also said “With us, 
everyone is welcome. Even you can become a civilian casualty.” The idea was also 
to take the civilians to the military base, but this part of the plan was never carried 
out.  
This is an example of a supportive stunt according to the model introduced in 
chapter 3. Ofog framed its protest as an attempt to help NATO make its exercise 
more realistic and improve it. There are similarities with the way the John Howard 
                                            
542
 Please see Chapter 4 for more details about this area now called Vidsel Test Range but formerly 
known as NEAT (North European Aerospace Test range). 
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Ladies’ Auxhiliary Fan Club supported John Howard and how Netwerk Vlaanderen 
pretended to search for landmines in AXA in concern of everyone’s safety. Irony 
was used to draw attention to the fact that most people killed in war are civilians. A 
large majority of the people Ofog met on the street also understood this irony, but 
two people took everything literally, and thought they had applied for a real 
summer job.  
The incongruity Ofog aimed to expose was the military’s attempt to present war as 
“clean” and a fight for human rights and development, while the reality on the 
ground is that civilians are wounded and killed. Since Ofog’s show was on the 
street, and not directly confronting NATO, it could be ignored by the 
representatives of the dominant discourse. Had Ofog instead chosen to take the 
play to a place where NATO or Swedish authorities could not ignore it, the 
spectacle would have been different. Since they were not playing the ordinary 
protester role, it would with all likelihood have been difficult to respond adequately. 
However, the audience Ofog was targeting was the general public in the hope of 
increasing awareness about NATO’s role in causing civilian suffering.  
It is difficult to know if Ofog got their message across better through the use of 
irony, and one can only speculate if Reality AB managed to reach a different 
segment of the general public or if they reached them at a deeper level. Johanna, 
who was one of the recruiters on the street, reflects about how the general public 
usually know in advance what types of arguments they will meet from both the 
military and from protesters: 
I think it is difficult for most of us to reflect critically on the 
militarism we live in and get fed with every day. Therefore it is 
important to think about strategies that make people reflect. It 
can be easy for people to “switch off” and I think [the style of 
Reality AB] is a strategy one can use not to end up in this for and 
against. When we hand out leaflets about the tragic consequences 
of war and so forth, I think it is easy for people to switch off and 
kind of let go. However, you reflect on something that seems to 
be somehow twisted. (…) Although I am angry at an unjust world 
order, I think it can be very difficult to get sympathies when you 
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are angry. I think it can be easier to get people to join you if you 
make them laugh, and [make them see] that you have some kind 
of self-distance.   
Here Johanna describes how she experienced Reality AB to be a strategy to reach 
out to people in a way that differed from conventional leafleting. Although she is 
angry about the state of the world, her experience is that it is more constructive to 
channel this anger into a type of action that is “twisted” and therefore makes 
people reflect about what Ofog “really” means. 
During interviews, Reality AB is the action several people within Ofog have 
mentioned as Ofog’s best humorous action. Both Johanna, Vera and Lena 
mentioned it as their favourite example of Ofog’s use of humour. Vera exclaimed 
spontaneously when she remembered the action: “God, that was really smart. That 
was a typical genius thing”. She was not in Luleå the year it took place, but thought 
it was a very successful action, a smart choice:  
That was probably the best ever. Unfortunately I didn’t have 
anything to do with it. But that was a really smart thing, and I was 
very impressed by those who got the idea.  
The stories about Reality AB have become part of Ofog’s “heritage” and are shared 
when humour is discussed within the network. However, it is not so pervasive that 
everyone I have interviewed had heard about it.  
Refining recruitment ads from the armed forces 
Ofog has also been working with “ad-refinement” or “ad-sabotage” of the Swedish 
military’s public recruitment campaigns. Sweden ended conscription in 2010, and 
ads for the Swedish military, Försvarsmakten, were new in public space. To recruit 
enough soldiers, Försvarsmakten spends roughly 1 billion Swedish crowns 
(approximately 166 million Australian dollars) every year on recruitment 
campaigns. The institution is acutely aware of the need to build a brand that 
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appeals to young people, and that there is a huge difference between this brand 
and selling commercial products.543 The first recruitment campaign had the slogan 
“Do you have what it takes?”, and in addition to having the right physical and 
mental capacities, it also included references to having the right opinions. These 
ads stated things like “Your grandmother does not think it’s a big deal if Sweden’s 
airspace is violated. What do you think?” and “Your friend does not want any help 
during natural catastrophes. What do you think?” Ofog activists did a refinement of 
the ads by manually adding more text. The text “Your grandmother does not think 
it’s a big deal if Sweden’s airspace is violated” was supplemented with “But she is 
fucking outraged that USA is practicing bombing in Norrland” [area in the north of 
Sweden]. “Your friend does not want any help during natural catastrophes” was 
corrected with “By the military. Other help is welcome”. “Do you have what it takes 
to have an opinion” and its reference to Försvarsmakten’s webpage was modified 
with “We have what it takes” and a reference to Ofog’s webpage. The ironic press 
release about the action began this way:  
Ofog shows that we have what it takes to have an opinion and 
refine Försvarsmakten’s many million crown ad campaign. The 
military’s colourful posters with biased messages were tonight 
expanded with a little more facts the military itself forgot to 
mention.544  
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 Christopher Holmbäck and Urban Hamid, "Framtidens Svenska Militärer Rekryteras Tidigt," 
Re:public 2012. 
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 Ofog, "Vi Har Vad Som Krävs För Att Ha En Åsikt!,"  http://ofog.org/nyheter/vi-har-vad-som-
kr%C3%A4vs-f%C3%B6r-att-ha-en-%C3%A5sikt  
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This type of ad-refinement is an example of corrective humour as described in 
Chapter 3 and has many similarities with culture jamming. Instead of just openly 
criticising the Swedish military forces, Ofog corrects the image that 
Försvarsmakten tries to portray of itself with a different version of what military 
reality is about. When the military attempted to sell itself as a helper during natural 
disasters, Ofog suggested that this should be a civilian task. When 
Försvarsmakten referred to violation of Swedish airspace, Ofog tried to draw 
attention to the fact that NATO is allowed to practice war in Swedish airspace. The 
provocative assumption in the posters, that if you do not agree with 
Illustration 17 Ofog. The original text from Försvarsmakten, white on 
green background says “Your friend does not want any help during 
natural catastrophes.” It has been refined with the text: “By the 
military. Other help is welcome”. In the corner, the supplement text 
says: “We have what it takes” and a reference to Ofog’s webpage. 
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Försvarsmakten’s interpretation of reality, it means that you don’t dare to have an 
opinion, is openly rejected. By the very act of ad-refinement, Ofog activists showed 
that they disagreed, and that they certainly had what it takes to have a different 
opinion. 
Returning to the theatre metaphor, Ofog snuck in on the scene behind the back of 
Försvarsmakten, something which is a typical characteristic of the corrective stunt. 
There are no major actors present to be challenged, and there is no special 
requirements regarding timing, apart from doing the modification while 
Försvarsmakten’s campaigns were running. Just like with Reality AB, Ofog’s 
intended audience is the general public, maybe even specifically the young people 
that Försvarsmakten are targeting in their recruitment campaigns. To my 
knowledge, no one in Ofog has been caught doing ad-refinement and there has 
never been any other reaction from authorities and companies that provide spaces 
for ads than to remove the changes as quickly as possible. Lena, an experienced 
ad-refiner, has noticed that when she does the corrections openly on smaller 
posters on public transport, it becomes a way to discuss militarism with the other 
passengers.545 Sneaking in on the stage without a direct confrontation and having 
the general public as the main audience means that it was unproblematic for 
authorities to ignore Ofog.    
In these ad-refinements there are some similarities to the billboard liberators and 
adbusters mentioned in Chapter 3, but also some important differences. Ofog’s 
modifications were a critique of this use of public space, and an attempt to interfere 
with a newly established brand – the Swedish armed forces, which now had to sell 
itself in a way that was not required before. But although Försvarsmakten has 
worked hard to create its own brand, Ofog’s refinements were not a critique of 
consumerism like most adbusting. It also differed from the type of adbusting that 
Harold criticised for not presenting alternatives. It suggested joining Ofog instead of 
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 Comment made by Lena during the War Starts Here seminar about counter recruitment July 24
th
 
2011, Luleå. 
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the armed forces, and this way showing that you have what it takes to have an 
opinion, just not the one Försvarsmakten would like to see. Compared to the 
Obsession example from chapter 3 Ofog’s modifications were not very graphically 
and technically sophisticated in this case, but it provided a much more 
controversial message than reminding the audience that cigarettes cause cancer 
or that skinny models might contribute to young people’s eating disorders. It also 
expressed Ofog’s attitude of “do it yourself” with the means available. 
Ironic posters and flyers 
When the technical university in Lund arranged an open day and invited 
companies to have a stall and meet the students who were training as engineers, 
physicists etc., two people from Ofog also showed up. One of the companies that 
were invited was SAAB, one of Sweden’s big arms producers. SAAB and the other 
companies used this as an opportunity to show themselves as good employers, in 
order to recruit the best students. Ofog took advantage of this, and decided to 
produce a satiric version of a SAAB recruitment flyer. The first three lines read:  
Do you have what it takes to create a world filled with suffering, 
death and misery? Then SAAB AB is the company for you. SAAB is 
world leading in the attack and war industry and our weapons are 
frequently used around the world.  
The two activists discretely placed the flyers among SAAB’s own recruitment 
material, and as far as they know, SAAB did not notice them. They have not heard 
about any reactions to the satiric flyers either.546  
This was an example of a corrective stunt that has the core characteristics of the 
challengers sneaking in on the scene behind the back of the actor they wanted to 
expose, in this case SAAB. They hijacked the recruitment flyer and in ironic terms 
phrased it as if this was produced by SAAB. As in the other corrective stunts, the 
activists aimed to bring attention to facts that the company would prefer to keep 
                                            
546
 Interview with Gustav September 2011. 
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silent about. They targeted the same people as SAAB, those who were showing an 
interest in working for the company, presumably in the hope that this unmasking of 
the company might make people think twice about this employment choice.    
A second satiric flyer was produced and handed out by the Malmö-Lund group 
during the election campaign for the parliamentary election in 2010. It was a 
parody of a sales ad and advertised Swedish arms. On the top it said “Sweden’s 
war industry is booming, we celebrate that with an arms sale”. On the bottom it 
said “you find us all over Sweden”. In the middle were photos of three weapons 
produced in Sweden, the red dot sight from Aimpoint in Malmö, an Excalibur 
grenade and a Carl Gustaf grenade launcher. It did not have a direct connection 
with the election, and the person who made the flyer thought that the timing with 
the election was not ideal since it drowned among all the election flyers from the 
political parties. 
The arms sales flyer was a supportive stunt, again using irony to bring attention to 
Swedish arms production and export. What at first glance can be interpreted as 
celebration for the arms industry used the easily recognisable language of a shoe 
or cloth sale to ironise about these products made in Sweden. The activists did not 
get any immediate reactions from their audiences, maybe because the timing of 
their show was not ideal, but as with many other stunts it is difficult to measure the 
effect. 
In 2013 Ofog in Stockholm produced a series of satiric posters, and 7 of them were 
posted on Facebook in January and February. The posters were a parody of the 
newest recruitment campaign from Försvarsmakten called “what are you doing?” In 
this campaign Försvarsmakten produced a number of films and posters with 
people doing various arty/cultural/meaningless things, depending on who you 
asked. One showed a young woman apparently sorting her books according to the 
colours on the back, another a young man making a piece of art/meaningless 
pattern with post-it notes in different colours. Below Försvarsmakten wrote 
something about what they do, for instance “What we are doing is making tracks  
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Illustration 18. Two flyers from Ofog Malmö-Lund used on two different 
occasions:  
Left: Satiric ad for Swedish arms. On the top it says “Sweden’s war 
industry is booming, we celebrate that with an arms sale”. On the 
bottom it says “you find us all over Sweden”. In the middle are photos 
of three weapons produced in Sweden, the red dot sight, Excalibur 
grenade and Carl Gustaf grenade launcher.  
Right: Satiric recruitment flyer from the company SAAB, hidden among 
SAAB’s own recruitment material during a job fair. The text begins: “Do 
you have what it takes to create a world filled with suffering, death and 
misery? Then SAAB AB is the company for you. SAAB is world leading in 
the attack and war industry and our weapons are frequently used 
around the world.”    
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Illustration 19. Parody poster from Ofog. The text says “As children we 
were obsessed with Följa John [game where you imitate someone else] 
and Simon Says. As adults we play the military versions Follow Orders 
and Uncle Sam Says. On this meadow we are trying to follow the order 
‘preserve a ridiculous tradition’. That is one of the things we know best.“ 
 
during snowstorms, and rescuing people in the mountains. Service within 
Försvarsmakten is an opportunity to make a real difference”. To some observers, 
the campaign was specifically ridiculing people doing something related to art, and 
the campaign generated much controversy.547 Ofog’s posters, on the other hand, 
were ridiculing Försvarsmakten. A number of Försvarsmakten’s own photos were 
adapted to imitate the “what are you doing?” campaign, with the main text changed 
into “what are we doing?” The texts in this corrective stunt was again referring to 
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 See for instance Alex Schulman, "Och Vad Håller Sveriges Försvarsmakt På Med," [And what is 
Försvarsmakten doing?] Aftonbladet, January 27 2013. 
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things that people in Ofog thought were missing from Försvarsmakten’s own self-
portrait. The first poster published showed what appears to be a military ceremony. 
The text from Ofog said:  
As children we were obsessed with Följa John [game where you 
imitate someone else] and Simon Says. As adults we play the 
military versions Follow Orders and Uncle Sam Says. On this 
meadow we are trying to follow the order ‘preserve a ridiculous 
tradition’. That is one of the things we know best.  
On Facebook, 242 people pressed “like” for this poster, and it generated 50 
comments. However, most of the comments were critical comments from people 
who disapproved of Ofog. The other posters received between 31 and 120 “likes” 
and between 6 and 28 comments.  
War Starts Here 
Although the War Starts Here campaign was not developed with humour in mind, it 
had some humorous aspects. During this campaign Ofog marked all the places 
where war starts pink. The choice of the colour pink, the most un-militaristic colour 
available, does create some humorous associations for many people. One of the 
more spectacular actions happened in the town Umeå, where a new Ofog group 
had recently been started. On April 20th 2011 a tank placed in the public space 
outside the regiment was painted completely pink. In the press release, Ofog 
explained the action this way:  
The marking with pink of the tank is a part of a bigger campaign 
to mark out all military activity like weapon factories, military 
areas and other places representing militarism. “We don’t think 
that military symbols should be found undisturbed in public 
space”, says Angelika, one of the people who participated in the 
action.548  
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 Ofog, "Rosa Stridsvagn - Pepp Inför Sommarens Massaktion!,"  
http://ofog.org/pressmeddelanden/rosa-stridsvagn-pepp-infor-sommarens-massaktion. 
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Illustration 20. Ofog. Umeå April 20th 2011, a tank outside the local 
regiment was painted completely pink. The text says: War Starts Here. 
On May 18th, Ofog in Umeå wrote on Ofog’s web page that now the tank had been 
removed from public space.549 
The painting of the tank is a typical example of a provocative stunt with its 
message of “fuck you, this is our scene too, and now we control it temporarily”. It is 
the devil-may-care attitude of the activists which makes it provocative, with the 
colour pink adding humorous incongruity. A pink tank is absurd since it is rendered 
useless when its camouflage colours are changed, not just to any colour, but pink – 
the most un-militaristic colour on the paint pallet, one that contradicts the macho 
associations of the military institution.  
                                            
549
 This information was accessed July 5
th
 2011 from http://ofog.org/ but was subsequently 
removed. 
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An international peace camp in Luleå in July 2011 has so far been the major event 
of the campaign. Under the title “War Starts Here – Let’s Stop it Here” somewhere 
between 200 and 300 people participated. The reason for choosing Luleå was that 
it is close to Vidsel Test Range/NEAT, where both Swedish and foreign military 
practice and prepare for war. Ofog had held a peace camp in Luleå also in 2009 
and 2010, but this was the biggest so far. In addition to international seminars 
covering everything from militarism & climate change to counter recruitment 
against military recruitment, Ofog had arranged one day of mass action on July 
26th to mark NEAT pink. The action consisted of different steps with the possibility 
to participate in the marking without risking arrest, but many chose to enter the 
restricted area. The activities of the clowns that participated were described in 
Chapter 4. Ten international activists were arrested and detained at the local police 
station,550 and more than 20 Swedish activists were arrested and later convicted 
and fined.  
War Starts Here combined aspects of the absurd and provocative types of stunts. 
The colour pink is absurd because it is completely out of place: it does not fit in 
with the military. However, it is mainly a provocative type of action, the civil 
disobedience a refusal to be intimidated by the threat of fines and a criminal 
record. Although not all civil disobedience is amusing, it is a refusal to accept the 
rationality of the prevailing ideas about right and wrong. In the case of War Starts 
Here, where the civil disobedience is combined with the absurd colour pink, some 
audience members smile when the military equipment is symbolically 
disempowered simply by changing its colour. Pink also has the advantage that it 
signalises openness and inclusiveness, carnival and creativity. It is difficult to 
present and frame 200 people dressed in pink as “dangerous”, and for the activists 
who went further into NEAT in the days following the mass action, it also worked as 
a protection against accusations of espionage.    
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 Ofog, "”Släpp Ut Våra Vänner” – Fredsdemonstration Utanför Luleå Polisstation,"  
http://ofog.org/pressmeddelanden/slapp-ut-vara-vanner-fredsdemonstration-utanfor-lulea-
polisstation. 
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Britta’s ladies gym against NEAT 2012 
The year after the big international War Starts Here camp, Ofog was back in Luleå, 
but on a much smaller scale. About 20 people participated during a weekend in 
August and a smaller group continued the stay a bit longer to do civil disobedience 
actions while a military exercise was going on. Britta’s gym against NEAT in 
downtown Luleå does not fit the definition of a humorous political stunt because 
there is no direct confrontation or blurring between the performers and audiences. 
However, it does have some absurd elements and is included here because I 
gathered a number of reactions from passers-by that document how difficult it is for 
activists to get their message across and are relevant for both humorous and non-
humorous actions.  
Brittas damgympa mot NEAT (Britta’s ladies gym against NEAT) was a gym 
program announced to be suitable for everyone and took place in the main 
pedestrian area in Luleå during one of the busiest times of the week, Saturday 
afternoon. In the press release, Britta Fredh551  as the initiator of the gym said:  
I’m already active in Ofog, and felt that I wanted to do something 
creative against NEAT. What could be better than to gather and do 
a gym session together? In addition, we need to be fit in order to 
have the energy to fight for peace.552  
The press release promised an interesting gym programme that would be suitable 
for everyone no matter seize, gender, and age. “The only demand is the will to do 
gym training for peace against NEAT.”553 
When I asked Jona, one of the initiators what the purpose of this gym was, the 
response was:  
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 The last name is spelled almost like the Swedish word for peace (fred) and pronounced the 
same way. 
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 Ofog, "Brittas Damgympa Mot Neat Har Premiär I Luleå," (press release 2012).  
553
 Ofog, "Brittas Damgympa Mot Neat Har Premiär I Luleå." 
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The purpose was to attack NEAT from a new direction. A gym 
session can be for or against anything, it is attention grabbing and 
people think it is funny. I feel more and more that it is important 
to generate positive emotions for people in order to gain 
acceptance and raise interest. The gym I had previously seen 
generated positive reactions. I think that people will remember a 
gym session against NEAT so much more than for example 
someone giving a speech and distributing flyers. That is not so 
attention grabbing, quite simply.554 
Jona had done a similar event in Gothenburg when Sweden’s right wing party 
Sverigedemokraterne held a meeting and in Stockholm in 2011. On these 
occasions she thought these gym sessions against racism and xenophobia had 
worked well and also gotten attention from the media beforehand.555     
During the 45 minute gym session in Luleå, 10-15 women from Ofog participated. 
Others handed out flyers in the beginning, but soon ran out of flyers. While the gym 
session was going on, I made a little interview with some of the passers-by, asking 
what they had seen, what they thought about it, if they had noticed the banner that 
said Britta’s Ladies gym against NEAT, if they knew what NEAT was, and if they 
had heard about the military exercise that would start the following Monday called 
Nordic Air Meet. The way the questions were phrased depended on how the 
conversation started, how people responded and if they knew about the military 
test area. 
I had dressed in a way that did not make it apparent that I was part of Ofog or had 
anything to do with the gym and approached people that had looked at the gym for 
a few minutes. Some people did not want to talk, but most were willing to answer 
when I asked “I noticed that you are looking at the gym here. Do you mind if I ask 
you a few questions about it?”  Altogether I talked to 15 people, six pairs and three 
individuals. Only four out of these 15 had heard about NEAT, and  two of them only 
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 Personal communication with Jona December 3 2012. 
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 Emma Löfgren, "Brittans Damgympa Dansar Mot Främlingsfientligheten," [Brittan's Ladies gym 
dance against xenophobia] Dagens Nyheter, December 8 2011. 
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as a “yes, now that you say that it is Europe’s largest military exercise place here in 
Norrbotton”. The lively and colourful gym session with music generally caught 
people’s attention. The weather was fine, and many people stopped to watch for a 
little while, but not the whole session. Even those who did not stop generally 
looked in the direction of the gym when walking past, so it was without doubt a 
useful way to catch attention, and the more movement the gym included the more 
people seemed to stop.556 However, many did not notice the banner that made the 
connection to NEAT, and 11 out of 15 people that I talked to did not know what 
NEAT was. Consequently, people had no way of understanding that this was a 
protest against a military area. With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to identify 
several ways that the message could have been emphasised: The participants 
could have been wearing something that said gym against NEAT, since people 
looked at the participants in the gym, not the banner next to them. It appeared to 
be a good atmosphere to hand out flyers in, so making sure to have enough flyers 
and people to hand them out would increase the possibility that passers-by 
understood what this was about even if they were not familiar with the abbreviation. 
However, the best thing is to make sure that you use terms that the people you 
reach out to associate with something. In Luleå, people are very well aware about 
the military activity in their area, although not how far it reaches and who gets the 
opportunity to practice there. But they refer to the name of the military airport, F21. 
Another opportunity for Britta and her friends would have been to refer to a more 
general concept, such as militarism like they had done in the other events that 
Jona mentioned in Gothenburg and Stockholm.   
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 The description of the reactions is based on my field notes August 25, 2012. 
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Illustration 21. Ofog Britta’s Ladies gym against NEAT, main street in 
Luleå August 25, 2012. In the background some curious passers-by can 
be seen. 
Svensk Vapenfadder – Swedish weapon sponsors 
Svensk Vapenfadder means “Swedish weapon sponsors”557, and is the name of a 
satiric not for profit association and a web page launched by Ofog activists on May 
27, 2012. Under the heading “What is Svensk Vapenfadder”, the campaign is 
explained this way: 
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 A more literal translation would be “weapon Godfather”, since a ‘fadder’ is a Godfather or 
Godmother, the person who during a baptism promises to take responsibility for the child in case a 
child’s parents die or are unable to take care of it. The same term is used by development agencies 
that facilitate individual sponsorships to children in poor countries. The Swedish term indicates an 
even closer relationship with the weapon than what is apparent in the English translation.  
 
318 
 
Svensk Vapenfadder is a not-for-profit association, started with 
the purpose of increasing the knowledge about Swedish arms 
export. We are religiously and politically independent, and united 
by our decision to change the negative attitude towards arms 
export found in the Swedish society.  
We believe that as a nation, we can and should be proud of the 
achievements of the Swedish conflict resolution industry. Swedish 
products for combat and surveillance are market leading both 
when it comes to efficiency and profit. Sweden exports most 
weapons in the world per capita. We think that is something to 
celebrate and as Swedes feel personally involved in.  
As a weapon sponsor you become a sponsor of your very own 
weapon. You also become a member of the association Svensk 
Vapenfadder. For a modest sum you really make a difference, 
create public opinion and in addition you get a warm and personal 
relationship with your weapon that usually only the soldier in the 
field has.  
As a weapon sponsor you will – no matter what weapon you 
personally have chosen – regularly receive reports about your 
weapon. Is it fully assembled? What conflict will it be shipped to? 
Has it contributed to any deadly shootings yet? In the case of 
deadly shootings we of course give an immediate update, 
something like that you should not go and wonder about! 
We continuously work on expanding our offers, so that you easily 
can find a weapon that fits your personal style. There is a weapon 
for every taste!  
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Illustration 22. The logo of Svensk Vapenfadder. 
The campaign slogan was “Swedish weapons – in war for you”, and the webpage 
offered information about seven of the different types of weapons, weapon parts 
and dual purpose surveillance equipment that are produced in Sweden. One 
example is the Carl Gustaf granade launcher: 
Carl Gustaf, or granade launcher m/48 as it is also called, is a 
fairy-tale about success in Swedish arms export. The first model 
was launched already in 1948, but it is still going strong and has 
now been sold to more than 40 countries. Cambodia, Burma, 
Vietnam, India and Iraq, to mention some. But Carl Gustaf likes 
travelling and changing hands on the black weapon markets, and 
therefore it is an exceptionally exciting weapon to sponsor. If you 
chose a Carl Gustaf as your weapon, it might happen that you will 
be informed that it has contributed to deadly shootings not only in 
the country it was sold to, but in quite different places. It is 
especially popular for conflict resolution on the African continent. 
Carl Gustaf has been found during the civil wars in both Liberia 
and Somalia. 
Carl Gustaf is made by Saab in Sweden. The barrel is made in 
Eskilstuna, the system part and assembling in Karlskoga.  
The webpage also had a list of many of the Swedish companies contributing to the 
arms industry, and a list of answers to frequently asked questions. People could 
choose between becoming a sponsor themselves and giving away a sponsorship 
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to someone else by filling in a form asking for their name and their email address, 
and choose what weapon they wanted to sponsor. They would also be asked if 
they wanted to sponsor a child soldier in addition, and could pick the name of their 
weapon from a list of 13 more or less ridiculous names. Once the form had been 
submitted, it automatically generated an email to the email address that had been 
provided, congratulating this person with the sponsorship. When choosing a 
weapon, a price of the different sponsorships was given, but there was never any 
prompt to donate any money, and the page did not include an account number. 
Under the heading “proud weapon sponsors”, the page included a list of 11 
politicians and civil servants closely linked with the arms industry, who was given a 
sponsorship as a present during the launch of the campaign. One example was 
this: 
Minister of trade Ewa Björling has a refreshingly minimalistic view 
of government intervention in Swedish arms deals with countries 
at war. She thinks that “ultimately it is the responsibility of the 
arms companies themselves in what market they choose to 
operate”. Of course that does not exclude that the state can help 
when needed. Ewa Björling contributed to starting the front 
company supposed to make it possible for the Swedish state to 
build an arms factory in Saudi Arabia. She also tried, but sadly 
failed, to help the government owned company Svenska 
Rymdbolaget sell a surveillance system to Ghadaffi six months 
before he was brought down in Libya. For her zeal she is rewarded 
with a weapon sponsorship to nothing less than a JAS 39 Gripen.   
All the information about both weapons and the VIP sponsors’ statements was 
accurate and thoroughly researched. 
The campaign was launched on May 27 2012 in two different ways: The VIP 
sponsors received a letter explaining that they had been chosen as VIP sponsors, 
including the text about their achievements published on the web page. We also 
had two stalls in Gothenburg and Stockholm, where Ofog activists in disguise 
recruited potential weapon sponsors in two central public spaces with many 
pedestrians. For the occasion we had produced a flyer telling about the campaign, 
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brought along a little table where we offered coffee and displayed some of the 
descriptions about the VIP sponsors.  
The activists in the two cities had chosen two different strategies in their approach 
towards the general public. In Stockholm they wanted to remain ambiguous, and 
not reveal that this was satire. In Gothenburg, the two of us had decided that we 
wanted to exaggerate our enthusiasm for the weapons so much that people by 
themselves would realise that this was satire.  
One activist who participated in Stockholm wrote about his experiences: 
[I] encountered three people who expressed a positive attitude 
towards the weapon sponsor [campaign]. One of them was an 
officer. The other, a big middle aged man, did not say much about 
himself, but he had a lot of knowledge about the topic. He knew 
about different defence associations, and seemed to think that we 
did a good job. He asked a lot of curious questions. I tried to get 
his name and contact info, but did not succeed. He wanted to 
check out our organisation himself. He thought it was sad that the 
Swedish armed forces had received less and less money year after 
year if one accounts for inflation. He asked if we thought we would 
succeed in collecting enough money to really make a difference, it 
is a question of big sums. I said that we did not know yet. That we 
were still in an early phase and don’t yet know what the result will 
look like, but that we of course hope to be able to collect a lot of 
money. He seemed a little suspicious about who we really were.558 
The same person continues, now referring to himself in the third person: 
It was sad to notice that none of the people Paul talked to 
expressed criticism of what we tried to do. Can it be because 
many Swedes are scared of conflicts? Paul did not in any way 
encounter anyone who questioned if this was real or if we were 
joking. It really did not look as if anybody saw through our satire. 
Thomas, another person who participated during the launch in Stockholm, wrote  
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 Personal communication with Paul May 2012 
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Most of the time it was unpleasant when people were extremely 
positive, but on one occasion it became really cool. A man with 
many years of experience from the armed forces and some arms 
companies swallowed the bait totally. He started talking about a 
new arms fair in Stockholm that he is the project manager of. Of 
course he agreed that the majority [of the population] has a way 
too negative image of weapons, and did not understand what 
stability it created. He went on for a few minutes before he went 
away with some concluding words about the possibilities for a 
future cooperation. 
The two of us who were responsible for the launch in Gothenburg had chosen a 
different strategy, where we saw it as a goal to exaggerate so much that people by 
themselves would understand that this was ironic. But that was much more difficult 
than expected. I wrote about my own first encounter: 
The very first person I talked to got very upset, and I did not 
manage to exaggerate the concept enough to make him 
understand that we were trying to satirise. He ended up leaving in 
anger, saying loud that this was “really sick” – something we 
could only agree with. 
The rationale for making people grasp the irony was two-fold – our own well-being 
and what we felt comfortable with, and the idea to communicate anti-militaristic 
values and world views to people. When preparing, we identified three potential 
main scenarios, which I summed up before the actual launch: 
The best for me will be to get people interested who are a bit 
sceptical at first, and then make them realise that this is satire, to 
make them feel smart and clever that they figured it out. The 
worst cases will be people who are genuinely interested and 
maybe become upset or angry if they realise that we are satirising 
about things they really believe is good. Then there might be 
really ignorant people who don’t really understand, hopefully we 
can send them away with a leaflet and they will talk to someone 
who can figure it out. 
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Illustration 23. Ofog. The launch of Svensk Vapenfadder in Gothenburg. 
The coffee table with presentations of some of the VIP sponsors. Malin 
(right) in conversation with a curious passer-by and the author (in white 
jacket) trying to engage people in conversation. 
During the two hours we spent in one of the most crowded pedestrian areas in 
Gothenburg, we became much better at this than I had been during my first 
encounter. My fellow recruiter, who called herself Malin for the occasion, perfected 
her performance. At the end of the day we had developed a routine which we had 
not talked about in the planning. This idea was introduced by Jeanette, another 
Ofog activist, who was visiting us in order to take some photos and decided to 
contribute to our efforts. Jeanette started shouting like a street seller, quite loud, 
and with a monotone voice “Welcome to Svensk Vapenfadder, we have great offer 
today, become the sponsor of your very own weapon” and similar things. We 
noticed how it worked to grab attention, and became an opportunity for Malin and 
myself to approach those who suddenly started to look towards our table. Already 
the same day I noted how the irony became more obvious because of the 
incongruity between this type of communication, and the statements in what was 
said. When Jeanette had to leave, I followed up her style. My favorite line when a 
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group of people approached was to say “Support the Swedish war industry”. Then I 
would continue with various combinations of the following:  
Welcome to Svensk Vapenfadder. Become a sponsor today of your 
very own weapon produced in Sweden. This is your opportunity to 
support with your heart, not just with your wallet.  
We established the routine that I would shout, and Malin would follow up. At first 
the shouting felt uncomfortable, but at the end of the day I wrote that “This shouting 
in the street I actually found rather liberating. Because it was so absurd that I found 
it impossible that anyone would think I was serious.”  
At the end of the day, I summed up the different scenarios Malin and I had 
encountered like this: 
Out like this, we encounter so many different people. Most don’t 
want to talk at all. A few are curious by themselves when they see 
a stand and approach us. Some just want a cup of coffee, and the 
kids want the cookies. Some look at the stand or hear the 
shouting, and get curious and we can approach them. Some of 
them agree that the war industry is disgusting, and are relieved 
when they find out that it is satire. Then they say that what we do 
is great and wish us good luck. Others like weapons and the war 
industry, and don’t want to see the irony, or maybe don’t want to 
admit it. One guy told me that he already had a weapon, and 
when I asked what kind it turned out to be a pistol from the Czech 
republic, and he started to show me his licence for it. I don’t really 
think he understood the joke, although I told him we could offer 
something much bigger, like the JAS Gripen fighterplane. Some 
people never seem to get the irony. Hopefully they will take the 
leaflet, look at the webpage, or some friend will tell them they 
have been fooled. A lot of people just seem to live with 
information overload and don’t want to hear or think or know.  
In December 2012 in the week before Christmas, Jeanette contacted seven of the 
VIP sponsors. The opening was that now they had been sponsors for a while, 
Svensk Vapenfadder would like to ask if they could get a quote for the webpage. 
Jeanette only managed to get in contact with one person, the six others all had 
secretaries and did not return phone calls or emails. The politician Jeanette 
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managed to reach directly did not want to have anything to do with Svensk 
Vapenfadder. After Jeanette had introduced herself and reminded the politician 
about the VIP sponsorship she received in May, the response was: 
Politician: Alright, I don’t take this very seriously probably… 
Jeanette: What do you mean by that? 
Politician: It was a rather unpleasant interference 
Jeanette: How do you mean? 
Politician: Well, I don’t think I need to explain so much more I 
think. You know yourself what your purpose is, and I don’t share 
the opinions you have… (hesitates) You’re talking about that 
webpage, right…? 
Jeanette: Yes, we have a webpage and an organisation. 
Politician: If we say it like this, I’m not interested in having 
contact with you this way, I think it is important with a good and 
straightforward discussion on good conditions when it comes to 
our export of defence materiel, and I didn’t like this initiative, that 
is about what I have to say.559 
It is possible to interpret the reactions of the politician in many different ways. First 
of all it is rather remarkable that she knew straight away what Jeanette was talking 
about in spite of the almost seven months that had passed since she received the 
VIP sponsorship from Svensk Vapenfadder. Although she expressed some 
hesitation and asked if it was about the webpage, her first response was not “what 
are you talking about?”, but “Alright, I don’t take this very seriously probably…”, 
straight away signaling that she knew what it was all about and implying that she 
understood the irony. Then she proceeded to say that she disapproved of the stunt 
and preferred a straightforward communication.  
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 The phone conversation was audio-recorded on December 14 2012. 
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The six other politicians and civil servants who were contacted only know 
themselves why they did not respond to Svensk Vapenfadder. It is reasonable to 
assume that they realised they were part of an ironic stunt and were wise enough 
to ignore it since they were not put in a position where they were forced to respond.  
The idea of the weapon sponsor campaign was to my knowledge first brought up at 
the workshop in Gothenburg in May 2011. However, nobody wanted to carry it 
forward at that time, so it remained unused during the summer. I mentioned the 
idea at the next workshop in Malmö in September to see what that local group 
thought about it. Also here there was agreement that it was a good idea, but again 
nobody wanted to take responsibility for it. During the national meeting, we set up a 
small working group composed of people who wanted to explore the idea. Although 
many creative ideas came up, such as actually sending phone messages to 
people, we decided to start slowly with a webpage. 
After our first planning meeting, I wrote this about our expectations: 
 Mentioning in different media, also mainstream 
 Something that will be useful for the local groups 
 Need to make sure we can keep track of number of sponsorships.560 
After a skype conversation a few months later, I wrote this under the heading of 
what we wanted to communicate: 
It has to be interesting to read, and informative. Remove what is 
not funny and does not contribute information. We aim to touch 
people in the “crack” where they are wondering if this is serious or 
if someone is pulling their leg.561 
Somewhere between 10 and 15 people were involved in the preparations and the 
launch. A small group of us had worked on it for quite a while. In addition, someone 
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 Notes from Skype call January 3 2012. 
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did the logo, another contributed with technical assistance for the web page and a 
third with proof reading. Others offered comments or participated as recruiters on 
the launch. A media spokesperson was ready on the phone, although she never 
got any calls. It was a typical example of Ofog’s way of developing projects in 
collaboration.  
At this point I had already written much about humour and the ambition of reaching 
the “crack” where the audience is uncertain if this is irony or “real” directly 
developed from ideas that had come up when I interviewed people. Thus, this is a 
good example of how data collection and interpretation cannot be considered 
totally separate in a participatory action research inspired project.  
Svensk Vapenfadder never became the big campaign some of us had hoped it 
would. Some of the people who had been most engaged had other priorities after 
the launch and those who were interested in continuing only did a few attempts.  
More than a year later the concept was used again during Almedalsveckan, a one 
week yearly political event on a Swedish island where politicians, civil society and 
media meet and discuss all sorts of political issues at small and big seminars. In 
2013, Försvarsmakten and the weapon producer SAAB arranged a seminar about 
the JAS Gripen fighterplane at a place called “Defence Political Arena”. Three 
people from Svensk Vapenfadder were ready to welcome the 60-70 participants 
with the phrase “Would you also like to have a more personal relationship with JAS 
Gripen?” about 15 minutes before the seminar started. In a setting like this, people 
already had the arms industry in their mind.562 Thomas, who was a Vapenfadder 
recruiter here as well had the experience that it was much easier to use the 
concept here than it had been a year before in Stockholm. For Louise, this was her 
first experience with being a Vapenfadder recruiter, and she remembers in 
particular a woman who was working for the defence political arena and was 
standing right next to them handing out her own leaflets. She came over to Louise 
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to enquire what they were handing out, and Louise told her about how you could 
sponsor your own weapon. Louise tells that “She was very interested and said 
Vapenfadder sounded very good. While we were talking, she definitely thought it 
was for real and we swopped leaflets”563 Louise did not know if she later read the 
leaflet and there were no one who came to talk to her after the seminar.  
Because it took a while for the seminar to start, the Vapenfadder recruiters had 
time to observe the reactions of people who sat down to read the leaflet. Several 
people who appeared to come from Försvarsmakten and the armaments industry 
had responded positively when they were first approached by Vapenfadder, “yes 
they would like to have a more personal relation with the fighterplane”, something 
which both Thomas and Louise observed. Louise only remembers one person who 
did not respond with a “yes” or “oh, that was nice”. When the seminar started, the 
recruiters stayed and listened and observed people. Thomas’ impression was that 
people’s faces changed as they read the leaflet and it started to sink in that this 
could not be real. On the other hand, people from the peace movement and others 
who were critical of the JAS Gripen plans were first annoyed by Svensk 
Vapenfadder, but started to relax the more they read. Only a few people came to 
talk with Thomas after they had read the leaflet, and the Vapenfadder recruiters 
made sure to keep the mask and continue the play.564 
Thomas had one conversation without being in the role as a recruiter that he 
remembered in particular. The man who approached Vapenfadder held a leading 
position at an arms factory. He told Thomas that they knew about Svensk 
Vapenfadder, and started to joke that they were hurt that none of their weapons 
were included in the leaflet and the webpage. However, as time passed he became 
annoyed and asked Vapenfadder to leave since they were interfering with 
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someone else’s event when they were distributing the leaflet, something he said 
was undemocratic.565  
Thomas’ impression was that the seminar at Almedalsveckan was a much better 
arena to use for the Vapenfadder concept than the launch on the street. Here they 
really managed to reach most of the participants at the seminar and could observe 
them reading.566 Nevertheless, it was not possible to evaluate what people thought 
about it.    
The weapon sponsor campaign is a parody of the child sponsoring campaigns 
where people can sponsor a child and follow that particular child through its school 
years. However, the target here is not these child sponsorships, but the Swedish 
arms industry. It is an example of a supportive stunt, where the critique was 
disguised as an opportunity to show support for the arms industry. For those of us 
who participated, it created a steep learning curve about how to use irony in a way 
that the general public will understand it. We were very surprised by how hard this 
part was. 
The launch of this supportive stunt differs from some of the other supportive stunts 
by not directly confronting the armaments industry. During the launch, Ofog did not 
try to invade a scene where major actors were present, but instead established a 
private scene among the general public. Because Ofog considered the general 
public the main audience in this action, it was no problem for the industry and the 
politicians exposed through the VIP sponsorships to ignore Svensk Vapenfadder. 
During Almedalsveckan the recruiters were a bit more confrontational, since they 
stood right outside the place where Försvarsmakten and SAAB were arranging a 
seminar. It is interesting to notice that the man from the arms company who 
approached one of the recruiters had heard about vapenfadder and knew straight 
away what it was, since the concept had been used only a few times more than a 
year before. Obviously it must have been a topic for conversation at some point. It 
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also seems as if this man felt Vapenfadder was at least a little annoying, since he 
bothered to argue and called Ofog’s presence undemocratic. 
The number of people from the general public Vapenfadder got in contact with was 
quite modest. Since the concept was only used a couple of times and it never went 
“viral” Vapenfadder shows a potential and a learning process, but it probably did 
not have much effect. The peak number of daily visitors to the webpage, 598 on 
the Monday after the launch was pretty good but not spectacular.    
In preparing the launch, the aim had been to get some media coverage, and a 
press spokesperson was ready for calls on the phone. A few days before the 
launch a press release was sent out, and the morning after the action a new one. 
They did not result in any coverage. It is hard to judge if this is because the 
webpage was not convincing enough to look as the real thing, or if media decided 
not to cover it for other reasons. Nevertheless, this part of the stunt was a complete 
failure, documenting that not all humorous political stunts are covered by the mass 
media.  
Speech bubbles at the Pride Parade 
In August 2011, Ofog participated in the week long pride festival in Stockholm, 
organised by the gay community as a way to celebrate and show pride in their 
sexuality. Also present was the Swedish military, Försvarsmakten, represented by 
men and women who are openly homosexual in the military. Under a banner 
saying “Openness – part of our reality,”567 Försvarsmakten had a stand used to 
promote the institution. This was a combination of the armed forces campaign 
slogan “Welcome to our reality” and the pride festival slogan of “openness”.  
Many Ofog activists are concerned with LBGTQ (Lesbian, Bisexual, Gay, 
Transgender, Queer) rights and themselves identify as homosexual or queer 
persons. They wanted to protest against the presence of Försvarsmakten in the 
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parade, referring to the parade’s code of conduct that the parade is nonviolent. In 
their feminist analysis, these activists in Ofog also think that being a feminist, one 
cannot at the same time endorse violent solutions to conflict.  
Ofog activists therefore did an action to correct the image Försvarsmakten 
promotes of itself. 15 Ofog activists did a die-in with a banner saying “Your reality 
kills”in front of Försvarsmakten’s stand. During the parade through Stockholm 
which is part of the festival, Ofog activists carried posters formed as speech 
bubbles in cartoons with different expressions referring to the “real reality” of 
working in the military. One bubble said “Here I walk to protect my human rights 
while my job is about abusing other’s human rights”, while others were “I’m just as 
good as killing as straight soldiers”, “My job kills” “I think that some people’s lives 
are worth more than others’” ,“Abusing other people’s rights is part of my reality”, 
“Försvarsmakten’s reality = violence and repression” and “I think that Swedish 
children are worth more than Afghan children”. These speech bubbles were carried 
next to the uniformed soldiers to make it look like their statements. 
 
 
Illustration 24. Ofog. The text in both photos says: Here I walk to 
protect my human rights while my job is about abusing other’s human 
rights. 
332 
 
Less than a month after the action, I made a phone interview with one of the 
participants, Sofia. She told me that they were about 10 people who all consider 
themselves part of the radical queer movement, and that it was all planned while 
they were at the festival when they saw Försvarsmakten’s stall and realised they 
were there. The activists were not aiming at a lot of publicity, and did not send a 
press release before the action.  
When they wrote the text for the different speech bubbles they wanted to focus on 
two things: That the military uses its participation in Pride for pinkwashing its 
image, and that its reality is not openness, but to kill and uphold injustice. Sofia 
used the term pinkwashing as a way of describing the armed forces’ double 
standards. Apparent tolerance for LBGTQ persons creates positive associations at 
the same time as the discourse of militarism stands in stark contrast to radical 
LBGTQ values.568 The participants in the action thought that being queer has to do 
with a lot more than policies about sexual identity. The group wanted to show that 
there is no consensus within the LBGTQ movement about the presence of 
Försvarsmakten in the parade. Therefore Sofia was also pleased to see that the 
action has led to internal debate within the LBGTQ movement.  
While they prepared the speech bubbles, the activists did reflect that some of the 
statements were kind of harsh, but concluded that they were all true. Looking back, 
Sofia comments that there was probably a difference between those that said “I” 
and those that said “my job”. Although she does not say it explicitly, this is a 
reference to the nonviolence principle of distinguishing between a person and the 
role she performs.  
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Sofia explained that the action was not intended to be funny in the sense of making 
anyone laugh, and she is not certain what words are the best to describe what they 
aimed at doing, but thought humour was part of it, not laughter. She also saw it as 
a ridicule of the military’s intention to use this as an opportunity to give a positive 
image of themselves, and that it can be funny when that is not possible for them. In 
this case, there is a difference between being there, where it was not humorous, 
and being part of an audience that hears about it later. While I have met people 
who do not consider this humorous at all, others, myself included, have smiled 
when they saw the photos from the parade. Thus, this is a clear illustration of how 
much perspective matters for causing amusement.  
Returning to the model of humorous political stunts, this action is an example of a 
corrective stunt. Ofog presented an alternative version of how the soldiers speak 
about their job than what Försvarsmakten and the soldiers themselves would do. 
Ofog confronted their dominant discourse with a different perspective that aimed to 
dispute perceptions of what the reality of the armed forces is and should be. In 
contrast to many other corrective stunts, Ofog did not sneak onto a stage to display 
the correction, but did it openly in a way which could hardly be mistaken for being 
the soldiers’ own statements. Through this direct confrontation it also has some 
similarities with a provocative stunt. 
Ofog’s speech bubble action generated many different types of reactions. During 
the parade itself, the individual soldiers did what they could to ignore it. Afterwards, 
a spokesperson for the soldiers, Michael ”Totte” Ekdahl, chair of the association for 
homo-, bi and transpersons in Försvarsmakten (HoF) said they were going to 
report the activists to the police.569 In an interview with a newspaper, and a 
subsequent opinion piece he wrote, he presented a very different perception of 
what was at stake than Sofia did. Without mentioning the critique of militarism, he 
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said the individual soldiers felt hurt when opinions they did not have were attributed 
to them. This way, he moved the debate away from Ofog’s intention of criticising an 
institution. Instead he contextualised the action as an attack on individual 
homosexual soldiers who had already encountered much prejudice. He wrote: 
It is very cynical to pick on the most vulnerable in all groups. The 
activists have made a conscious decision to achieve maximal pain 
for HoF’s participants. This way, they have ”kicked” our work for 
openness for LBGT-persons in FM [Försvarsmakten, the Swedish 
military] back as well as turned the Pride concept ”openness” to 
suspiciousness.570  
Similar comments were made in blogs and comments to the articles, for example 
this:  
And it is no problem to critisise the military in Sweden, but why 
have the bad taste to do it by picking on homosexuals and 
[transpersons] in this profession?571 
Ekdahl was also suspicious of the motives of the Ofog activists. Instead of 
acknowledging this as a contribution to a debate about queer identity and 
militarism, he referred to their “conscious decision to achieve maximal pain.” This 
kind of devaluation was also part of the comments: “Can one expect anything else. 
Left wing activists have never put democracy especially high on the agenda”.572   
Different bloggers and comments to blogs as well as the news report expressed 
much criticism of the action. The main line of argument was that it is offensive 
towards the individual soldiers. Only the soldiers themselves can tell if they felt 
personally hurt or not, but there was nothing in the speech bubbles that criticised 
the sexual identity of the soldiers. Instead, the bubbles offered a critique of the 
military and war and referred to the potential consequences of Swedish soldiers’ 
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participation in the war in Afghanistan. The soldiers were targets because they 
were soldiers, not because of their sexual identity. They were wearing their 
uniforms and carried a banner that promoted the training to become an officer in 
the armed forces. In a response to the debate article, Cattis Laska from Ofog wrote 
how she considered anti-militarist work an integrated part of the queer struggle. 
She finished with saying:  
Finally: War kills, LBGTQ-military personnel as well as civilians, 
and then it does not matter what sexual identity or gender identity 
the soldier who carries the deadly weapon or the officer that gives 
the order has.573  
A year later, just before the next Stockholm Pride, Ofog’s action from 2011 drew 
attention again. The action became part of a debate about who has the right to 
define “queer” and if the LBGTQ struggle should be limited to the rights of sexual 
minorities or implies a much broader political focus that also can question 
capitalism and militarism.574  
Under the heading “The whole parade became one long torment”, one of the 
officers tells about how he experienced the episode. He filed a report to the police, 
but the prosecutor dismissed the case because he did not think the soldier had 
been the victim of any crime. However, in contrast to Ekdahl who wrote about the 
events the year before, this officer acknowledged Ofog’s intentions to criticise 
militarism. When asked if he intended to participate in the parade again this year, 
he said:  
It will not destroy my intention and my commitment to show who 
I am. It is a little like an “antiprotest”, throw dirt on me, but I 
walk anyway. Maybe because I know they have an agenda that is 
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not about the LBGTQ-question but about the existence of the 
armed forces.575  
In an interview with the same newspaper, Kristina Johansson from Ofog again 
emphasised why Ofog did this: 
For us it is obvious that Pride is political. If the armed forces are 
there it is political in a certain way. That is what we think you 
have to start talking about. That it is not just a family party, that 
the questions are political in many different regards.576 
Internally in Ofog, the action has also generated debate, both about tactics and 
about respect for individuals. To some people, this was simply too much of an 
exposure of individuals. Others that participated in the debate used a different type 
of argumentation: They did not object to exposing soldiers in uniforms this way, 
militarism is militarism no matter what sexual orientation the soldiers have. But 
from a strategic point of view they thought the action unwise, since it was too easy 
for opponents to reframe Ofog’s intentions. They worried about the debate focusing 
on discrimination of LBGTQ persons instead of on militarism. 
Sofia was not surprised to see that Ekdahl tried to frame this as an attack on 
individuals and their sexuality. When asked if she thought anything should have 
been done differently, her spontaneous reaction was “no”. It was good that it 
generated debate within Ofog and the LBGTQ movement, and she is satisfied with 
the action.  
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Summing up on Ofog’s public humour 
The previous pages presented most of the outward directed humour that Ofog has 
engaged in while it has been active in Sweden, and revealed the diversity when it 
comes to the types of humorous political stunts that Ofog has initiated. Some of the 
stunts that have required most preparation have been supportive, such as Reality 
AB and Svensk Vapenfadder. The stunts that have challenged Försvarsmakten 
recruiting and brand building efforts have primarily been corrective, as the 
examples of adbusting and Ofog’s speech bubbles in the pride parade illustrated. 
Many of the humorous political stunts that Ofog has performed have been 
provocative, and for example the speech bubbles in the pride parade were 
perceived as extremely provocative by the soldiers. Nevertheless, it is only the 
painting of the tank in Umeå which is a provocative stunt the way it is defined in the 
model. That Ofog has also used absurd stunts became clear from the clowning 
presented in the previous chapter. Thus the only type of stunt that Ofog has not 
experimented with is the naïve. 
Returning to Berger’s list of 45 humorous techniques, which is a useful way to 
understand what creates humorous incongruity, irony was the dominant technique 
in the two supportive stunts, Reality AB and Vapenfadder. They got their inspiration 
from making parodies of up-and-coming businesses and the child sponsoring 
organisations, but the real target was the discourse of militarism and arms 
production. However, in order for the irony to work the audiences were required to 
recognise the ways of communicating that were being parodied and simultaneously 
recognise the incongruity between the message and the way of communicating. 
One way for Ofog to make sure the audiences switched from the rational mode to 
the humorous mode was to use the technique of exaggeration. Another way of 
communicating the irony was by using modes of expression that did not fit with the 
message. For instance the street seller parody used in Vapenfadder was 
incompatible with the pretended aim to convince people to become weapon 
sponsors.  
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The technique of absurdity was the humorous ingredient in the War Starts Here 
actions at NEAT and the painting of the tank in Umeå. The corrective stunts with 
the speech bubbles and the adbusting of Försvarsmakten used parody, 
unmasking, ridicule and insults as their techniques.    
Looking at the four elements of stage, actors, audiences and timing from the 
theatre metaphor reveals that Ofog has used many different stages – from the 
streets in Luleå, Stockholm and Göteborg with Reality AB, Svensk Vapenfadder 
and Britta’s gym, to the tank in Umeå, the adverting boards and the Pride Parade. 
Nevertheless, in spite of this diversity of stages, it is apparent that Ofog generally 
shies away from major stages and actors in its humorous political stunts. There 
were no parliaments or royal castles involved in Ofog’s actions.  
The main audience was the general public, preferably to be reached directly. This 
was the case with Reality AB, the ad-refinement, the ironic posters and flyers, 
Britta’s ladies gym and Svensk Vappenfadder. The only actions which were 
exceptions were the speech bubble action at the pride parade and War Starts 
Here. Although the soldiers who were targeted at the pride parade cannot be 
considered main actors, they were representatives of the Swedish armed forces. 
Likewise, during War Starts Here the painting of the tank and the civil disobedience 
actions at NEAT also directly confronted these institutions and forced them to 
react. However, these two actions were also some of the cases included here that 
were the least obviously humorous.  
Ofog has also had an ambition about obtaining coverage by the mass media in 
order to reach the general public, but has been far less successful with this than 
many of the other groups that use humorous political stunts. 
Timing is a crucial factor for anyone aiming to enter major stages and confront 
important actors directly. Timing considerations become less troublesome when it 
comes to reaching out to the general public which meant that for instance Svensk 
Vapenfadder could work independently of what the arms industry did. The 
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adbusting, on the other hand, only makes sense when it is seen in connecting with 
Försvarsmakten’s ads.  
After looking at Ofog’s humorous political stunts in relation to the theoretical model 
presented earlier, the next section goes a step further and analyses what the 
consequences of this use of humour are, and what it means to the activists who 
engage in it. 
Analysis: Humour in political activism  
The previous section documented most of the outward directed humour that Ofog 
carried out in Sweden so far. This section continues the analysis about what this 
humour achieves in relations to people outside of Ofog and what it means to 
people within the network. It is based on written comments I collected in workshops 
about humour and on interviews with Ofog activists. The data reveal a very 
reflective attitude towards humour and contain many thoughtful responses that 
reflect the diverse attitudes and experiences of humour within the network.  
Together the responses illustrate the diversity of all the stakeholders Ofog activists 
wish to reach out to. The four questions to the participants in the workshops were 
phrased like this: 1. What is the best example of a humorous nonviolent action that 
you know of? 2. What do you think can be achieved by using humour as a method 
in nonviolent actions? 3. How can humour influence the relations with the military, 
media, arms producers and police in nonviolent actions? 4. Can there be any 
problems with using humour as a method in nonviolent actions? The respondents 
focused on very different things, presumably what they were concerned about. 
Some focused on media, many on the police, a few on the workers at the arms 
factories and the military.  In most of the written statements from the workshops 
there is no way of knowing if the comments reflect a personal observation of a 
concrete action, a speculation or a hope. What they document is the diversity of 
thinking about humour and its relations with challenging power, depending on the 
type of humour, its context and target.  
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In order to provide a structure, I present the material with the same headings as in 
chapter 4. However, I have divided “facilitating outreach and mobilisation” into two 
categories in order to acknowledge the difference between reaching out to mass 
media and the general population and consciously aiming to get more activists:  
a) facilitating outreach  
b) facilitating mobilisation  
c) facilitating a culture of resistance  
d) challenging power relations 
After these four sections I round off with discussing two aspects of Ofog’s use of 
humour that do not belong in any of these categories.    
Facilitating outreach  
Both activists and academics assume that creativity and humour contribute to 
reaching out to other people. Accounts of creative activist groups such as the 
Raging Grannies, Billionaires for Bush and CIRCA frequently report this.577 Many 
of the examples from chapter 3 were also covered rather extensively by national 
mainstream mass media, for instance the Chaser’s APEC stunt. However, the 
assumption about mass media appeal is so much taken for granted that no one 
has done a comparison between the attention given to humorous and non-
humorous actions, so we do not know how big the effect is. Although this anecdotal 
evidence makes it reasonable to assume some effect, it would be interesting to 
look into the failed cases as well. With Svensk Vapenfadder Ofog tried to reach 
mass media with humour but was unsuccessful, and when other actions have 
received mass media coverage it has not been unproblematic.  
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It is not just in academic literature that the connection between humour/creativity 
and media coverage is assumed. The answers from the workshops with Ofog also 
reflect an expectation that humour can facilitate outreach to potentially new 
activists and sympathetic passers-by as well as convince journalists that this is a 
story worth covering. This section is concerned with outreach to journalists and the 
general public, the next with reaching new activists. 
In both workshops and interviews, many people mentioned that it is easier to reach 
the media if you do something humorous, and reaching out can be to both mass 
media and the general public. One person expressed this distinction in a written 
comment from a workshop:  
Mass media. Succeed in being portrayed as a creative movement. 
Avoid being portrayed as a destructive, lawless left leaning pack 
like the media otherwise maybe want to portray activists. General 
public: I think it is easier for an “ordinary person” to sympathise 
with civil disobedience actions if they are carried out in a 
humorous and clear and evidently non-aggressive way.578  
Other respondents focused on how humour can catch attention and wake up 
people: 
Partly to make one’s message more accessible to those who are 
“watching”.579  
You reach new groups, that you in other cases can’t reach. People 
who think politics etc. is dry and boring can be carried along with 
the help of humour.580  
Along similar lines, someone suggested that humour can be a way to reach people 
in a different way: 
I think that you get out to more/reach to more. Humour tears 
down people’s “protection walls” and it can be easier to 
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accept/realise something you actually don’t want. In addition I 
think humour can demonstrate absurdity that can be difficult to 
realise because conventions and patterns in society are habits.581   
The written comments were too short to discuss outreach in detail, but in the 
interviews a more nuanced picture appeared. Both Lena and Vera expressed the 
view that humour had not made it easier for Ofog to get media attention. As 
discussed in the previous chapter clowns can make good photos, for instance the 
image of the CIRCA clown Trixie that went around the world after the protests in 
Edinburgh. Nevertheless, Lena and Vera also said that in their experience, the 
media were more interested in the possibility that the clowns would break the law 
than in what the activists wanted to express with the clowning. 
In Lisa’s opinion it is very difficult to predict what will get attention. She sees the 
potential of humour, but was clear that humour is not the only possible option: 
Ofog is a quite small movement that attempts to highlight 
questions that no one really cares about. We need to pursue a 
way that is a little sensational. To get oneself arrested is one such 
way, and to be funny and dramatic is another very effective way. 
However, we could also be very serious; it is difficult to predict in 
advance what will gain a lot of attention.582 
When I asked Vera what kind of response they obtained from media on the use of 
humour, she replied: 
We get the best response from media when we use humour, no 
doubt. The only thing that gets as much response is when we get 
arrested all of us, and that is a very laborious way to get media 
attention. I think it is easier to get media to write about the 
reason, the background to the action when you have used 
humour. They write just as much, they are just as susceptible to 
make an article as when you get arrested, but [when you get 
arrested] then they don’t explain. In my experience it is more 
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likely that you get some background when you have used 
humour.583 
Here Vera brings in a crucial dimension in getting media attention: Although some 
might consider all coverage good coverage, she makes a distinction about the 
quality of the reports. In the quote above she said that she thought the quality was 
best when they used humour, and then commented on the quantity of the reports 
about civil disobedience. Straight after this quote, Vera continued to explain how 
media reports on civil disobedience actions have a tendency to focus on how many 
get arrested and where rather than why: for some reason these actions do not 
encourage journalists to reflect. Her conclusion is that a combination of civil 
disobedience and humour might be the best: 
It works a little better if you have used humour, maybe in 
combination [with civil disobedience]. The best actions are often 
when we have something which is directed outwards, and 
someone who is arrested, then we get most attention from a 
purely media perspective. A little sad sometimes, and you don’t 
want to play by their rules too much, but at the same time it is 
good to know what works and what does not work.584 
Emma and Maria said more or less the same about the local press in their city. 
When they have arranged things like a candle lighting and one minute of silence 
for the victims of the weapons produced at the local arms factory, no media 
bothered to show up. But if someone announces that he or she will climb the fence 
in order to do a citizen inspection, they will be there. Maria expressed some of the 
same doubts as Vera about relying too much on the media:  
It feels like a difficult balance, media would like you to do 
something spectacular (…) and they can always turn it around the 
way they want, so sometimes it feels best not to involve them. 
You never really know what happens.585 
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When asked if humour attracts people, Johanna answered: 
Yes, I really think that it does. For instance when they painted 
pink hearts on tanks in Stockholm a couple of weeks ago [as part 
of the War Starts Here campaign]. As a response to a critical 
comment on Facebook someone had answered “but don’t you see, 
it is hearts!” It is much easier for people to understand, as 
opposed to smashing [the tank] to pieces (…)It is more difficult to 
dismiss as a kind of ordinary vandalism or sabotage.586 
Here Johanna considered painting hearts on a tank humorous, and explained why 
she thought it is much more difficult to dismiss this type of activity as vandalism.  
Lena also gave a very sophisticated and rational explanation for why she thinks 
humour is an effective way of communication. When asked if something can be 
achieved by using humour which cannot be achieved otherwise, she 
spontaneously said yes. She elaborated that in a time where irony is used so 
much, it is almost necessary to use this way of communication. When people are 
presented with a sort of puzzle which they cannot solve straight away, it makes 
them feel smart, special and capable when they are able to figure it out within a 
reasonable time frame and are not tricked. Lena also thinks that the general public 
finds it difficult to take in all the pain and suffering in the world. If you just tell them 
about everything that is wrong, how Sweden contributes to war and how war starts 
here, most people just close their ears. So she explained that you have to take a 
detour in order for them to take it in, and humour and irony which they have to 
crack and which make them feel smart can be one way of constructing this detour. 
A similar comment was made by Raging Granny Barbara Calvert Seifred in Roy’s 
study. She said that  
Humour breaks down barriers… [and] eases the interactions. 
We’re basically preaching in a way, but not in a preachy way… I 
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think they’re disarmed a little bit at first, then they understand the 
message and it’s too late.587  
She thought that the humour disarmed the audience, created a crack where the 
message could get in, and when the message was understood it was too late for 
that person to withdraw from the message. Roy also quoted Regina Barreca about 
humour’s potential as an eye-opener: 
Humour can be a shortcut, an eye-opener… to get to the truth of 
the matter (…) When we can frame a difficult matter with humour, 
we can often reach someone who would otherwise withdraw.588  
The comments resemble the logic behind the International Situationists and their 
notion of detournement. It also has similarities to the concept of appropriate 
incongruity. The humour that is likely to have this effect is the “intellectual” type 
based on techniques such as irony and wordplays. Examples of humour used by 
Ofog where Lena’s “detour” would fit are Reality AB, Svensk Vapenfadder and the 
adbusting of Försvarsmakten’s recruitment material.  
Facilitating mobilisation  
In much of the literature on humorous political activism presented in Chapter 1 it is 
assumed that humour makes it more attractive for new activists to be involved. 
One example is Shepard who has focused on all forms of play and not just 
humour. The potential for mobilisation is one of the conclusions of his work on 
playfulness in queer activism. Shepard writes: “When social actors organize in 
engaging, thoughtful ways, their work usually attracts followers. Through play, 
others are seduced to join.”589  
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However, a closer look at the relationship between mobilisation and humour in 
Ofog reveals complexity: People get involved in Ofog from various starting points. 
Emma and Johanna for example knew someone who was already involved, others 
picked up a flyer or saw a poster about an action and decided to participate in it, or 
they had followed news on Ofog’s email list. Maria mentioned that she was 
interested in the issues Ofog works with, and at first she was a bit put off by the 
humorous style which she had to get used to but now enjoys a lot. On the other 
hand someone else told me in an informal conversation that originally she was not 
especially concerned about militarism, but liked Ofog’s style and inclusiveness. 
Lisa said that it was almost a coincidence that she became involved in Ofog and 
not another issue.  
Many different factors are involved in determining if people get involved in political 
struggles, what level of engagement they have, if they maintain their commitment 
over long periods of time, leave activism altogether or return to it again later in 
life.590 My own previous research had shown that humour might play a role in 
mobilisation of activists and supporters591, so in all interviews I asked if people 
thought humour was important and if the use of humour would make more people 
interested in becoming involved in Ofog. I also wondered if humour helped present 
a clearer picture of what type of world it was that Ofog was working towards, a 
world with more warmth, carnival, humour and joy. 
Lisa answered “absolutely” when asked if humour can be a way of getting more 
people involved in Ofog. It is one reason why she remained active in Ofog during a 
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number of years. She agreed that humour can make it more clear what kind of 
world Ofog strives towards – to be easy-going, humorous and carnivalesque 
conveys a positive image of what it is that we want.592 Johanna expressed a similar 
thought when she said “the world we want to see, we also have to try living.”593 
However, Lisa also thought humour has some disadvantages if activists focus too 
much on what they themselves think is funny and not on what is most effective. To 
her humour becomes meaningless if it is just funny for Ofog activists. In addition, 
Ofog risks being perceived as silly and losing trust. People will ask themselves how 
a “frivolous” group like this would be able to govern a society or be responsible for 
an economic policy. This said, Lisa did not think Ofog should take on this role: 
there are other groups for that. But according to her Ofog needs to think 
strategically about who is won over with humour, and who is scared away.594  
Peter thought that humour and a light-hearted tone are important, and that Ofog 
has an image of being both serious and making spectacular actions. He 
considered humour important to the atmosphere in the group, otherwise people 
cannot keep going for a long time. Many organisations are very “weighted down 
with earnestness” as he said, and it can also be very aggressive.595 Ofog is 
remarkably different and that is very important for Peter, otherwise he would not 
have remained in Ofog.  
Gustav emphasised some of the same things as Peter, that humour is important for 
the people taking part, to find the energy to keep going. He definitely thought that 
Ofog’s easy-going tone makes it easier for people to be involved in Ofog. 
Otherwise you are only able to take part for six months “and then you are totally 
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hitting the wall,” as he expressed it.596 This “tone” also frames Ofog as innocent 
and harmless, showing that the activists are just human beings like anyone else.  
Vera did not want to use the word “important” about humour, but she thought it is 
smart. She also agreed that humour makes Ofog attractive to some people, but it 
discourages others. In her city, there are people who do not want to be part of Ofog 
because they prefer to be dressed in black, be angry and look dangerous. But 
other people are drawn by the openness and the positive style, and for Vera that 
optimistic and inclusive tone is an absolute necessity.597  
In the next section about how humour influences activists themselves it becomes 
even more apparent how complex the relationship between humour and activism 
is. 
Facilitating a culture of resistance  
Facilitating a “culture of resistance” refers to humour’s potential for sustaining and 
strengthening cultures that facilitate resistance. Chapter 1 introduced Scott’s and 
Bayat’s work about hidden transcripts and quiet encroachment.  In Chapter 4 I 
noted how clowning for many activists is experienced as a personal liberation and 
how this type of activism provides new energy. It is perfectly possible to facilitate a 
culture of resistance without any use of humour, but previous research has 
suggested that it might help. Again this has also been confirmed by Shepard’s 
work on play, although he does not use the term “culture of resistance”: 
For many, play offers a life-affirming response to death and war. 
Here, play represents a counterbalance to disengagement; it is a 
way to stay engaged rather than fall into depression and personal 
alienation.598  
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That humour can help prevent burn-out and act as a counterbalance to the 
depressing issues of war and arms production was also confirmed by workshops 
and interviews with Ofog activists. Two workshop comments illustrate this.  
Laughter or happiness bubble in your stomach – and that is worth 
so much when you work with heavy issues. Happiness quite 
simple.599 
Feel better ourselves.600 
Maria also stressed that for a network like Ofog concerned with such serious 
issues it is almost unavoidable to use humour because people need something 
that creates some distance from the topics. Otherwise she fears that activists may 
become very aggressive themselves in the end when they cannot find any 
energy.601 
At the outset of the research project I expected to find a relatively clear distinction 
between humour which was directed outwards, and humour that was more internal. 
However, this distinction is not drawn automatically by activists themselves.  
Sometimes humour is purely internal, as illustrated by an anecdote told during the 
workshop in May 2011. In connection with Ofog’s participation in an action in 
Scotland, some people gave the police false names, which have an antimilitarist 
meaning in Swedish but made no sense to the English speaking police. One 
person was called Nei til Kärnvapen (No to Nuclear weapons), another Nedrusta 
Nå (Disarmament Now). These names then followed them in the prison, during 
police interrogations and DNA tests – much to the amusement of the activists.602  
However, such a clearly internal type of humour is not very frequent. Many 
examples of humour which took place before 2011 intentionally had a “public” and 
visible side to them. But at the same time, they might have been difficult to grasp, 
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and therefore ended up being more for the benefit of the activists themselves. An 
example of this is from Luleå 2010, where the participants in that year’s summer 
camp and civil disobedience action were parodying the military recruitment ads “do 
you have what it takes to have an opinion?” It was the same ads that were the 
target of the ad-refinements in Gothenburg mentioned previously. During the 
various actions, the activists carried speech bubbles saying things like “My brother 
thinks it sick to practice killing” and “my cousin does not think the military is good 
for democracy”603, parodying the military ads.  
Those who entered into the military test area were dressed as people from various 
professions which Ofog considered more useful for society than the military. They 
had statements attached to their clothing that said things like “My nurse does not 
think the USA should be able to practice bombing here,” “My Librarian does not 
think that war will ever create peace” and “my carpenter does not think the USA 
should practice war in Norrbotten.”604 
However, although the satire was public, it mainly played an internal role. In Ofog’s 
press releases about seven people entering the military area in a civil disobedience 
action, the way the activists are dressed is mentioned:  
Dressed as “people beneficial to society” – teacher, carpenter, 
cook, artist, nurse, librarian and farmer – they wanted to point 
towards alternatives to militarisation and specifically disturb the 
war preparations.605 
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However, there is no reference to the parodies of the military ads, and the local 
news reports about the events did not mention it either.606 This reflects that Ofog 
did not consider this humorous aspect of the action important in its relations to the 
media, and the observation above that the media primarily focus on the civil 
disobedience. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it did not play a role internally.  
A similar example is from the camp in Karlskoga in 2007, close to the weapon 
producer Bofors the year before the clowns were successful in negotiating public 
space. At that time, the US TV Series CSI (Crime Scene Investigation) was very 
popular, so Ofog played on this theme and announced a crime scene investigation 
at Bofors where they suspected war crimes and crimes against humanity were 
taking place. The police tape to mark where the activists could not go contributed 
to the crime scene feeling.607  
In 2009, NATO was carrying out an exercise in Norrbotten which it called “Loyal 
arrow”. As a parody, Ofog named its protest camp and actions “Royal Error”. Lisa 
explained how Ofog had done that on several occasions. When asked if other 
people though it was funny, she said: 
No, I’m not sure. It is something which can be quite difficult if you 
want to use humour. It easily becomes quite internal. We 
understand the joke and think it is funny ourselves, but no, of 
course it can be difficult for others to understand (…) maybe it is 
just as much for our own sake, maybe it does not have to 
influence someone else.608 
Royal Error was the same year that Reality AB was recruiting people to act as 
civilian casualties in the streets of Luleå. Another affinity group provided another 
example of this internal-external dynamic of humour. Emma was part of the group 
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which acted as a support group for deserters. In a little leaflet, distributed to the 
soldiers the day before, the group invited all soldiers to participate: 
Welcome to support group conversation for deserters.  
Do you feel held back by the macho culture in the military and 
want to learn to show emotions? Is your integrity abused by 
orders from authoritarian officers? Do you want to lay down your 
arms? We invite you to participate in our five step programme 
where psychologists, social workers and life-coaches work closely 
for your re-integration into society. Friday June 12 we will be 
present outside F21 [the military airport] and receive both 
conscripts and professional soldiers. With coffee and cakes we 
create a nice atmosphere and through individual conversations 
and group exercises we work with issues of self-confidence, 
friendship and values. Spread the word at your regiment and 
together we can work for a world without war.609  
Of course this should not be interpreted as a serious attempt of converting the 
soldiers, but through the exaggerations the action aimed at communicating 
different values. Instead of condemning the conscripts, it was an invitation to reflect 
on what it was that they were involved in. Emma explained how they had prepared 
a role play where some of the activists were soldiers and others were the 
counsellors. In front of the conscript soldiers on guard that day, they performed the 
role play. For instance they illustrated how to challenge your ideas about 
masculinity by practicing embracing your friend without slapping his back. They 
also provided alternatives to what the soldiers could do instead of guarding a 
military airport. An example was directed to the military police, who carry an 
armband with the letters MP. Instead of guarding the airport they could join the 
green party, which in Swedish is called Miljöpartiet and also uses the initials MP. 
After the performance the activists offered coffee to everyone, but as far as Emma 
remembers it was only the dialogue police who accepted the offer.  
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During the workshop in Gothenburg, the participants who first told me about this 
action generally thought that it went well, and that the soldiers had given the 
impression that they thought it was cool that something happened. However, one 
person mentioned that she did not want to participate herself because she thought 
it was targeting the conscript soldiers too much and not the military system. In our 
interview, Emma said she thought the action went well, but that she was not sure 
this had been the best way to convince the soldiers to desert. Nevertheless, when 
they left, the soldiers had given them the peace sign with their fingers.   
I did not participate or observe this myself, but I suspect the achievements of this 
action were mainly internal. The participants presumably had a good time 
preparing and carrying it out, and managed to present their protest of the military 
exercises as a positive, dialogue oriented stunt rather than an angry and negative 
way of saying no. This way, it did have some of the characteristics of a supportive 
stunt. Nevertheless, as Lisa said as a general comment above, sometimes the 
impact on others is probably rather limited. The support group for deserters was 
not intended to reach the media, and although some of the soldiers might have had 
some reflections about their job, they did not appear to be the direct target either. 
Had that been the case, the activists had presumably chosen a method that 
involved less performance and more real dialogue. And in order to be successful 
that would probably have required a setting that was not so directly connected to a 
protest and civil disobedience action.  
So far I have shown how humour can be a way to facilitate both outreach, 
mobilisation and a culture of resistance. Among Ofog activists is it common to 
consider humour important for their own well-being. Much of Ofog’s humour is 
directed outwards, but several examples of humour that was public with all 
likelihood served a more internal function. In the next section humour’s influence 
on the relations of power is the focus. 
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Challenging power relations through discursive guerrilla war 
In Chapter 1 I discussed the complexities and limitations of understanding and 
analysing relations of power and what impact humour can or cannot have on these 
relations. Ofog’s humorous political stunts illustrate the challenge of estimating 
what effect they have. The network’s focus on the very broad and extremely 
powerful discourse of militarism makes it difficult to point towards any immediate 
results. Unlike some of the other groups who perform humorous political stunts, 
Ofog has a very broad agenda. Over the years, different parts of the network have 
worked on quite different issues – from the military test site Vidsel Test 
Range/NEAT to countering the armed forces’ recruitment efforts and Swedish arms 
production. This diversity in focus and campaigns that seldom last more than a 
couple of years make it less likely for the network to be able to point towards a 
clear “success” regarding a clearly defined goal. That does not mean that Ofog’s 
actions do not temporarily undermine relations of power, but it makes it much more 
difficult to identify a more permanent impact.  
In the previous chapter it became clear how the clowns to a large degree focused 
on the immediate relations with police and military present during the actions. Most 
of Ofog’s actions described in this chapter challenge relations of power not at the 
level of interpersonal relations, but through attempts to destabilise dominant 
discourses. Reality AB challenged NATO’s discourse of war as something 
connected to sophisticated technology and protection of human rights by reminding 
random passers-by in Luleå that war causes death and suffering and that civilians 
are most exposed. The corrected recruitment ads reminded viewers that one can 
“have what it takes” to have a political opinion without subscribing to the worldview 
Försvarsmakten communicates through its ads. Although the discussion afterwards 
got side-tracked, the speech bobble posters during the pride parade were also an 
attempt to weaken Försvarsmakten’s discourse. Likewise, the ironic posters and 
flyers also interfere with various dominant militaristic discourses. All these 
humorous political stunts can thus be understood as “hit and run” attacks in this 
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discursive guerrilla war. They might be short lived and temporary, but nevertheless 
they raise dissenting voices in the public sphere about what is true, right and just. 
More knowledge about how these contributions to the discursive guerrilla war are 
received by various audiences would be an obvious topic for future research, since 
the data about how the general public perceives Ofog’s humorous political stunts is 
limited. Above I included my observations about reactions to Svensk Vapenfadder 
and Britta’s ladies’ gym. The lack of media coverage also reveals that apart from 
the clowns’ ability to make good photos, Ofog’s use of humour has been of very 
limited interest to mass media. The information about how Ofog’s actions are 
understood by people in positions of power is even more rudimentary. Apart from 
the one politician who did not like to be included in Svensk Vapenfadder, I cannot 
tell how these actions were perceived – if they were noticed at all – by politicians, 
arms producers and the authorities’ representatives in the police and armed forces. 
However, Ofog activists have provided many comments on their perceptions of this 
interaction.  
In the written comments from the workshops, there were many different answers to 
the two questions “What do you think can be achieved by using humour as a 
method in nonviolent actions?” And “How can humour influence the relations with 
the military, media, arms producers and police in nonviolent actions?” which dealt 
with humour’s ability to challenge relations of power. What is most striking about 
the answers is the diversity. Those who commented on how humour affects 
relations of power wrote things like: 
To show the absurd in the system one protests against and 
resists. To reduce hostility between different sides in a conflict by 
doing something creative. (Just like it is good to have music in a 
demonstration and not just shout slogans.). To get each other to 
think creatively and therefore better find solutions.610 
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This person suggested that humour communicates less hostility, similar to the way 
the clowns in the previous chapter were communicating nonviolent values. This is 
supported by another person who suggested that: 
It is possible to make fun of and ridicule and resist what is terrible 
and horrible without being it yourself. By highlighting something 
from a “new” angle it can become so obvious how crazy power 
relations are that resistance can become beautiful and funny at 
the same time as it becomes more powerful.611  
Someone else commented on the dilemma that humour might create for the police 
and military sent out to prevent or stop an action: 
In relation to military/police etc., make it more difficult for them 
to physically prevent the action. It is more difficult to “brutally” 
stop someone you think is funny and sympathise with.612 
The quote above can be an observation about a clowning action where the clowns 
succeeded in physically opening up space, but it might also be a comment on a 
different type of situation.  
Another person, writing about actions against arms production, expressed hope 
that the employees at the factory would understand that the action was not directed 
against them, but the system they are part of: 
Think it can help clarify. For example, it makes workers at an 
arms factory [understand] that the action is not directed towards 
them but against the system.613 
In the next quote, the person referred to humour’s potential for creating uncertainty 
for people who are usually sure of themselves, in this way emphasising the 
common bond between all human beings no matter their role in society:  
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I think a major point may be the uncertainty that humour can 
create in these meetings. All these actors hopefully need to think 
about and talk about such actions and then also talk about/think 
about the issue itself. Laughter is a good way to meet = 
disarming. We see we are humans.614 
Finally, someone who wrote specifically about clowning expressed hope that the 
police would see the creativity and that it would make them reflect about their own 
organisation. 
On the occasions that I have participated in actions where there 
have been clowns present, the police have often interacted. I hope 
that they see that activists use creative methods for changing 
society, instead of violence. Make them reflect on their own 
organisation.615 
The quotes reflect the wishes and hopes from people in a marginal anti-militarist 
network about what the use of humour achieves. Future research might reveal how 
it is perceived by people in positions of power and what meaning it has for them.  
I separated the functions of humour into four different aspects of how it facilitates 
outreach, mobilisation, a culture of resistance and challenging relations of power. 
However, this categorisation is only for analytical purposes, because on the ground 
of political activism the four different aspects are closely linked together, and one 
humorous event might contribute to more than one aspect. Nevertheless, the four 
categories might be useful when navigating the complexities of humour. Although a 
particular event might not have sparked any reactions from people in positions of 
power, it was still a contribution in the discursive guerrilla war about what to 
consider true, right and just. Thus it can have reached out to many in the general 
public, or it can have contributed to a culture of resistance. The four different 
aspects make it easier to discuss exactly what a group can expect a particular 
humorous political stunt being planned to achieve, or evaluate its impact. It might 
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also be a way to expand the repertoire if it turns out that a group has a tendency to 
focus on mobilisation, in spite of an outspoken goal of challenging an established 
power relation.  
The two final sections treat two aspects of the use of humour that came up in the 
interviews and workshops but do not belong in any of the four categories above. 
The first issue is whether the distinction between the humorous and non-humorous 
actions is artificial and the second what the risks with humorous activism are.  
Artificial distinction between humorous and other creative actions 
One thing that has become obvious during this research is that the distinction 
between humorous and other creative actions is rather artificial in the perspective 
of activists’ lived experience. This is not something the informants tell explicitly, but 
it becomes clear from the stories people spontaneously start to tell. When I asked 
for examples about the use of humour, the first examples I was told were usually 
clearly humorous. However, several people continued with examples of actions 
which were creative and involved some kind of performance such as street theatre, 
but were not necessarily humorous.616 For example, Ofog activists in Malmö made 
a street theatre of an auction of Swedish produced arms in the autumn of 2010. 
One person played the auctioneer, while others were playing the buyers from India, 
Pakistan and USA. The performance included a part where the Indian and 
Pakistani buyers kept overbidding each other. All the weapons came together with 
a civilian casualty who told how he or she had been bombed, shot or killed. This is 
not a humorous political stunt since there is no confrontation or blurred lines 
between audiences and performers, but it is obviously humorous. However, 
straight afterwards, the Malmö-Lund activists told about two other episodes, which 
were creative, thought provoking and drew attention, but were not humorous. One 
Christmas they hung toy automatic weapons in the public Christmas tree wrapped 
as gifts. Under the banner “Sweden sends hard gifts to the world’s children again 
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this year,” they collected signatures against arms export from the general public. 
Another example was the “jump for peace” that they arranged in connection with a 
trial against activists who had done a citizen inspection at Aimpoint.  
Humorous actions are different from other types of action. For analytical purposes, 
it makes sense to distinguish humorous from non-humorous actions. However, 
researchers should bear in mind that for many activists, this distinction between 
humour and other kinds of creative performance is more academic than 
experienced.  
Risky humour 
The final theme about humour and political activism from the interviews and 
workshops with Ofog activists is the potential risks with using humour. Here the 
findings from the field work are compared with the few existing reflections about 
risks in the literature on creative activism.   
1. The risk of being perceived as not serious about the issue 
Almost everyone I have asked about potential problems with using humour in 
activism responded that they see a risk of not being taken seriously. When asked 
about potential risks in the workshops, one person in a written comment expressed 
concern about being seen as unserious and self-centred:  
We can be seen as unserious. Childish, silly, without anything 
important, sensible, or important to say. Exhibitionistic: People 
have thought that we want to “be seen”, without any more aims 
or thoughts than that.617 
The risk of not being taken seriously expressed in this quote appears real enough: 
one must expect part of the audience to respond as if they believe that the 
pranksters are just out to have fun themselves.  
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In Day’s analysis of Billionaires for Bush, she includes a quote from a woman who 
prefers “honest” and straightforward protest. Billionaires for Bush dressed as 
stereotypical rich characters and made an ironic performance in support of US 
president George Bush’s economic policies benefitting the rich. After Bush left the 
White House, they have pursued the same issue. They are still Billionaires, but 
what they are for depends on the circumstances. The quote that Day refers to was 
broadcast in an interview on national radio when the Billionaires were present at a 
Bush fundraiser: 
I think they’re making a mockery out of it and it’s a joke, and it’s 
pretty embarrassing. It’s confusing to children and it’s confusing 
to a couple of adults here as well. And I have more respect for the 
people over there who are saying what they happen to feel. They 
dress normally. They don’t have to come in costume and have a 
gimmick.618 
There is no way of knowing how representative this woman’s views were, but they 
reflect the need for care. However, much more research is needed about how 
audiences perceive humorous political stunts before one can conclude that 
audiences prefer rational ways of communicating. Some audience members may 
prefer rationality because it is more familiar or easier to ignore. 
Gustav is a Ofog activist who cautioned against too much humour. He emphasised 
that it is important to show that one understands the issue one works with:  
And then I don’t always think it is good to use humour. 
Sometimes it is good to show that you are a serious person who 
has read a lot and do this because you really believe in it, and can 
argue your case as well.619 
The issues of arms export and war that Ofog works with are probably some of the 
most controversial issues one can imagine. Humour about any sensitive issue like 
torture, hunger and people’s loss of life and livelihood should of course be 
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approached with care. There will probably always be people who consider black 
humour tasteless, but research about the use of humour in professions exposed to 
life and death indicates that black humour might be a way of coping with difficult 
issues.620 Nevertheless, the most obscure and macabre might be best kept as 
internal jokes in order not to offend those who activists want to protect. However, it 
also depends on how the black humour is performed. Before I started this research 
project, I would have been doubtful about the possibility for creating humour 
around civilian casualties in war. Nevertheless I think Reality AB is a good example 
of black humour, and I have only met one person who openly disapproved of it.  
All social movements considering using humorous political stunts need to take the 
risk of not being taken seriously into consideration. Fear of this consequence is 
probably the reason why humour is not used more, in spite of its potential benefits. 
Organisations and movements who have already established ways of 
communicating with their potential audiences based on rational arguments might 
simply find it too risky to experiment with humour. The persistence of logical 
argument  is quite strong, even within a network like Ofog which is more willing to 
experiment with humour than most other organisations.   
The interviews and workshops also revealed other potentially problematic issues: 
2. a risk of ridicule being experienced as abuse 
Another risk with humour is the potential ethical problem that ridicule might be 
experienced as abuse. If humorous intent can be reframed as abuse, a totally 
different discourse is in use than when something is considered to belong to the 
just-joking sphere.   
Ofog’s platform emphasises nonviolence and respect towards everyone, so Ofog 
activists can obviously get into trouble when an action involves ridicule or other 
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expressions that might be interpreted as abuse. The speech bubble action at the 
Pride Parade is the most obvious example where the target explicitly said that they 
experienced this as abuse, and where also people within Ofog reacted. Although 
the activists who participated in the action wanted to expose the consequences of 
militarism and the presence of the soldiers in the pride parade, the soldiers who 
were targeted experienced it as an attack on them as individuals, raising the 
question of ethics.  
In chapter 1 I presented Gantar’s and Billig’s thoughts about ethics and humour. If 
one insists on judging humour along ethical lines in spite of Gantar’s conclusion 
that it is not possible, one point of departure that Gantar and Billig do not discuss is 
the position of those who initiate the humour. There is a huge difference between 
ridicule initiated by people in power aimed at a minority, and ridicule that comes 
from people in a subordinate position directed towards those more powerful. An 
example of the first was the so-called Muhammad cartoons published by Jyllands-
Posten in 2005, where an established mainstream newspaper directed its satire 
towards a religious minority in Denmark. That is very different from humorous 
political stunts initiated by small activist groups and directed at powerful discourses 
and their representatives. When people in power try to use what Billig calls the 
“tease-spray” or the “just-joking spray”, one can point out that they speak from a 
position of power and disapprove of their mockery, at the same time as one can 
approve of ridicule which kicks upwards. 
However, although it is possible to make this distinction in principle, Ofog’s speech 
bubbles at the pride parade illustrate some of the dilemmas. It was people in 
subordinate positions who ridiculed someone they saw as representatives of a 
powerful institution, but under the circumstances, the individual soldiers did not feel 
very powerful.  
3. a risk of irony not being understood 
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In connection with the Vapenfadder campaign the participant observation made it 
very clear how problematic it can be to communicate with irony. No matter how 
exaggerated a group itself thinks it is, there is always a risk that people 
misunderstand the irony because the clues are not clear enough.  
In Haugerud’s article about the Billionaires for Bush, she writes that most passers-
by who lingered for a little while realised that the performance was ironic. However, 
she also quotes two people who embody this risk that the irony might not be 
understood: 
‘Is it a joke? I can’t figure out if it’s a joke’ said a woman 
encountering the Billionaires for the first time at their 2004 tax 
day event outside New York City’s central post office. A male 
passer-by at the same event at first wondered: ‘But are they for 
or against Bush?’621 
That humour is not understood the way the initiators intended it to be seems 
especially to be a potential problem with the technique of irony where the literal 
meaning is different from the intended meaning. To understand irony requires what 
Hutcheon calls “discursive communities”, where we share an understanding with 
others about what things mean. All humorous techniques can potentially be 
misunderstood just as rational communication can be, but the ambiguity of humour 
and especially irony means that the potential for misunderstandings is built into the 
fabric of this way of communicating. According to Hutcheon irony is not “just” the 
opposite of what is said or done, but something that “happens” in the tension 
between the people who initiate the irony, those who interpret it, the meaning 
which is stated as well as what is not stated.622 Irony is based on the audience’s 
moment of doubt about whether this is the actual meaning or not. For the prankster 
the more cues one gives, the “rougher” the irony is and more likely that many 
people will get it. On the other hand, if there are just a few cues, the irony gets 
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better because of the ambiguity, but at the cost of the irony going over the head of 
more people.623  
There are two potential sources for the misunderstandings. Sometimes the 
activists constructing humorous political stunts are just not skilled enough in 
designing irony. This can be because they are not able to exaggerate thoroughly or 
present the absurdity convincingly, which was probably the case for the 
Vapenfadder campaign. Nevertheless, it would also become a problem if political 
groups needed the skills of professional entertainers in order to be funny.624  
The problem might also be that the irony is so sophisticated that it goes over the 
head of the intended audience. If it is based on references that the general public 
are not aware of they have no way of discovering the hidden meaning. Then the 
humorous political stunt risks becoming elitist, serving to show that “we are more 
clever than you”, rather than engaging people in a debate about a political issue.625 
And if an ironic message is taken literally, the result might be that stereotypes are 
reinforced.626 
4. a risk of humour becoming too internal or an end in itself 
If the goal is outwardly directed action and campaigning, and humour is one of the 
elements, it is important to consider beforehand how it will be understood and 
perceived by the intended audience. Generally it is more difficult to create actions 
that others will understand than what most activists assume, no matter if they are 
humorous or not. Activists would probably benefit from researching these issues by 
asking members of the potential audience what they think and evaluate their 
campaigns instead of relying on their personal assumptions and speculations. 
However, as described above there are also benefits to be gained from using 
humour internally when it comes to creating a culture of resistance, and as long as 
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the internal humour does not obstruct the communication outwards it is hard to see 
any problems with internal humour.  
5. the difficulty with combining the humorous and non-humorous 
During its existence, Ofog has continuously combined humorous and non-
humorous types of actions. Reality AB took place side by side and partly mixed 
with non-humorous street theatre, and the internal-external examples above 
illustrate the same overlaps. However, during the interviews one person in 
particular questioned if this was a good strategy. Lisa stressed that humour is 
important for her own commitment to Ofog, but she would like Ofog to be more 
cautious about mixing different approaches. We were talking about an idea for an 
ironic campaign that had come up during the workshop in Gothenburg but was 
never carried out. Lisa first emphasised that there has to be enough resources in 
the form of time and energy to do it properly, but then continued to talk about how 
mixing different strategies might be less efficient.  
.. there should be energy to do it properly (…) I did not think that 
we should do it this year [2011], because we already had a 
campaign with one concept, and it could become very confusing to 
have an ironic campaign and a serious campaign… and that was 
how it was when we did Reality AB, that it became a little double 
in a way, that at the same time we also had a non-ironic 
campaign, and maybe that is not very strategic, we ought to 
become better at choosing a focus. But in itself, [ironic 
campaigns] are a very good idea.627 
Here Lisa reflected on what she considered the problems with mixing rational and 
humorous campaigns, comparing it to her memory of how reality AB worked. She 
continued:  
I think absolutely that [Reality AB] worked very well as it was, I 
think it would have worked even better if we had just gone for 
                                            
627
 Interview September 2011. 
366 
 
that, (…) maybe it became a little half done, that someone got the 
idea and that we did not do it 100%. But it is always like that.628  
The problem that not everyone commits 100% to a certain idea is not something 
that is peculiar to humorous political stunts. Since it is only a minority of groups that 
primarily rely on humour in their communication, the majority of groups are likely to 
change between the humorous and the non-humorous. And as long as 
“seriousness” (= the rational) continues to be the norm, ideas for humorous 
campaigns will end up being a supplement to the norm. Thus, the problem that 
Lisa is pointing out is unlikely to disappear unless groups dare to say that this time, 
we will try to let the humorous be the norm.  
Lisa saw the potential that a humorous and non-humorous campaign about the 
same subject might appeal to and reach out to different audiences, and suggested 
that campaigns can run in parallel if it is not obvious that they originate from the 
same place.  
I think it can be difficult, but maybe it is possible to combine. It 
does not have to be very obvious that it is Ofog who does it, 
maybe Ofog runs a serious campaign, and then the ironic or 
upside down can just be there. It does not need to have any 
sender at all. Maybe we can reach different people that way. (…) It 
is difficult, because I really believe in the idea [of an ironic 
campaign], but I also believe in the idea of being serious (both 
laugh), (…) and I think that you have to choose, I really think you 
have to choose.629 
In spite of Lisa’s belief that ironic campaigns can be a useful tool, she still ended 
up stressing that she thinks it is important to choose and prefers that Ofog is 
cautious about mixing humorous and non-humorous approaches about the same 
issue.  
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Related to the issues that Lisa brought up is the problem with doing a humorous 
political stunt half-heartedly and mixing it with traditional protest. For activists who 
are used to “ordinary protest” it can be a challenge to leave all the usual symbols of 
protest behind, for instance when participating in a supportive stunt. However, the 
result of a mix might be that neither the supportive stunt nor the ordinary protest 
symbols come across. Instead the message one communicates is just confusing.  
6. Satire risks making people disillusioned 
The final potential problem with humour was not mentioned in workshops or 
interviews, but has appeared in the literature. Perhaps the most fundamental 
critique that has been directed against satire and irony is that they are cynical and 
make people disillusioned. They are good at criticising everything and everyone 
but do not present any alternatives.630 However, this is a misreading of much satire 
and irony. Rebecca Higgie uses the Chaser team as an example of how one can 
make a distinction between cynicism and kynicism when discussing satire. 
Kynicism is a notion that comes from ancient Greek philosophy and Higgie says 
that “Kynicism is cynicism without the latter’s nihilistic nature.”631 Whereas cynicism 
criticises without seeing any hope for change, “Kynicism also questions and 
doubts, but maintains that there is a better way of doing things”.632 Although the 
satire does not provide any alternatives to the prevailing political order, under the 
surface of the irony, a kynical approach finds that not all truth is said to be non-
existent, just the particular truth of the prevailing order.633 When it comes to the 
satire and irony in humorous political stunts, it is usually quite clear that the 
initiators are committed to improving and not just criticising. It is difficult to accuse 
the grassroots groups behind most of the stunts presented here of being cynical. 
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The risk is much greater for professional comedians, though many of them have a 
direction in their social critique.  
The potential risks with using humour that Ofog activists have identified vary a lot, 
but also have something in common. Fear that humour might offend, be 
misunderstood or lead to a group losing legitimacy are different reasons, but all 
result in a persistence of logical argument . However, an investigation into the 
potential problems also revealed that some of the potential problems might be due 
to general organisational and planning aspects. When evaluating a humorous 
political action and deciding if something similar should be repeated in the future, 
this might be worth taking into consideration.   
The persistence of logical argument might also stem from the fact that subversive 
irony requires an intimate knowledge of dominant discourses – an intimacy that 
can also be considered complicity.634 That is probably one reason why some 
political activists become uncomfortable when it comes to humour, including irony. 
To create irony is only possible if you know very well the language of what you 
want to ironise about. Hutcheon explains that there is an emotional element when it 
comes to producing and interpreting irony. Irony does not just say something about 
a certain topic; it also adds an emotion or an attitude towards it.635 This emotional 
dimension might be problematic for activists concerned about being perceived as 
rational.  
Conclusion 
Activists in Ofog work with serious issues of war and war preparations, arms 
production and arms export. This chapter is not an attempt to document Ofog’s 
whole history, but the part concerning the role of humour. Although a light-hearted 
tone, including humour, plays an important role in much of what Ofog does, it is far 
from the only thing. The majority of the civil disobedience actions are carried out 
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with only hints of humour and these hints are usually more for the benefit of the 
participants than directed outwards. In legal activities aimed at awareness raising 
and opinion building, the use of humour takes more space and has been used on 
numerous occasions as the primary strategy, for example in Reality AB, 
Vapenfadder and the satiric posters.  
What is most striking with the humorous examples in this chapter is their diversity. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, humour is so diverse that it is almost impossible to 
make general statements about the phenomenon. As Ofog activists have 
expressed in interviews and written comments, they mean very different things 
when they speak about humour. The people who have participated in this research 
are just a small sample of a fairly homogeneous group. They all have more or less 
the same background and political perspective. Nevertheless what they speak 
about when they use the word humour is quite varied. Imagine what it would have 
been like asking the same questions to a group of people with highly varied cultural 
and political backgrounds. 
This diversity makes it difficult to make generalisations about using humour in a 
struggle, because the notion covers so many different types of activities. In order 
for such a conversation to be meaningful, it is necessary to examine specific 
humorous actions and be clear about intended audiences.   
Another finding from this chapter is that although the distinction between humorous 
and non-humorous actions is meaningful for analytical purposes, it is not a 
difference which makes much sense in the everyday life of activists. When people 
are asked about humorous actions they usually start out telling about humour, but 
it is not uncommon subsequently to switch to actions that have other creative 
aspects. “On the ground” it might make more sense to talk about to what degree 
methods are creative, rather than humorous.  
Complexity is also a key word when it comes to understanding the reactions to 
Ofog’s humorous political stunts. The small inquiry I did during Britta’s ladies gym 
against NEAT gave an idea about how difficult it can be to get the intended 
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message across to the audiences. The reactions after the speech bubble action at 
the Pride Parade suggest some of the tactics that opponents may apply in order to 
devalue activists and reframe the discussion so it takes place on their home 
territory.  
The functions of humour for Ofog activists were divided into facilitating outreach, 
mobilisation, a culture of resistance and challenging relations of power.  
Facilitating outreach means reaching out to various audiences, but especially 
media and the general public. The findings in this chapter supported previous 
research in documenting how humour can be a good way to catch the attention of 
members of the general public otherwise not concerned about the issue. However, 
it is difficult to know if this attention leads to a change in opinion or behaviour. One 
Ofog activist suggested that ironic messages the audience can “crack” within a 
reasonable amount of time might make people feel smart and this way reach them 
at a deeper level. This would be an interesting topic for further research. 
Many of the examples of humour presented in Chapter 3 were successful in 
reaching mass media with their humorous political stunts. This is not something 
Ofog has experienced, probably because most of the humorous political stunts 
have been directed more towards the general public than mass media. Since 
humour’s appeal to mass media is so much taken for granted, little is known about 
how many other political groups have tried to reach media with humour but failed. It 
would also be interesting to compare what type of media coverage would result if 
the same amount of time and energy was spent on non-humorous activism but 
equally attention grabbing activities, such as civil disobedience.  
Even though they mean such different things when they talk about humour, most of 
the people from Ofog I interviewed considered it an important factor in facilitating 
mobilisation. They said that it is an important reason why they joined, that they 
think it makes potential new activists interested in Ofog, and a reason why they 
stay committed. For a network working with such grave issues, humour is 
experienced almost as a necessity in order to prevent burnout. 
371 
 
Ofog is a network speaking from a marginalised position. Although many people in 
Sweden are highly critical of Sweden’s arms export, Ofog is a very small network 
that is also marginalised within in the broader and more moderate peace 
movement that does not engage in civil disobedience. Some political groups 
decide to focus on a very narrow issue whereas others spread out their activities 
much broader. Ofog belongs to the last category, with attention going to arms 
production and military recruitment as well as military test sites. There are many 
reasons for this, but a consequence is that there are rarely any short term goals to 
reach, making it much more difficult to judge if a campaign has been successful 
and really challenged relations of power. It is difficult to see any changes in 
Swedish arms production, recruitment practices and use of test sites that can be 
attributed to Ofog activities. If one compares the resources that Ofog controls with 
those of the armed forces, FMV and the armament industry, it would be quite 
unrealistic to expect Ofog’s humorous political stunts to create much permanent 
change, but Ofog provides a critical dissenting voice in a context where belief in 
military solutions to conflict dominates. Through the humorous political stunts, Ofog 
can be seen to wage a discursive guerrilla war where dominant discourses about 
NEAT/Vidsel Test Range, the job as a soldier and the results of Swedish arms 
production are challenged in many small ways. Although these challenges to 
dominant discourses are temporary, they do break the hegemony and at the same 
time give an impression of the potential that arises from this type of activism.  
Ofog has used four of the five different types of humorous political stunts – the only 
type missing is the naïve stunt. The supportive, corrective and absurd stunts have 
been used in different forms, while the provocative has only been used when 
people in Umeå painted a whole tank pink. 
Another conclusion is that one should not underestimate the power of the 
experience of challenging a major dominant discourse – and having fun at the 
same time. Although there is no sign that the discourse of militarism or the 
institutions that uphold it are about to be dismantled, all successful social 
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movements had to start somewhere and appeared hopelessly naïve when they set 
out. 
Finally, the chapter included a discussion about some of the risks with using 
humour. The most obvious risk, pointed out by almost everyone, is of audiences 
perceiving the presence of humour as a sign that the activists do not take the 
issues of war preparation and arms production seriously. This is a consequence of 
the widespread and taken for granted dichotomy between the “humorous” and the 
“serious”, where the humorous cannot be serious at the same time. Speaking 
about “rational” or “non-humorous” types of actions as a contrast to the humorous 
avoids this problem. The other potential risks identified are of ridicule being 
experienced as abuse, irony being misunderstood, the humour becoming too 
internal, and the potential problems with mixing humorous and non-humorous 
methods in the same campaign. Although it was not brought up during the 
interviews and workshops, I also discussed the risk of satire being perceived as 
cynical.  
Fear that humour might offend, be misunderstood or lead to a group losing 
legitimacy all result in a persistence of logical argument. Gantar suggested not 
caring about ethics when investigating laughter critically because it is an 
epistemological dead end. Nevertheless, activists performing humorous political 
stunts are operating in a world where ethics does matter, and are well advised to 
consider how their stunt is likely to be received also from this perspective. With 
ethics in mind they have a better chance of getting the political message across 
instead of spending their time defending their choice of method. 
Nevertheless, when planning and evaluating a potential humorous action or 
campaign, it is worth keeping in mind that some of the problems that arise with an 
idea involving humour might be due to general organisational and planning 
challenges and not connected to the humour per se. For example it is a general 
problem for many groups that they pursue several ideas half-heartedly instead of 
committing 100% to one idea.  
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The next chapter is a case study of the strategies of another Scandinavian group 
working on anti-militarism. Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt (KMV), meaning The 
Campaign Against Conscription, worked under circumstances comparable to Ofog, 
but focused on one particular issue, total resistance to conscription.  
  
374 
 
Chapter 6: Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt – combining 
legal and spectacular actions 
Introduction 
How can you imprison a conscientious objector for 16 months without calling it a 
punishment? This was the central question for Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt (KMV), 
which means The Campaign Against Conscription. KMV was a Scandinavian 
campaign started in 1981 to work against conscription and support conscientious 
objectors who were imprisoned for their conviction. The case study focuses on the 
Norwegian conditions and the strategies used by the campaign to pressure the 
Norwegian government into changing the law. Although this is not the history of 
KMV, it includes many details about KMV’s way of organising and working with 
both humorous and non-humorous activities. The purpose of this is to provide a 
coherent narrative about KMV and to show its similarities and differences with 
Ofog.  
In the previous chapter Ofog activists’ perceptions about the benefits and risks with 
using humour were discussed in relation to different audiences and functions 
related to outreach, mobilisation, a culture of resistance and challenging relations 
of power. Since nothing indicates otherwise, it is reasonable to assume that the 
KMV activists shared similar ideas about what humour could achieve. This chapter 
then takes the question of what role humour can play in challenging relations of 
power one step further and analyses how the humorous political stunts were 
integrated with three other non-humorous strategies.  
The chapter begins with some background information about the campaign and the 
situation for the conscientious objectors. It continues by presenting four different 
strategies that KMV used in its struggle, the first and major one being 1. to create a 
spectacle around the court hearings and imprisonments. The group performed 
several humorous political stunts as part of this strategy which are especially 
relevant here. In addition, three other strategies were pursued: 2. Participants in 
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KMV used the court system by filing charges against the state for violating their 
human rights, something that turned out to be essential for their success. 3. 
Solidarity work with other conscientious objectors around the world and 4. 
Lobbying and participating in the public debate. These different strategies are 
presented in some detail to make it possible to trace the use of humorous political 
stunts within a larger campaign. Because the legal strategy was decisive for KMV’s 
success, this chapter does not have humour as its only focus. 
The launch of KMV  
KMV was launched in Halden in Norway on 28-29th of November 1981.636 This was 
also the first time the name KMV was used publicly. KMV was a joint campaign 
involving Swedish and Norwegian activists, with some links to Denmark and 
Finland as well. The campaign was primarily concerned with the fate of the so-
called total resisters who refused both military and substitute service, but also 
supported other conscientious objectors risking imprisonment. Some of the key 
Swedish and Norwegian activists knew each other from War Resisters’ 
International and since they were so few in each country they decided to work 
closely together in a joint campaign.   
Although many activities took place in Sweden and one person was very active in 
Finland, the major focus of KMV was the conditions in Norway. The language 
barrier was one reason it was difficult to get a bigger Finnish involvement and in 
Denmark the way the conscription system was organised meant there was very 
little interest in total resistance.  
In its main platform, a booklet published in 1981, KMV was introduced with an 
English name, ICR – Scandinavia. The booklet explained that the campaign had 
been underway in Scandinavia for more than two years, and that publishing the 
booklet was a step towards an active network. ICR was an abbreviation of 
                                            
636
 The press releases from the founding meeting are dated late November. 
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International Collective Resistance, an international campaign for total resistance 
originating in 1974.  
KMV’s platform was a four page long pacifist-anarchist declaration. It refused both 
the military, direct and structural violence and enforcement of service to society, 
but spoke in favour of decentralised nonviolent resistance to violence and 
oppression. 
Under the heading “Common anti-militarist understanding” the platform started: 
We look at ourselves as radical anti-militarists. Our resistance is 
not only directed against the military, but against any kind of 
violence. We strive towards the abolishment of all armies – both 
an army built on conscription and a recruited army. We dismiss 
conscription and all its consequences, especially the substitute 
service, the so-called civil service.637  
The substitute service was described as an integrated part of the military system 
that can “never be in any fundamental opposition to the military service”.638 
The platform continued with the question of the development of modern weapons 
technology and linked the military system with patriarchy. It also noticed women’s 
possibility for refusing to cooperate with the military system although they were not 
drafted. War preparations and militarism influence people’s lives long before any 
service is demanded, and resistance should begin “everywhere where there are 
psychological, political and economic preparations for war. Real peace work must 
imply a dismantling of society’s violent structures”.639  
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in some of the major meetings and events which took place, almost all of them were partners of 
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is not unusual in places where only men are conscripted, but it means that the platform’s 
association of militarism with patriarchy and the idea that women should actively refuse militarism 
although they were not drafted apparently did not result in a different practice within KMV.  
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Under the heading “our goal” the platform described a society based on human 
rights and people’s right to decide on issues related to their own life. It called for 
economic redistribution and decentralisation of big businesses, and stated that 
KMV would work towards building alternatives to show that another world is 
possible. “We see in nonviolent forms of action the only possible means of defence 
because it also includes the values it wants to defend, like openness, democratic 
decision making and so on.”640 Later in the text KMV emphasised the principal 
difference between a substitute service organised by the state and a completely 
volunteer and self-organised peace service.  
The platform finished by noting KMV’s international affiliations and the possibility of 
cooperating with other parts of the peace and environmental movements on issues 
where one worked in the same direction. It stated that KMV respected the work 
done by pacifist peace organisations that supported the substitute service, but that 
KMV saw “total resistance as the ultimate consequence of refusing to cooperate 
with the military system”.641   
With a few exceptions, the most active participants in KMV were men who were in 
the middle of their cases as total resisters or had recently finished them. As Ulf 
Norenius, one of the Swedish founders of KMV, answered when asked about why 
he became so involved in KMV: “You know, it creeps very close when you have to 
go to prison yourself, most people don’t have to go to prison.”642  
Several of the founders of KMV had much experience from other anarchist, peace, 
radical law, solidarity and environmental groups which they were actively involved 
in parallel with the work in KMV. In Norway there was especially an overlap with 
Folkereisning Mot Krig (FMK) a pacifist organisation dating from 1937. Two of the 
Norwegian co-founders of KMV, Jørgen Johansen and Øyvind Solberg, explained 
how there was fierce discussion within FMK about whether one should accept the 
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substitute service or not. The majority in FMK considered substitute service 
acceptable, while Johansen, Solberg and a few others did not and decided to form 
an independent group to work particularly on the issue of supporting total resisters 
and abolishing all conscription. According to Johansen, FMK’s general assembly 
changed the organisation’s position regarding total resistance several times. The 
total resisters in KMV remained active in FMK and the two groups worked closely 
together.643  
KMV was a non-hierarchical group, deliberately organised as a campaign focusing 
on one particular issue. It was more of a loose network than a formal organisation. 
The highest authority in KMV was the grand meeting. Everyone could participate in 
these meetings which were held approximately two times a year.644 Between the 
grand meetings, the work was organised by individuals and local groups. During 
the 1980’s the most consistent groups over time were in Oslo, Ise, and 
Gothenburg. Other local groups popped up and died out depending on where 
certain individuals lived and how involved they were in the campaign at that 
particular time.  
Who were the total resisters? 
In 1981, Norwegian conscientious objectors had to go through a thorough police 
interrogation and be accepted by the ministry of justice in order to be recognised. 
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The substitute service was longer than for military service, presumably in order to 
make up for the fact that the conscientious objectors were not called up for 
repetition exercises like the military conscripts.645 Nevertheless, to the 
conscientious objectors it felt as if the duration of their service was a punishment 
for refusing to carry arms. Most conscientious objectors had no trouble explaining 
their strong pacifist conviction, objecting to participating in all wars and serving the 
substitute service. During the 1970’s and early 1980’s the number of applications 
for conscientious objector status was increasing.646 The substitute service, which 
most conscientious objectors willingly accepted, was required to be “civilian in 
character and under civilian administration, without connection to military 
installations or activities.”647 The substitute service was mainly carried out within 
the areas of education, health care and cultural institutions. However, the small but 
diverse group of total resisters prevented the system from functioning smoothly 
since they refused both the military and substitute service.  
In an article in one of KMV’s newsletters, Øyvind Solberg gave a thorough 
description of nine groups that potentially could be called total resisters.648 In 
relation to the way KMV focused its work and prioritised its activities in Norway, 
three groups are of particular interest.  
1. Principled total resisters who on principle refused all service to the state. 
Typically they were acknowledged as conscientious objectors because of 
their commitment to pacifism. When they were called up to serve their 
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substitute service, they refused that as well. Next a court determined that 
the conditions were fulfilled for them to serve their service by force in an 
institution under the prison administration. This was regulated in §20 of the 
Norwegian law on conscientious objection from 1965. Since the time of the 
alternative service was 16 months, they should serve 16 months as well. 
They could either serve in a special place for total resisters, called camp 
Dillingøy, or spend 16 months in prison. Camp Dillingøy was an open 
institution and primarily established for the members of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, who agreed to serve there. The principled total resisters who 
were motivated by political arguments such as anarchism and refused to 
cooperate with the system in any way were transported to the prison by the 
police.  
The principled total resisters were not convicted of anything criminal, and 
the 16 months were not called a punishment. The time served was not 
entered into their criminal records, but apart from that there were no 
practical differences between their prison conditions and those of other 
prisoners. Solberg mentioned that some people refer to this group as the 
“true” total resisters, and it is principled total resistance which is the 
philosophy behind KMV’s platform.649 
 
2. Selective objectors650 were not pacifists, but applied to become 
conscientious objectors because they did not want to fight in wars under the 
present system. Generally they referred to Norway’s membership in NATO 
or the existence of nuclear weapons. Since only pacifists who refused to 
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participate in all wars could obtain the status of conscientious objector, the 
applications of the selective objectors were denied and they received their 
military call up orders. If they then refused, they were convicted to three 
months in prison. In a typical situation they would get a new call up order 
and refuse that as well. Sometimes they would be pardoned the second 
time, but the practice changed over time. The selective objectors were 
convicted of evading military orders and their time in prison was considered 
a regular punishment. In his article, Solberg mentioned that at least some of 
the selective objectors would also refuse the substitute service if they had 
had the opportunity. Even if they were not pacifists, they objected to the idea 
of people being obliged to have a duty to serve.651   
 
3. Content dependent objectors who were pacifists but refused the substitute 
service because it was not relevant and did not train them in a national 
defence based on nonviolence. By and large these objectors did part of their 
substitute service and then became total resisters during this process. They 
were sent to prison for the remaining time of the substitute service under the 
same conditions as the principled total resisters.652 
These were the three main groups and their typical situation. However, the 
situation was frequently unpredictable and also changed during the time KMV was 
active. Also many other types of total resisters were active for shorter or longer 
periods of time or their cases were of interest to KMV. Usually the processes went 
on for many years, and it was not uncommon that people changed their positions 
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during the time. For example, someone who was actually a principled total resister 
might declare himself a selective objector in order to get less time in prison.  
In Sweden the situation was different. Principled total resisters were given a 
regular court case, charged with refusing to obey orders. During the campaign’s 
existence, the length of the punishment was changed. Within KMV, many of the 
Swedish participants were so-called late refusers653 who had done their military 
service but developed their conscientious objection later in life and refused to do 
the repetition exercises.654    
KMV as an organisation was committed to principled total resistance, and not 
everyone who was spending time in jail for refusing military service felt comfortable 
in the group. This was one reason why an even more informal group was 
established in Norway, called Samvittighetsfanger I Norge (S.I.N) which means 
Prisoners of Conscience in Norway.655 Another reason was that the concept of 
prisoners of conscience had other connotations which were more appropriate 
under some circumstances, e.g. when it came to cooperating with Amnesty 
International. Many of the most active activists in KMV were also heavily involved 
in S.I.N and changed their “hats” depending on the circumstances. S.I.N produced 
two issues of a newspaper and a report about conscientious objectors in prison as 
a reply to a government proposition on conscription.  
Norway’s way of treating the principled total resisters with 16 months in prison 
without calling it a punishment was unique in Europe. Officially the total resisters 
simply carried out their substitute service by force in an “institution under the 
administration of the prison administration”. This contradiction – that what 
appeared as a punishment was called something else – became the core of the 
total resisters’ spectacular protests and legal strategy, revolving around their court 
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hearings and prison time and generating newspaper headlines like “Prison is not 
punishment.”656 The court hearings were not a real court case, since their only 
purpose was to establish the identity of the total resisters. They were not charged 
with anything criminal, but nevertheless, media frequently reported as if this was a 
serious criminal offence. This indicates that the Norwegian state had a hard time 
explaining its practice.  
During the early 1980’s the idea of total resistance became known in much wider 
circles, thanks to the young men’s own efforts. Their visibility also made the 
number of total resisters grow. Between 1965 and 1984, eight people spent time in 
prison after being sentenced according to §20. At the end of 1984, 25 people had 
been convicted according to §20 and were waiting to go to prison.657 In December 
1985 this number had increased to more than 40, and KMV was in contact with 96 
total resisters, estimating the real number to more than 100.658  
The department of justice was responsible for all cases regarding conscientious 
objectors, and I had the opportunity to interview Jens Jensen659 who represented 
the Norwegian state and the department of justice in questions regarding 
conscientious objection. The interview revealed that the representatives of the 
Norwegian state were unaware how closely the selective objectors and total 
resisters cooperated and how much the two groups felt they had in common. To 
the lawyers they appeared to be two very different types of cases because of the 
difference in legislation, but the people it concerned found a communality of 
interests because both groups spent time in prison for their convictions.  
Jensen explained that he had forgotten about the issue of the total resisters 
serving their substitute service in prison until I reminded him about it when I 
contacted him for an interview. On the other hand, he had clear memories about 
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the heated debates regarding the selective objectors. In the eyes of Jensen and his 
colleagues, the issue of total resisters was a minor one:  
Those who did not want to perform substitute service for 
principled reasons, they were shrugged off, like okay, if they really 
want to make it so complicated for themselves, let them do that. 
(…) It was a small group that we [in the department of justice] 
didn’t care much about.660 
That the total resisters themselves and the Norwegian authorities had different 
views on the importance of the issue is no surprise. For most total resisters, 
refusing to perform substitute service was a decision that changed their lives. For 
the Norwegian authorities, they were a handful of people making life difficult for 
themselves and working on an obscure idea about abolishing military defence. 
Before, during and after KMV’s campaign, the institution of conscription remained a 
cornerstone in Norwegian defence policy. However, although KMV was 
insignificant in the eyes of Jensen and he did not remember the change in their 
treatment, for KMV activists it was a major success they still talk about 25 years 
later.  
After this introduction to KMV and the issues of total resistance and selective 
objection, the next section investigates the different ways KMV aimed to challenge 
the imprisonment of both groups.  
KMV’s strategy 
As noted in the introduction, KMV’s way of working can be divided into four major 
strategies which were pursued simultaneously: 1. To create a spectacle which was 
sometimes humorous 2. Using the court system when it seemed beneficial to KMV 
by filing charges against the state for violating the human rights of the total 
resisters. 3. Solidarity work with other conscientious objectors around the world 
and 4. Lobbying and participating in the public debate. I identified these four 
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strategies by first making a chronological list of all KMV activities mentioned in the 
newsletters. Looking at the outward directed activities and excluding internal 
meetings and meetings with other peace organisations, these four types of 
activities appeared to be distinct ways of working which have their own logic and 
goals. Taken together they contribute to facilitating outreach, mobilisation, a culture 
of resistance and challenging established relations of power. The first category of 
creating a spectacle also reflects the finding from chapter 5 that the distinction 
between humorous and other creative action is artificial and does not reflect activist 
experiences. Combined the two first strategies of creating a spectacle and using 
the court system were decisive in changing the legislation within a decade. These 
two strategies were the main outward directed activities of KMV, with the solidarity 
and lobbying playing only minor roles.   
Creating a spectacle  
Already at the founding meeting in Halden in 1981, KMV set the stage for the 
spectacles to come. Halden is a border town between Sweden and Norway and 
the town was symbolically chosen. The press was invited to Fredriksten Fortress, a 
17th century fortress with a great stake in the past wars between Sweden and 
Norway.661 A handful of participants in KMV burned their conscription books or call 
up orders and two speeches were held. The local newspaper carried a photo of six 
men setting fire to the military papers on the front page together with an article that 
quoted from KMV’s platform.662 
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Illustration 25. Jørgen Johansen’s conscription book, burned at 
Fredriksten Festning, Halden, during the launch of KMV, November 
1981. 
 
Norenius explained how this and other burnings were part of a strategy of non-
cooperation with the conscription system. When charged with refusing 
conscription663 or a repetition exercise in Sweden, a number of people refused all 
cooperation with the court that was going to punish them. They did not show up in 
court voluntarily and made it as difficult as possible for the police to serve them the 
date of the trial. Some people refused to show up in court while most preferred to 
make the trial a political spectacle. When in prison, the non-cooperation could be to 
refuse to work or eat. Norenius himself refused to work, something which meant 
that he was sent to a high security prison.664 The burnings of military documents as 
in Halden were part of this non-cooperation:  
[We really saw] the burning of the conscription books as a 
challenge towards the system, because it says in them that it is a 
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document of value that you must take care of, that it is your duty 
to take care of it. And when we burned that and call up orders, 
then there is much more pressure in the protest [compared to 
other protests] (…). Then you challenge the state, take the 
initiative yourself [kind of say] “come on, press charges against 
me for this as well [if you dare]”.665 
None of the people I have interviewed had heard about anybody who was charged 
after burning the military documents, and they think the authorities were uncertain 
about how to handle the situation.666 It became what is called a dilemma action 
where the state loses face no matter how it reacts.667 They could let the young men 
get away with the burnings, thus giving them the opportunity to show their 
contempt publicly. Alternatively the authorities could press charges for the 
burnings, something which would give a group like KMV the chance for further 
publicity about the issue of conscription that they wanted to highlight. It added to 
the dilemma that most of these young men were well educated and otherwise 
relatively well adjusted in society. I will return to the subject of dilemma actions in 
Chapter 7.  
Over the years, Norwegian participants in KMV tried in various ways to draw 
attention to their §20 court hearings, for example by bringing many supporters or 
by making the court hearing itself into a spectacle. One of the first that is 
documented is that of Jørgen Johansen, another founder of KMV. Already in 1977 
Johansen had been accepted as a conscientious objector and exempted from 
military service, but he also refused to carry out the substitute service. His §20 
hearing was coming up in April 1982. Before this, he produced a poster which was 
displayed in public places. He invited everyone to come and watch this “drama in 
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several acts arranged by the court and KMV”.668 According to Johansen the judge 
was very upset by the poster, claiming that it was provocative to call the court the 
organiser of a piece of theatre.669 Already before the hearing, Johansen was 
interviewed by the local newspaper, and given the opportunity to explain several of 
the complicated details in this type of case – for instance how the state tried to 
define 16 months in prison as service to society and not a punishment.670 
Usually these types of §20 cases did not take very long, but Johansen had called 
many witnesses, and two days were set aside by the court for the case. Johansen 
also spent a long time explaining his pacifist and anarchist convictions. Many 
people came to hear the case.671 Johansen and his lawyer Øyvind Solberg argued 
that 16 months in prison cannot be considered anything else than a punishment, 
no matter what the official label is. They declared that by automatically sending 
someone to prison for 16 months, the state violated §96 of the Norwegian 
constitution which prohibits automatic punishment without a fair trial. Johansen and 
Solberg also remember one of the witnesses in particular. She held the most 
senior administrative position in the department of justice responsible for the 
conscientious objectors, and was asked to explain what type of court hearing this 
actually was. To Johansen and Solberg she appeared uncomfortable when she 
explained that it was not an ordinary criminal case or a civil case. Neither was it a 
special court. It was simply a meeting in the court room.672 
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The court did not agree with Solberg and Johansen’s arguments, and Johansen’s 
case ended with the court announcing that the conditions were fulfilled for him to 
serve his substitute service in an institution under the administration of the prison 
authorities. Nevertheless, the case was a huge success in terms of generating 
attention, both in the local area673 and in one of the major national newspapers.674 
Several headlines included the obvious contradiction “prison is not punishment”,675 
a theme around which the subsequent legal processes revolved.  
Johansen’s court proceedings themselves had been very sober, and he and his 
lawyer and witnesses had tried to argue rationally why what was going on with the 
 
Illustration 26. The local newspaper Sarpsborg Arbeiderblad’s coverage 
of Johansen’s case. The heading says “16 months in prison is not 
‘punishment’, says authorities” Sarpsborg Arbeiderblad, April 20 1982. 
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total resisters was wrong. In the spectacular actions to come this rational approach 
was replaced with attempts to expose the court as a farce, thus escalating with 
nonviolent means the tensions around the issue of total resistance.  
The first type of humorous political stunt that KMV engaged in was a so-called jail-
in. On midsummer night in June 1983, 12 people managed to climb up on the 
prison wall of Oslo Kretsfengsel with ladders, and ten of them then jumped into the 
prison yard. Their demand was that either Johan Råum should be let out of prison, 
or they should all be locked up together with him. Since he was in prison because 
of his opinions and they all shared these views, the “visitors” argued that they 
ought to be imprisoned as well. Råum was a selective objector who had already 
served his first three months prison sentence, and was now serving the second. 
The prison authorities were not used to getting extra inmates and one can assume 
that the action must have been totally unexpected. The activists refused to leave 
and managed to have a meeting with the person in charge of the prison and Råum 
himself. They negotiated that a press conference should be held inside the prison 
before the ten activists were carried out by the police.  
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Illustration 27. Arbeiderbladet’s coverage of the first jail-in June 24 
1983. The heading says “They escape the wrong way”. 
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KMV called this a røm-inn, a literal translation of which would be an escape-in. The 
English term jail-in676 does not really cover the meaning of trying to escape but 
doing it the wrong way, which is quite funny to those who speak Norwegian. After 
spending three to four hours at the police station they were all released. The story 
got considerable attention, for instance it was covered by the tabloid VG.677 The 
newspapers reported that the prison authorities were not going to press charges, 
and that the action would have no legal consequences for the activists. One of the 
articles also mentioned that there was a nice and friendly atmosphere between the 
activists and the prison authorities, something which both sides pointed out.678 
However, in his own writings Johansen says that they were reported to the police 
for trespassing, but that the charges were later dropped because of “lack of 
evidence” as the official terminology goes.679  
The masterminds behind the action were Knut Solberg and Øyvind Solberg who 
both had read and been inspired by Gene Sharp’s 198 methods of nonviolent 
actions. After brainstorming about how to do the action, they asked if anybody else 
wanted to participate. Johansen was one of those who were eager, and the group 
organised the rope ladders and also practiced using them. Johansen and Solberg 
remember with great amusement that some of the KMV participants who stayed 
outside the wall hid the ladders, so when the police arrived they could not figure 
                                            
676
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out how the KMV activists had managed to get up there. The police’s own ladders 
were too short for them to reach the top of the prison wall and bring down those 
who were sitting there, something which added to the amusement. KMV had 
several activists who were experienced in working with the media, and they had 
informed journalists whom they trusted that if they turned up at the prison at a 
certain time, something interesting was going to happen.680 Officially the action 
was carried out by S.I.N, but judging from the KMV newsletter’s references to the 
event, KMV felt very much responsible for it. The overlap between KMV and S.I.N 
is also confirmed by Johansen and Solberg.    
A year later, a new jail-in was staged by S.I.N. This time it was for Rune Berg, 
another selective objector who was serving time.681 A third jail-in was carried out 
on May 3 1987 in support of Bjørn Eggen who was on his second hunger strike. 
Four people jumped into the prison yard of Oslo Kretsfengsel and 8 others 
occupied the prison wall.682 Eggen had completed his compulsory military service 
and four repeat exercises, but then became a principled total resister and was sent 
to prison for 143 days after his §20 hearing. Already in March 1987 he was taken 
to prison and went on a hunger strike. After 29 days his deteriorating health forced 
the prison authorities to bring him to hospital. Either a misunderstanding or a 
deliberate deception led Eggen to believe that he would be released and he started 
to eat again. When it turned out that he would instead be taken back to prison, he 
escaped from the hospital. During these months in 1987 Eggen’s hunger strike, the 
jail-in and another support action where 7 people locked themselves to a pillar 
outside of the government building in Oslo generated much media attention for the 
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total resisters and KMV.683 Solberg also remembers that KMV activists at some 
point organised a 24 hour vigil outside of the prison with torches, and that for 
several weeks there was a 24 hour presence outside of the government building in 
order to show support for Eggen.684  
Hunger strikes were a way for the total resisters to bring attention to their cases 
once they were in prison, and several others before Eggen had been on hunger 
strikes and managed to get out using this method.685 
KMV’s second type of humorous political stunt took place on September 12 
1983686, a few months after the first jail-in in order to gain attention for the case of 
Øyvind Solberg. He was a lawyer by profession, an attorney for many of the total 
resisters and also one of the driving forces in KMV. Solberg did three months of his 
military service in the late 1960’s after finishing law school, and says that he 
actually enjoyed the military training then. Because he had three children he 
obtained a postponement for the rest of his service, and he claims to have been a 
quite conservative law student. It was not until 1973-74 that he became radicalised 
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and was drawn into anarchist and radical law circles. Only then did he start thinking 
seriously about militarism and conscription and realised that it was “completely 
hopeless” and that “I really can’t be part of this”.687 When he was called up for a 
repetition exercise in the mid 1970’s his pacifism had matured and he applied to 
become a conscientious objector. At that time he did not consider total resistance; 
that idea only started to form after he met other total resisters in FMK in 1979.  
The conscription system moved slowly, and anyone who did not cooperate with the 
system could drag their cases out for years by ignoring letters and not showing up 
for the substitute service. Solberg’s §20 hearing did not come up until 1983. Then 
he called his friend Jørgen Johansen and said “I would like you to be in court with 
me, I need your help”. Johansen replied “Sure, I will come with you, but you are a 
lawyer, so you can defend yourself?” To Johansen’s surprise, Solberg replied “No, 
no, I already have a defence lawyer, I would like to have you as the prosecutor!” At 
first Johansen thought that would not be possible to organise, but the real 
prosecutors seldom bothered to show up for the §20 hearings, because the result 
was not negotiable, always 16 months in prison. This was a fact that annoyed the 
activists in KMV a lot, and one of the reasons Solberg had the idea for this stunt. 
Johansen says “we were annoyed that the prosecutor did not show up in these 
cases, it all went so automatic that they did not bother to come”. Solberg explains 
that “at the time, I had the idea that if you are going to do something, what if 
everything was turned upside down?” He had not heard about anyone who ever 
tried to do anything similar, but liked Monthy Python’s humour and tried to apply a 
similar approach to political activism. Many people have a privately engaged 
lawyer, but Solberg is the only Norwegian who has ever had a privately engaged 
prosecutor.  
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Illustration 28. Arbeiderbladet’s front page after the prosecutor case 
became public. The heading says “Played prosecutor”. Arbeiderbladet, 
September 19 1983. 
Johansen borrowed a prosecutor robe and turned up in court, where he was sitting 
at the prosecutor’s place when the judges turned up. There the judge asked “are 
you new here?”, which Johansen could say yes to without lying. Johansen, who 
had long hair and a big beard, had done his best to tame it with hair pins and look 
respectable. Solberg had prepared a script for Johansen for the court proceedings, 
and because Solberg had himself worked as both a judge and a prosecutor after 
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law school he knew which details to include in order to make the performance 
convincing. In court, nobody noticed that anything was wrong, and the proceedings 
went on for two hours. The whole event was filmed by KMV, and Johansen did 
indeed look very serious and convincing during the proceedings. Nevertheless, 
some of the things he said were rather outrageous. In his parody of the prosecutor, 
Johansen demanded that since Solberg was a lawyer, he ought to serve almost 
four times as long in prison as the police had initially demanded. Because Solberg 
had served part of his military service, he was facing 96 days under the 
administration of the prison authorities. Johansen demanded that he get 376 
days.688 Nevertheless, the judge did not notice anything wrong and it was KMV 
itself that told the press about the fake prosecutor.  
At first, KMV was not sure what to do with the film, and it took almost a week 
before the story hit the media. But it exploded when part of KMV’s film was shown 
as the major story of the 7pm news, Dagsrevyen. In 1983 Norway only had one TV 
channel called NRK, and “everyone” was watching that particular news broadcast.  
The reporter introduced the two and a half minute story with “Last Monday Oslo 
byrett [Oslo court] was tricked by a fake prosecutor in a case about a conscientious 
objector.”689 In studio he continued with some of the facts in the case, and then 
part of the film was shown while Johansen was introduced. The speaker said about 
him that “he went to extremes and demanded a longer time in prison than what the 
police had asked for. He played his role so convincingly that the judge did not 
expose him.” The voiceover added that the judge had told Dagsrevyen that the 
prosecutor did not say much, that there was little juridical argumentation and that 
was why he did not react. The broadcast then continued with an interview with 
Solberg in the studio. The interviewer asked the reason for showing up with a fake 
prosecutor, and Solberg replied: “The whole point was to show that the court 
system in these cases is a parody of a proper court system.” Solberg explained the 
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arrangement with the 16 months in prison and how the court really had no choice 
about how to rule. The journalist finished off with asking “you are yourself a lawyer. 
Is it not a violation of the court’s dignity to do something like this?” Solberg got the 
last word with his reply “In my opinion it is the court that has violated my dignity 
when I’m dragged in front of a court which is such a parody.”690 
When the deception was revealed, both Johansen and the judge were interviewed 
by several of the national Norwegian newspapers. The judge is quoted for saying  
I was shocked when I heard what had happened. All my 
colleagues have reacted strongly and want Oslo byrett [Oslo 
court] to take action. I will report the case to the police and the 
department of justice.691  
When asked by the journalist whether he had any suspicions, the judge said: “No, 
usually this is routine cases. ‘The prosecutor’ gave a plausible explanation for 
showing up, something the police usually don’t do in these cases.” The newspaper 
finished the article paraphrasing the judge: “he [the judge] admits that ‘the 
prosecutor’ seemed convincing when he in a trustworthy way argued that Solberg’s 
time in prison should be expanded compared to the police demand.”692 
For KMV, it was all about the possibility to show what a farce the court cases were. 
Solberg expressed it directly in the interview in NRK – they considered the court a 
parody of a proper court system and wanted to expose that. In a newspaper article, 
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Solberg and Johansen were also quoted as saying that they hoped a case would 
be raised against them. Johansen said:  
We hope there will be a case against us, so that we can show what 
happens to us conscientious objectors. I take responsibility for 
what I have done and I’m prepared to be punished for it. Most 
likely I will demand to get the law’s harshest punishment.693     
The point about demanding the harshest punishment was a Gandhi-inspired 
approach designed to show that he really was prepared to take responsibility for 
his actions. At first, Johansen and Solberg had their hopes fulfilled. The court filed 
a report to the police against both of them as well as Solberg’s lawyer Wulfberg.694  
In his report of the event, judge Alfsen described the proceedings differently from 
what Johansen and Solberg remember. Alfsen thought that Johansen did not say 
much, and that there was nothing unusual in what he said: 
At the start of the court procedure on September 12 a person 
dressed in a black lawyer robe appeared and let the recording 
clerk understand that after the police had been informed that a 
defence lawyer would participate (what usually does not happen in 
this kind of cases), they had decided to participate as well. The 
person sat down at the prosecutor’s usual place. Because of the 
information the person had given, the recording clerk wrote 
“public prosecutor Jørgen Johansen” on the piece of paper with the 
names of those who appear in court at the table of the court (…) 
Jørgen Johansen de facto performed as the prosecutor in the case. 
He did not engage in any legal argumentation against the relative 
substantial pleas made by Solberg and lawyer Wulfsberg, since he 
“was not prepared for this”.695  
Alfsen wrote that Johansen, Solberg and Wulfberg had violated several paragraphs 
in the criminal code and courts act696 for “unauthorised exercise of official authority” 
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or assisting in this, and they had shown contempt for the court. Alfsen’s superior 
used this report to report Johansen, Solberg and Wulfberg to the police the day 
after the deception was first revealed in newspapers and on national TV.697     
Solberg came close to losing his right to practice as a lawyer, but got away with a 
“serious warning” from the department of justice because he assisted Johansen in 
impersonating the prosecutor.698 However, even the highest placed civil servant in 
the department of justice, Departementsråd Leif Eldring, could see the comic side 
of the case according to the well-respected newspaper Aftenposten.699  
The legal proceedings against all three were dismissed for lack of evidence, 
although both Johansen and Solberg requested that they be tried in court. Both 
argued that it was in their interest to be tried, Solberg because he had no 
possibility of appealing the warning he had received700, and Johansen because of 
the “harassment” he had been met with in the mass media.701 However, none of 
them heard back from the police. The main reason they would have liked to have a 
trial was of course the possibility of generating more publicity about the total 
resisters.702 
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In Johansen’s and Solberg’s opinion, most people that heard about this stunt really 
liked it and thought it was good fun. They have only heard one person being 
sceptical about it – a FMK member who thought the deception was not in the spirit 
of Gandhian nonviolence because deceiving the court betrayed the principle of 
honesty.  
Meanwhile, different kinds of spectacular dramas in the courts continued. On 
November 16 1983, Knut Solberg, another principled total resister (not related with 
Øyvind Solberg) had his court case in Oslo. He started out with three demands to 
the judges: 1. The judges had to be willing to make an independent decision in this 
case.  2. The judges had to promise to follow their conscience, and not just rule 
according to the laws. 3. The judges also had to promise to take Solberg’s 
conscience into consideration so that they together could make an ethical ruling in 
the case. The main judge dismissed these demands straight away, which made 
Knut Solberg state that he considered this response very arrogant, and that he did 
not have any confidence in the court. He and the audience then proceeded with the 
court hearing, while the judges and the prosecutor left “for a break”. After a while 
they came back with the police, and declared that everyone in the audience was 
expelled. Both the audience and Knut Solberg left voluntarily in order to finish their 
version of the protocol somewhere else, while the hearing inside finished without 
Solberg being present.703    
In May 1984, the principled total resister Harald Eraker set fire to his conscription 
book during his court hearing with these words:  
This is not a real court case. Neither they nor I have any kind of 
influence on what happens. I will be given 16 months in prison 
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anyway, and for me there is no purpose in testifying. Therefore I 
will not cooperate any more in this case.704  
Five other activists were in the court to support Eraker. They carried a banner 
saying “stop the court parody. Remove §20”. The action was covered by a national 
Norwegian newspaper and the report included a big photo of the burning of the 
conscription book, the activists and the banner. Eraker was interviewed at length 
about his conscientious objection and the newspaper article also included a quote 
about how he considered the courts a parody: 
This is not a court case. I will be told that I’m going to prison for 
16 months, but I could have received that in a letter. Instead they 
dress this in a legal frame. The only thing the judge has to do is to 
establish that I’m Harald Eraker and that I refuse substitute 
service.705  
The article also showed that the total resisters now had established a reputation 
and were known to the press. The journalist wrote that the events in court “are the 
latest in a number of actions in connection with court cases against conscientious 
objectors”.706 
Numerous other actions were carried out in connection with the §20 court cases. 
The activities are only mentioned briefly in KMV documents, but show a steady 
flow of efforts to expose the parodies of the §20 hearings and in other ways bring 
attention to the total resisters. On October 24, 1986 Dag Olav Sivertsen burned his 
conscription book in Oslo byrett.707 Jan Otto Nilsen made a funeral for §20 out of 
his hearing when he tore the page with the paragraph out of the law book, burned it 
inside the court and later tried to bury it on the lawn outside of the Norwegian 
government building. However, the guards came running and he did not manage to 
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actually get §20 in the ground.708 On November 20 1986 total resister Morten 
Rønning and the audience showed up for his §20 hearing dressed as clowns under 
the motto “§20 is a parody”. The event is described in the newsletter: 
And parody it became! The clowns came up with so much silliness 
and antics that the police were called and the clowns expelled. The 
conclusion was that you don’t get more fun than what you make 
yourself. Wonder who will be the next judge who voluntarily takes 
a total resister case?709  
Solberg also remembers a clowning episode, but is not sure if it was the same or 
another event where Morten Rønning was using a red clown nose. Every time 
someone said “§20”, Rønning would stand up, grab the red nose on his face and 
move the nose to and from his face while he in a mocking, high pitched voice 
repeated “§20, §20, §20”. Solberg noticed how the two lay judges were struggling 
to prevent themselves from smiling, while the main judge looked gravely at Solberg 
and said “do you have anything to do with this, lawyer Solberg?”  
Other occasions than the court hearings were also used to create a spectacle. 
During a parliamentary hearing about conscription in Norway in 1985 some total 
resisters came to listen to the debate dressed in prison uniforms. The two or three 
times resisters were referred to in the debate they stood up.710  
In 1988 KMV produced a poster with the heading “Wanted”. It showed 24 smiling 
young men and the time they were going to spend in prison for their conscientious 
objection. The text underneath the photos said: 
Here are 24 of the almost 200 conscientious objectors who are 
going to prison in Norway. Six of them have been summoned to  
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Illustration 29. KMV poster from 1988. Under the heading “Wanted” it 
shows 24 men and the time they were going to spend in prison for their 
conscientious objection. 
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prison, but have evaded. They are considered dangerous because 
they are expected to resist with nonviolent means. They are all 
supporters of nonviolence and freedom of conscience, and work 
for a nonviolent alternative to the military defence. It is important 
that they are arrested and sent to prison before such ideas are 
spread. Possible information about the wanted should be given to 
the department of justice or to the nearest police authority.711 
December 1 is recognised as international day for prisoners for peace, and for 
some years KMV in Norway marked this by inviting people to burn their 
conscription books in front of the parliament. The event in 1989 was documented in 
the newsletter. Next to two banners saying “The parliament is arming, we disarm” 
and “conscription books to be burned here” they kept a fire going. Solberg 
remembers that they had made sure in advance that someone who still had a 
conscription book would turn up and burn it. But out of the blue, people they did not 
know at all just came by, threw their conscription books in the fire and left without a 
word.712 One report of the event said that the conscription books with their plastic 
cover gave a thick, black smoke,713 while another newspaper reported that 20 
people followed the encouragement to burn their conscription books and that the 
people who did that were all reported to the police.714 Solberg never heard that 
anyone was actually prosecuted for burning his conscription book715, so it might 
well be another case which was dismissed for “lack of evidence”. 
To sum up on KMV’s spectacular events, they included the humorous political 
stunts with the fake prosecutor, the jail-ins and the clowning. In addition, 
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conscription book burnings and the funeral procession in court were spectacular 
and attention grabbing, but not humorous. Looking at the number of events, this 
strategy appears to have been KMV’s preferred choice, something which was also 
confirmed in the interviews. In the analysis below I investigate what role the 
humorous political stunts played for KMV’s success in changing Norway’s law on 
conscientious objection. 
The Norwegian authorities responded to the strategy of creating a spectacle in 
numerous ways, but the design of the actions meant that it seldom was possible to 
ignore the total resisters completely. Frequently the police were brought in to arrest 
the total resisters and/or their supporters and remove them from the court room or 
the prison walls. At other times the police only became involved after the event 
when charges were pressed against the total resisters, for instance with regard to 
the fake prosecutor.  
Jensen remembers that in the department of justice he and his colleagues were 
aware that “[the total resisters] made quite some noise” as he spontaneously called 
it, and he remembers the case with the fake prosecutor. When asked what he 
thought about it he said: ”Nothing else than that we had a quite relaxed attitude to 
it. What was problematic were [the selective objectors] who were not exempted 
from military service.”716 
There is no reason to doubt Jensen regarding the department of justice’s position 
when it came to the spectacular events. Although they were responsible for the 
conscientious objectors’ cases, it was the courts and prison authorities who were 
first in line when KMV took action. It would have been very interesting to have data 
about the reactions from both the juridical and lay judges who witnessed all these 
actions, but unfortunately such an investigation would be very difficult to carry out 
after so many years. However, even if the department of justice did not have to 
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deal directly with the spectacular actions, the situation was different when it came 
to KMV’s legal strategy of suing the Norwegian state.   
Using the courts  
In parallel with the spectacular actions which exposed the court hearings as a 
farce, KMV attempted to use the court system to expose the state rationally as 
well. However, contrary to many other organisations that pursue a legal strategy, 
KMV did not see this as the only possible course of action, and the legal strategy 
was combined with a successful media strategy. 
Norenius from Sweden was the first of the total resisters from KMV to apply to the 
European Commission of Human Rights at the Council of Europe. He was one of 
the late refusers who had done his military service. When he was called up in 
1963, he decided to do his 10 months with an open mind, but when I interviewed 
him he said that “if I wasn’t an anti-militarist before, I became one”. The first time 
he was called up for his repetition exercise he received a postponement because 
he was studying, but when it was time for the second repetition he refused to 
participate. According to the practice of the time he was convicted to one month in 
prison for this “severe refusal to accept orders”.717 The next time he refused his 
repetition exercise he was first convicted to two months in prison, but when he 
appealed the higher court lowered it to one month again. Because he refused to 
work while in prison he was sent to a high security prison, something he referred to 
as “the university of life”.718  
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Illustration 30. The text in this drawing says “pacifist” for the prisoner to 
the right. Underneath it says “You are imprisoned for murder, and I for 
refusing to kill”. Norenius referred to this cartoon and said “And this was 
true in Sweden in 1984, I was doing time together with murderers”. The 
origin of the drawing is unknown.719  
After being denied the opportunity to have his case heard by the Supreme Court in 
Sweden, Norenius complained to the European Commission of Human Rights. His 
argument was that his total resistance was treated differently than that of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses because they were automatically exempted from both 
compulsory military service and substitute service in Sweden.720 He considered it 
discrimination when those who were basing their total resistance on religious 
grounds received a different treatment compared to him and others with political 
motivations whose total resistance led to fines and a prison sentence.721 Not 
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surprisingly for Norenius, his case was dismissed by the commission. The 
explanation for the dismissal was that membership in Jehovah’s Witnesses was 
convincing evidence that someone held strong religious believes preventing him 
from performing any compulsory service. According to the commission no similar 
evidence could be found in other cases, and the Swedish state’s need for 
conscripts was reason enough to convict non-religious total resisters to prison.722 
When I asked how KMV decided which cases to take to court, the driving force 
seems to have been individual persistence rather than a collective decision about 
which case would have a chance. Norenius said that “here it is oneself who 
chooses. It was not the campaign as such [that decided], it was more about 
someone who wanted to try.” However, once someone decided to go ahead it 
appears to have been self-evident that he would receive the support of the 
campaign. 
While Norenius’ case regarding the Swedish conditions was still under 
consideration, Johansen took his case to the same European Commission of 
Human Rights at the Council of Europe with a different argumentation and referring 
to Norwegian conditions. Johansen’s original court hearing had happened in April 
1982. After that, he appealed to the Supreme Court in Norway, but the case was 
dismissed in November the same year. Johansen had still not been summoned to 
camp Dillingøy, but on May 4 1983 applied to the European Commission of Human 
Rights to consider his case a violation of several articles of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.723 In May 1984 the commission decided to ask the 
                                            
722
 The commission wrote: ”It is understandable therefore, if national authorities are restrictive in 
exempting total resisters from any kind of service, the purpose being to avoid the risk that 
individuals who simply wish to escape service could do so by pretending to have objections of 
conscience against compulsory service in general.” KMV, "Rundbrev 11," p. 7. 
723
 European Commission of Human Rights, "Decision of the Commission as to the Admissibility 
Application No. 10600/83 by Jørgen Johansen against Norway," in 10600/83 (Strasbourg1985). The 
“European Convention on Human Rights” is the short version of the name. The full name is 
“Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” 
410 
 
Norwegian state for a written explanation, but only regarding article 5.724 This 
article of the Convention about “Right to liberty and security” states in §1 that:  
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one 
shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in 
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: 
(…) 
(b) the  lawful  arrest  or  detention  of  a  person  for  
noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to 
secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; 725   
Johansen and his lawyer Øyvind Solberg argued that there must be a limitation to 
this, and that “the effect of the present Norwegian law is that a certain group of 
men must be imprisoned for sixteen months”.726 
Johansen’s case at the European Commission of Human Rights was first 
mentioned in a national Norwegian newspaper June 24 1984, when the 
commission asked the Norwegian state to give a written explanation about its 
practice.727 It became a rather big case on March 9, 1985, when it became known 
that the commission had asked the Norwegian state to appear before the 
commission in order to explain its practice728, and the Norwegian state immediately 
stopped imprisonment of the principled total resisters while the case was 
pending.729 Only one other case against the Norwegian state had ever been 
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considered for admission by the commission, so this was an important case that 
officials took very seriously.730  
That the case was important for the Norwegian state was confirmed by Jensen. 
When asked if the case was embarrassing for Norway, he said:  
Not embarrassing, no, not to go there, but of course quite a lot of 
prestige was at stake when you are dragged to the European 
Commission of Human Rights. If the commission had found that 
Norway’s praxis was contrary to international law, then of course 
it would have been problematic. (…) There is no doubt that from 
the state’s side, quite a lot of effort was invested in the case (…) 
when the case was taken to Strasbourg and [the commission] 
accepted to take it, it was time to start working.731 
Although Jensen did not agree that it was embarrassing for the government, he left 
no doubt that the case was important for the Norwegian state in terms of prestige 
and the time spent on it. 
The actual meeting took place on October 14 1985. Since the Norwegian state was 
sending five representatives, Johansen and Solberg decided to bring two other 
lawyers with them. For the local newspaper in the town where Johansen had had 
his first court hearing in 1982, Sarpsborg Arbeiderblad, this was such a major 
event that it decided to send a journalist to Strasbourg to cover the case. In an 
interview a few days before the hearing, Solberg showed great optimism about the 
prospects for the case to succeed. Johansen expressed his ambivalence towards 
the court system and probably spoke for many in KMV when he said:  
- I cannot escape the feeling that this is more a game about 
paragraphs than a question of justice, says Jørgen Johansen in a 
comment. – After all, it is 21 European governments that finance 
the commission and [they] presumably wish to safeguard the 
states’ interests. Personally I make a clear distinction between law 
and justice, but hope that this case is such a clear breach of the 
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Convention on Human Rights that it is unavoidable to get a fair 
judgement. As an anarchist it is fun to get permission to negotiate 
with the state. That has probably never happened before either for 
anarchists or for peace movements. At least the state has been 
forced to the table to talk, says Jørgen Johansen.732  
However, the optimistic quotes in the newspapers are with all likelihood part of 
involving media in the spectacle. In the minutes of the KMV grand meeting held on 
January 1st 1985, it says “Jørgen Johansen has little hope of winning in the 
European Council which he calls just as corrupt as the Norwegian court system”733. 
It seems fair to assume that the minutes present a more honest attitude than what 
Johansen told the journalist. 
The newspaper that quoted Johansen’s ambivalence about the commission’s 
ability to make a fair judgement also states that: “The Norwegian state also 
obviously considers the case very serious. The delegation has now been expanded 
from five to six participants.” It continues to list the names of the highly ranked civil 
servants from the ministry of justice and the ministry of foreign affairs.734    
The Commission of Human Rights spent 5 hours deliberating the case, but in the 
end it was considered inadmissible. Solberg was terribly disappointed, although he 
had not expected to win, he had been fairly certain that at least it would be 
considered by the commission. The announcement that the case was inadmissible 
was given straight after the deliberations, but it took some months before the 
explanation for the decision was released. In this period all that was public was that 
Johansen’s complaint had been dismissed, but no one knew why.735  
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When the decision from the commission was released in December 1985, it 
became clear that the commission had accepted the arguments of the Norwegian 
state. The time Johansen would spend in prison could not be considered a 
punishment since he would be released if he changed his mind and decided to 
perform the substitute service. 
The commission considers that there is a difference in the 
character of the detention in the applicant’s case as compared 
with detention after conviction. The applicant may at any time be 
released, provided that he changes his attitude. This fact may be 
of little interest to the applicant, but it distinguishes his detention 
from normal incarceration following a criminal conviction.736 
Around 8-10 principled total resisters who had had their court hearings were now 
facing 16 months in prison. In spite of the defeat in Strasbourg, KMV decided to 
continue pursuing the path of the courts. Already in 1982, KMV had raised a case 
against the state, claiming that the imprisonment of the principled total resisters 
was a breach with the Norwegian Constitution’s article 96 which prohibits 
punishments without a judgement.737 This case was dismissed by the court 
because no individual total resister was named, and the court could not make a 
judgement just because an organisation thought it was unconstitutional.738  
In May 1986, two of the people who had been summoned to prison decided to 
pursue this path again and filed charges against the Norwegian state at the court in 
Oslo. Bjørn Bremnes and Tom Nilsen claimed that the state was violating article 96 
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of the Constitution. While the case was under consideration, the department of 
justice decided that no principled total resisters should be imprisoned.739  
Because of the ruling in Strasbourg, Solberg knew what line of argument the 
representatives of the Norwegian state were most likely to pursue. He decided to 
sharpen his argumentation around the issue of the “choice” that the state claimed 
the total resisters had to change their mind and perform the substitute service. 
Solberg remembers that he made a comparison with the way the Nazis in 
Germany had told members of Jehovah’s Witnesses that they could just change 
their faith, and then they would not be required to go to the concentration camps.740 
KMV also called Nils Christie, a famous Norwegian professor of criminology, as 
one of their witnesses. He testified that although the total resisters were not 
technically punished according to the Norwegian state, in reality their time in prison 
resembled that of other prisoners in all respects. And in the Norwegian criminal 
law, you had to have committed quite serious crimes in order to be sentenced to 16 
months imprisonment. Compared to many other places, Norway had (and still has) 
a rather liberal prison policy. 
Oslo court decided on the case January 12-13 1987, and did not find any violation 
of the constitution. The conclusion was the same as in Strasbourg; the total 
resisters would be released as soon as they changed their minds.741 KMV 
appealed the decision, and it took another two years before the case was heard in 
January 1989 in Eidsivating Lagmannsrett.742 The court had seven judges – three 
of them had a law degree and four of them were lay judges with no judicial 
background. Six of the seven judges agreed with the earlier ruling, but one of the 
lay judges dissented, something which according to Solberg was very important.  
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KMV activists lost in all the cases where they tried to challenge the Swedish and 
Norwegian states with legal means. That the courts uphold the status quo in cases 
like this is no surprise. Many social movements that have tried to battle states and 
big business with legal means discover that the court system is geared towards 
protecting those with money and power rather than being an institution where 
“justice prevails”.743   
However, in spite of losing the legal battle, KMV in Norway was still successful in 
using the cases to generate attention. Below it will become apparent how big a role 
these cases played in changing the law. Not only did they stall the imprisonment 
while they were pending, they also drew the civil servants’ attention to the 
problems with the law. 
Solidarity 
In addition to the two main strategies of creating a spectacle around their cases 
and using the courts to challenge the state, KMV’s activities also reflected other 
ways of working. One of them was solidarity with conscientious objectors and 
especially total resisters in other parts of the world as well as within Scandinavia. 
KMV activists advised other potential total resisters about the consequences of 
different types of refusal. In some periods this was organised as a service with 
special phone numbers and people on duty to receive calls744, at other times it was 
more sporadic.  
Several times it was also suggested to establish a symbolic “refugee camp” in 
Sweden for Norwegian total resisters. It was discussed during the grand meeting in 
June 1982, where two different strategies were suggested: a permanent “refugee 
camp” as a community, or a tent camp during the summer of 1983. Norenius and 
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his partner offered their house as a place for such a community,745 and their letter 
also outlined the logic which must have been discussed during the June 1982 
meeting. They wrote: 
At the meeting at Seletun, Bergen, last summer we discussed the 
possibilities for opening a “refugee camp” in Sweden for 
Norwegian total resisters. Admittedly, total resistance is a crime 
both in Norway and in Sweden, and there exists an extradition 
treaty between the two countries. However, the point is that the 
Norwegian total resisters have not been convicted, and hence 
ought not to be extradited.746 
KMV was assuming that the fact that the total resisters in Norway were not 
convicted in a regular trial, but “just” serving their substitute service in an institution 
under the administration of the prison authorities, would prevent the authorities 
from using the regular extradition system between the two countries. Apparently no 
one took up the offer from Norenius and his partner, as the plans for a permanent 
refugee camp never went ahead.747 When interviewed, Norenius reflected on the 
limitation of letting the Norwegian resisters stay with friends in Sweden on an 
individual basis. 
It’s an idea, but it costs quite a lot in terms of resources. Of 
course you could let these young Norwegian men come to Sweden 
and stay with friends and they would also be able to work and so, 
but then you don’t get this refugee camp effect, it does not 
become a political question. It becomes support of an individual 
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and that is good, but the issue [of conscription] you don’t get 
anywhere with.748    
Here it becomes apparent that even when it came to solidarity work, KMV was still 
thinking in terms of using the refugee camp to generate publicity and making a 
spectacle around the total resisters. 
In July 1983 it was announced to have a symbolic tent camp in Krokstrand on the 
Swedish west coast, close to the border. A Norwegian journalist who visited 
reported that 16 Norwegian total resisters participated, but in spite of the 
newspaper’s reference to these “sensational plans”749, the camp did not have any 
political significance for KMV. 
Another type of solidarity work was with conscientious objectors and especially 
total resisters in other parts of the world. The KMV newsletter frequently had 
updates about new and ongoing cases and legal developments in countries such 
as West Germany, Poland, South Africa, Greece, France and Spain. This type of 
solidarity also went the other way. When Norenius refused to perform his repetition 
exercise he received several letters of sympathy. During the court procedure the 
judge read several letters out loud; one came from Argentina and demanded that 
Norenius be acquitted. The support appeared to have meant much to Norenius: the 
letter from Argentina was something he mentioned spontaneously when talking 
about his own case.  
On a few occasions, the KMV newsletter reported on actions in sympathy with the 
Norwegian principled total resisters. In August 1985, in connection with a march for 
nonviolence in Denmark, some actions were carried out to show sympathy with 
total resisters. The group considered the conditions for conscientious objectors 
worst in Spain, France and Norway, and wanted to occupy their embassies in 
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Copenhagen.750 At the Norwegian embassy, some protesters climbed up with a 
banner outside, while others found their way to an entryway which they blocked. 
They were careful to let through people who wanted to apply for a visa or other 
services, but not the staff.  
Norenius who participated at the Norwegian embassy thinks that somewhere 
between 10 and 15 people took part. He remembers it as a fun and successful 
nonviolent direct action. “It all went really well, and there was never any expression 
of hatred or heated atmosphere.” To him, it was an example of how nonviolence 
changed how others perceived the situation. The first sign of the police they saw 
were two or four policemen in their short sleeved summer uniforms and 
characteristic police caps. They sat down and chatted with the occupiers while they 
waited for backup. When the backup arrived they could all hear the sirens from a 
distance, and out poured the police in full riot gear with helmets, shields and 
machineguns, lining up in a row. When the person in charge had been briefed 
about the situation, he gave an order, and all the police went to change into what 
Norenius called “almost civilian cloth” – the short sleeved shirts and usual caps. 
Norenius was the designated negotiator, since he knew the Norwegian case quite 
well. The demand for all three occupations was “Freedom for all conscientious 
objectors”, and at the Norwegian embassy they demanded to talk to the 
ambassador. In an article about the event that Norenius wrote for a Swedish 
newspaper, he said that they managed to have a “real political debate” with the 
employees at the embassy. Altogether the Norwegian embassy was occupied for 
two hours and twenty minutes before all the occupiers were carried out to a police 
bus. When they were released from police custody one by one during the evening, 
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the cheers and celebrations outside of the police house increased. As far as 
Norenius remembers they got a lot of positive media coverage of the event.751  
Another international solidarity action took place in October the same year. When 
Johansen’s case was up for consideration in Strasbourg, Spanish total resisters 
held a demonstration outside the Norwegian Embassy in Madrid. The newsletter 
also reprinted articles in French and Flemish about the situation for the Norwegian 
total resisters.752  
Such solidarity actions were with all likelihood reported home to Oslo by the 
embassies, but it is difficult to know if they had any impact, since they are not 
referred to in the department of justice’s suggestion to change the law on 
conscientious objection. However, it helped the Norwegian total resisters feel that 
they were not alone and not forgotten.  
KMV also sought solidarity from Amnesty International, but the relationship was 
ambivalent. Amnesty International works for respect for human rights and amnesty 
for political prisoners, and until 1979 it recognised the total resisters as prisoners of 
conscience.753 Then the organisation made it clear that it accepted conscription 
and it was only the selective objectors who declared that they were willing to 
perform the substitute service but not granted the status of conscientious objector 
that were considered prisoners of conscience by Amnesty International.  
In 1986 selective objector Ulf Alstad was recognised as a prisoner of conscience 
by Amnesty International when he was serving his second prison sentence. This 
recognition was reported in Aftenposten, one of the major Norwegian 
newspapers.754 A group of people from KMV and S.I.N did a solidarity action 
outside of the department of justice while Alstad was in prison. They climbed into a 
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couple of trees with a banner saying “Amnesty demands: Set Ulf Alstad free”. In 
addition they requested to talk to the minister of justice. That demand was not 
heard but they were promised that if they climbed down and cleaned up after 
themselves they could meet with the minister’s Secretary of State the next day, 
something they accepted. However, Amnesty International did not like the way 
KMV and S.I.N had used its name. In a subsequent meeting with Amnesty’s 
section in Norway, KMV agreed not to use slogans at future events which could be 
misinterpreted as if Amnesty International was the organiser.755 
Amnesty International had (and still has) a very high standing in Norwegian 
society, and when Norway ended up on Amnesty’s list of countries that violate 
human rights because of its treatment of the selective objectors, it became news. 
For instance, in 1987 it was covered by a national Norwegian newspaper that Lars 
Aasen, a selective objector, had been adopted as a prisoner of conscience by local 
Amnesty groups in the Netherlands, Austria and Great Britain.756 Johansen and 
Solberg explained that when the selective objectors had been accepted as 
prisoners of conscience they were “playing in a completely different league”, that 
generated media attention because of Amnesty’s status, and then the spectacular 
actions became superfluous.  
This view is also confirmed by Jensen who remembers that the total resisters were 
not a concern at the department of justice, just something they had to “manage”. 
The selective objectors who were adopted by Amnesty, on the other hand, were a 
totally different matter: 
What were a little touchy were those who were adopted by 
Amnesty as prisoners of conscience. That Norway ended up on 
Amnesty’s list of countries that had prisoners of conscience was 
troublesome in itself. That was a little sensitive, but apart from 
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that group [of selective objectors], everything about the 
conscientious objectors was something that just had to be 
managed.757  
KMV frequently pointed out what they considered Norwegian politicians’ double 
standards – that when Amnesty International criticised other countries that was 
something good, but when the organisation pointed towards flaws in Norway’s way 
of treating its conscientious objectors it was something different. A short but 
amusing example of this is when Øyvind Solberg met and talked with the 
Norwegian King about the subject “Amnesty International and prisoners of 
conscience in Norway”. In an article titled “Meeting with the boss”, Solberg wrote:  
The King has several times encouraged people to support Amnesty 
International. This can seem uncontroversial, also various 
[Norwegian] governments have given their support to Amnesty’s 
struggle for human rights. The problem is that Amnesty thinks 
that Norwegian authorities violate human rights by imprisoning 
conscientious objectors. Does the King support Amnesty’s demand 
to release Norwegian prisoners of conscience? The King did not 
want to tell. He would rather not talk about the subject at all, 
except that he thought it would be very few conscientious 
objectors who were imprisoned. Therefore we talked about 
something else, like abortion for instance.758   
However, KMV’s relationship with Amnesty International remained ambivalent 
since Amnesty International did not accept the Norwegian principled total resisters 
as prisoners of conscience during the 1980’s. Over the years KMV lobbied for a 
change in Amnesty’s position and participated in some of their meetings in the 
hope of getting Amnesty to take a stand against the treatment of the total resisters. 
They did get support from some people within Amnesty, but nevertheless the 
lobbying remained unsuccessful.759  
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KMV spent quite some time on solidarity work with conscientious objectors in 
prison, and also received some support from abroad. There is a considerable 
overlap between KMV’s and S.I.N’s solidarity work and the spectacular actions. 
The jail-ins for instance can be understood as a show of solidarity, although they 
were primarily constructed to create a spectacle. Had they only been intended as 
an act of solidarity, KMV would not have called journalists in advance.  
Lobbying and participating in the public debate  
The documents that KMV produced give an impression of a group showing 
surprisingly little interest in direct lobbying of decision makers compared to many 
other campaigns and organisations. KMV did write open letters and met with 
politicians and representatives from the authorities, but this activity has not left 
many traces. Compared to the attention given to other types of activities, these 
meetings mainly appear to be mentioned as side remarks hidden among the more 
important business of creating a spectacle around the court hearings and 
imprisonment. For instance, all I have been able to find regarding the meeting with 
the Secretary of State in 1986 mentioned above in connection with Alstad’s case is 
this:  
During ‘the conversation’ the next day we did not get many 
concessions or promises about change, but we presented our view 
and also got some information about the government’s plans and 
attitudes after the Strasbourg case.760  
One can wonder why the “government’s plans and attitudes” did not deserve more 
attention. I suspect that the reason the KMV newsletters reflect so little interest in 
lobbying efforts is that the meetings were experienced as insignificant. The minutes 
of a grand meeting in 1985 describe how KMV representatives met with three 
different political blocs (the liberal-conservatives, the social democrats and the 
socialists) before the parliamentary debate about the conscription system in 
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Norway. In the minutes it says that “None of the political parties wanted any 
change in the law, that was the conclusion of the meetings”.761 
However, attitudes towards lobbying differed from person to person, and especially 
Solberg was an eager participant in the public debate. He wrote a considerable 
number of open letters and letters to the editors of numerous newspapers where 
he argued rationally for KMV’s ideas and a better treatment of the total resisters. 
One of the open letters also reflect KMV’s playful attitude. In 1983, KMV together 
with five other organisations wrote to the King, suggesting a change to the 
traditional speech on New Year’s Eve. Usually the King used the opportunity to 
send a greeting to the country’s armed forces at home and abroad. Reminding the 
King that not everyone serves their service in the armed forces, they suggested 
that he send the greeting to “everyone serving conscription, whether it is in the 
armed forces, in civilian service or in our prisons”.762  
There is not much to sum up regarding KMV’s lobbying activities. They were 
almost non-existent compared to the attempt to create a spectacle and the use of 
legal procedures against the Norwegian state. Below it will also be apparent that 
the law was not changed because of initiatives from the politicians, but because 
the legal strategy in the courts prompted the civil servants in the department of 
justice to look for a less controversial treatment of the total resisters. 
The legal procedures that changed the law  
In June 1990, the parliament changed the legislation that had made it possible to 
serve the substitute service in an institution under the administration of the prison 
authorities, and the new law took effect on January 1 1991.763 At the same time, 
the criteria for being accepted as a conscientious objector were also slightly 
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revised, making it possible for those who objected because of the existence of 
weapons of mass destruction to be recognised as conscientious objectors as well, 
but through a different bill. The activities of KMV and S.I.N described above were 
decisive in bringing about this change. However, the process of discussing and 
deciding on official reports and white papers in order to change laws can be long 
and winding. In this case some of the processes were exceptionally long and 
exceeded the decade that KMV existed as an active campaign. Tracing the 
changes is complicated by the fact that the issues of total resistance and selective 
objection were two very different issues when it came to the laws that regulated 
them.  
In 1974 the Norwegian government decided to appoint a committee whose task 
was to write a Norwegian Official Report on conscription.764 The reason the 
committee was appointed was the rise in the number of both conscientious 
objectors and selective objectors. One of the questions the report was to discuss 
was the criteria for exemption from military service. The committee did not present 
its findings until 1979, and in spite of the report’s more than 350 pages, the 
question of total resistance is barely touched. Only the camps where Jehovah’s 
Witnesses agreed to serve their substitute service after their §20 hearings were 
mentioned. The people who refused this and were sent to serve “under the 
administration of the prison authorities” were indeed very few before 1979, but it is 
noticeable that they were not mentioned at all.  
This official report meant that the parliamentarians in the justice committee 
required a white paper765, which was presented by the department of justice in 
1984, 10 years after the first committee was constituted.766 The white paper 
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discussed the criteria for exemption from military service and how the selective 
objectors were treated. But this report devoted no attention to the issue of total 
resistance, in spite of the fact that KMV had made this a public issue by then.  
The justice committee in the parliament was dominated by representatives from the 
Liberal-Christian government coalition parties. Not surprisingly, the committee was 
divided when it came to the question of expanding the criteria for being exempted 
from military service. The majority was satisfied with the present order and did not 
intend to make it possible for more young men to have their reasons for applying 
for conscientious objector status accepted.767 After a decade of report writing and 
debate the political constellations had changed so much that changes that 
appeared obvious in 1974 were no longer acceptable.  
However, when the justice committee’s suggestion was presented in parliament, it 
was followed by a heated debate that brought up many issues, especially 
concerning the selective objectors. Those who wanted a change were repeatedly 
accused of eroding the idea of conscription and Norway’s defence will.768 
Nevertheless, the debate in parliament revealed that there was still a strong 
opposition to the present law and that the Christian party was about to change its 
position. From the debate it is quite obvious that those politicians in favour of a 
change were especially concerned about the criticism from Amnesty International. 
One parliamentarian even considered it “shameful” for Norway.769 Another 
parliamentarian mentioned that he expected the protests from young men who 
were denied the status of conscientious objector to increase in “numbers and 
intensity”.770 Although the white paper did not discuss the total resisters, their 
existence was also mentioned in the debate by parliamentarians who wanted to 
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remove the possibility to serve the substitute service in prison.771 Since this praxis 
was not mentioned in the document itself, the only explanation for the references to 
total resistance are the total resisters’ own efforts to place their treatment on the 
agenda.  
When Jensen recalled the events from this time, it was obvious that the question of 
selective objection were a much more challenging issue for the department of 
justice than the total resisters. He repeatedly referred to the total resisters as a 
minor issue that the department had to “manage”, and compared the sensitivity of 
the issue to the selective objectors like this: 
When it came to how infected the question was, the issue of 
selective objection was an extremely sensitive political question, in 
comparison to the management of the total resisters (…). [The 
total resisters] were more or less a footnote in comparison.772  
The law changes that were passed in 1990 concerned both §1 which regulated 
who could be considered a conscientious objector and thus mainly affected the 
selective objectors, and §§19 and 20, which concerned the treatment of the total 
resisters. Below I will discuss these two processes separately.   
Changing §1 
Regarding §1, parliamentarians from the socialist party were for several years a 
driving force for expanding the right to conscientious objection. They wanted many 
of those who were considered selective objectors and convicted to prison 
sentences to be recognised as conscientious objectors. According to the 
representatives of the socialist party, there had for several years been a 
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parliamentarian majority in favour of expanding this right, but the government was 
on purpose delaying proposals for change.773 
Already on August 5 1986, Kjellbjørg Lunde as a member of parliament proposed 
that the parliament should order the government to suggest a law change that 
would expand the right to conscientious objection. The committee of justice 
decided against this774, and instead parliament on November 19 1986 sent the 
case to the government for ”investigation and pronouncement”.775 The government 
took a long time to investigate this, and on November 2 1988, an upset Kjellbjørg 
Lunde took the opportunity during question time in parliament to ask about the 
case. When the minister replied that the working group was about to finish its work, 
Lunde reminded the parliament that it was two years ago since the case was sent 
to the government for “investigation”, and a year since the minister was supposed 
to present the findings. “When the minister of justice cannot give a reply a year 
after the case was supposed to have been presented, I consider it pure delaying 
tactics.”776  
The debates about a changed legislation revealed that this was a highly sensitive 
issue that many were concerned about. The discussion was not just about the 
conscience of the limited number of young men who applied to become 
conscientious objectors, but about the risk of weakening the military defence. The 
changes that were finally passed in 1990 made it possible for some of the selective 
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resisters to become conscientious objectors. Those who refused to serve because 
of Norway’s membership in NATO would not experience any changes, but those 
who referred to the existence of nuclear arms or other weapons of mass 
destruction could now become conscientious objectors. 
Changing §§19 and 20 
Total resisters serving their substitute service in an institution under the prison 
administration were regulated by §§19 and 20. Regarding these changes the 
process was different, and the parliamentarians much less involved. The initiative 
to change these paragraphs came from the department of justice, and was first 
mentioned in a proposition to the parliament that suggested a new bill, ot. prp. nr 
39, in February 1989. Because of various delays, the proposal was not discussed 
by the parliament’s justice committee until June 1990777 and finally passed later the 
same month.778  
The suggested change regarding §§19 and 20 was one suggestion among several 
others regarding changes to the law on conscientious objection.779 In the 
proposition to the parliament called ot. prp. 35 it appeared as if the debate that 
KMV had initiated about their treatment being unconstitutional and a violation of 
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their human rights was the main reason why the department suggested these 
changes. The department referred to this criticism and Johansens’s case in 
Strasbourg, but concluded that since KMV activists lost both in Strasbourg and the 
case against the Norwegian state, the parliament was not obliged to change the 
law.780 The suggested law change was introduced in a peculiar way: 
Even if it must be assumed that the arrangement [with serving 
substitute service in prison] is not contrary to International law or 
the Constitution, it is a question whether the present arrangement 
is appropriate.781  
The word “appropriate”782 is a bit peculiar because it does not really say anything. 
Did it mean that the lawyers at the department of justice was aware that they had 
the law on their side, but themselves found it odd to keep people in prison for 16 
months without calling it a punishment? Or did it mean that they were aware that 
KMV were likely to keep making trouble? Or could it be a reference to the solidarity 
actions that had been carried out at Norwegian embassies in Denmark and Spain? 
Since Jensen did not remember the issue of total resistance and details about the 
law change any more, he only commented generally about how the lawyers in the 
department of justice thought at this time: 
This is how it is when you start to approach a grey zone, even if 
you are not crossing the borderline. If there are other solutions 
which mean that you stay clear of being near the borderline, then 
you rather withdraw and find other solutions.    
With this general statement Jensen meant that even if the Norwegian authorities 
had the possibility to continue the “prison without punishment” practice, it was 
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considered near a grey zone since there was so much controversy about it. 
Because another solution was available, the regular trial that KMV demanded, 
proposing this change was a withdrawal from the grey zone. One reason Jensen 
was certain that the case in Strasbourg played an important role for changing §§19 
and 20 is the closeness in time. Although a couple of years passed, he saw this as 
the only possible explanation for the change, and law changes always take time. 
It is obvious that [the case in Strasbourg] brought the question on 
the agenda. So if it was the same type of question, then I think 
you can say quite clearly that there is a connection, I don’t think 
there is any doubt about that.783 
The argument used in the report for abolishing the possibility to serve the 
substitute service in prison reflected what KMV had said for years. It did not seem 
fair that the selective objectors were convicted to an unconditional prison sentence 
of two times 3-4 months in a regular trial, while those who served the substitute 
service spent at least twice as long in prison. The department of justice 
acknowledged that:   
While it can be adduced that compulsory service [in prison] is not 
completely comparable with serving a prison sentence, the reality 
for those concerned is comparatively modest when disregarding 
the economic circumstances. 784    
From a judicial perspective it is notable that this suggestion from the department of 
justice was passed without much comment or discussion. The legislative work 
preceding the conscientious objection law of 1965, Ot prp 42, explicitly said that 
“punishment ought not to be used as a reaction towards conscripts who refuse 
                                            
783
 Interview with Jens Jensen April 2013. 
784
 Justis- og politidepartementet [Department of Justice and Police], "Ot Prp Nr 35 (1989-1990) Om 
Lov Om Endringer I Lov 19 Mars 1965 Nr 3 Om Fritaking for Militærtjeneste Av 
Overbevisningsgrunner Og Militær Straffelov 22 Mai 1902 Nr 13," p. 6. 
431 
 
substitute service on principled reasons.”785 That is, no person refusing substitute 
service because of his conviction should be punished. In light of the fact that 
previous lawmakers explicitly had declared that total resistance should not be 
punished, it was quite drastic to turn it into a crime in 1990. The lack of debate is a 
clear indication that most people probably had considered the 16 months in prison 
a punishment in spite of the official terminology. There did not seem to be any 
reason to discuss the principles when the result of the change was a considerably 
shorter time in prison.  
Jensen explained that the law did not operate in a vacuum, but followed trends and 
developments in society. So although he agreed that it was a big principle change 
to go from no punishment to convicting people to time in prison, “legislation adapts 
to the situations and questions that appear”786. I asked Jensen if it was unusual 
that a law change was suggested by the department of justice, but he said that:  
It was not an exceptional way of doing it. In cases when problems 
and questions press their way forward without any commissions 
having written a word about it, it is done this way. So I wouldn’t 
say it was extraordinary. It is when things start to get 
troublesome for the government and they see that here there 
might be reason to make a change that they present a report and 
this is probably what happened here.787  
A united justice committee supported the suggestion from the department of justice 
regarding the changes to §§19 and 20 with the remark that the practice of serving 
substitute service in prison was “unfortunate on principle” and continued “Even if 
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forced service in prison is not imprisonment, the difference in reality is small for the 
person concerned.”788  
There was only a very short debate in parliament preceding the decision to change 
the law. However, although no parliamentarians were involved in suggesting the 
changes, two of them referred to the end of the practice with substitute service in 
prison as the most important part of the revision.789  
Analysis: The role of humour within a campaign 
From silence to spectacle  
Traditionally conscientious objection to military service is considered an individual 
moral choice that each conscript has to make on his or her own. However, just as 
laws do not operate in a vacuum but reflect changes in society, so do individuals’ 
conscience develop influenced by inspiration and debate from their surroundings.  
The Norwegian state was uncomfortable with the whole issue of imprisonment of 
conscientious objectors, something which is obvious from the interview with 
Jensen, the official reports and white papers, and the debates in parliament. For a 
country like Norway that claimed to be a defender of human rights, it was 
problematic to be accused of violating the rights of the conscientious objectors. 
That authorities preferred to keep the issue quiet can be illustrated by an anecdote 
that Norenius told. Although this happened in Sweden it is still an illustration of the 
preference for silence. Many years after his imprisonment for refusing a repetition 
exercise Norenius received a new call up order. This time it was not for the regular 
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armed forces, but for what is called civil defence, a part of the Swedish total 
defence strategy. Norenius wrote to them that he was going to refuse the exercise 
and reminded them of a case back in the 1950’s where a Swedish woman called 
Barbro Alving had refused to participate in civil defence. The case was famous 
since she was a well esteemed writer and journalist known by her pen name Bang 
and served a one month prison sentence for her refusal.790 Norenius wrote that “if 
you really want to, I’m prepared to take this fight, but otherwise you can have your 
call up order back”.791 After that he has never heard from the military authorities 
again, and his interpretation is that they prefer to keep it as quiet as possible 
around the total resisters. 
Until the beginning of the 1980’s total resistance was almost non-existent in 
Norway, and to the Norwegian state this was desirable. The state’s representatives 
preferred to deal with the young men on an individual basis and when necessary 
send them to prison without any publicity. KMV was a very small political group, but 
managed to move the issue of total resistance from the arena of personal, 
individual choices to a collective challenge, making “noise” on the way as Jensen 
called it. In less than a decade total resistance was on the agenda as never before. 
Their situation was discussed in parliament, debated in major newspapers and 
parliamentarians questioned by journalists about their opinion on the issue. Court 
hearings were turned into a theatre stage and the Norwegian state had to defend 
its practice in front of the European Commission of Human Rights, an issue it took 
so seriously that no total resisters were imprisoned while the case was pending.  
Total resistance went from being a possibility that most young men had probably 
never even considered, to a viable option chosen by more than 100. Although this 
is a very small number compared to all those who went into military service and the 
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substitute service during the same period, it is still a dramatic increase when the 
choice involved such far reaching consequences.  
Each individual total resister was probably aware that the more their numbers 
increased, the greater the chance that they together would provide enough 
pressure to change the legislation. Most of the Norwegian total resisters involved in 
KMV never went to prison for total resistance, including both Johansen and 
Solberg. Nevertheless, there were no guarantees, especially not for the first ones. 
All they knew was that 16 months in prison was a real possibility and that only 
hunger strikes had made it possible for other conscientious objectors in prison to 
get out.  
Johansen felt that he had no choice: cooperating with the military system by 
performing the substitute service was never an option for him.792 Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to assume that most people would consider this a difficult choice, and a 
considerable number most likely had second thoughts. To most potential total 
resisters, no matter how politically important they considered their refusal to 
cooperate with the military system, it would have been fairly easy to justify both to 
themselves and to others the less dramatic choice of complying with the substitute 
service.793 
One challenge with making conscientious objection into a collective issue was that 
refusing conscription was (and still is) framed as an individual moral choice rather 
than a social phenomenon. This was reflected by KMV’s ambivalent attitude 
towards the legal system. On one hand, many KMV participants tried to cooperate 
as little with the courts as possible, seeing them as the extended arm of the military 
system. On the other hand, the §20 court hearings were one of the best 
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opportunities to generate publicity about the fate of the total resisters. KMV 
participants frequently used their court hearings for all they were worth, for 
instance when Johansen impersonated the prosecutor during Solberg’s hearing, 
when Eraker burned his conscription book in court or when Nilsen made a funeral 
procession and tried to bury §20. In spite of the ambivalence, KMV participants 
also tried to give the state some of its own medicine when they raised cases 
against the Swedish and Norwegian states for violating their human rights.  
The total resisters did have a very good case in Norway, which made it more likely 
that they would succeed. No matter what one thinks about conscription, it violates 
logic to send someone to prison and not call it a punishment. In all other European 
countries with conscription and the right to conscientious objection, total resistance 
was considered a crime and the total resisters convicted in an ordinary trial. It was 
also obvious that the time - 16 months - was out of proportion both with sentences 
for ordinary crimes and selective objection in Norway as well as the punishment for 
total resistance in Sweden. 
The result of the campaign is an indication that the principled total resisters had a 
much better case than the selective objectors. The cases of the principled total 
resisters and the selective objectors appeared to have equal weight in the actions 
that KMV and S.I.N carried out. Nevertheless, the new law that went into force in 
1991 changed the conditions for the principled total resisters dramatically, while the 
circumstances for the selective objectors changed only slightly. It turned out to be 
easier to gather a parliamentary majority for the total resisters than for the selective 
objectors. This happened in spite of the fact that both Amnesty International and 
the parliamentarians from the socialist party were much more concerned with the 
selective objectors than the total resisters. Although it carried some weight in the 
debate that Norway was on Amnesty’s list of countries violating human rights, this 
argument was not heavy enough when the debate turned to the risk of Norway 
losing its “defence will”.  
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In the end, the department of justice had no problem convincing a united 
parliament that the contradiction “prison is not punishment” was not “appropriate”. 
A reason for the success on the issue of total resistance was probably also that the 
resisters now actually would be punished, something that can be framed as a more 
“conservative” line. On the contrary, the change regarding the selective objectors 
suggested by the socialist party could only result in fewer punishments and more 
conscientious objectors. 
Johansen is convinced that when they started the campaign, most people did not 
have a clue that total resistance was even a possibility, and most of the politicians, 
bureaucrats and judges did not fully understand what legislation Norway had and 
what they contributed to enforce. Johansen thinks that the facts only started to 
dawn on the elite after several years of spectacular actions, lobbying and the 
hearing in Strasbourg. He considered it “an erroneous law that very few people 
understood and no one could [actually] defend.” Johansen is certain that the 
Strasbourg case was an eye-opener, and that the civil servants who had 
participated went home knowing that they had to change the legislation. This view 
is supported by the fact that the initiative to change the law came from the 
department of justice itself and by the quotes from Jensen above.  
KMV’s success in Norway is quite impressive when taking into account the limited 
resources that were available to the network. As late as March 1985, when the 
NOU about conscription was discussed in parliament, only a few politicians 
mentioned the total resisters during the parliamentary debate.794 When KMV met 
with them in advance, no one was prepared to propose a law change.795 Just 4 
years later the department of justice proposed a change which was accepted 
unanimously by parliament.  
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Most parliamentarians have probably forgotten about KMV long ago – even Jensen 
who was working on issues of conscientious objection regularly only had vague 
memories about this group of total resisters. Should they remember, the politicians 
would probably hesitate to admit that KMV was decisive for their change of mind. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see any other factors than the total resisters’ own 
effort, creativity and persistence. Johansen said “there is no other explanation than 
our actions”796, and Jensen was certain that the case in Strasbourg played a 
decisive role.  
Looking at the timing of the change it is even possible to assume that two factors 
were more important than others. Early in 1985 the Strasbourg case had not yet 
received much attention in Norway; this only happened later that year. It therefore 
seems reasonable to give that case much credit for the sudden change in attitude. 
Secondly there are the numbers: At the end of 1984, 25 men had had their §20 
hearing and were waiting to go to prison.797 In December 1985 this number had 
increased to more than 40, and KMV wrote in its newsletter that the campaign was 
in contact with 96 total resisters.798 The department of justice did not know about 
all these because they had not yet had their §20 hearings, but the 40 existed in the 
system. It is not clear if the department of justice was aware of the increase. Since 
Jensen’s memories of the whole issue of total resistance were so vague, he did not 
remember anything about the numbers. The department of justice did not keep a 
record of the number of total resisters, since they were considered to be serving 
their substitute service just like the other conscientious objectors. Neither was the 
increase mentioned in ot. prp. 35. On the other hand it seems unlikely that such a 
dramatic increase in numbers should go unnoticed and not be part of the reason 
the department of justice suggested abolishing the arrangement with serving 
substitute service in prison. 
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If the court cases against the Norwegian state and the numbers of total resisters 
played such an important role, did it mean that the spectacular actions had been 
superfluous, and that Johansen’s case in Strasbourg alone could have changed 
the law? That we will never know, but that seems unlikely too. The two strategies 
of creating a spectacle and using the courts went hand in hand, and it is 
reasonable to assume that the numbers grew because of all the attention that the 
total resisters received for all of their actions, spectacular as well as “sober”. 
Further research such as interviews with a number of the total resisters who joined 
KMV during these years might clarify how they heard about KMV and what 
convinced them to become total resisters themselves. However, it is just as reliable 
to draw from findings from the case study with Ofog and my previous research on 
Otpor. That a creative and spectacular style of protest, including humour, is likely 
to attract more people became clear when the themes of outreach, mobilisation 
and a culture of resistance were discussed in Chapter 4 and 5.799 
The role of the humorous political stunts 
The humorous political stunts that KMV activists performed were a vital part of their 
strategy. The stunts were an unpredictable obstruction of the state’s intention of 
carrying out the court procedures in an orderly fashion, and they were a way to get 
attention. The stunts were part of the discursive guerrilla war about what is true 
and just concerning total resistance.  
KMV used two types of humorous political stunts which in two distinct ways 
positioned KMV as a critic of Norwegian authorities’ discourse about total resisters. 
In both of these stunts, it was the dominant discourse of military service as the 
norm which was under attack as well as the option of accepting the substitute 
service as a valid alternative. To KMV the substitute service was something the 
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representatives of the dominant discourse had adopted as a way to appear more 
tolerant and inclusive while still upholding the military service as the norm. 
The prosecutor impersonation was a supportive humorous political stunt, and 
included all the characteristics of this type of stunt described in chapter 3. Instead 
of a conventional and rational protest, it was framed as a support and 
encouragement to the Norwegian authorities’ position on total resistance. 
Johansen made the court into a parody when he appeared overenthusiastic in his 
role and suggested that Solberg should be sentenced three times as long as the 
law demanded. It was an invasion of the authorities’ own stage, right in front of 
their eyes. Although it is not an important stage for national politics like the 
parliament, it was an absolutely crucial stage for legitimising the treatment of the 
principled total resisters and dressing their imprisonment in a legal frame. It is 
difficult to imagine a more appropriate scene to invade when the intention was to 
disrupt the Norwegian state’s routines regarding the total resisters.  
At this point in time, KMV was not a well-known group. They did not have any 
celebrities to promote their cases, they were rather few and had very limited 
resources. In this particular case, Johansen’s performance and improvisations 
skills turned out to be so convincing that the usual actors on the stage did not even 
realise that their usual performance had been turned into a play of politics. To the 
larger audience, the Norwegian public, the stunt served to expose the reality of the 
total resisters’ cases. Each person who heard or read about this stunt made his or 
her individual interpretation of its meaning, but in the newspaper coverage the 
stunt was presented according to the taste of KMV. They framed it as astonishing 
that a fake prosecutor could demand an imprisonment so much longer than what 
the law prescribed without anybody noticing. To the authorities it must have been 
rather discomforting to have their practice on an issue they preferred to keep out of 
the public eye exposed this way. According to Johansen and Solberg, the case is 
unique in the history of Norwegian judicial practice. According to their friends and 
colleagues, it is still something that lawyers and judges talk about, and a friend of 
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Johansen who is an attorney has called this “the most hilarious thing I have heard 
in many, many years”.800     
The jail-ins were provocative humorous political stunts. In this type of stunt there is 
no attempt to disguise behind irony and double meanings that this is a protest as in 
the other types of humorous political stunts. The humour derived from playful twists 
to the provocation, in this case by someone unexpectedly making their way into the 
prison instead of the conventional goal of escaping. Just as in the prosecutor case, 
KMV invaded a stage which was central for their struggle, the prison walls. Again 
this was not a major national scene, but just as the court room it was loaded with 
symbolism. If the usual actors in the court room – the judges, prosecutor and their 
assistants – were unprepared for a fake prosecutor, the prison authorities were 
probably even more unaccustomed to citizens clamouring to get in. Afterwards, a 
dilemma arose for the prison authorities and prosecutor: Charge the intruders with 
trespassing or pretend that nothing happened? According to Johansen the case 
was “dismissed for lack of evidence” in spite of a written confession, the same 
thing which happened in the prosecutor case. KMV interpreted this to mean that 
the authorities did not want any further publicity about the incident. When it came 
to the audience of the Norwegian population, again KMV managed to reach them 
through mass media. Once they had access to the media, the stunt spoke for itself. 
However, it was a type of stunt which depended on surprise, and could only work 
this way a limited number of times – after a while, it would not be newsworthy any 
more.  
The central aspect in both the jail-ins and the prosecutor case was how KMV 
positioned itself in relation to the dominant discourses of crime and punishment. 
The fake prosecutor did not argue against sending Solberg to prison, but instead 
was very supportive of the legal practice and demanded that the total resister 
receive a longer sentence. In the jail-ins there was no disguise, but an open 
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provocation when they demanded that either the prisoner of conscience be set 
free, or they should all be imprisoned with him. In the case of the prosecutor, it was 
an attempt to expose the absurdity in sending someone to prison without calling it 
punishment. The jail-in served to expose and ridicule the practice of sending 
conscientious objectors to prison.  
Reflecting on what they did at the time, Johansen said that  
It was not always a clear political message that we sent out, it 
was about showing them the finger, doing things that were totally 
unexpected. After a while we wanted to get attention from the 
media, we were so annoyed with not being heard. [Usually] we 
only got small letters to the editor in the newspapers, and then we 
soon realised that spectacular actions made it easier to get 
through to the media.”801 
Johansen’s reference to “show them the finger” indicates that the provocation was 
important to KMV. He elaborated on the statement that it was not a clear political 
message by explaining that the actions themselves did not show why they did 
them. Although they brought banners for the jail-ins, someone who just heard 
about someone jumping into the prison would not understand the connection to 
conscientious objection without an explanation.802 Likewise, a story about a fake 
prosecutor tells that the court system can be fooled but the listener needs much 
more information in order to understand the context of total resistance. Johansen 
might have a point here, but the scenes that KMV’s chose to invade were central in 
their struggle and what they wanted to change about their situation. In the 
prosecutor case they snuck in behind the backs of the authorities, in the jail-in they 
openly captured the prison walls. In both cases the boldness and devil-may-care 
attitude of it causes admiring smiles and the absurdity invited people to ask 
                                            
801
 Interview with Jørgen Johansen and Øyvind Solberg January 31
st
 2013. 
802
 To illustrate this point, Johansen told about someone in his family who knew someone who 
happened to be doing time in the prison when the first jail-in took place. According to this person, 
the inmates in the prison had no idea what the drama was all about until they read about it in the 
newspaper the next day. 
442 
 
themselves, “why would anyone voluntarily climb into the prison? How come that 
no one notices a fake prosecutor?” In the jail-in case the amusement increased for 
passers-by who could wonder “what should be the punishment for this provocation 
– prison as the activists had demanded?”  
These humorous political stunts were an integrated part of KMV’s strategy, but 
they were only part of it and their contribution to the success cannot be understood 
in isolation from the other strategies. The spectacles around the imprisoned 
conscientious objectors were not just created with humour, but with actions 
involving non-humorous conscription book burnings, hunger strikes and a funeral 
for §20. In the previous chapter I indicated how the distinction between humorous 
actions and other types of creative activism can be seen as artificial and does not 
reflect the lived experience of many activists. When it comes to KMV this is evident 
from the fact that the humorous political stunts they performed can best be 
analysed as part of a strategy that aimed to create a spectacle, humorous as well 
as non-humorous.  
KMV and the courts 
KMV had an ambivalent attitude towards the judicial system. On the one hand, the 
legal system was used to convict the selective objectors to prison and send the 
total resisters to serve their substitute service “in an institution under the 
administration of the prison authorities”. As anarchists, most of the participants in 
KMV had a very negative attitude towards the state and therefore also its legal 
system. Johansen expressed this explicitly when he doubted that he had a chance 
with the commission in Strasbourg. On the other hand, KMV activists did what they 
could to use the legal system to their advantage, by suing the Norwegian state.  
Little has been written about how social movements interact with the legal system. 
Gustafsson and Vinthagen make an international review in their article “Rättens 
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rörelser och rörelsernas rätt”803 and provide a framework for investigating KMV’s 
interactions with the legal system. Gustafsson and Vinthagen’s aim is to move the 
discussion about social movements’ experiences with the law away from 
dichotomous understandings. In earlier writings about the subject there has been a 
tendency to see the law either as the extended arm of the state that movements 
cannot influence (legal pessimism) or an overly optimistic view about the legal 
system’s contribution to social change (legal optimism).804  
Thomas Mathiesen suggest a third approach in his book “Retten i samfunnet”805 
He calls this a critical approach in between the two extremes that “leads to a very 
careful and thoughtful use of legal strategies”.806 Mathiesen focuses on what 
lawyers can do to promote the interests of “weak” groups; his critical approach 
does not include what activists without formal law qualifications can do. He 
proposes five different legal strategies, but emphasises that the list is not 
exhaustive. The most obvious is to bring concrete cases to court, but Mathiesen 
warns about the risk of the whole question the weak party wants to raise becoming 
legalised. By this he means that the judicial process and its rules count more than 
the issue itself. Probably the biggest problem with legalisation is the risk that if one 
loses in court, the case is closed in public. There is no doubt that Mathiesen raises 
an important point, but this was not so relevant for KMV. Even though Johansen, 
Bremnes and Nilsen lost their cases, KMV was prepared to continue its campaign 
with different actions. This might be because of most KMV participants’ anarchistic 
worldview. Although Solberg had some expectation that they could win legally, 
most activists presumably expected the Norwegian state to win. So although it 
might have looked as if the case was now closed, KMV all the time had new plans, 
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and the department of justice started to work for a law change in spite of the legal 
victories.  
Most people in KMV viewed Johansen, Bremnes and Nilsen’s cases in a way that 
resembles Mathiesen’s next legal strategy, that lawyers use the court as an arena. 
The court becomes a political platform without letting the judicial form and the 
prospects of winning or losing dominate. Mathiesen refers to Jaques Vergés’ 
notion breaking process807 where the parties do not have the same values and do 
not agree on the rules. When it comes to KMV, many of the §20 hearings were 
such a use of arena/breaking process where the court was used as a platform to 
express disapproval and lack of respect for the court, for instance by burning the 
conscription book and symbolically bury §20.  
Mathiesen’s last three legal strategies concern lawyers working systematically with 
cases, work in movements or the practice of jurisprudential work. That Solberg was 
a lawyer by profession gave the campaign an opportunity to navigate the judicial 
system without making some of the obvious blunders that organisations without 
such knowledge might have made. It is probably also a contributing aspect to the 
fact that KMV never let the issue of total resistance become legalised in spite of the 
amount of time spent on legal cases. 
Similarity to Mathiesen, Gustafsson and Vinthagen also present a model between 
the legal optimistic and legal pessimistic. But where Mathiesen is concerned with 
the role of lawyers in the legal strategies, Gustafsson and Vinthagen are interested 
in the relation between the law and social movements in a broader sense that also 
includes how organisations and citizens can use the law to their advantage. They 
suggest five strategies that social movements have at their disposal in their 
attempts to influence the law. 1. Social movements can “compensate for 
implementation of existing laws”. 2. They can try to reform the law on the system’s 
terms. 3. They can “challenge existing law” by breaking the law. Even more far 
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reaching is 4. To create new law and 5. To “undermine existing law by resisting 
and subverting the power-relations that uphold the law”.808  
The case study of KMV shows how the group used two or three out of these five 
categories in its work in Norway. The number depends on how one understands 
Gustafsson and Vinthagen’s fifth category of undermining the law. 
First of all KMV tried to use the method of reforming the law through its lobbying 
activities, vigils outside of the prison and the hunger strikes. These are methods 
mentioned by Gusafsson and Vinthagen.809 The two authors do not consider the 
possibility of using the court procedures themselves to reform the law, but both 
Johansen’s complaint to Strasbourg as well as Bremnes’ and Nilsen’s case against 
the Norwegian state are examples of trying to reform the law by using the existing 
system to the extent possible. Even if KMV in these cases followed the rules of the 
established system, one can also understand their activities around the reform 
work as a method for gaining media attention, something they considered 
necessary in order to create change. This way the experiences from KMV show 
how reform work in court and the struggle for media attention can complement 
each other. It is interesting that even if KMV lost according to the system in all 
court levels, the law change that they finally won was also on the system’s terms. 
Secondly, KMV challenged the law during the court cases and imprisonment of the 
selective objectors and the total resisters. The humorous political stunts with the 
jail-ins as well as other spectacular actions with burning conscription books, 
burying §20 and playing a clown in court all violated existing laws and norms. 
Gustafsson and Vinthagen point towards this strategy’s potential to bring attention 
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from mass media810, something which also happened after many of these 
challenges, in particular the first jail-in.  
It is not so easy to place KMV’s action with the fake prosecutor in Gustafsson and 
Vinthagen’s typology. It is possible to interpret the fake prosecutor as another 
example of challenging the law, but the action can also be understood as an 
example of undermining the law. Gustafsson and Vinthagen mention strikes, 
boycotts and sabotage as examples of this legal strategy811, and at first glance a 
single fake prosecutor does not have the potential to exert the force that they 
describe in this category. On the other hand, they characterise the category as 
“One attempt to practically prevent and at the same time convince others that the 
legal activity must stop for political/ethical reasons”.812 Gustaffson and Vinthagen 
do not provide examples of this unusual method where the undermining of the law 
actually takes place within the court room itself. Nevertheless it is perfectly possible 
to interpret the fake prosecutor as a direct undermining of the law within the court 
room. Because of this parody of a prosecutor Solberg could not be considered to 
fulfil the conditions in §20 after the deliberations this day: the case had to be heard 
again later with a real prosecutor present. The presence of the fake prosecutor 
thoroughly sabotaged the court hearing, although only temporarily. The stunt was a 
concrete prevention of the smooth functioning of the law and intended to convince 
others that the law should be changed, just like Gustaffson and Vinthagen 
characterise undermining in their typology.  
To sum up the relationship between KMV and the courts, the group was successful 
in bringing about a law change, but it was not the court cases against the state that 
directly led to this. Rather the legal strategy worked indirectly through the attention 
the issue of total resistance generated.  
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The role of other factors 
KMVs ability to reach mainstream media both with its spectacular actions and the 
legal strategy is with all likelihood part of the reason for its success in changing 
§§19 and 20. Without this attention there would probably not have been such a 
dramatic increase in the number of total resisters, and there would not have been 
any “noise” to make the department of justice reflect on the existence of the total 
resisters. Over the years, KMV activists and supporters created several front page 
stories, numerous news reports in print media, a steady stream of letters to the 
editors and the fake prosecutor even hit the 7pm TV news. However, it is important 
to notice that the coverage of the jail-in and fake prosecutor stunts were not as 
extensive as Johansen imagined. A systematic search of a large number of 
Norwegian newspapers revealed that the cases were indeed reported in some 
newspapers, but it was far from the “all” that Johansen implied in the interview.813    
From the data here, it is not possible to say much about the effects of the two 
strategies of solidarity and lobbying. They seem to have played a minor role for 
KMV when it came to time and effort, and they do not seem to have had any 
impact on changing the law. However, it would have been extremely unusual to 
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have a political campaign that did not try to explain its goals through lobbying and 
participating in the public debate.  
Even if the solidarity did not have a direct effect on the outcome, it can have 
contributed to sustaining a culture of resistance in KMV. The emphasis that 
Norenius put on the support letter he received from Argentina is an indication of 
this. The importance of solidarity work would be an interesting topic for further 
research, but since many activists spent time on solidarity activities, it seems 
appropriate to draw attention to the fact that solidarity work did not seem to have 
much relevance in this case. Even the occupation of the embassy in Denmark that 
Norenius described as a successful nonviolent action in terms of dialogue with the 
employees at the embassy and maintaining nonviolent discipline did not leave any 
traces in the legislative work for the law change. That does not mean that it was 
not noticed, but at least it did not make its way into the official documents.  
Had the idea with a permanent refugee camp at the Swedish side of the border 
been carried out, it would probably have been its spectacularity that could have 
contributed to success rather than the solidarity it was a sign of.  
Another important factor for KMV’s success was the smooth functioning of the 
network. The men who were most active got along well both as activists and as 
friends, and managed to create a very supportive an open atmosphere that 
encouraged creative actions. Johansen was proud that  
Everyone who did something, they got a pat on the shoulder, yes! 
[Someone would say] ’I saw you did this, I saw you wrote that 
article or organised that meeting.’ We supported each other, it 
was a very positive atmosphere, there wasn’t any trouble or 
fighting within the group, it was [like a] party!, (…) a constant 
party.”814  
Solberg agreed with this positive description, and added that “and if anybody 
disagreed about something, that was okay.” Johansen continued: “I can’t 
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remember any political disagreements within KMV, like there were in other groups I 
have been part of. (…) It was just supportive reactions.”815  
Although KMV fizzled out in the early 1990’s without reaching the goal of 
abolishing conscription, it was probably the success regarding §20 that was the 
main reason. Had the Norwegian authorities continued to send total resisters to 
prison to serve their substitute service, the resistance would have continued. KMV 
was prepared to go further and try new ways. The group even warned the 
department of justice that more was to come during a meeting on April 21, 1986.816  
The decision to change the law in Norway was made in June 1990. This timing with 
the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the end of the cold war raises the question of 
whether this structural factor might have played a role. Although it is a relevant 
question, there is nothing in the data to support this connection and it appears to 
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be a coincidence. The changes to both §§1, 19 and 20 had been on the way for 
years. The department of justice argued in favour of a changes to §§19 and 20 
already in February 1989, at a time when Norwegian authorities had no reason to 
believe the Berlin wall was about to fall. The wording of the revised bill did not 
change during the almost 1½ years that passed before the decision to change the 
law was made.817  
Dissolving KMV 
The victory of the revised law in Norway meant that the air went out of KMV and it 
gradually dissolved. It appears that some of the most energetic individuals had 
already started to spend their time on other political questions and movements 
before the law was passed without new people taking over. Norenius thinks that an 
important reason was that many of the most active people became fathers during 
these years, and it was demanding to have young children and continue this type 
of political activism. Thus, what in social movement literature is called their 
biographical availability diminished.818 When the Norwegian state again started to 
imprison total resisters as a punishment after a regular trial, the most active people 
had moved on to other issues without being replaced. Another reason Norenius 
identified was the general tendency of people leaving one movement or 
organisation for other challenges. Solberg said that “it just fizzled out”, and 
Johansen commented that “no one was sent to prison, there was nothing to make 
a fuss about, few court hearings, pause in the imprisonments.”   
KMV continued to have some activity during the early 1990’s and a magazine 
called Basta was produced at irregular intervals between 1990 and 1994. 
According to Solberg, one of the important campaigns during these years was to 
                                            
817
 Justis- og politidepartementet [Department of Justice and Police], "Ot Prp Nr 35 (1989-1990) Om 
Lov Om Endringer I Lov 19 Mars 1965 Nr 3 Om Fritaking for Militærtjeneste Av 
Overbevisningsgrunner Og Militær Straffelov 22 Mai 1902 Nr 13." 
818
 Corrigall-Brown, Patterns of Protest: Trajectories of Participation in Social Movements: pp. 20-
23. 
451 
 
encourage people to opt out of the conscription system, but it never really took off. 
When the first of the total resisters convicted according to the new legislation went 
to prison in 1994 there was some more activity and new newsletters before it 
fizzled out again.819 A web page called KMV still exists but was last updated in 
1998.820 
The impact of KMV 
Ajangiz has argued that in order to understand the changes in the length of military 
service and the abolition of conscription in many European countries during the 
1990s the role of social forces, including the number of conscientious objectors 
cannot be ignored.821 He considers Spain the most obvious example where a 
strong movement of total resisters compelled the decision to abolish conscription in 
1996 with effect from 2001. Compared to KMV, the Spanish movement was very 
strong. Between 1988 and 1999 more than 20,000 people in the state of Spain 
spent time in prison in the struggle against conscription.  
Apart from the situation in Spain and a Swedish investigation822 there does not 
exist any literature in English or the Scandinavian languages about total resistance 
and its influence on politics and law.   
Although KMV failed in its attempt to abolish conscription altogether, the changes 
to §§19 and 20, which meant that the arrangement with substitute service in prison 
was abolished, was a major victory for the group. Their decade long struggle had 
also had practical consequences for the men who had declared total resistance. 
While the legal cases in Strasbourg and against the Norwegian state were 
pending, no total resisters were taken to prison. Solberg is proud that up to a 
                                            
819
 KMV, "Utopi Eller Apati: Rundbrev for Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt " (Nr. 1 Vinter 1994), p. 2. 
820
 KMV,  http://www.arbeidskollektivet.no/kmv/. 
821
 Rafael Ajangiz, "The European Farewell to Conscription?," in The Comparative Study of 
Conscription in the Armed Forces, ed. Lars Mjøset and Stephen van Holde, Comparative Social 
Research (Emerald Group Publishing, 2002). 
822
 Janne Flyghed, "Konsten Att Disciplinera En Opposition," [The art of disciplining an opposition.] 
Retfærd, Nordisk Juridisk Tidskrift 12, no. 2 (1989). 
452 
 
hundred people who had had their §20 hearings in reality got an amnesty. 
Although such an amnesty was never officially declared, they just fell through the 
cracks in the system.  
Johansen and Solberg also think that KMV had other effects that had not been 
goals of theirs, but nevertheless the result. During the years that KMV was active, it 
became easier to become a conscientious objector based on a pacifist conviction. 
Although there was no change in the law, they noticed that in practice it became 
easier to be accepted in the police interrogation. So although KMV did not work on 
the rights of the conscientious objectors performing substitute service (they had 
their own organisation), Johansen and Solberg believe that KMV influenced their 
situation. In Norway there does not exist any study to document this claim, but the 
tendency to adjust the treatment of all the conscientious objectors based on the 
number of total resisters has been clearly documented in Sweden.823 It is a divide 
and rule tactic the state can use to separate the moderate antimilitarists (who 
accept the substitute service) from the more radical total resisters. 
According to Johansen and Solberg, KMV was also part of a process of 
radicalisation of the whole peace movement that happened in the 1980’s in both 
Sweden and Norway. A relatively small number of people, including Johansen, 
Norenius and Solberg, were driving forces in this process. Creative and confronting 
ideas were being reinforced by an encouraging and supportive activist 
environment. For instance, FMK’s magazine Ikkevold exposed secret NATO bases 
in Norway in 1983. In addition to being secret, the bases were also prepared to 
receive nuclear weapons in spite of Norway’s official position of refusing nuclear 
arms on its territory in peace time. The editorial committee of Ikkevold was 
accused of espionage and the case went all the way to the Supreme Court before 
the members of the committee were found not guilty. In Sweden a train that carried 
Haubits cannons to be exported to India was stopped in 1987 in a civil 
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disobedience action and the whole Swedish arms export industry scrutinised. The 
military air facility in Rygge in Norway was temporarily closed down in 1983-84 in 
some of Norway’s biggest civil disobedience actions opposing military activity. It 
would be an interesting area for further investigation to see if Johansen and 
Solberg are right in believing that KMV was important for this radicalization 
process.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this case study has been to show how KMV’s use of humour 
worked as part of a strategy within a larger campaign, and to the extent possible 
establish which effect the humour had compared to other factors.  
Through the actions that were carried out and those that only remained ideas KMV 
demonstrated much creativity as well as a good understanding of what aspects of 
the treatment of the total resisters made the Norwegian authorities most 
vulnerable. At the time it called itself a campaign, with the terminology of today it 
would probably have been called a network. Its way of organising has a striking 
similarity with Ofog, except that the transnational character made KMV rather 
exceptional for its time.  
Both total resistance and selective objection were a response to the system of 
conscription, which meant that the Norwegian state was the initiator of this 
“engagement”. However, from 1981 it was not just the young men who were forced 
to respond to call up orders from the state and make up their mind about their 
position – the state also had to respond to numerous initiatives from KMV and 
S.I.N. that went way beyond an individual refusal. By 1985 the number of total 
resisters in Norway had grown considerably. 
The case study identified four different strategies that KMV pursued:  
1. Spectacular actions took place primarily in the courts and prisons. They aimed to 
expose the court hearings as a farce and draw attention to both total resisters and 
selective objectors serving time in prison, no matter if this was labelled punishment 
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or substitute service. KMV used two types of humorous political stunts – the 
provocative jail-ins and the supportive fake prosecutor. Looking back with the 
benefit of hindsight, Johansen was not satisfied with the fact that these two types 
of humorous political stunts did not speak for themselves about the issue of total 
resistance and conscientious objection. Nevertheless the scenes of prison walls 
and court rooms stand out as highly relevant for the changes KMV demanded. 
There are many humorous political stunts where one could be much more critical 
about why a particular scene was chosen for a certain message. 
2. The challenges the state seemed to take most seriously were the use of the 
courts against the Norwegian state. Johansen complained to the European 
Commission of Human Rights at the Council of Europe that the Norwegian state 
was violating the European Convention on Human Rights when he was forced to 
serve the substitute service in prison while the state refused to call it a punishment. 
The state naturally enough found it necessary to defend itself and spent many 
resources on this. Although the informant from the Norwegian state insisted that 
being dragged to the court was not an embarrassment as long as the state won, it 
still turned out to be a decisive factor for the law change that eventually took place.  
The case in Norway where Bremnes and Nilsen filled charges against the state for 
violating the constitution was another important case. Although KMV activists lost 
both these cases in court, they demonstrated that there was a grey zone which the 
state decided to withdraw from, something which was confirmed without doubt from 
the same informant. The legal strategy was combined with a media strategy, thus 
showing even this type of legal battle’s potential for contributing to the spectacle.  
3. Solidarity activities with other total resisters around the world probably meant 
much to individuals. It was a welcome support when groups in other countries 
carried out actions in solidarity with KMV, for instance at the Norwegian embassies 
in Denmark and Spain. However, there is no data to tell if this was something the 
Norwegian authorities registered or cared about.   
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4. Some individuals within KMV, especially Solberg, wrote many letters to the 
editors about total resistance, and this way participated in the public debate. KMV 
also had meetings with political parties and tried to lobby for their case, but 
compared to how many political groups operate, KMV as a campaign showed 
surprisingly little interest in this part of its work.  
The four strategies demonstrate how humour can successfully be used as part of a 
larger campaign. In the analysis of the case I showed that humour was an effective 
way to draw attention to an issue that concerned only very few people. The stunts’ 
media appeal indicates that KMV were able to reach out to many more people than 
those who felt the imprisonment on their own body. The humour was with all 
likelihood a contributing factor to the dramatic increase in the number of total 
resisters. However, there is no doubt that humorous political stunts did not do this 
alone – they were an integrated part of a strategy where the legal cases probably 
influenced the Norwegian authorities more directly. In just four years the situation 
changed from absolutely no parliamentarian interest in the fate of the total resisters 
to a unanimous “yes” for the law change suggested by the civil servants.  
KMV and Ofog resemble each other in many ways, especially when it comes to the 
radical anti-militarist ideology and the way of organising. However, there are also 
some notable differences. Whereas KMV was focusing on the issues of selective 
objectors and total resisters in prison, and only that, Ofog is concerned about a 
much broader range of issues. One reason KMV could claim such a major victory 
after a decade of organising was that it was so committed to this particular issue. It 
helped KMV that the Norwegian legislation violated simple logic when it claimed 
that prison was not punishment. Nevertheless the issue of total resistance was so 
radical and something that concerned so few people that it is difficult to see the law 
change as anything else than a major achievement for such a small group.  
The interview with Jensen who represented the Norwegian state and the 
department of justice in questions regarding conscientious objection provided 
much insight about the processes that were taking place on the other side of the 
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table. Although the information concerned this particular case it also illustrates 
some consequences that might be interesting to many social movements as more 
general observations.  
First of all the alliance that the total resisters and the selective objectors had 
formed made no sense to those on the other side. Where Solberg and Johansen 
saw a natural connection because both groups were serving time in prison for their 
refusal to cooperate with the military system, Jensen saw two completely different 
groups with little in common.   
The case also revealed that contact with politicians is not necessarily the key to 
changing laws. For the selective objectors, representatives from the socialist party 
were important for pushing their case forward. However, the proposal for a revision 
of the relevant paragraphs concerning total resistance came from the civil servants 
in the department of justice.   
KMV grew out of the so-called youth rebellion of the late 1960’s, which did not 
really manifest itself in Scandinavia until the 1970’s. The spread of the idea of total 
resistance based on combining anarchism and pacifism was part of the political 
radicalisation of the late 1970’s. Two of the three key people I interviewed from 
KMV had actually performed regular military service, and it was the repetition 
exercises that got them involved in total resistance. 
Although a major part of KMV’s work regarding the situation in Norway is described 
and analysed here this is not the history of KMV. A thorough history would require 
more focus on the work done in Sweden and the network-like informal way of 
organising which characterised KMV and set it apart from many other 
organisations. This said, I hope the case study has provided enough details to give 
more than a taste of how KMV organised, strategised and developed ideas.  
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Chapter 7: Humorous political stunts and relations of 
power 
Introduction 
The first three chapters presented the relevant literature on political humour, 
nonviolence and power, the methodological considerations behind the thesis and 
the definition and model of humorous political stunts. Chapters 4-6 analysed the 
data from the two case studies about Ofog and KMV. This chapter discusses the 
potential and limitations of the humorous political stunt’s engagement with relations 
of power. I will return to findings presented earlier and discuss them in relation to 
each other.  
In Chapter 1 I discussed different understandings and definitions of power and 
resistance and the implications for research on humour. I quoted some humour 
scholars that persistently claim that humour cannot change political circumstances 
and is merely a vent for frustration. A similar discussion has been taking place 
within performance studies about the efficacy of the carnivalesque in protest. Such 
ideas reflect an old-fashioned realpolitik perspective on power and seem to miss 
the point that most humorous political stunts are aiming to make.  
Below I problematise the arguments from both humour studies and performance 
studies in relation to my findings and a perspective on power and resistance which 
takes Foucault, Scott and Bayat into consideration. After a brief discussion of the 
problems with how to measure impact, I look at humorous political stunts’ potential 
impact on facilitating outreach and mobilisation, a culture of resistance and 
challenging relations of power from this perspective. Afterwards the chapter revisits 
the model of five types of humorous political stunts and the theatre metaphor, 
before proceeding to Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolent action and its four 
dimensions – dialogue facilitation, power breaking, utopian enactment and 
normative regulation. Here I investigate how different types of humorous political 
stunts strengthen or weaken the various elements. It appears that humorous 
458 
 
political stunts work especially on the power breaking dimension, under some 
circumstances can contribute to dialogue facilitation, and that some types of stunts 
are good examples of temporary utopian enactments. 
How to evaluate the impact of humorous political stunts? 
Social relations are complex, and all social science struggles with the question of 
how to “prove” causal relationships. Knowing that there will seldom be a conclusive 
answer, approaching the subject requires clarity about what one considers an 
effect under particular circumstances, and how much effect is required in order to 
have achieved change.  
Humorous political stunts are one type of method that activists can use, alongside 
many options for rational communication. In most cases, the same people who 
carry out humorous political stunts also engage in non-humorous, rational activism 
as the work of for instance Ofog, KMV, Otpor and Netwerk Vlaanderen show. A 
few groups or individuals have specialised in humorous political stunts, like the Yes 
Men and Mark Thomas, but nevertheless they are still part of larger movements 
fighting for similar goals about social justice.  
Day in her writing about ironic activism points out that the activists are aware that 
the stunts in themselves will not be able to convert committed conservatives.824 
However, groups that perform humorous political stunts are parts of larger trends 
that may or may not be considered successful social movements a hundred years 
from now. Over time, some social movements without doubt shape society and 
contribute to change regarding small and big issues.  
To date most experiments with humorous political stunts have been rather small 
scale. The week long Santa action is one of the most extensive examples when it 
comes to the number of participants and time. But the culmination in the shopping 
centres did not involve more than 50 people during one afternoon. What would 
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have happened if the humorous political stunts had been carried out on a larger 
scale? How would it affect those in powerful positions if they had involved ten times 
as many people, and occurred ten times as frequently? The answers to these 
questions of course involve speculation or counter-factual history writing, but 
asking the questions assumes that the potential of humour might only just have 
been touched.  
Imagine an army of Santas handing out presents in every single shop in 
Copenhagen before Christmas, not just two places. Imagine Reality AB actually 
bringing hundreds or even thousands of victims of “collateral damage” to a NATO 
exercise: how would Swedish authorities have reacted then? Imagine Ofog’s ad 
corrections being present on every ad, not just a few. And not just on one 
occasion, but every single time the military advertises in order to recruit new 
soldiers.  
Some pranksters aim to change particular circumstances, and if the goal is limited, 
it is possible to see if they succeed or not. At one level KMV had a very bold goal, 
to abolish conscription, but the group also had a much more limited objective, to 
change the law that gave many of its members 16 months in prison. Although they 
did not succeed in ending conscription, they were very successful in changing the 
law and reducing their time in prison considerably.  
Ofog is a group operating with a much more diffuse goal, a peaceful world. Those 
who are active do not expect to win this battle in their lifetime, but at least they can 
look themselves in the mirror and say that they tried. The institutions that a group 
like Ofog is up against have almost unlimited resources. The Swedish armed 
forces control an annual budget of 40 billion Swedish crowns, spend 1 billion of this 
on advertising, and are one of the biggest employers in Sweden.825 Ofog is a 
network of volunteers. Of course a few humorous political stunts will not dismantle 
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Swedish militarism, but neither will a similar level of action using rational 
arguments and non-humorous political activism.  
Although the potential of humour should not be dismissed because no immediate 
result can be documented in terms of law or policy changes, one should be careful 
not to fall in the trap of viewing everything that activists do as a success. Even if 
activists themselves consider a certain activity important and meaningful, it might 
look different through the eyes of an observer. Of course activists need to justify to 
themselves why they do what they do, and it is extremely painful to reach the 
conclusion that “what we did was badly planned, carried out half-heartedly and did 
not have any impact”. The case study of Ofog showed how the Ofog activists did 
not evaluate their actions in relation to the goal of dismantling militarism. Probably 
because “militarism” is so diffuse, it is difficult to know when one has had any 
influence. Instead Ofog activists focused on the relations immediately observable, 
such as reactions from police and civilian passers-by. Likewise it can be difficult for 
a researcher supportive of a certain struggle to conclude that actions taken by 
friends did not seem to reach their goals at all.  
Schriver and Nudd have suggested looking at performative protests as a 
continuum rather than as a dichotomous success/failure.826 They base this idea on 
a Foucaudian power analysis which recognises that even when what one opposes 
looks like a monolithic force it still has multiple sources.827 Their continuum is a 
major step forward from perceiving success/failure as either/or, but it is still far from 
catching the complexities of humorous political stunts and their effects on various 
audiences. To mention just one example, it is perfectly possible to be successful 
when it comes to mobilising new activists, but an utter failure in changing a policy.   
However, a more nuanced view of success and failure should not neglect the fact 
that many political activists have much to learn when it comes to evaluating their 
own actions. Seldom is it made explicit what the criteria for success are, and there 
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is a strong tendency to view one’s own actions in a positive light. This might be 
natural in order to make one’s own actions meaningful, but such an approach is not 
necessarily effective in bringing about change.  
In Chapter 4, several activists emphasised the positive relations clowns could 
develop with the police. However, although such good relationships can be one 
aspect of a successful nonviolent action, it would be strange if good relations 
became the main goal. The risk of being side tracked from the activists’ core issues 
of militarism, neo-liberalism and social justice is a general problem and not 
something peculiar to humorous activism. A non-humorous example from Chapter 
6 about KMV can illustrate this. The occupation of the Norwegian embassy in 
Denmark in support of the total resisters was described by one of the participants 
as a very successful nonviolent action. However, what he implicitly treated as 
criteria for success were the friendly atmosphere, the maintenance of nonviolent 
discipline and the action going according to plan. These are all meaningful aspects 
of nonviolent actions, but to me one very important success criterion ought to be 
the impact on Norwegian authorities, something which was not mentioned. The 
same problem was apparent in several of Ofog’s actions. When clowning, success 
was measured in the relationship with the police – not the influence on the arms 
producer Bofors or those responsible for running the Vidsel Test Range.  
Impact on outreach and mobilisation 
One way to evaluate the impact of humorous political stunts is to investigate 
whether they influence outreach and mobilisation, a culture of resistance or 
relations of power. When it comes to outreach, it is obvious that humorous political 
stunts can sometimes open the door to mainstream mass media for small activist 
groups. A quote from a US prankster sums up this aspect of the relationship 
between the media and humorous political stunts: 
The media can never deny coverage to a good spectacle. No 
matter how ridiculous, absurd, insane or illogical something is, if it 
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achieves a certain identity as a spectacle, the media has to deal 
with it. They have no choice.828   
Although this process might not always be as automatic as it is assumed by this 
prankster and it is not unheard of that media remain silent about major spectacles, 
some of the people who perform humorous political stunts are tremendously 
successful in generating media attention for their stunts. I have not compared the 
media coverage of conventional protest systematically with humorous protest, but 
most activists who have tried to gain access to the media will agree that the 
coverage Solvognen and KMV obtained for the army of Santas, the jail-ins and the 
fake prosecutor were out of proportion to the coverage given to conventional 
demonstrations or public awareness raising meetings. Netwerk Vlaanderen’s ACE 
bank that invested in oil, weapons and child labour, the dropping of the teddy bears 
over Belarus, and Voina’s giant penis on the bridge in St. Petersburg are other 
examples of humorous political stunts covered internationally by mainstream 
media. Likewise with the Chaser’s APEC stunt where they entered the security 
area with an entry pass with the word “joke” across it. 
Although Ofog activists had the impression that civil disobedience actions might 
generate more coverage than humorous actions, at least one person experienced 
that the quality of the reports was much better when they used humour. However, 
a humorous political stunt is not in itself enough to gain media attention, and it 
remains a challenge to obtain coverage that communicates the message and not 
just the method. When the Yes Men’s corrective stunt about compensation to the 
victims of the Bhopal catastrophe from Dow Chemicals appeared on the BBC, it 
was due to a mistake by the BBC. Although the Yes Men are very skilful it seems 
unlikely a group can rely on such luck when planning, and the BBC invitation was a 
scenario the Yes Men had not counted on.  
                                            
828
 Harold, Ourspace: p. 86. 
463 
 
In previous chapters I distinguished between humorous political stunts’ ability to 
facilitate outreach and mobilisation. Facilitating mobilisation requires outreach to a 
certain part of the population that one expects to be sympathetic to the cause and 
willing to join the carnival themselves. Existing literature points towards humour’s 
potential for facilitating mobilisation. The case study of Ofog confirmed this 
potential and regarding KMV humour probably played a role in increasing the 
number of total resisters. 
Impact on cultures of resistance 
When I started this research project my main interest was the pranksters’ 
interaction with the opponent, but along the way it became more and more difficult 
to maintain this distinction between the impact on those outside the movement and 
those inside since they influence each other. The case study on Ofog explored this 
internal-external dynamic where humour might happen in public, but mainly be for 
the benefit of the activists themselves. 
It might appear to outsiders as if social movement organisers are “wasting their 
time” when they frequently preach to the converted through humorous political 
stunts. However, things that appear meaningless to the outsider might contribute 
significantly to higher morale and energy within the movement, which in turn have 
the potential to lead to more energy to spend on other types of activism. This 
aspect of social movement organising I have referred to as building and sustaining 
cultures of resistance. 
In an article called "Anger, Irony, and Protest: Confronting the Issue of Efficacy, 
Again" Chvasta positions activist academic Benjamin Shepard, who has used 
much creative protest in gay and anti-war activism, against political scientist Robert 
Weissberg. According to Chvasta, Shepard thinks that the carnivalesque does not 
work anymore, and Weissberg thinks that it has never worked and is actually 
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counterproductive. Chvasta herself thinks that the carnivalesque has to be 
combined with lobbying.829 
According to Chvasta, Weissberg thinks that only institutionalised efforts of 
lobbying can bring about change. The carnivalesque is ineffective and potentially 
harmful because it takes too much focus and energy. However, what Weissberg 
considers effective lobbying, some activists would probably call a lame co-optation 
where activism has its teeth extracted so they can no longer bite the system. In 
Chapter 1 I presented a number of authors who have written about tactical carnival 
and the carnivalesque and found that the reasons for using creativity are seldom 
purely concerned with achieving immediate political goals, but about making 
activism and political campaigning sustainable.830 But how is it exactly that 
preaching to those who are already converted contributes to sustaining a culture of 
resistance? Day discusses this in a chapter about irony in activism.831 She quotes 
Jonathan Gray for saying that there is a reason why religious preachers do preach 
to the converted every week. Reminders and reinforcement are important, and 
religious leaders are aware of this. Day herself adds that “affirmation and 
reinforcement fulfil an integral community-building function, which is a crucial 
component of nurturing a political movement.”832 Humour can be one aspect in this 
community building.  
The energy which is available to activists is not a fixed amount, and participating in 
activities one considers fun and meaningful is likely to create more energy and 
motivation to continue. People who feel that others value their contributions, have 
close friends within the movement, think activism is enjoyable and believe their 
contribution will make a difference are much more likely to stay in activism and 
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dedicate more time and effort to it. A good atmosphere contributes to creating a 
community, and having a good laugh together can be one way to make it more 
bearable to concern oneself with the apparently never ending uphill battles against 
for instance war, dictatorships, poverty and climate change.  
Impact on challenging relations of power 
There are numerous ways to approach the issue of how humorous political stunts 
challenge established relations of power. Later in the chapter I return to 
Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolent action for the purpose. Here I suggest four other 
elements that both researchers and activists can evaluate. 
1. Discursive guerrilla war 
Most organisers of humorous political stunts are well aware that their challenges 
are not “real” resistance as the concept is understood in the old-fashioned 
realpolitik approach to power. Instead humorous political stunts can be understood 
as engagements in the discursive guerrilla war over what is true, right and just in 
the domains that the activists are concerned about. The previous chapters 
discussed how especially the corrective stunts presenting alternatives can be such 
guerrilla attacks.  
One of the ways that power is challenged in humorous political stunts is when 
different dominant discourses are played out against each other. These different 
discourses usually exist side by side governing different domains, but can be 
brought together and contrasted with each other. For example, in western 
societies, discourses of profit, human rights and gift giving are all dominant 
discourses regarding a desirable life. When a humorous political stunt manages to 
rub some of these discourses against each other, an interesting dynamic arises 
when one dominant discourse is used to criticise another. This was the case when 
the Santas in Copenhagen positioned the naïve and generous gift-giving Santa 
against discourses about theft and private property. In Belarus the discourse of 
human rights was used to challenge the discourse of respect for national 
466 
 
sovereignty and air space. This way of playing dominant discourses against each 
other is not unique to humour, but one reason that humour arises for some 
audiences is that they spot the incompatibility and incongruity among discourses. 
However, this is probably also a reason why other people are not amused at all – 
they see one of the discourses as being much more important under the 
circumstances (profit, sovereignty) and thus no appropriate incongruity arises for 
them.   
2. How do others respond to humorous political stunts? 
Another way to investigate how humour has engaged with relations of power is to 
look at responses to it. The different examples have documented some of the 
many types of reactions, and how important it is for a social movement to be able 
to read what is going on. Sometimes those who are being challenged can ignore 
the attempt to undermine them. For instance, NATO did not get into trouble for 
ignoring Reality AB. At other times no reaction might stem from the fact that no one 
suspects that a prank is taking place, such as when the Yes Men spoke at the 
textile conference in Finland. But frequently humorous political stunts are met with 
sanctions from authorities: elves, Santas and clowns are handcuffed and taken to 
prison.  
Several authors writing generally about humour have made the observation that it 
can be difficult to find an adequate response to a humorous attack.833 Both Palmer 
and Speier have indicated that the best response is probably to come up with an 
even better witticism.834 However, everyone who has found themselves the victim 
of someone’s joke knows how difficult it can be to find a witty retort on the spot. 
None of the defenders of the dominant discourses under attack in the examples 
presented here have tried to respond this way in public.  
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Reactions to social movements’ campaigns and actions are complex processes, 
potentially involving a large number of people in different positions. It is pointless to 
try to understand reactions isolated from the whole interaction, but focusing on 
responses reveals diversity and a number of nuances that reach far beyond the 
common sense categories of support or repression. 
Most humorous political stunts differ from conventional protest because of the 
pretence that the instigators are not protesting. The disruption through pretence 
opens up possibilities for transformation rather than opposition. For many 
humorous political stunts it is natural to use a vocabulary of confrontation, 
opponent etc. The activists who initiate the stunts frequently see a clear division 
line between themselves and those they consider powerful. On the other hand, the 
use of humour means that it is much more difficult for representatives of the 
dominant discourse to frame these actions as ordinary protest, although they 
frequently try. Since non-protesting protesters cannot easily be categorised with 
other protesters, the show is interrupted in a different way. On the surface, the fan 
club was not protesting Howard’s politics, they were celebrating him. The Polish TV 
walkers did not strike or march in a demonstration, they just took their TVs for a 
walk at a certain time. Ofog’s company Reality AB did not demonstrate when the 
NATO exercise took place, they just helped improve it. The Yes Men did not 
disrupt WTO meetings, they just clarified the institution’s message. None of them fit 
into the ordinary play called “dominant discourse tolerates protest”.   
3. Does humour speak to a common humanity? 
In Chapter 4 I demonstrated how clowns can show what another world can look 
like at the same time as they often aim to speak to a shared humanity that 
transcends roles of activists and police officers. Even when they are annoying, 
nonviolent rebel clowns to some degree appeal to the shared experience of what it 
means to be human. However, I also pointed out that the relations are fragile, and 
if the clowning is not experienced as sincere the possibility will collapse.  
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In Redeeming Laughter: The Comic Dimension of Human Experience, Peter 
Berger writes that the ability to perceive something as comic is a unique human 
feature. To him, humor is an intrusion into the non-humorous paramount reality that 
dominates most people’s everyday existence. The idea of “intrusion” becomes a 
striking expression for describing the humorous political stunts. It is both an 
intrusion into authorities’ and conventional non-humorous protesters’ paramount 
reality. Berger uses the term transcendence to describe this intrusion:  
…the comic transcends the reality of ordinary everyday existence; 
it posits, however temporarily, a different reality in which the 
assumptions and rules of ordinary life are suspended.835  
Berger does not discuss whether this transcendence can also take place when 
someone does something they intend to be humorous, but that the butt of the joke 
or part of the audience does not perceive it as funny at all. What happens then? 
Does the transcendence still work with the police officers who do not want to play 
along with the clowns? Can the transcendence only take place for those who agree 
that this was humorous? As mentioned in Chapter 1, Palmer has emphasised how 
humor is fragile and easily can fail. Accepting something as humorous is not 
straightforward and self-evident; it is a struggle over what meaning to attribute to 
what is said or done, and depends on the context. Humorous intent is not enough 
for humor to succeed. The butt of the joke or prank does not have to agree that 
something is funny, but either the audience agrees that an event was humorous, or 
there is something special about the occasion which a given culture considers 
humorous.836 The butts of the pranks may not consider them funny at all, but 
nevertheless at some level it is possible to interpret the pranks as an appeal to our 
common humanity, no matter if this is done consciously by the pranksters or not. 
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When Berger discusses the comic and its intrusion into the paramount reality he 
does not address these issues.  
In my opinion, humorous political stunts have a potential for transforming relations 
of power because they highlight the contradictions and weaknesses of the 
dominant discourse, using a format that is recognisable as humorous also for those 
who are the butt of the joke. The comic is an intrusion into our paramount reality 
and temporarily suspends the world as we know it. Even when the “victims” are not 
amused, the presence of the comic still communicates to everyone involved that 
we are all humans in spite of our different roles in society. However, this is another 
topic for further research.  
Humorous political stunts call for a lexicon of disruption, challenge, transformation 
and transcendence, rather than “opposition”, because the choice of humour as a 
method is in itself much more inclusive and transformative than oppositional. This 
vocabulary reflects a Foucauldian understanding of power formations and 
dominant discourses, and can be found in academic fields such as queer theory 
and performativity studies which directly draw on Foucault as well as queer 
activism that has inspired other political movements to create a more playful 
atmosphere.837 However, a similar vocabulary can also be found in fields like 
peace studies and postcolonial resistance studies where Foucault has a less 
prominent place, but where resistance and opposition nevertheless are understood 
as multifaceted and relational.838 
By applying the metaphor of theatre and pointing out the elements of pretence in 
the stunts, these investigations into the humorous political stunt have shown how 
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current (political) reality is temporarily forced aside to reveal a glimpse of other 
potential (political) realities.  
4. Dilemma actions 
The fourth and final way I suggest to approach the subject of humour and relations 
of power in this section is through the concept of dilemma actions. In nonviolent 
action theory, a dilemma action is constructed so the target has to make a choice 
between two or more responses, each of which has significant negative aspects for 
them. The responses are not readily comparable and this is the nub of the 
dilemma. In a typical dilemma action involving nonviolent action, the opponent can 
either let the activists proceed to achieve their immediate goals or use force to stop 
them with the risk of adverse publicity.839  
Dilemma actions do not have to be humorous but many humorous political stunts 
are dilemma actions. In both the Polish examples, the communist Polish regime 
was caught in a dilemma. If they continued to let people take their TVs for a walk, 
dissent could continue. But as soon as they made something innocent illegal, they 
made fools of themselves. Likewise with the happenings of Orange Alternative – 
police arresting elves who had not uttered a word of protest risked becoming a 
target of further ridicule. The Chaser’s APEC stunt is also an example of a dilemma 
action. The Australian authorities and the world leaders could either laugh or be 
outraged. If they laughed, they implicitly admitted that their security arrangements 
were ridiculous. When they prosecuted the comedy team, they made themselves 
vulnerable to accusations of lacking a sense of humour.  
Dilemma actions, humorous as well as non-humorous, undermine relations of 
power when those apparently in a subordinate position can use creativity and 
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surprise to catch the more powerful off balance and place them in situations where 
no response appears quite right. 
To sum up this section about how to evaluate the impact of humorous political 
stunts, it is first and foremost important to be clear about exactly what impact one 
is aiming to measure. Humorous political stunts can have an influence on many 
different levels, to do with their potential for outreach and mobilisation, creating and 
sustaining cultures of resistance as well as challenging relations of power. Next I 
briefly revisit my model of humorous political stunts before I approach the subject 
of impact by combining my model and Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolent action.  
The model of humorous political stunts revisited 
In previous chapters I introduced numerous humorous political stunts and analysed 
them according to my model presented in chapter 3. The model divides the stunts 
according to their way of relating to dominant discourses’ logic and claims to truth.  
Supportive stunts pretend to help or celebrate people in positions of power or their 
dominant discourse, with irony and exaggeration used to reveal that the support is 
in fact not sincere at all. An example of a supportive stunt was Ofog’s company 
Reality AB which was a tool for engaging the general public in a different 
discussion about war when the “recruiters” were searching for people for a summer 
job as civilian victims of “collateral damage” during a NATO exercise in Sweden.  
Corrective stunts share some similarities with the supportive stunts in the way that 
they at first glance look as if they are the real thing. However, a closer look reveals 
that the identity of a powerful institution or person has been “borrowed” in order to 
present a corrected version of its message. It is not a fake message, but an honest 
representation of the aspect of the discourse that those in powerful positions prefer 
to keep quiet about. The Yes Men’s stunts where they impersonated 
representatives of the World Trade Organisation and the company Dow Chemicals 
are some of the most famous examples of these types of corrections. However, 
many others have used similar techniques for instance Ofog when the group added 
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text to the Swedish armed forces recruitment ads in an attempt to make passers-by 
reflect on the messages.   
Those who perform naïve stunts take a very different approach and pretend that 
they are not aware that what they do can be interpreted as dissent, for example by 
hiding their message behind something innocent and normal. However, they can 
also do like Solvognen did before Christmas in Copenhagen and take on a naïve 
and innocent role like Santa, and perform the ordinary duties of this role figure, like 
giving gifts away.  
Absurd stunts do not directly relate to the dominant discourses at all. Instead they 
use absurdity to maintain a distance from all claims to truth, like the clowns in 
Chapter 4. The Polish Orange Alternative also staged absurd happenings in the 
late 1980s when Poland was under communist rule. There was no obvious 
expression of dissent in the silliness and the authorities had difficulties finding an 
adequate response to the pranks when they presented no obvious threats or 
political content. 
Finally there are the provocative stunts. They challenge the dominant discourses 
and their representatives head on without “hiding” behind irony, impersonations or 
innocence. Instead they add an incongruous element which causes audiences to 
smile. When KMV staged their jail-ins they were very confrontational about the 
issue of imprisoned conscientious objectors, but by jumping into the prison yard 
instead of a more conventional escape over the walls many people had to laugh. It 
further added to the amusement that it became rather difficult to punish them for 
trespassing since they had themselves demanded to be imprisoned together with 
their friend.  
In order to further analyse the dynamics of interaction in each stunt, the metaphor 
of play was used to illustrate the complexities of each stunt and the differences 
between them depending on the stage, actors, audience and timing. The metaphor 
serve as a way to illustrate how easy the dynamic of the interaction can be 
changed depending on each of these four different dimensions. The challengers 
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can intensify or make their challenge less dangerous with just a little change in one 
aspect. The metaphor is also an attempt to illuminate the dynamics of the 
interaction involved in the stunts. The challengers can seldom determine the 
outcome alone, exactly what happens also depends on the responses from the 
established players and the audiences.  
1. The examples have illustrated some of the diversity in humorous political stunts 
when it comes to the type of stage the pranksters enter and the way they do it. In 
Australia, John Howard Ladies’ Auxiliary Fan Club went for a major stage, targeting 
Howard in the midst of an election campaign, while Ofog and the Polish TV-
walkers preferred the more accessible stage of the streets. In some stunts the 
stage was openly “invaded” right in the face of the audience and the other actors, 
like in KMV’s jail-ins, while the Yes Men snuck in using disguise and were not even 
recognised as challengers until after the stunt was over. The stage can be virtual, 
or it can be a physical place.  
2. Actors in this theatre also vary tremendously – from the Prime Minster in the 
Australian case, to less known actors in the others. The challengers can be few in 
numbers – the Yes Men were just two individuals with much help - or they can be 
many, as the Polish TV-walkers. However, there seems to be a tendency that 
humorous political stunts are initiated by small groups of tightly knit challengers – 
something which is not strange when considering the need for planning and 
scripting. In all the stunts I have looked at, the highest number of challengers found 
is the 100 Santas that came to Copenhagen just before Christmas in 1974.840  
One reason is probably that performing a humorous political stunt requires more 
skills and dedication than signing a petition or participating in a demonstration. 
However, this creates a potential risk of humorous political stunts being an elite 
endeavour for those who can afford to spend much time on preparing for political 
activism.  
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Nonviolent activists have numerous audiences in mind when they design their 
actions. Some are just desperate and want to do something. Others carefully 
calculate how they think their opponent will react, and plan to achieve a certain 
reaction from particular stakeholders. Sometimes activists are not so concerned 
about the reaction from the opponent or there is no particular opponent such as in 
the Santa actions, but want to reach out to the general public or attract more 
activists. Many actions are successful and achieve their aims, but sometimes 
things do not go as planned.  
3. Who are the audiences for the stunt, and how do audience members react? Do 
the challengers treat the audiences as part of the play, as in the Reality AB, or is 
the play most successful with an audience that will later watch a movie of it, as in 
the case of the Yes Men? Throughout the thesis I have talked about humour’s 
ability to facilitate outreach to media and passers-by and mobilisation of new 
participants. One of the features of a humorous political stunt is that audience 
expectations are challenged. People watching the show on the political scene 
usually have perceptions about what is going on and what they are going to hear 
from different institutions and organisations. The challengers manage to turn these 
expectations upside down when a lecturer or a prosecutor says something 
outrageous and turns out to be someone else. 
The way different audiences interpret humorous political stunts is probably the 
most crucial factor highlighted by the theatre metaphor. It does not matter what 
message the challengers had in mind if it is interpreted differently. How different 
audiences interpret a show is also what is most difficult to discover. Even when 
asked directly about their personal opinions, there is no guarantee that audience 
members speak their minds and not what they think others wish to hear.  
4. The timing of the stunt is sometimes crucial for the development of the stunt, at 
other times less important. When activists are concerned with meeting the general 
public it might not appear to matter so much exactly when the stunt is staged. 
However, as the experience from Ofog’s Vapenfadder showed, timing the stunt in a 
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way so the audience is already thinking about the topic might help get the intended 
message across. In stunts such as those carried out by John Howard Ladies’ 
Auxiliary Fan Club and the Chaser’s ridicule of APEC security, a successful event 
depends on timing it with the presence of the other actors required to be on the 
scene to play their roles. Turning up a day too early or too late will ruin the stunt.  
Considering each of the four aspects of the theatre metaphor – stage, actors, 
audience and timing – can give an indication of the criteria for a successful stunt, 
and how to increase the pressure if the stunt did not generate the expected 
reaction. Above I indicated numbers and frequency as two ways to increase the 
potential of a humorous political stunt; these four aspects are other ways of 
thinking along the same lines. Imagine how much more attention KMV would have 
received if those jumping into the prison and demanding to be locked up had been 
more prominent actors – say the prime minister, the bishop or their children. If Ofog 
had been a little bolder, they could have taken their victims of “collateral damage” 
to a stage where it would have been difficult to ignore them, the NATO exercise 
itself, something which would also have given the stunt a different audience. If 
Netwerk Vlaanderen had timed their search for landmines with an important 
meeting at the bank, it might also potentially have increased the visibility of the 
stunt.   
Writing about politics in terms of theatre does not mean that challengers that 
interrupt the show are just “playing” and not serious about the issue concerned. 
Using this metaphor is a way to take a step back and create an analytical distance. 
It is also a reflection of the fact that all social interaction can be thought of as a 
“performance”, and that both the representatives of the dominant discourses and 
the challengers play their part in this interaction.  
The phenomenon I have termed humorous political stunts differs from other types 
of political humour by being done in public, and its confrontational attitude. The 
chapter on clowning revealed that this particular sub-category of an absurd stunt 
through the use of play and otherness can communicate nonviolent values and 
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appeal to a mutual recognition of the human in the other. Well done clowning might 
transcend differences between different groups (like police and protesters), even 
when those who are the butt of the joke are ridiculed for their signs of importance 
and authority, as long as they have just a little critical self-distance.  
The two case studies documented how humour can be one way of reaching out to 
more people, and how it can make activism more sustainable. The KMV chapter 
also illustrated how humour can work together with other strategies and be 
successful in achieving a limited goal. A single stunt cannot be expected to achieve 
all this by itself, but together they point towards the potential inherent in humour. 
It is the way the organisers of the humorous political stunts set out to challenge 
dominant discourses and taken for granted assumptions that should be analytically 
distinguished from non-humorous forms of protest. In addition to the appeal to our 
common humanity, the dilemmas they create for their opponents differ because 
they have not accepted the usual role of “protester” in the political game, but 
pretend that something else is going on. 
Humour and Vinthagen’s four dimensions of nonviolent action  
In chapter 1 I introduced Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolent action and its four 
dimensions of dialogue facilitation, power breaking, utopian enactment and 
normative regulation. Taking the insights provided by the model of humorous 
political stunts and the metaphor of play into consideration, how does the use of 
humour in nonviolent action influence the rationality of each of these four 
dimensions? In what way does it help or hinder the logic of the nonviolent action?  
1. Dialogue facilitation  
In his concept of dialogue facilitation, Vinthagen combines Gandhi’s satyagraha 
with Jürgen Habermas’ thoughts on the ideal speech situation. In the ideal speech 
situation, the participants mean what they say and they treat each other’s 
statements with mutual trust. The communication is undisturbed by power 
relations, and there is time enough to hear all people’s opinions and explore what 
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they mean. Everyone with a stake in the issue under consideration participates on 
equal terms and all have access to relevant information. Rational arguments are 
allowed to rule and the best argument wins, not the person who is in a position to 
force her opinion on someone else or best at manipulating. Finally, everyone is 
ready to change their point of view based on convincing arguments by someone 
else. The ideal speech situation is an utopia that can never occur in practice, but 
that should not prevent people from striving for it. Another aspect to consider when 
evaluating the effect of humour is who the activists are aiming to have a dialogue 
with. 
However, there are some problematic aspects with the ideal speech situation that 
can be highlighted from the perspective of humour. Sammy Basu has shown how 
the distrust in the ambiguity of humour is a shortcoming in Habermas’ ideal speech 
situation, since humour is a way for both the strong and the weak to find more 
“room to manoeuvre”.841 My findings about humorous political stunts support 
Basu’s perspective, because even when they are ambivalent, humorous political 
stunts usually remain dialogue oriented, both towards those who represent a 
dominant discourse and other audiences. Although Basu does not elaborate on 
how exactly humour can overcome the differences, he considers it social glue that 
serves to incline one towards empathy with others.842 This inclusive humour 
“cultivates the pleasurable recognition of our mutual absurdities with the Other”.843 
Sombutpoonsiri found that the multiple voices that can exist side by side in carnival 
foster an atmosphere of dialogue despite the existence of prejudices and 
antagonism. A joyful atmosphere has the posibility of transforming hostility 
between demonstrators and authorities and contributing to maintaining nonviolent 
discipline.844 My analysis of the humorous political stunts showed that they almost 
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always are communicating with multiple audiences. Compared to violent 
resistance, humorous nonviolent actions appear to signal more openness because 
of their playful attitude. This is especially obvious in carnivalesque protests of naïve 
Santas, absurd clowns and pink carnivals, but also other types of stunts can 
frequently be understood as dialogue oriented if the alternative had been more 
disruptive forms of protest. Some activists also find it easier to communicate with 
others when they are playing a role and can leave their usual shy self at home.  
However, for those watching the clowns and the Santas the message might be 
unclear, something which risks distorting the communication. The risk of being 
misinterpreted when using humour is probably higher than with rational 
communication. The people behind the actions are with all likelihood perfectly 
aware of the possibilities for the discussion to side-track, but consider the attention 
they get for an issue important enough to run the risk. Audiences might be 
suspicious of the communicative intentions when it is not obvious to them what the 
message is or it is loaded with possibilities for multiple interpretations as in the 
absurd stunts.  
In supportive and corrective stunts, the messages are more obvious, but audiences 
used to rational communication might prefer honest, unambiguous communication 
that does not require them to figure out what the intentions are. In addition, part of 
the audience might become uncomfortable if it is not clear who is responsible for 
what information, as when the Yes Men impersonated a Dow spokesperson on 
BBC. It is necessary to bear in mind that no form of action is likely to satisfy all 
audiences. Just as some people feel constrained or uneasy by Habermas’ demand 
for rationality, others are lost without it. However, no matter how the audiences 
interpret humorous political stunts the pranks almost always provide “material” for 
conversation. It is both a way to strengthen the dialogue among the grassroots and 
provoke those in power positions to at least pay some attention.  
When evaluating the limitations and possibilities of the dialogue element in 
nonviolent actions, one should not compare it only with rational communication in 
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the ideal speech situation. On the other side of the spectrum stands the choice of 
violent resistance or sabotage, such as taking up a gun, burning cars or smashing 
windows. Compared to that even the most ambiguous and confrontational 
humorous political stunts are considerably more dialogue oriented, also in the 
sense of Habermas’ ideal speech situation.  
In cases where the nonviolent activists are especially concerned with appearing 
willing to engage in dialogue, for instance if they aim to convert the opponent to 
their cause, it is probably wise to shy away from humour and especially ridicule. 
Activists who have no problem “loving their enemy” and who can always present a 
friendly and non-threatening face probably benefit from rational communication 
since ambiguous humorous messages are likely to create more confusion than 
clarity.  
However, for activists who are angry and frustrated, the ambiguity of humour might 
facilitate dialogue compared to violent actions and aggressive shouting. From the 
perspective of the tradition of nonviolence, Voina’s painting of the big penis on the 
bridge in St. Petersburg as a “fuck you” to the secret police was more dialogue 
oriented than smashing their windows, especially towards audiences who see or 
hear about it. On the other hand, painting the penis is less dialogue oriented than 
sitting down and having a rational conversation about what one thinks is wrong 
with the secret police. This is not to say that smashing windows and setting cars on 
fire is not communicative in the sense of sending a clear message of frustration 
and contempt, but it is even further from Habermas’ ideal speech situation of 
respectful dialogue than the painting on the bridge. To the secret police, it might 
not make much of a difference, and it is even possible that the painting would 
anger them more than a broken window. However, to the general public the 
painting sends signals of clever provocateurs rather than an angry mob out of 
control. In the study and practice of nonviolence one emphasises that how 
audiences perceive and interpret an action matters as much as the intentions and 
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facts about what happens.845 Thus, both the traditions of nonviolence discourage 
anything that can be considered vandalism, the principled tradition because 
vandalism and sabotage are perceived as morally wrong, and the pragmatic 
tradition because of the way such actions are perceived by others. 
However, dialogue is just one element of the nonviolent action, Vinthagen has also 
identified three other dimensions. 
2. Power breaking  
However much nonviolent activists strive towards dialogue with representatives of 
what they oppose and object to, the possibility for dialogue is heavily influenced by 
the existing power relations. The ideal speech situation requires that everyone 
involved in the conversation are striving towards the utopia; it is not something that 
can be done by just one party. The problem is that those who benefit from the 
status quo seldom find much reason to engage in dialogue until they are forced to 
do so. They resist this dialogue on equal terms with all possible means, including 
devaluing the activists as persons and their motives, reframing what the action is 
about and using all official and unofficial sanctions at their disposal. The most 
obvious aspect of a nonviolent action is the attempt to break these existing 
relations of power by pressuring those who refuse to engage into interaction.  
With a Foucaudian understanding of power, people can never be outside the 
relations of power that they want to challenge, but have to act from within. 
Sombutpoonsiri’s thesis about the Serbian group Otpor emphasised humour’s 
excorporation potential, where parody and satire can be used to resist power from 
within the existing culture. 
Many of the humorous political stunts aim to challenge and transform the power 
relations. Usually this remains a temporary symbolic power breaking, when those 
in power are ridiculed, humiliated and shown not to be so powerful and almighty as 
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they first appeared. This is most obvious in the provocative stunts, as when Studio 
Total violated Belarusian airspace to drop teddy bears supporting human rights or 
Voina painted the penis on the bridge in St. Petersburg. Actions like these shout 
“see, they are not that almighty anyway”. In some of the naïve stunts, such as the 
innocent advertising for sausages on the butcher’s van door in Denmark, the 
provocation is less direct and a bit more intellectually sophisticated.  
However short and symbolic, the humorous political stunts can be powerful 
contributions in what I call the discursive guerrilla war that the activists are waging. 
If Foucault is right that the main source of disciplining a society is through 
discourse, then a key role of resistance is to combat dominant discourses. Viewed 
from this perspective, humorous political stunts have much to contribute in this 
battle about what is true, just and right and what meaning to attribute to events and 
actions.  
Corrective stunts are the avant-garde of the discursive guerrilla war. It is not just a 
stage which is occupied: they also include a clever message or a suggestion for an 
alternative cause of action. When the Yes Men impersonated representatives of 
Dow and the WTO, they showed that BBC and conference organisers could be 
fooled, but that was a side effect. The main point was to establish a stage for 
presenting an alternative way of acting for Dow and the WTO. Even if they 
probably did not expect these institutions to listen, they succeeded in showing 
audiences that alternative ways of behaving were actually a possibility.    
At other times, humorous political stunts break the power of those representing 
dominant discourses when they force a theme on the public agenda. Mark Thomas 
broke Indonesian government representatives’ silence about human right violations 
when his supportive stunt tricked them into admitting to human rights violations 
while being filmed. Likewise, when Netwerk Vlaanderen created ACE bank that 
relied on investments in controversial industries such as oil, weapons and child 
labour it drew attention to a subject which all the major banks would have preferred 
to keep silent about. Total objectors from KMV had little possibility to draw attention 
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to their fate via traditional channels of communication, but when they staged stunts 
like the jail-in and the false prosecutor, media coverage enabled others to know 
about their situation which the Norwegian state was mainly silent about. When the 
representatives of the Norwegian state then responded, a sort of dialogue had 
been started. Although it was still far from the utopia in the ideal speech situation, it 
was a move away from total silence. 
Controlling language and symbols is an important aspect of upholding a dominant 
discourse. The possibility to name and label the world can be just as important for 
hegemony as physical control through the threat of violence. A consequence of this 
understanding is that one should not underestimate the threat to the dominance 
that arises from undermining symbols and language. Well done supportive and 
corrective humorous political stunts skilfully twist and play with words and images 
and bring in new associations. Ofog’s weapon sponsors, ad corrections and Reality 
AB are examples of this parody and ridicule of the language of power. When the 
Swedish armed forces through their recruitment ads tried to define military 
solutions as the only solutions for anyone who “had what it takes to have an 
opinion”, Ofog used their own symbols and language to suggest alternatives from 
peace activists who were not afraid to have a different opinion.   
Social movements have their own hierarchies and systems of power. Although 
many political groups are aware of this and consciously work to counter 
inequalities through their decision making practices and ways of organising their 
work, they will probably always be there. Humorous political stunts, especially 
absurd ones, can also be a way to point towards a movement’s own power 
structures and aim to transform them. Clowns cannot only create uncertainty 
among representatives of the authorities, but also among activists of the “old 
school” who are most comfortable with rational arguments.  
3. Utopian enactment 
According to Vinthagen, it is not just the existing power relations that stand in the 
way of an ideal speech situation. Communication about sensitive issues, such as 
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political struggles, is also highly influenced by emotions. Emotions were long a 
neglected research area when it came to social movements, but now many texts 
have documented how feelings of anger and grief are central for the moral shocks 
and outrage that are strong driving forces for many activists.846 Nepstad and Smith 
argue that it is inaccurate to see emotions and rationality as opposites: 
We need to cease viewing emotions and rationality as 
dichotomous. Moral outrage is a logical reaction to the torture, 
disappearances, and assassinations of innocent civilians and to the 
lies disseminated by a government to cover its role as an 
accomplice to these atrocities.847 
Nepstad and Smith consider moral outrage a rational response to accounts of 
torture and killing of civilians, thus it does not make sense to claim that emotions 
and logic can and should be separated from each other.   
However, in the context of nonviolent action, negative emotions like anger and 
longing for revenge towards those responsible for wrongdoing and injustice may 
block activists’ thinking about constructive solutions and a future peaceful co-
existence. The aspect of the nonviolent action which carries an utopian enactment 
can present a more constructive element. This does not contradict anger as an 
emotional kick-starter for activism, but is a supplement when it comes to thinking 
about the future. Utopian enactments demonstrate that alternatives to the 
prevailing order are possible here and now, however fleeting and temporary. With 
this enactment, nonviolent action suggests alternative ways of structuring society.  
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As discussed in chapter 1, the definition of humour includes an emotional aspect. 
This indicates that the humorous mode speaks to an emotional side of people that 
might not be reached the same way when we operate in the non-humorous mode. 
This makes humorous political stunts a good starting point for investigating 
emotional aspects of nonviolent activism. Sombutpoonsiri’s thesis with its concept 
of the carnivalesque as well as Bogad et al.’s idea about tactical carnival also point 
towards this side of humour.   
Humorous political stunts speak to the imagination, thinking out of the box, 
encouraging audiences to look at reality from a new perspective. This is an aspect 
where they differ from many conventional expressions of protest. Thinking about 
the future is not limited to the usual way of “doing politics”, but instead an 
encouragement to “play politics”. Orange Alternative showed with their happenings 
that the grey everyday life of communist Poland could easily be turned into a 
carnival, thus hinting at other possible ways of living in the future. Also the army of 
Santas which used the naïve Santa figure to communicate values of generosity 
and solidarity concretely enacted how the world could be different. Similarly, all the 
other figures speaking to fantasy and imagination emphasise that the organisers 
value diversity and creativity. In addition, absurd stunts are a way of illuminating 
the absurdity of various situations.  
When it comes to the corrective stunts, they can be much more concrete and 
specific than the naïve and absurd about what alternatives they suggest. The logic 
of the absurd requires the clowns and elves to remain ambiguous about what the 
future could look like, but corrective stunts do not have this limitation. For instance, 
the Yes Men showed how the WTO could close itself down, and that Dow indeed 
had a possibility for apologising and compensating the victims of the Bhopal 
catastrophe. 
However, there is a limitation with using humour to present these alternatives. 
Especially when it comes to the carnivalesque, some observers might associate 
the playful frame with irresponsibility and not consider it “serious” enough. This is 
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less of a risk in the corrective stunts, but here the “dishonesty” might in some 
people’s eyes disqualify the expression of dissent from seriousness. It might also 
become more difficult to reach out to potential allies and new activists who find it a 
challenge to let go of their anger and don’t feel at home in an environment that they 
see as too silly.     
4. Normative regulation  
The fourth and final aspect of nonviolent action that Vinthagen identified he called 
normative regulation, which points towards the struggle for making nonviolence the 
norm, the normal, and violence the abnormal. For Gandhi and his followers this 
involved living by the principles of nonviolence in all aspects of life, something they 
translated into service to society. The challenge was not just to fight injustice, but 
also to build alternatives in parallel. In western societies, this aspect of nonviolence 
is rather neglected, although some communities that practice both resistance and 
construction can be found. The most widespread aspect of attempted normative 
regulation can be found in trainings before nonviolent actions where the 
participants practice how to remain nonviolent in spite of provocations.  
Almost all the humorous political stunts contribute to the normative regulation 
aspect of a nonviolent action because of the inherent playful attitude that speaks to 
our common humanity. This is especially obvious with the same stunts that 
contribute to utopian enactments. Many accounts describe how clowns and a 
carnivalesque atmosphere deescalate tensions and make the atmosphere less 
hostile, especially in cases where protesters are directly confronting a massive 
police presence and there is a considerable risk of violent clashes. It does not even 
have to be all protesters who are playing these roles: the mere presence of some 
in the frontline appears to make the situation less tense. However, as pointed out 
by some informants, individual police might be provoked and the ambiguity of the 
clown role that teases and ridicules does allow for many possible interpretations of 
intentions. Humour which is perceived as aggressive might make an opponent 
insecure about how true the nonviolent intentions are. Judging whether humour is 
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appropriate in the situation is similar to the dilemma when it comes to dialogue 
facilitation: In cases where protesters have no problem maintaining their nonviolent 
discipline and remaining calm and dignified without abusing their opponent, the 
ambiguity of humour makes the nonviolent intention and norm less obvious. 
However, when this is not the case and there is a risk of the nonviolent protest 
turning aggressive, using humour and the carnivalesque to maintain nonviolent 
discipline is much preferable, although it remains ambiguous.  
Although humour at some level contributes to this normative regulation, the stunts 
presented here are temporary interventions and usually their main purpose is a 
short breaking of established relations of power. They are miles away from the 
Gandhian constructive programs and the contribution to the normative regulation is 
very superficial compared to the ideal. However, as Vinthagen points out when 
presenting his theory, the normative regulation aspect is generally neglected in the 
western world where most of my examples of humorous political stunts come from. 
This discussion about humour’s relation to Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolence and 
its four dimensions has revealed that humour can contribute to the goals of a 
nonviolent action, but also that some aspects of some types of humorous political 
stunts might be problematic because of the ambiguity of humour. While humour 
can help emphasise one of the aspects of nonviolence, at the same time it might 
become problematic when it comes to others. Table 3 schematically sums up some 
of these relationships. However, to make it even more complex, it is also important 
to take into consideration which audiences or actors the activists are aiming to 
influence in what way. To take some examples: The main strength of KMV’s jail-ins 
and fake prosecutor actions were that they broke the power of Norwegian 
authorities, although only for a short while. They also had a dialogue oriented 
element towards the general public who were not aware of the situation of the total 
resisters. On the other hand the deception with the fake prosecutor and the 
provocation in the jail-ins did not facilitate dialogue with Norwegian authorities. 
There is an ever-present tension between the elements of dialogue facilitation and 
power breaking in a world of unequal power relations. Neither were these two 
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actions in themselves utopian enactments since they did not “speak” about the 
alternatives KMV sought. Like all the other humorous political stunts the 
contribution to the normative regulation is only superficial because of the temporary 
nature of the stunts.  
 
Table 3. The relationships between Vinthagen’s four dimensions of 
nonviolence and humorous political stunts.  
Dimension How do humorous political 
stunts potentially weaken 
nonviolent action? 
How do humorous political stunts 
potentially strengthen nonviolent 
action? 
Dialogue 
facilitation 
 
 Ambiguity about who is 
behind a stunt and what 
the organisers actually 
mean might make the 
dialogue more difficult. 
 The deceptions in some 
stunts can be interpreted 
as dishonesty that 
weakens the dialogue.  
 All types of humorous political 
stunts can be interpreted as 
dialogue oriented.  
 Play is communicative, 
especially compared to violence 
and hostility. 
 Corrective stunts communicate 
a suggestion for an alternative 
cause of action.   
 Many activists experience a 
personal liberation when taking 
on a role. 
 Stunts frequently provide 
material for conversation. Also 
those who disagree talk about 
them. 
Power 
breaking 
 
 Silliness can be 
interpreted as if the 
activists are not serious 
about the issue. 
Especially the naïve and 
absurd stunts run this 
risk.  
 All humorous political stunts 
temporarily break the 
hegemony of powerful 
dominant discourses.  
 Humorous political stunts 
contribute to discursive 
guerrilla war, challenging 
dominant perceptions about 
what is true and just.  
 Absurd stunts can break power 
within the activists’ own group. 
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Utopian 
enactment 
 
 Ridicule and humiliation 
can be counterproductive 
when it comes to the 
utopian enactment. 
 
 Many stunts give positive and 
constructive images of an 
alternative and more just future 
with room for tolerance and 
diversity.  
 Corrective stunts clearly point 
towards an alternative. 
Normative 
regulation 
 Humour perceived as 
aggressive might cast 
doubt on how deep the 
commitment to 
nonviolence is. 
 The playful attitude of 
humorous political stunts 
speaks to a shared humanity.  
   
   
In other stunts, other aspects appear most clearly. Mark Thomas broke the power 
of Indonesian government officials when he tricked them into talking about their 
human rights abuses on camera under the disguise that he would teach them how 
to improve their relations to the media. This was not oriented towards dialogue with 
the Indonesian government. However, revealing what the government 
representatives had said was an utopian enactment of a world where 
representatives of a government do not lie to the public.  
That a single action or stunt is not able to be the ideal when it comes to all the four 
aspects is not a problem unique to humorous political stunts. Nonviolent activists 
encounter the same contradictions between the different dimensions of an action 
when they engage in non-humorous action planning. This issue is something for 
both activists and academic researchers to consider further. There is no “solution” 
to this problem, and no perfect humorous political stunt exists. Judging what is 
most appropriate will always be a question about which aspect of a nonviolent 
action one considers most important in the circumstances.  
Conclusion  
Humorous political stunts have an ability to appeal to the imagination, to people’s 
desire for spectacle and drama. They create a tension between the said, the 
unsaid, the skills and the attention of both the initiator of the irony and its 
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interpreters. Political activists who undertake stunts like these see a possibility to 
destabilise established relations of power when communication becomes even 
more complex than usual. This is not to say that irony is automatically at the 
service of those with less power, but those already in power have much less 
interest in modes of communicating based on an unpredictable ambiguity with an 
uncertain outcome. However, this ambiguity and built-in tension can be a way for 
activists to reach out, mobilise, contribute to creating a culture of resistance, and 
challenge established relations of power.  
Looking at the data on humorous political stunts from the perspective of 
Vinthagen’s four dimensions of nonviolent action revealed that most stunts’ biggest 
contribution is to temporarily and symbolically break the power of dominant 
discourses. By engaging in this discursive guerrilla warfare, humorous political 
stunts show the potential of a different future. A single humorous political stunt is 
unlikely to achieve much, but as part of bigger campaigns and movements stunts 
provide attention-grabbing dissenting voices that speak from a different position 
than conventional forms of protest.  
In addition to their power breaking potential, some humorous political stunts are 
also oriented towards dialogue facilitation, although they are far from Habermas’ 
ideal speech situation which is based on logic and reason. Activists who find it 
unproblematic to remain dignified and calm are probably better off with non-
humorous forms of communication if the dialogue element of nonviolent action is 
what counts most for them. However, if the alternative to a humorous political stunt 
is displaying anger and smashing windows, even the most provocative humorous 
political stunt is more dialogue oriented. Although the target might not experience it 
as dialogue oriented, other audiences are more likely to see a smart provocateur 
with a message rather than frustration out of control. In most nonviolent actions 
there is a built-in tension between the dialogue-facilitating and the power-breaking 
elements. Dialogue without power breaking is unlikely to move the powerful to 
change that matters. On the other hand, power breaking without dialogue becomes 
a way of polarising political differences and cementing established points of view 
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rather than searching for ways to create change together in the Gandhian spirit of 
holding on to one’s truth while approaching Truth.  
Corrective and absurd humorous political stunts also contribute to the utopian 
enactment element of the nonviolent action when they display a tolerance for 
diversity or temporarily enact alternative courses of action for powerful institutions. 
At one level all the humorous political stunts are contributing to the normative 
regulation aspect of a nonviolent action since they question the discourse that 
violence is normal. On another level, because they are only a temporary power 
breaking, they are very far from Gandhi’s idea of the constructive programme on 
which Vinthagen based this notion.  
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Conclusion 
Introduction 
This conclusion sums up the thesis’ major findings as well as the theoretical 
implications for research on humour and nonviolence. In addition, I will briefly 
discuss the practical implications the findings might have for social movements 
working for peace and social justice. 
Humour, power and nonviolent resistance 
Nonviolent resistance has been practised for centuries and studied within 
academia for decades, but understandings of the dynamics of nonviolent action are 
still rudimentary. Since nonviolence has been neglected and violent resistance 
glorified to such a degree, there is much history to recover and contemporary 
practice to document in order to provide reliable analysis of what impact nonviolent 
action can have on relations of power. When it comes to studying the use of 
humorous methods as part of a nonviolent campaign, hardly any research has 
been done previously.  
In humour research it has long been debated if humour can be a form of 
resistance, or if it is merely a vent for frustration. However, framing humour’s 
subversive potential as a question of either/or is a simplification of complex 
processes. Some political humour is probably meaningless in the context of 
struggles for social and political change. Nevertheless, jumping straight from this to 
the conclusion that humour cannot make a difference or even that it is 
counterproductive seems rather premature. Authors such as Foucault, Scott and 
Bayat have investigated the subtle workings of power and resistance in ways that 
take into consideration that neither power nor resistance can be considered one 
dimensional. Humour researchers who are sceptical about humour’s ability to play 
a role in resistance do not appear to take these authors’ work on power into 
consideration. Instead they speak generally about resistance as if it is something 
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that is either openly declared and will lead to violent revolution, or totally absent. 
This study demonstrates why such an approach is inadequate. In order to 
investigate how humour can sometimes be resistance it is necessary to use a more 
sophisticated language on what humour is as well as a nuanced power theory 
which can reflect the dynamic interaction between all the actors involved. 
Although there has been little systematic inquiry into the relationship between 
humour and nonviolence, what has been done shows that the interesting question 
is not if a single instance of humour can change relations, which is of course 
unreasonable to expect, but rather 
What role can humour play in facilitating resistance to dominant discourses 
and powerful institutions and people?  
This has been the guiding question for my research.  
Both in academic research and everyday language it is common to speak about 
humour as if it is one “thing”, thereby allowing all humour to be judged and 
evaluated from the same perspective. This is probably also a reason why a number 
of humour scholars have insisted that humour cannot have an effect on resistance. 
Based on one type of data (often jokes) they make overly broad generalisations 
about all humour. The only thing all humour has in common is that it includes an 
incongruity that causes at least part of the audience to be amused. Apart from this 
very basic characteristic, humour is extremely diverse. Humour is a way of 
communicating and is not inherently positive or negative. Just like any other form 
of communication it can be used to make people happy or to cause them intended 
or unintended harm. Some humour will reinforce the status quo, whereas other 
humour encourages rebellion, and some may even have mixed effects. 
Humour can be expressed through a wide range of techniques such as irony, 
exaggeration, parody and impersonations through different media including jokes, 
cartoons, theatre, music and graffiti. This complexity means that participants in 
social movements discussing the pros and cons of humour in general terms might 
actually be discussing very different things without realising it. If they want to 
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discuss if humour can be used as an appropriate method it is probably wiser to talk 
about the possible benefits and potential risks of a specific action. Likewise, 
academics interested in understanding humour must also specify exactly what type 
of humour in what context they are interested in.  
Another problem with both academic and everyday language is labelling the 
opposite of humour “serious”. This implicitly assumes that something cannot be 
humorous and serious at the same time. Since a lot of political humour is both, it is 
better to call the opposite of humour “rational” or “non-humorous”. This is not to say 
that those who use humour are not rational, but that their method of 
communication instead is based on contradictions and ambiguity which distort 
usual forms of rational communication.  
Humorous political stunts and the power of nonviolence 
In order to investigate what role humour can play in facilitating resistance to 
dominant discourses I have focused on one particular form of humorous action and 
performance that I call humorous political stunts. I chose the term “stunt” because 
it is not so clearly associated with one particular activist or academic tradition as 
other possibilities such as “action”, “hoax”, “performance” or “prank”. I have defined 
a humorous political stunt as  
a performance/action carried out in public which attempts to undermine a 
dominant discourse. It is either so confrontational that it cannot be ignored 
or involves a deception that blurs the line between performers and 
audiences. It includes or comments on a political incongruity in a way that is 
perceived as amusing by at least some people who did not initiate it.  
However, even within this particular form of humorous political activism there is a 
huge diversity in the way it is practised. I have identified five distinct ways for those 
who perform humorous political stunts to position themselves in relation to 
dominant discourses and people in positions of power.  
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Supportive stunts use irony, parody and exaggeration to disguise their critique. 
Instead of being openly critical, they pretend that they support and celebrate their 
target or want to protect it from harm. The targets will know that they are being 
watched, and the audiences are presented with an image of the target’s vulnerable 
sides.  
Corrective stunts aim to transcend the inequality in power by presenting an 
alternative version of “the truth”. They temporarily “steal” the identity of the 
institutions and companies they are aiming to unmask. From this disguise, they 
present a more honest representation of who the target really is. The correction 
can for instance be an exaggeration that exposes greed and selfishness, or it might 
just be the facts in language that everyone can understand. The Yes Men have 
made this type of “identity correction” an art form under the slogan “sometimes it 
takes a lie to expose the truth”848, but many others have used similar tactics.  
Naïve stunts bring the unequal relations of power to everyone’s attention by 
tackling the opponent from behind an apparent naiveté. What is actually critique is 
camouflaged as coincidences or a normal activity. While the supportive and 
corrective stunts often exaggerate and overemphasise what those in positions of 
power say, people who carry out naive stunts pretend that they are not aware that 
they have challenged any power.  
Absurd stunts rely on total silliness and absurdity. From this position, the activists 
are ridiculing everything and everyone claiming to know the one and only truth – be 
it governments, institutions, or people within their own movement who take 
themselves a bit too seriously. The absurd action shares some similarities with the 
naive regarding the apparent naiveté of the activists, but whereas the participants 
in the naive stunt appear not to understand, the absurd pranksters refuse to 
acknowledge that any truth exists.  
                                            
848
 Front cover of Bichlbaum and Bonanno, "The Yes Men Fix the World." 
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Provocative stunts do not pretend anything like the four other strategies. They are 
an openly declared challenge to claims to status and power. They include an 
element that part of the audience considers amusing, for instance when they 
manage to expose shortcomings and present the “almighty” as humans with flaws. 
The pranksters do not deny the unequal relations of power, as in absurd stunts, or 
present any alternatives like the supportive or corrective actions do: they simply 
appear not to care about the consequences of their actions.  
This typology of humorous political stunts takes some of the complexity of the 
phenomenon into consideration. What happens in an absurd stunt is so different 
from what happens in the supportive and corrective that one cannot evaluate and 
analyse them as if they are the same. They have the incongruity in common, but 
when it comes to how they temporarily destabilise relations of power they are very 
different – both in the way they position themselves in relation to dominant 
discourses and the responses they generate. People exposed to political humour 
react in many different ways, of course, depending on whether they are passive 
bystanders, an audience getting involved, police ordered out to intervene or the 
target of ridicule and humiliation. In addition, reactions depend on the context, the 
message and the medium used.  
Another method to approach the diversity of humorous political stunts I have 
developed is to apply the theatre metaphor. Since all political activity can be 
understood as a form of theatre where the actors enact a drama, the metaphor can 
be a way to catch other elements of the diversity. Analysing the stunts from the 
perspective of the stage, actors, audiences and timing can provide insight for both 
activists and academics. For researchers it is a way of analysing the relational and 
dynamic aspects of the stunts. One can ask who initiates the stunts and who 
involuntarily becomes an actor in the play of politics? Where do the stunts take 
place, and who are the audiences? How do the different audiences respond, and 
how is the whole affair timed? For academics, these questions might provide new 
insights, but the four elements can also be a way for activists to consider how to 
make a humorous political stunt more effective. If an action has not had the desired 
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effect, changing some elements might increase the pressure on governments, 
appeal more to media or challenge dominant discourses more effectively. If it is 
difficult to get close to certain main actors like prime ministers, maybe the effect 
can increase if one attempts to capture another stage or considers changing the 
timing.  
Vinthagen’s theory of nonviolent action has identified four central dimensions which 
he has termed dialogue facilitation, power breaking, utopian enactment and 
normative regulation. Looking at humorous political stunts through this framework 
reveals some of the ways that humour can contribute to the goal of the nonviolent 
action, but also indicates situations where humour might be counterproductive. 
When it comes to Vinthagen’s first dimension of dialogue facilitation, humorous 
political stunts are more dialogue oriented than resistance that involves smashing 
windows and setting cars on fire, at least when looking from the tradition of 
nonviolence and considering other audiences than the target. On the other hand, 
one can imagine forms of communication that are more dialogue oriented than a 
humorous political stunt, since the ambiguity of humour can distort communication 
when it is not clear what the message is or who is behind it. In addition, ridicule 
might hurt in a way that hinders dialogue, and campaigns that rely on ambiguity, 
double meanings, and incongruity might be perceived as unpredictable. Targeted 
governments and companies might not experience it as worthwhile to have a 
rational dialogue. Although humour can contribute to presenting a friendly face to 
outsiders, target companies and institutions might become more cautious in their 
attempt to engage in a dialogue with humorous activists.   
If one is interested in humorous political stunts’ ability to challenge relations of 
power, Vinthagen’s second dimension of a nonviolent action, power breaking, is 
perhaps the most interesting. A single humorous political stunt can usually not be 
expected to have more than a temporary and symbolic effect, but all resistance has 
to start from somewhere. A humorous strategy can be built around a series of 
stunts. If one agrees with Foucault and believes control of discourses to be one of 
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the most important aspects of domination in a society, then it also follows that 
attacks on the core of these discourses are an important method of resistance. I 
have introduced the term discursive guerrilla warfare to indicate how humorous 
political stunts can be “hit and run” attacks on such dominant discourses. Many of 
the stunts are not just suggesting small adjustments or moderate reform of the 
current world order, but have attacked essential aspects of dominant discourses 
like neo-liberalism, consumerism and militarism.  
The naïve and absurd stunts have demonstrated a particular ability to contribute to 
the part of a nonviolent action expressing the third and fourth dimension of 
Vinthagen’s theory, the utopian enactment and normative regulation. The naïve 
and absurd Santas, clowns and elves speak to people’s imagination, popular 
myths and folklore as well as childhood memories. Although this is also temporary, 
these figures are one way of illustrating what a different world order valuing 
spontaneity, creativity and imagination could look like.  
The case studies about Ofog and KMV 
The ways researchers gather information influence the type of answers they can 
provide. No knowledge is neutral and research that does not explicitly attempt to 
speak from the perspective of those in subordinate positions will almost inevitably 
benefit most those with status and privilege and further cement established 
relations of power. My research project was explicitly developed to investigate 
humour from the perspective of nonviolent activists in order to see how humour 
can be used as part of a struggle for a more just and peaceful world. Inspired by 
the values behind participatory action research and feminist standpoint theory I 
developed a case study strategy to investigate two detailed case studies using a 
triangulation of methods.  
Ofog is a Swedish anti-militarist network working against Swedish arms production 
and the militarisation of society. Together with the network I investigated how 
humour can be used as part of a strategy to challenge militarism. I used participant 
observation, carried out interviews and initiated workshops to investigate humour 
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together with Ofog. This case study primarily investigates what meaning humour 
has for the activists who engage in it and how they perceive its effect. It also 
documents some of the “messy” processes of day to day activism and how difficult 
it can be to make priorities about what activity to pursue next. The research did not 
generate as much change over time as I had anticipated. Although I never 
imagined predicting the course of events, I had expected to witness an increase in 
the use of humour, an even more reflexive attitude and strategic planning that 
included more humour. Although this lack of development probably says more 
about me than about other participants in Ofog, it is also a testimony to what I have 
called the persistence of logical argument. Even within a network that is very 
interested in using humour and where activists have an open mind when it comes 
to experimenting with new types of actions, there is still a tendency to believe that 
rational discourse will be more effective.  
2½ years of participant observation and interviews with people in Ofog about 
events that took place before I became involved made it possible to document 
Ofog’s extensive use of humour. Four out of the five different types of humorous 
political stunts have been carried out by Ofog activists. Radical clowning, a 
particular version of the absurd stunt where people dress in a mixture of military 
uniforms and clowning attributes, was one of the forms of humour that had been 
used most frequently within the network. For activists in Ofog, it is considered a 
way to challenge and ridicule police and military in uniforms. This form of activism 
is found in many parts of the western world where it is part of the traditions of 
tactical carnival and playful protest.  
On several occasions Ofog has engaged in supportive and corrective stunts. A 
supportive stunt that has become part of Ofog’s humorous baggage was when 
people from the network invented the company Reality AB, that was going to “help” 
NATO during an exercise in the north of Sweden by recruiting civilians to play dead 
and traumatised victims of “collateral damage”. The one provocative stunt that 
Ofog has carried out was when a whole tank was painted pink as part of a 
campaign to mark out the places where war starts.  
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I analysed humour’s role in facilitating resistance from four different perspectives. 
First of all, humour is perceived as a good way to facilitate outreach to media and 
passers-by. One person I interviewed suggested that because understanding 
humour requires an intellectual detour, it reaches them at a different level. Since 
activists have the impression that many people meet conventional non-humorous 
protest with a preformed opinion about what the activists are going to say and how 
they themselves are going to respond, it is difficult to reach them. The detour that 
is required to reconcile and grasp the incongruity creates a crack where you might 
be able to catch people off guard. However, when it comes to media the situation is 
not straightforward. Although many groups have successfully reached out to mass 
media through a humorous political stunt, Ofog has not had the same experience.  
Secondly, many activists consider humour a good way to mobilise new activists, 
and several Ofog activists mentioned the network’s use of humour as something 
they found attractive. However, to know more precisely how effective humour is for 
mobilisation would require a different study where one observes if an increase in 
the use of humour is followed by more people joining in. Alternatively it is possible 
to interview newcomers about their perceptions about what motivated them to 
become involved. 
Thirdly, when it comes to facilitating a culture of resistance, it is possible to say 
something more conclusive. For many Ofog activists, clowning and other types of 
humour can be a personal liberation and a way to make activism more sustainable 
and prevent burn-out. Contrary to some perceptions, energy for activism is not a 
zero-sum game where time and energy spent on one thing automatically mean 
less time and energy for other activities. Instead some of the humorous actions are 
felt to create a good atmosphere and new energy within the network, which in turn 
can be used on non-humorous activities. The feeling of contributing to resistance 
might become self-reinforcing.  
Fourth and finally, the data in the case study on Ofog reveal the activists’ wishes 
and hopes about how humour will challenge relations of power. Since Ofog is 
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working on such broad issues, it is not possible to point towards a “victory”. It 
would be naïve to expect a network of volunteers like Ofog to dismantle Swedish 
arms production or export with a few humorous political stunts. Nevertheless, even 
if this is a small network, one should not underestimate the power of dissenting 
voices. All resistance to dominant discourses has to start from somewhere, and 
Ofog activists can be considered combatants in the discursive guerrilla war that 
attempts to undermine the dominant discourse of militarism in Sweden. However, 
one should be careful not to jump from this conclusion to seeing success when it is 
not justified. Some humorous political stunts are probably not very effective if they 
do not reach any audiences, or if the messages are not communicated clearly 
because of lack of skills or unforeseen circumstances.   
Investigating the meaning of humour also revealed that the distinction between 
humour and other types of creative activism might make sense from an analytical 
perspective, but it does not reflect the lived experience of all political activists. 
Interviewing people about “humour” provided many examples of creative activism 
that did not necessarily include the appropriate incongruity which is central to the 
definition of humour. Likewise, the idea that there would be a clear distinction 
between “internal” humour and humour which was directed outwards to 
communicate with media, the general public, potential new activists as well as the 
target of an action also turned out to be naïve. Although some humour was clearly 
internal or directed outwards, the case study of Ofog also provided examples of 
humour which was visible to outsiders, but nevertheless appeared mainly to be for 
the benefit of the activists themselves.  
Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt (KMV) was a Scandinavian campaign active in the 
1980’s in support of total resisters who refused both military and substitute service. 
This case study focused on the campaign’s work in Norway where the primary goal 
was to change the law that sent the total resisters to prison for 16 months without 
calling it a punishment. I found that KMV pursued four different strategies in this 
work. Firstly, the campaign developed a strategy of creating a spectacle around the 
court hearings and imprisonments of the total resisters and selective objectors. 
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Part of the spectacle was two types of humorous political stunts – a provocative 
stunt where the activists jumped the prison walls, not to escape, but as a jail-in 
where they demanded that either their friend be released, or that they go to prison 
with him since they shared his opinions. KMV activists were also behind a 
supportive stunt where one activist showed up in court as the prosecutor when 
another activist was having his court hearing that would send him to jail for total 
resistance. In spite of the exaggerations, the parody of the prosecutor was so 
convincing that the judge did not notice anything wrong, something which 
subsequently generated much media attention.  
KMV’s other strategy was to use the legal system against the Norwegian state. 
One activist filed a complaint with the European Commission of Human Rights at 
the Council of Europe, and two others made a court case against the Norwegian 
state for violating the constitution when they were sent to prison without a proper 
trial. KMV participants lost both these cases, but nevertheless they generated so 
much attention that in 1989 the civil servants in the department of justice proposed 
a law change in accordance with what KMV found acceptable. In 1985 there had 
been no interest among the parliamentarians in the fate of total resisters, but a few 
years later the department of justice’s proposed change of the relevant paragraphs 
was accepted unanimously by the parliament. 
Thirdly, KMV also engaged in solidarity activities with other total resisters and as a 
fourth strategy some individuals were very active in writing letters to the editor and 
other lobbying activities. However, in this particular case these last two strategies 
do not seem to have had much effect on the law change although they meant a lot 
to some individuals.      
The case study of KMV showed in detail how various humorous and non-humorous 
aspects of a campaign can complement each other. Humour has the potential to 
play an important role within a campaign that combines humorous as well as non-
humorous elements. Here it was the ability to generate attention from media and 
interest from potential new total resisters that seemed to be decisive. Although the 
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department of justice did not keep track of the numbers of total resisters, KMV’s list 
of contacts grew and an increasing number of young men decided to become total 
resisters during the 1980’s.  
When I was looking for cases that would be rich in information about humour it was 
not a sampling criterion that the political activists in the case studies were 
concerned about the same or similar themes. As it turned out, both Ofog and KMV 
are/were radical anti-militarists organised like networks that work as marginalised 
groups within a democratic setting. Although it is not possible to make strong 
conclusions based on just two case studies, it is striking that both of these marginal 
groups organised in network structures found it useful to use humour. It might be 
worth exploring further if small and marginalised organisations see humour as an 
opportunity to gain attention, while larger organisations do not see the need or fear 
the risks associated with humour. Even if the persistence of logical argument could 
be found in Ofog, it might be even more pronounced in formal organisations where 
all activities need to be approved at the top of the organisation.  
In spite of the similarities, there are also major differences between Ofog and KMV. 
An obvious one is the separation in time, so while Ofog is still an active network, 
KMV has dissolved. However, the most significant difference is that KMV worked 
on a campaign with one particular aim in mind, while Ofog’s focus is much broader. 
It might seem like an obvious finding, but the two case studies confirm that it 
appears to be easier for a group that keeps a narrow focus to get direct results. 
KMV did have a good case because of the obvious contradiction in sending 
someone to prison for 16 months without calling it a punishment, but it probably 
helped that they remained focused on this particular issue. 
The risks and limitations with humorous political stunts 
The case studies have shown that using humorous political stunts has many 
potential benefits for social movements that aim at facilitating outreach and 
mobilisation, a culture of resistance and challenging established relations of power. 
However, this should not make activists and academics blind to the risks and 
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limitations. Using humour includes a risk of not being taken seriously and a risk of 
the humour becoming too internal. Trying to combine the humorous and the non-
humorous might also become a challenge.  
Many of the humorous political stunts included here were extremely successful in 
generating media attention. However, Ofog has not had the same experience so 
one should not assume that humorous political stunts are a guaranteed path to the 
front pages. Since the stunts that become most known are often spread via mass 
media, there is an inevitable selection bias in the stunts included here. We know 
little about all the attempts made that never reach the media because of issues like 
unfortunate timing, bad planning or journalists’ hesitations to cover it. To uncover 
all the attempts that never succeeded would require ethnographic research 
comparable to what I did with Ofog. 
All social movements with political messages face the problem that some people 
do not understand their message, but the risk seems to increase when humour is 
involved. The Yes Men tried on many occasions to make absurd statements 
without getting any response. Irony in particular can be a tricky technique since it 
based on saying one thing, but meaning something entirely different. Although 
other humorous techniques as well as rational communication sometimes result in 
confusion or bewilderment, ironic statements risk being mistaken for the real 
opinion. On some occasions when people in Ofog were experimenting with irony to 
confront militarism, their statements were understood literally as support for arms 
manufacturers and NATO. In such situations it is not unusual to blame the 
audiences for being stupid, but as Hutcheon has written, irony requires a discursive 
community which had not been created on these occasions and might be more 
difficult to establish than we think. Activists engaging in ironic communication must 
be careful not to create ironic distance and hierarchies between those who “get it” 
and those who do not.   
Humorous political stunts provide an opportunity for social movements to be 
creative in search of new ways to challenge dominant discourses. Many people 
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might find an outlet for their creativity and talents that otherwise has little value 
among fellow activists. However, this constant changing and shifting is demanding. 
If the stunts are not re-invented, they lose their energy, so a certain stunt can only 
be repeated a limited number of times in a certain context. In addition, humorous 
political stunts predominantly seem to be carried out by small tightly knit groups 
who spend a lot of time preparing their stunts. Some people might consider this a 
potential problem that results in elitism, since not everyone can afford to spend so 
much time on activism. Although it has not been a problem in my case studies, 
there is also a potential trap in humour becoming an end in itself. Because humour 
generates good feelings for the activists themselves they need to evaluate if 
humour is a self-indulgence that is no longer considered one potential method in a 
struggle, but creates an ironic distance to the subject.  
Using humour, and especially ridicule, can also be discussed from an ethical 
perspective. What is experienced as humour by the initiators and part of the 
audience might look entirely different to the butt of the ridicule. Gantar found an 
epistemological dead end regarding this question and concluded that it is 
impossible to judge humour from an ethical perspective. Nevertheless, political 
activists are likely to be judged from this perspective anyway and ought to take it 
into consideration when planning.  
I have suggested that if one insists on judging humorous political stunts along 
ethical lines, an important place to start is the position of those who use humour 
and ridicule. There ought to be a major difference between ridicule initiated by 
those in positions of power that kick down, and ridicule initiated by marginalised 
political activists kicking upwards.  
However, although this can be a good starting point for an ethical judgement, two 
examples from the case studies illustrate some of the dilemmas that will inevitably 
arise. Although Ofog and KMV wanted to challenge the discourse of militarism and 
those on top of the hierarchies, the individuals they encountered did not always 
feel very powerful. On one occasion a group of openly homosexual soldiers from 
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the Swedish armed forces participated in the Pride Parade in Stockholm. Next to 
them a group of Ofog activists walked with speech bubbles made out of cardboard 
with statements that was supposed to look as if they were the soldiers’ statements. 
Although the text was related to war, the death of civilians, and Sweden’s military 
presence in Afghanistan the individual soldiers experienced it as an attack on their 
sexuality since it took place during the parade.  
Likewise, the judge in the case where KMV turned up with a fake prosecutor was 
quoted in a newspaper for saying “I was shocked when I heard what had 
happened” and he made his superior file a report to the police.849 He did not 
explicitly say that he felt abused, but it is not unreasonable to assume that at least 
some people would have felt that way under similar circumstances. KMV was 
targeting the court system, not an individual, in order to expose the system as a 
farce. Nevertheless this judge, just as the soldiers in the Pride Parade, became the 
direct victim, raising the question of whether Ofog and KMV behaved unethically. In 
both cases it was people in subordinate positions who ridiculed those they saw as 
representatives of powerful institutions – the court system and the military. 
Nevertheless, those who initiate a stunt cannot dictate the emotional responses of 
others.  
Further research in the field 
As mentioned in the introduction, this study has generated more questions than 
answers, something which is often the case when researching an area where little 
or nothing was known previously. Much research about humour’s role in nonviolent 
resistance remains to be done. For starters, it would be interesting to see if the 
typology of humorous political stunts applies worldwide, namely whether it is 
possible to classify examples from other cultures according to the same five types 
that I have used here. And is the use of this type of humorous political activism 
really spreading globally and increasing in frequency as some authors have 
                                            
849
 Haugstad, "Her Blir Dommeren Lurt Av Falsk Aktor." 
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indicated? A related task is to continue the theoretical exploration of the borders of 
humorous political stunts. 
Equally interesting would be more research on the reactions to humorous political 
stunts. I have focused on the meaning humour has for the activists, but other 
studies could do more to uncover what others think about it. A whole range of 
thrilling questions remain unanswered: Is it really true that humorous political stunts 
are better at getting media attention, or is this assumption a reflection of a selection 
bias when one is forced to analyse stunts already described in the literature or 
known from mass media? What can be observed about a target’s reaction when 
they are confronted with a humorous political stunt, and what do they themselves 
think about it? Do they experience it as dialogue oriented, or does the ambiguity of 
humour distort the communication? How do other audiences, such as potential 
new activists and the general public, respond? Can the detour demanded by 
humour really find or create cracks and reach people at a deeper level? Does the 
ambiguity of humour make it easier to communicate complex messages, or does 
humour increase the risk of side-tracking so the focus ends up on the method and 
the spectacle rather than the message that the activists want to communicate?   
In order to investigate social movements’ humorous political stunts, it is a 
requirement that the groups’ histories are documented. For both my case studies it 
was necessary to document their activities in order to provide context for their use 
of humour. The world over, there are numerous small networks whose histories 
need to be written. 
The main data for this research was from two Scandinavian case studies, but a few 
of the other examples as well as earlier research has documented that humour can 
play an important role also under authoritarian circumstances, for instance in 
reducing fear. Researchers with access to this type of data can bring important 
insights to the study of nonviolent resistance that can also have practical 
implications.    
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Theoretically my research has relied primarily on the theory of nonviolent action. It 
has only touched the surface when it comes to perspectives from performance 
studies and social movement theories. There are whole bodies of literature with 
insights about street performance and emotions within social movements that 
might be interesting for future studies.850   
One finding from the study was that from the perspective of activists, the distinction 
between humour and other types of creative and spectacular activism appears 
rather artificial. Research on the effect of all kinds of creative activism could 
investigate differences between humorous activism and other types of creative 
activism. 
Finally there is the question of the choice of methodology for researching 
nonviolence and social movements. Researchers with access to money and 
research time have a tremendous responsibility to use such resources wisely. It is 
important to choose topics and questions that are not just interesting for the 
researcher herself and will benefit her career, but also make a difference for people 
struggling for peace and justice. Much inspiration can be drawn from participatory 
action research and intervention research for activists and academics aiming at 
bridging the gap between these two worlds. There is a huge potential for 
systematic comparative “experiments” about nonviolence in general and humorous 
political stunts in particular. One line of experiments would be to compare the 
consequences of using humorous and non-humorous methods about the same 
political issue. Another type of intervention/action research would be to work 
together with activists in order to make “bigger” humorous political stunts in terms 
of frequency and number of participants. My research has pointed out some of the 
potential with humorous political stunts, but it has documented only the tip of the 
iceberg of what is achievable through this type of action.   
                                            
850
 A starting point for such an inquiry could be to look at humorous political stunts from the 
perspective of Richard Schechner’s holistic view on play, performance, ritual and politics presented 
in: Richard Schechner, The Future of Ritual: Writings on Culture and Performance (London: 
Routledge, 1993).  
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